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Cognitive sciences have been involved under numerous accounts to explain how 
humans interact with technology, as well as to design technological instruments 
tailored to human needs. As technological advancements in fields like wearable 
and ubiquitous computing, virtual reality, robotics and artificial intelligence are 
presenting novel modalities for interacting with technology, there are opportunities 
for deepening, exploring, and even rethinking the theoretical foundations of human 
technology use.
This volume entitled “Cognition and Interaction: From Computers to Smart Objects 
and Autonomous Agents” is a collection of articles on the impacts that novel 
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interactive technologies are producing on individuals. It puts together 17 works, 
spanning from research on social cognition in human-robot interaction to studies 
on neural changes triggered by Internet use, that tackle relevant technological and 
theoretical issues in human-computer interaction, encouraging us to rethink how 
we conceptualize technology, its use and development. 
The volume addresses fundamental issues at different levels. The first part revolves 
around the biological impacts that technologies are producing on our bodies and 
brains. The second part focuses on the psychological level, exploring how our 
psychological characteristics may affect the way we use, understand and perceive 
technology, as well as how technology is changing our cognition. The third part 
addresses relevant theoretical problems, presenting reflections that aim to reframe 
how we conceptualize ourselves, technology and interaction itself. Finally, the last 
part of the volume pays attention to the factors involved in the design of technological 
artifacts, providing suggestions on how we can develop novel technologies closer 
to human needs.
Overall, it appears that human-computer interaction will have to face a variety 
of challenges to account for the rapid changes we are witnessing in the current 
technology landscape.
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Editorial on the Research Topic
Cognitive Aspects of Interactive Technology Use: From Computers to Smart Objects and
Autonomous Agents
The current advancements in many interactive technology fields, and the consequent spread
of digital and intelligent devices in the consumer market, give the opportunity of deepening,
exploring, and even rethinking the foundations of human technology use.
The increasing adoption of wearable and self-tracking technologies (Rapp et al., 2015), for
instance, is changing how people reflect on themselves (Rapp and Tirassa, 2017), think of their
past (Matassa et al., 2013; Elsden et al., 2016), perform physical activity and sport (Rapp and
Tirabeni, 2018), and manage their health (Schroeder et al., 2018), encouraging us to explore the
impacts of such technologies on mind and behavior. Likewise, people spend more and more time
in digital environments, like video games (Rapp, 2017), social media (Lu et al., 2018), and virtual
organizations (Reinecke et al., 2013), whereby these virtual and augmented realities are blurring
the boundaries between the digital and the material world, potentially affecting how we experience
and perceive what we call the reality. The miniaturization of sensors and the rise of the Internet of
Things (Atzori et al., 2010) are further making traditional human-computer interfaces disappear
(Console et al., 2013), at the same time modifying the affordances that are commonly associated
to everyday objects (Rapp and Cena, 2015). Lastly, the increasing ubiquity of different types of
interactive robots and autonomous agents, suggests that we investigate in-depth how we humanize
artificial entities (Warshaw et al., 2015), how we socially interact with them (Rapp, 2018), and how
we understand their behavior (Thellman et al., 2017).
These represent only a few examples of technological changes that are reconfiguring how we
interact with “tools,” which can inspire a renewed discussion on human-technology interaction.
This volume precisely explores how humans create, interact, account for, and are impacted
by emerging interactive technologies. It puts together 17 high-quality works, spanning from
research on social cognition in human-robot interaction to studies on neural changes triggered
by Internet use, also tackling relevant technological and theoretical issues that foster us to rethink
how we conceptualize technology, its use, and its development. In other words, this volume
addresses relevant issues at different levels, including biological, psychological, theoretical, and
technological/design levels.
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As for the biological level, Liu et al. investigate the neural
mechanisms underlying Internet search, discovering that it
impacts human brain functions: their study results suggest that
Internet search enhances the spatial information processing,
but also may alter the memory system, making individuals
less engaged in remembering information. Smyk et al. conduct
a study with 20 participants investigating how sensorimotor
oscillatory electroencephalogram (EEG) activity can be affected
by the perceived nature of a task partner, human or robot,
during a novel “reciprocal touch” paradigm. The results provide
evidence for differences in attentional and tactile processing
when interacting with human and robotic partners.
With reference to the psychological level, Hou et al. try to
understand individual differences in the use of social network
sites by surveying 714 Chinese students in order to assess
how personality traits relate to excessive use of WeChat and
Weibo. They find that neuroticism, loneliness, and external
locus of control have positive correlations with excessive use
of Weibo and WeChat, while agreeableness, social support, and
social interaction negatively correlate to their excessive use.
Further, they discover that the two social network sites fulfill
different needs and thus attract people with different personality
traits. Reichenberger et al. explore the potentiality of virtual
environments in conducting social fear conditioning related
experiments. They show that social fear can successfully be
induced and extinguished using virtual reality, providing insights
into learning and unlearning of social fear. Whereas, Kätsyri
explores the reasons underlying the sense of eeriness and lack
of familiarity that we may experience when we observe virtual
characters. Results of an experiment with 64 participants, asking
them to learn and recognize a set of virtual, and real faces, seem
to suggest that lesser perceptual expertise may contribute to the
lack of subjective familiarity with virtual faces.
Böffel and Müsseler investigate an important phenomenon
in human-avatar interaction: when spatial dissociation between
the user’s and the avatar’s orientations arises as a consequence of
the task handled, the user has to adopt the avatar’s perspective
and identify herself with it. A study is then set to identify the
conditions that benefit this change of perspective: the finding
is that perceived ownership, elicited by interaction instructions
leading to effector congruency between the participant’s hands
and the hands of the avatar, benefits perspective taking.
Morganti involves 61 participants in order to understand
if different embodied affordances could provide different
knowledge organization during wayfinding by using distinct
spatial simulations. The results show that different embodiments
afforded by different environments and the increasing complexity
in turn types result in different spatial outcomes.
As for the theoretical level, Osiurak et al. attempt to provide a
structured way of organizing the literature about the cognitive
processes involved in the different interactions we have with
tools by proposing a theoretical framework organized into three
levels. The first level describes how we interact when using
physical technologies which increase our sensorimotor abilities;
the second level pertains to sophisticated technologies, for which
we do not systematically understand the underlying working
principles; the third level tackles symbiotic technologies, which
link our brain directly to machines. In doing so, they highlight
the key role of technical and practical reasoning, which could be
undermined by the increasing use of sophisticated and symbiotic
tools. Likewise, Duus et al. use the extended mind theory
to explore how human-tech hybrids, represented by humans
interacting with mobile phones, smart watches, and wearable
activity trackers, gain and enact collective skills, how agency
is expressed and affects the interaction, and what the darker
sides are of being a human-tech hybrid. The proposed concept
of agency pendulum, which seen agency swinging between the
human and the device depending on the situation, reflects the
dynamism of agency in these hybrid entities. In his article, Baber
retraces the historical roots of the concept of affordance and
how it has been applied to interaction design. In reaffirming
its fundamental role for understanding “interactivity,” Baber
further develops the concept by extending it to the interaction
with “smart objects,” which sense how they are being used,
communicate with each other, and provide prompts to solicit
certain actions. Here, the human-object-environment system
pursues shared intentions and goals, and affordances become
both themeans by which actions are encouraged, and themanner
in which intentions are identified and agreed.
Honig and Oron-Gilad present a literature review of 52
studies that explore when people perceive and resolve robot
failures, how robots communicate failure, how failures influence
people’s perceptions and feelings toward robots, and how such
effects can be mitigated. On the basis of this review, they
develop a model of information processing for robotic failures
describing how individuals perceive, process, and act on failures
in human-robot interaction. Musetti and Corsano present an
interesting perspective for conceptualizing Internet not as a
tool, but as a social environment. As people are part of an
information society and can access whatever information they
lack whenever they want, no boundaries between their online
and offline lives can still be traced clearly. As a consequence
of this shift in theorizing, main models of Internet-related
pathologies, like Internet addiction, need to be rethought so
to avoid pathologizing normal behaviors. In the same vein,
Veissière and Stendel, Veissière and Stendel aim to recast current
understandings of the mechanisms involved in the addictive use
of smartphones in a broader evolutionary focus, suggesting that
it is the social expectations and rewards of connecting with
other people and seeking to learn from them that yield and
sustain addictive behaviors. They thus propose a hypernatural
monitoring model of smartphone addiction grounded in a
general social rehearsal theory of human cognition.
Finally, as for the technological/design level, Triberti et al. focus
on the role of emotions in designing interactive technologies,
highlighting that designers can not only rely on aesthetic and
engagement aspects of interaction, but also on emotions as
cognitive processes and active agents of interaction, in order
to create innovative and effective devices. van der Kuil et al.
evaluate the usability of a serious game addressed to aid patients
in the development of compensatory navigation strategies
after a brain injury. Results show that mouse controlled
interaction in 3D environments is more effective than keyboard
interaction, that patients prefer video-based instructions over
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text-based instructions, and that feedback timing has no effect
on performance and motivation. This may provide useful insight
for the design of serious games aiming to transfer skills from
virtual environments to real-life situations. Lovato and Piper
acknowledge the growing availability of voice interfaces, making
it possible for children to ask questions via Internet search even
before they have learned to read and write. Drawing on human-
computer interaction research, they thus review studies of how
children look for information, and of how they perceive and
understand the informational and social roles of technology. This
review leads to important considerations for the design of future
voice-based search interfaces. Lastly, Macedonia et al. emphasize
how guided embodiment is an essential feature in intelligent
tutoring systems for second language learning and aphasia
rehabilitation, as it increases efficiency in the learning process. To
enable the system of guiding the user through embodiment, the
authors suggest that the system tracks users’ gestures and provide
corrective feedback, so that sensor technologies are paramount.
The authors thus provide an overview of the sensor technologies
that can be used to this aim, ranging from camera-based systems
to sensing textiles.
These 17 articles give a snapshot of the current perspectives on
the foundations of human interaction with tools and technology,
proposing opportunities for debating emerging issues about the
design and the understanding of novel interactive devices. We
hope that readers will find the articles thought-provoking and
insightful, encouraging them to move the debate forward.
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Internet search changed the way we store and recall information and possibly altered
our brain functions. Previous studies suggested that Internet search facilitates the
information-acquisition process. However, this process may cause individuals to lose
the ability to store and recollect specific contents. Despite the numerous behavioral
studies conducted in this field, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying
Internet searches. The present study explores potential brain activity changes induced
by Internet search. The whole paradigm includes three phases, namely, pre-resting
state fMRI (rs-fMRI) scan, 6-day Internet search training, and post rs-fMRI scan. We
detected the functional integrations induced by Internet search training by comparing
post- with pre-scan. Regional homogeneity (ReHo) and functional connectivity (FC) were
used to detect intra- and interregional synchronized activity in 42 university students.
Compared with pre-scan, post-scan showed decreased ReHo in the temporal gyrus,
the middle frontal gyrus, and the postcentral gyrus. Further seed-based FC analysis
showed that the temporal gyrus exhibited decreased FC in the parahippocampal cortex
and the temporal gyrus after training. Based on the features of current task and functions
exhibited by these brain regions, results indicate that short-term Internet search training
changed the brain regional activities involved in memory retrieval. In general, this study
provides evidence that supports the idea that Internet search can affect our brain
functions.
Keywords: internet-search, short-term training, regional homogeneity, functional connectivity, long-termmemory
INTRODUCTION
Finding information through Internet search engines has become a common daily activity for
people (Small et al., 2009). The widespread use of the Internet changed the way we find and store
information. “Google effect” indicates that when people use the Internet as an external storage, they
need to remember “where” it is instead of the information itself (Sparrow et al., 2011; Ward, 2013).
These studies suggested that Internet search reduced the need for effort to process and remember
information (Carr, 2010).
Recent studies explored the influence of Internet search on the brain. Nicholas suggested that the
younger “Google generation” spends less time on individual questions and searches quicker, but the
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members of this generation show poorer working memory and
are less confident about the answers they provided compared
with the older generation (Nicholas, 2013). Small et al. (2009)
showed that prior experience of using Internet search increased
brain responsiveness in neural circuits involved in decision-
making and complex reasoning in aged adults after short-
term training. The brain activities of experienced Google
users were broader than that of novices during searches
(Small et al., 2009). A previous study found that people who
obtained information through Internet-based search memory
task would show lower accuracy when recalling information
and are highly impulsive in novel trials (Dong and Potenza,
2015). However, 6 days of practicing Internet search improved
their efficiency, but it reduced their dependency on their
long-term memory (Dong and Potenza, 2016; Dong et al.,
2017).
Brain and behavior are a dynamic system that influences
each other and form the basis of brain plasticity (Mechelli
et al., 2004). A large number of studies proved that learning
induced brain plasticity (Kolb and Whishaw, 2003; Vartanian
et al., 2013). In addition, various tasks generated differentiated
functional response patterns through modulation of training
(Koeneke et al., 2004; Kelly and Garavan, 2005; Erickson
et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2009). Previous studies revealed
that 3 months of juggling training could lead to a transient
bilateral expansion in gray matter in the mid-temporal area
and in the left posterior intraparietal sulcus (Draganski
et al., 2004). Five hours of meditation training can change
the activity of default mode network and connectivity of
the white matter (Brewer et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2015).
The neural circuitry of the frontal pole, anterior temporal
cortex, and anterior and posterior cingulate was activated in
Internet-savvy subjects after 5 days of practice (Small et al.,
2009).
Researchers recently realized that the effect of
training/expertise-specific on brain functions may extend
beyond task state to resting state. Resting state refers to the
state when subjects relax, stationary, eyes closed, and avoid
any systematic thinking (Mazoyer et al., 2001). Resting-state
fMRI was also used to study intrinsic functional connectivity
(FC) and has been widely used as a tool to assess large-scale
networks in the human brain in both clinical and healthy
populations (Wink et al., 2006; Tian et al., 2007; Buckner et al.,
2013).
Regional homogeneity (ReHo) and FC are often used
to evaluate brain activity synchronization in resting-state of
healthy subjects and patients. ReHo is a rank-based non-
parametric data-driven approach that reflects the temporal
homogeneity of the regional BOLD signal (Sepulcre et al.,
2010). ReHo measures the functional coherence of a given voxel
with its nearest neighbors by calculating Kendall’s coefficient
concordance (KCC) (Zang et al., 2004; Zuo et al., 2012). The
test–retest reliability of ReHo has been found very high despite
the physiological noise and preprocessing effect (Zuo et al.,
2012; Zuo and Xing, 2014). FC measures the similarity of
the time series of two relatively remote brain regions (Biswal
et al., 1995). These two measures are often used together to
detect local and remote brain activity synchronizations. Hence,
combining the ReHo and FC analysis could provide additional
information about brain activity synchronization induced by
Internet search.
Numerous studies revealed that short-term training could
alter the resting-state features of our brain. An existing study
found resting-state coherence in the right medial motor cortex
was increased by brief sensory motor intervention (Verrel et al.,
2015). A study on acupuncturists found that training/expertise
could modulate resting-state activity by increasing regional
clustering strength (Dong et al., 2014). In a short-term simulated
microgravity study, 72 h of  6 head down tilt (HDT)
resulted in decreased ReHo in the right inferior frontal gyrus
(Liao et al., 2013). Modulation of resting-state functional
connectivity (rs-FC) in the parietal circuit was found after
4 weeks of daily training of an explicit sequence learning
task (Ma et al., 2011). A study found that 4 weeks of
working memory training increased rs-FC between the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the precuneus, but decreased rs-
FC between the mPFC and the right posterior parietal cortex
(Takeuchi et al., 2013). These studies suggest that the resting-
state features of the brain could be altered by short-term
training.
Given these findings, we speculated that the brain activity
in resting-state would be affected by search engines usage. In
the present study, we first explore abnormal brain activity using
ReHo analysis and investigate the FC between regions with
altered ReHo and other brain regions. Previous studies found
that people using Internet search as a tool for remembering
new information showed lower brain activations in the middle
temporal gyrus (Dong and Potenza, 2015) and regions along
the ventral stream (Knutson et al., 2012). In addition, people
using Internet search tools just need to remember where
the information is stored instead of the information itself
(Sparrow et al., 2011). Hence, we hypothesized that short-
term training would make people to be better at remembering
where information is stored (higher brain activities in regions
along the dorsal stream) than the specific content (lower brain
activities in regions along the ventral stream). We compared
data on resting brain states between pre- and post-scan from
42 college student volunteers to examine the changes of
brain activity induced by Internet search by measuring ReHo
and FC.
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Participants
The experiment complied with the Code of Ethics of the World
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). The Human
Investigations Committee of Zhejiang Normal University
approved this study. This study was conducted in accordance
with the approved guidelines. Forty-two university students were
recruited through advertisements (22 males; 20 females; age:
21.4  1.2 years). All participants provided written informed
consent and underwent structured psychiatric interviews
using the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview
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(MINI) (Lecrubier et al., 1997) performed by an experienced
psychiatrist. According to the MINI assessment, they were free
of psychiatric disorders, including major depression, anxiety
disorders, schizophrenia, and substance dependence disorders.
All participants were medication-free and were instructed
not to use any substances, including coffee, on the day of
scanning. To obtain information regarding their Internet search
behaviors, all subjects were assessed using an Internet-search-use
questionnaire (Supplementary Material) (Dong and Potenza,
2015; Wang et al., 2016). Results showed that all participants
were familiar with Internet search and used it regularly. We
included Internet search experience as a covariate to exclude the
impact on experimental results (Wang et al., 2016).
Experiment Procedure
The whole experiment consists of three steps, namely, pre-scan,
6 days of training, and post-scan.
Subjects were “trained” for at least 1 h per day for six
consecutive days. In the experiment, subjects were asked to finish
one of six search tasks randomly without repetition. Each search
task consisted of 80 fill-in-the-blank items that required subjects
to seek answers using an Internet search engine. Participants were
informed that they will receive 20 Chinese yuan for their everyday
participation. To elicit motivation in searching, the subjects were
advised that the daily reward would be paid based on their real
performance [20  accuracy rates (%)]. This reward premise was
approved by the ethics committee. Participants who took the
work seriously and finished with an accuracy rate of over 80%
passed the training.
Image Acquisition
Functional MRI was performed on a 3.0 Tesla Siemens Trio
scanner. The functional scan was acquired using gradient echo
planar imaging sequence with the following parameters: [repeat
time (TR) = 2 s, echo time (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle = 90;
interleaved sequence; 33 slice per volume; 3 mm thickness; field
of view (FOV) = 220 mm  220 mm2, matrix 64 cm  64 cm,
acquisition matrix = 64  64]. Each functional run included
210 imaging volumes for each participant and the scan lasted
7 min. All subjects were instructed to rest quietly in the scanner
without falling asleep. Post-scan conforms to the same standard
and parameter.
Data Pre-processing
Data pre-processing was conducted using Data Processing
Assistant for Resting-State fMRI (DPARSFA1), a MATLAB
toolbox for “pipeline” data analysis of resting-state fMRI
(Yan and Zang, 2010; Song et al., 2011). DPARSFA is based
on some functions in Statistical Parametric Mapping2 and
Resting-State (REST3). The main preprocessing steps and
parameters are listed as follows. The first 10 volumes of
each functional time series were abandoned to avoid the
instability of the initial fMRI signal, thereby leaving 200 volumes.
1www.restfmri.net
2http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
3http://www.restfmri.net/forum/
Preprocessing included slice timing, head motion correction,
and spatial normalization to a standard template. Participants
with maximum translation that exceeds 2.5 mm or maximum
rotation that exceeds 2.5 were excluded from further analysis.
To reduce the effects of confounding factors, a regression of
nuisance signals including cerebral spinal fluid, white matter, six
motion vectors was performed. Following regression, detrending
was performed and temporal filtering (0.01 to 0.08 Hz) was
applied to the time series of each voxel to reduce low-frequency
drift and high-frequency noise. Data for one subject were
excluded according to the head-motion parameter (2.5 mm;
2.5).
ReHo Analysis
Resting-state fMRI data without spatial smoothing were used
for ReHo analysis with DPARSFA. Individual ReHo maps were
generated by calculating the KCC of the time series of a given
voxel with its nearest neighbors (26 voxels) in all directions on
a voxel-wise basis. The calculated formula of ReHo is defined as
follows:
W D
∑
.Ri/2   n. NR/2
1
12 K
2 .n3   n/ ;
where W is the KCC for a given voxel that ranged from 0 to 1. Ri
is sum rank of the ith time point and n is the number of ranks;
NR = [(nCC1) K]/2 is the mean of the Ri; K is the voxel number
among time series (27 voxels, one given voxel plus the number
of its neighbors). To reduce the influence of individual variations
in the KCC value, each standardized ReHo map was generated
by dividing the raw ReHo map by the global mean ReHo. Spatial
smoothing was conducted on the ReHo maps with a Gaussian
kernel of 4 mm  4 mm  4mm full-width at half-maximum
(Liao et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015).
FC Analysis
A seed-based correlation approach was used for FC analysis.
The seed was defined in the regions’ existing difference and
analyzed by ReHo. We calculated the temporal correlation
between these seed regions and every other voxel within
the brain. These procedures were executed using DPARSFA
software.
Post–Pre Analysis
To explore the differences between the pre- and post-training, a
pair-sample t-test was performed on the normalized ReHo and
FC maps with REST software. The result and statistical map were
set at a combined threshold of p< 0.05 (AlphaSim corrected) and
a minimum cluster size of 110 voxels.
RESULTS
Regional Homogeneity (ReHo)
Compared with the pre-scan data, the neuroimaging
data from post-scan were associated with the decreased
ReHo values in the temporal gyrus, which include the
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TABLE 1 | Brain areas showing Regional homogeneity (ReHo) difference between
post- and pre-training.
Areas Hemisphere Voxels Peak Coordinates
t-value
Decreased ReHo after training
Superior temporal gyrus R 147  5.3319 54–24 6
Middle temporal gyrus L 157  4.7822  48–72 18
Middle frontal gyrus L 345  4.7366  33–6 63
Postcentral gyrus L 211  4.4208  60–12 0
Voxel size = 3  mm3 mm  3 mm, p < 0.05 AlphaSim corrected and at least 110
voxels. L, left; R, right; t: t-values from a paired two tailed t-test of the statistical
different clusters.
superior temporal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus,
the middle frontal gyrus and the postcentral gyrus. Table 1
shows the detailed information for the brain regions with
ReHo difference after training. Figure 1 shows the brain
areas.
Seed-Based FC of Altered ReHo Regions
Based on the ReHo results, the temporal gyrus and the
middle frontal gyrus were selected as seed regions of interest
for FC analysis. The temporal gyrus exhibited decreased
FC with the parahippocampal cortex and the temporal
gyrus after training whereas the temporal gyrus showed
increased FC with the parietal gyrus. The middle frontal
gyrus exhibited decreased FC with the middle temporal gyrus
and the middle frontal gyrus after training (Table 2 and
Figure 2).
DISCUSSION
This study finds decreased ReHo in the temporal gyrus,
the middle frontal gyrus and the postcentral after training.
The temporal gyrus exhibited decreased FC with the
parahippocampal cortex and the temporal gyrus after
training, whereas the temporal gyrus showed increased FC
with the parietal gyrus. The middle frontal gyrus exhibited
decreased FC with the middle temporal gyrus and the
middle frontal gyrus after training. This evidence of local
functional homogeneity and interregional FC contributes to
our understanding of the changed brain activity produced by
Internet search.
The middle temporal gyrus located at the end of the
ventral stream, which was described as the “what” stream, is
involved in object identification and recognition (Mishkin and
FIGURE 1 | Brain areas with increased and decreased ReHo in post-scan compared with pre-scan. Pair-sample t-test p < 0.05, AlphaSim corrected, voxel
size = 3  3  3; T-score bars are shown on the right bottom. The voxels with hot colors represent increased ReHo after training, and cold colors indicate
decreased ReHo after training.
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Ungerleider, 1982; Goodale and Milner, 1992). The Decreased
ReHo and FC in the temporal gyrus supports our hypothesis
that short-term training decreases brain activities in regions
along the ventral stream. The parahippocampal cortex is a
part of the limbic system, which plays an important role in
memory encoding and retrieval (Ekstrom and Bookheimer,
2007). Evidence from patient studies suggested that the middle
temporal gyrus is associated with long-term memory (Squire
and Zolamorgan, 1991; Meulemans and Van der Linden, 2003).
Functional neuroimaging study also found that the middle
temporal gyrus is activated when individuals participate in
memory encoding and retrieval processes of memory (Onoda
et al., 2009). Previous studies found that Internet search decreases
brain activation in the temporal gyrus (Dong and Potenza, 2016).
Decreased ReHo and FC in the temporal gyrus might suggest
that Internet search causes people to rely less on their long-term
memory.
Results showed that short-term training increased FC between
the temporal gyrus and the parietal lobe. The posterior parietal
cortex is referred to as the dorsal stream or “where” stream,
which is involved in visuospatial processing (Mishkin and
Ungerleider, 1982). Therefore, increased FC might suggest that
Internet search enhances the spatial information processing
(Dong et al., 2017). The result is consistent with our hypothesis.
The middle frontal gyrus plays an important role in selective
attention, executive control, and working memory (Fuster, 2002).
TABLE 2 | Pre–post differences in seed-based FC in altered ReHo regions.
Areas Hemisphere Voxels Peak Coordinates
t-value
Post-training – pre-training
FC of R Temporal gyrus
Parietal gyrus R 110 3.2562 36–57 45
Temporal gyrus R 406  4.2347 39 6–21
Parahippocampal cortex R 446  3.8151 24–45 0
Superior frontal gyrus R 548  4.9860 9–18 78
FC of L Middle frontal gyrus
Superior temporal gyrus L 374  4.0656  33 9–18
Middle temporal gyrus R 417  3.8514 42–57 60
Middle frontal gyrus R 147  3.4775 45 6 51
Voxel size = 3 mm  3 mm  3 mm, p < 0.05 AlphaSim corrected and at least
110 voxels. L, left; R, right; FC, functional connectivity; t: t-values from a paired two
tailed t-test of the statistical different clusters.
Decreased ReHo and FC in the middle frontal gyrus may
suggest that individuals engage less in remembering something
when faced with information that can be found in the Internet.
According to Sparrow, people who used Internet search engines
to access information show worse recall rates of information
(Sparrow et al., 2011). Our results indicated that short-term
Internet search training could alter the memory system, which
further provided evidence for the hypothesis that Internet search
FIGURE 2 | Brain areas with increased and decreased FC in post-scan compared with pre-scan. (A) The voxels with hot colors represent increased FC between the
temporal gyrus and the parietal lobe after training, and cold colors indicate that the temporal gyrus shows decreased FC with the parahippocampal cortex and the
temporal gyrus after training. (B) The middle frontal gyrus exhibited decreased FC with the middle temporal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus after training.
Pair-sample t-test p < 0.05, AlphaSim corrected; FC, functional connectivity.
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enables people to be better at remembering where information is
stored than the specific content.
As the Internet evolved into a useful tool in our daily life,
people become susceptible to the unprecedented Internet search
environment (Zickuhr and Madden, 2012; Loh and Kanai, 2016).
Some researchers found that many people are increasingly relying
on Internet search (Zickuhr and Madden, 2012; Yang et al., 2014;
Wang Y. et al., 2017). People show irritability and depression
when they cannot immediately find what they want (Block,
2008). These symptoms are similar with withdrawal symptoms of
pathological Internet use (Davis, 2001). The executive function
of Internet addiction subjects is impaired, whereas the inhibition
control of Internet-using behaviors of those people is weakened
(Wang L. et al., 2017). Our study found that the brain activities
of Internet search users behaved differently. These people might
engage in less effort in remembering something after short-term
training.
CONCLUSION
This study found that the aberrant ReHo and FC were mainly
distributed in the temporal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus,
which are responsible for long-term memory. Results provide
evidence that support the idea that Internet search can affect our
brain functions.
Limitations
Several limitations should be addressed. First, given financial
and time constraints, we canceled the control group and pre–
post resting-state data were not collected from the control
group. We paid more attention to pre–post difference in one
group of subjects. Second, we found it impossible to recruit
university students that have no experience in Internet search.
Thus, all subjects were familiar with Internet search. This sample
group might affect training effect. Given the limitation of rs-
fMRI studies, the explanations of the results rely on the brain
functions of relevant brain regions, which lack direct support
from behavioral or task data. Thus, the explanations are based
on reasoning and the interpretation of the results is uncertain.
However, the findings provide evidence that Internet search can
affect our brain functions.
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Sensorimotor Oscillations During a
Reciprocal Touch Paradigm With a
Human or Robot Partner
Nathan J. Smyk* , Staci Meredith Weiss and Peter J. Marshall
Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States
Robots provide an opportunity to extend research on the cognitive, perceptual, and
neural processes involved in social interaction. This study examined how sensorimotor
oscillatory electroencephalogram (EEG) activity can be influenced by the perceived
nature of a task partner – human or robot – during a novel “reciprocal touch” paradigm.
Twenty adult participants viewed a demonstration of a robot that could “feel” tactile
stimulation through a haptic sensor on its hand and “see” changes in light through
a photoreceptor at the level of the eyes; the robot responded to touch or changes
in light by moving a contralateral digit. During EEG collection, participants engaged
in a joint task that involved sending tactile stimulation to a partner (robot or human)
and receiving tactile stimulation back. Tactile stimulation sent by the participant was
initiated by a button press and was delivered 1500 ms later via an inflatable membrane
on the hand of the human or on the haptic sensor of the robot partner. Stimulation to
the participant’s finger (from the partner) was sent on a fixed schedule, regardless of
partner type. We analyzed activity of the sensorimotor mu rhythm during anticipation
of tactile stimulation to the right hand, comparing mu activity at central electrode sites
when participants believed that tactile stimulation was initiated by a robot or a human,
and to trials in which “nobody” received stimulation. There was a significant difference
in contralateral mu rhythm activity between anticipating stimulation from a human
partner and the “nobody” condition. This effect was less pronounced for anticipation
of stimulation from the robot partner. Analyses also examined beta rhythm responses
to the execution of the button press, comparing oscillatory activity when participants
sent tactile stimulation to the robot or the human partner. The extent of beta rebound at
frontocentral electrode sites following the button press differed between conditions, with
a significantly larger increase in beta power when participants sent tactile stimulation
to a robot partner compared to the human partner. This increase in beta power may
reflect greater predictably in event outcomes. This new paradigm and the novel findings
advance the neuroscientific study of human–robot interaction.
Keywords: human–robot interaction, mu desynchronization, beta synchronization, social robotics, tactile
perception
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INTRODUCTION
As automation and technology become more ubiquitous in
society, it is increasingly commonplace for interactions that
have typically occurred between humans to also occur between
humans and robots. Social-cognitive neuroscience offers a
novel window into these interactions. Robots are traditionally
constructed as highly complex tools, a design approach that
persists in the present discourse on robotics and society
(Šabanovic´, 2010). Increasingly, robots are designed as social
agents, capable of interacting with humans in varied natural
settings (Fong et al., 2003). Social and interactive robots have
been developed for healthcare applications (Wada and Shibata,
2007; Broadbent et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2014; Mann et al.,
2015), educational settings (Tanaka et al., 2007; Toh et al., 2016),
and mental health treatments (Begum et al., 2016). Social robots
designed for these domains are often embodied, with varying
degrees of human likeness; there is evidence that embodied
social agents are more judged more favorably than disembodied
social agents (Lee et al., 2006), especially within the context
of social touch (Cramer et al., 2009a,b). Disembodied robots
may either be simulated via a computer program or presented
remotely through a screen. In either case, people empathize more
with robots when they are physically embodied and present,
compared with agents that are disembodied (Kwak et al., 2013).
Given the embodied nature of social robots, it is likely that our
interactions with such machines will increasingly involve tactile
experiences (Huisman et al., 2013).
Humans use touch to communicate a wide range of social and
emotional information (Knapp et al., 2013), and there is a good
deal of current interest in this channel of communication in the
context of human–robot interaction (HRI) (Gallace and Spence,
2010; Van Erp and Toet, 2015). We suggest that methods from
social cognitive neuroscience can be applied to questions within
the field of HRI, informing the design of robot entities to make
human engagement with technology more fluid. Additionally,
robots provide an opportunity to study human social behavior
in various ways (Broadbent, 2017). There are many factors
affecting how we perceive robots, from physical organization and
appearance, to more subtle influences based on function and
perceived intent. Functional affordances of a robot are the actions
it is able to do, be it physical actions, gestures, or utterances
(Awaad et al., 2015). In a study examining responses to multiple
kinds of social robots, participants were more likely to report
stronger engagement with a robot and intention to use it if
it had sufficient affordances to complete a physical task, while
physical appearance was rated as less important for engagement
(Paauwe et al., 2015). Humanoid social robots with the ability to
communicate through arm and hand gestures are rated as more
anthropomorphic and likeable than physically identical robots
without these capabilities (Salem et al., 2013).
Behavioral research within HRI has uncovered multiple
factors and contexts that influence the ways in which people
interact with and perceive robotic agents, specifically in the
context of touch. Participants in a collaborative virtual reality
environment rated a virtual agent capable of social touch through
vibrotactile feedback more positively on affective adjectives than
they did a non-touching agent (Huisman et al., 2014). Touch to
(and from) a robot was shown to encourage participants’ effort on
a simple motor task (Shiomi et al., 2017). More specifically, active
touch from a robot has been shown to be a stronger motivator
than passive touch (Nakagawa et al., 2011). When interacting
with robotic hands, participants report increased feelings of trust
and friendship when the hands are warm, compared to cold robot
hands or holding no hand at all (Nie et al., 2012); a similar
study with a robotic social dinosaur found people liked warmer
versions compared to tepid or cold conditions (Park and Lee,
2014).
One goal of research in HRI is to quantify whether robotic
partners are sufficient analogs for human contact across different
domains; perhaps unsurprisingly, there are contexts in which
people prefer the contact of humans. In a study conducted
in a nursing home, patients were comfortable with a robot
touching their arm when they believed the robots intention was
to clean them, but responded less positively when they believed
the robot intended to provide them comfort through touch
(Chen et al., 2014). A robot completing menial physical tasks
fits well within our conception of what robots ought to do,
but people tend to have reservations when imagining robots in
social roles (Fong et al., 2003). In individuals with preexisting
negative feelings toward robots, physical contact was shown to
increase those negative attitudes (Wang and Quadflieg, 2015;
Wullenkord et al., 2016); the inverse was true for those with
positive attitudes. While a massage is both a functional and social
task, participants receiving a head massage from a robot rated it
worse than an equivalent massage delivered by a human (Walker
and Bartneck, 2013). There is evidence that people may feel
arousal or embarrassment when asked to touch the intimate parts
of a robot (Li et al., 2016), and that humans also feel they are able
to convey comforting and affectionate emotional states to a haptic
machine through the action of touch (Yohanan and MacLean,
2012). These examples serve to highlight the complex nature of
touch between humans and robots, and the many ways it differs
across context and application.
Beyond the preceding review, little research exists on how
humans respond to tactile interactions with robots, and even less
work has considered the neural processes associated with these
interactions. There is a robust literature within social cognitive
neuroscience on the neural underpinnings of social touch, and it
is the goal of the present study to combine those approaches with
the goals and methods of HRI. Our interest lies in how examining
neural activity related to touch can inform the psychological
differences in interactions with robots rather than humans.
To probe this question, we investigated whether oscillatory
neural activity in anticipation of receiving tactile stimulation
is influenced by participants’ beliefs about whether the tactile
stimulation was initiated by either a human or a robot agent.
We were also interested in whether sensorimotor brain potentials
associated with triggering tactile stimulation to another entity
differ when the entity is a human or a robot. To examine these
questions we employed a novel “reciprocal touch” paradigm and
utilized measures derived from the electroencephalogram (EEG),
specifically the sensorimotor mu and beta rhythms. Within the
domain of social cognitive neuroscience, these rhythms have
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often been studied in the context of the connections between
the actions of the self and the actions of others, including tactile
aspects of these linkages (Marshall and Meltzoff, 2015; Shen et al.,
2017). Combining this line of work with behavioral insights from
HRI research can help to forge new directions in the study of
human responses to interacting with machines.
Changes in EEG brain rhythms have proven useful as
reliable indicators of attentional orienting to touch, predicting
perception of a subsequent weak tactile stimulus when that
stimulus can reliably be expected (Zhang and Ding, 2010).
Recent work in this area has focused interest on alpha-
range rhythms, particularly in relation to anticipatory attention.
Anticipatory desynchronization of alpha oscillations appears to
be an index of local sensory cortex excitability, with heightened
desynchronization associated with the perceptual salience of
upcoming stimuli (Zhang and Ding, 2010; Foxe and Snyder,
2011). While this phenomenon has been studied in various
sensory modalities, the focus here is on the sensorimotor mu
rhythm in the EEG in relation to touch. The mu rhythm is
an alpha-range oscillation that occurs at 8–13 Hz in adults
and is typically observed over central electrode sites. During
anticipation of impending tactile stimulation of the hand, there
is a reduction of mu rhythm amplitude over contralateral
somatosensory cortex (Anderson and Ding, 2011; Haegens et al.,
2012; Shen et al., 2017). This desynchronization of the mu rhythm
appears to reflect an increase in local field potentials of neurons
in somatosensory cortex (Gomez-Ramirez et al., 2016). Shen et al.
(2017) observed mu desynchronization in anticipation of tactile
stimulation to one’s own hand, which was not present when
a partner or “nobody” received tactile stimulation. However, it
is unknown whether the perceived origin of tactile stimulation
delivered to the self (e.g., tactile stimulation initiated by a
human vs. a machine) influences the amplitude of mu rhythm
modulation during anticipation of touch.
While much research on the mu rhythm has concerned
anticipatory attention, the EEG beta rhythm (14–30 Hz) has
mainly been examined in the context of action production
(Puzzo et al., 2011). Beta rhythm responses are modulated
by motor movement and imagery (McFarland et al., 2000),
and appear to reflect various spatial and temporal attentional
mechanisms (van Ede et al., 2011). The beta response to the
initiation of movement of the hands has been localized to
the contralateral sensorimotor cortex, and takes the form of
an event-related desynchronization (ERD) (Miller et al., 2007)
followed by an event-related synchronization (ERS) that appears
to reflect activity around the precentral gyrus (MI) (Gaetz
and Cheyne, 2006). The increase in beta amplitude (i.e., beta
rebound) following motor movement initiation is believed to
reflect decreased cortical excitability and reduced processing
of afferent sensory information involved in motor feedback
(Pfurtscheller, 2001), and is also related to greater predictability of
events and maintenance of the sensorimotor set (Engel and Fries,
2010). Alpha and beta oscillatory responses have also been widely
used in the development and implementation of brain-computer
interfaces (Yuan and He, 2014), with particular interest in the
beta rhythm due to the range of human behaviors that engender
this rhythm; the beta rhythm is responsive to both overt and
imagined motor movement, and can be used to control machines
(Neuper et al., 2009).
The present study introduces a novel paradigm in which
participants carried out a joint tactile task with a robot or
a human partner. The study aimed to answer the following
questions: (1) Are different anticipatory neural responses seen to
impending tactile stimulation to the self if it is believed that this
stimulation is initiated by a human versus a robot partner?; (2)
Is the sensorimotor EEG response to initiating tactile stimulation
different when the target of the stimulation is a human or robot
partner? In order to address these questions, we collected EEG
from adult participants while they engaged in a turn-taking task
with a robot or human partner. The overarching aim of the study
was to contribute to the development of new HRI protocols in
which human brain activity is monitored during interaction with
robotic agents in a controlled setting.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty undergraduates (18 females; mean age = 19.70 years;
SD = 2.34) received course credit in return for participation.
This study was carried out with approval from the Institutional
Review Board at Temple University, with informed consent
being obtained from each participant. All participants were
right handed according to the Oldfield handedness questionnaire
(Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected vision, and reported no
history of neurological illness or abnormality.
Stimuli and Materials
Tactile Stimulation
Tactile stimuli were delivered using an inflatable membrane
(10 mm diameter) mounted in a plastic casing and attached to
the finger by a flexible plastic clip. The membrane was attached
to the right index finger of the participants and their human
partner; the membrane was attached to the haptic sensor of the
robotic task partner (see below). The membrane was inflated by a
short burst of compressed air delivered via flexible polyurethane
tubing (3 m length, 3.2 mm outer diameter). The compressed air
delivery was controlled by STIM stimulus presentation software
in combination with a pneumatic stimulator unit (both from
James Long Company) and an adjustable regulator that restricted
the airflow to 60 psi. The pneumatic stimulator and regulator
were located in an adjacent room to the participant. To generate
each tactile stimulus, the STIM software delivered a TTL trigger
(10 ms duration) that served to open and close a solenoid in the
pneumatic stimulator. Expansion of the membrane started 15 ms
after trigger onset and peaked 20 ms later (i.e., 35 ms after trigger
onset). The total duration of membrane movement was around
100 ms. This stimulation method has been used previously in a
number of EEG and MEG studies (Pihko and Lauronen, 2004;
Saby et al., 2015; Shen et al., 2018).
Task Partner
Prior to participating in the experimental procedure, participants
were shown a demonstration of the robot that they would be
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup during the robot condition. Participants
responded to visual stimuli presented on the monitor. The robot used for this
study is on the right side of the barrier. The embedded image in the top right
shows how the stimulation device is attached to the index finger of the
participant. Written informed consent was obtained from the individual on the
left for publication of this image.
interacting with. The robot was implemented via an Arduino
UNO board. The robot was comprised of left and right “hands,”
a torso, and a head (see Figure 1). The left hand contained
a single haptic sensor; the right hand had a single point of
articulation at the position of the index finger, which was movable
via a servo embedded within the hand. The index finger was
programmed to move downward to touch the surface in front
of it in response to either a flash of light, or a touch to the left
hand during the demonstration. Two red LEDs served as the
“eyes,” while a small photoreceptor was placed between these
LEDs. Participants were asked to shine a light from a cellphone
over the photoreceptor of the robot, which triggered movement
of the right index finger. Participants were shown a small LED
light and were told that during the study, the robot would know
when it was its turn to press the button based on this LED flashing
toward its photoreceptor. All participants were given the same
introduction to the robot, and told they would be carrying out a
joint task involving reciprocal tactile stimulation.
Following the demonstration of the robot, participants were
all given the same introduction to their human task partners, and
told they would be carrying out the same joint task as with the
robot. Participants were shown that the human partner would see
the same visual cues as them, wear the same inflatable membrane,
and press an identical button to initiate tactile stimulation.
Design, Task, and Procedure
Procedure
Participants were seated 60 cm from a flat panel monitor (40 cm
viewable), on which visual cues relating to the onset of tactile
stimulation were presented. Participants held a small box in their
left hand on which a single response button was mounted. Seated
across from the participant was either a human partner or the
robot, depending on condition and order. During each block,
the participant was aware whether their partner was a human or
the robot, but could not see them (Figure 1): Participants were
separated from their task partner by a divider, in order to control
for visual influences during data collection. To mask any subtle
sounds associated with delivery of the tactile stimuli, participants
wore earplugs during EEG collection, and ambient white noise
was broadcast in the testing room.
Task Conditions
Participants engaged in three blocks of trials with a human
partner and three blocks of trials with a robot partner. All blocks
within a condition (human/robot partner) occurred together,
and the order of presentation (human first/robot first) was
counterbalanced between participants. Prior to beginning the
protocol, a practice trial was conducted by an experimenter, who
demonstrated each of the three trial types shown in Figure 2:
(1) Nobody trials: during these trials, an initial fixation point
was replaced with a black diamond, which then turned green
indicating that a tactile event was being sent to “nobody.” Neither
the participant nor the partner were required to press a button,
and an air pulse was sent to an inflatable membrane (not attached
to anyone or anything) in the testing room; (2) Self trials:
during these trials, the fixation point was replaced by a black
arrow facing downward, indicating that the participant could
expect tactile stimulation to delivered to his or her right hand
following a button press by the partner. Participants were told
that the arrow turns green when their partner presses the button.
Importantly, the partner (human or robot) was not actually
triggering stimulation; the arrow turned green at a fixed interval
of 400 ms following the black arrow across both conditions.
1500 ms after the arrow turned green, tactile stimulation was
delivered to the participant’s finger. The trial timing was held
constant across conditions, in order to keep the human/robot
conditions as similar as possible aside from the type of partner;
(3) Other trials: During these trials, a black arrow facing upward
replaced the fixation, indicating that the participant could now
press the button with his or her left hand, which then triggered
the arrow to turn green and initiated the tactile pulse to be
delivered to the partner’s hand 1500 ms later (See Figure 2).
Each of these three trial types was presented 80 times
within each condition (human/robot), resulting in six different
conditions and a total of 480 trials; since the nobody conditions
did not differ in any way between partner types, these were
collapsed into a single condition, resulting in five conditions for
analyses: nobody: tactile stimulation is triggered and felt by no
one; self-human: tactile stimulation is sent from a human partner
to the participant; self-robot: tactile stimulation is sent from a
robot partner to the participant; other-human: tactile stimulation
is sent from the participant to a human partner; other-robot:
tactile stimulation is sent from the participant to a robot partner.
Trials within the nobody and self conditions were 4900 ms in
length, while trials in the other conditions varied in duration
due to variation in reaction time for the button press. The mean
reaction time for the button press was 280 ms, resulting in an
average trial length of 4780 ms for this condition. Data collection
lasted approximately 45 min, including breaks between each
block. Nobody trials were randomly presented during the blocks,
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FIGURE 2 | Each trial began with a fixation point, followed by one of three possible trials: other, in which subjects pressed a button and their partner received tactile
stimulation; nobody, in which no one pressed a button or received stimulation; self, in which participants were told their partner was pressing a button, triggering
tactile stimulation to the participant’s right index finger. All trials were presented equally frequently across human and robot conditions.
while self and other trials were always presented in a self-other-
self or other-self-other fashion, as a way to keep the reciprocal
nature of the task salient. The presentation of these three trial
units was randomized across all blocks.
Following EEG collection, a brief questionnaire was given as
a manipulation check, consisting of 13 questions about their
performance with the robot partner, rated on a Likert scale from
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Overall, participants
believed that their human partner chose when to push the button
(M = 4.85, SD = 0.95), while participants were less likely to agree
that the robot partner chose when to push the button (M = 3.00,
SD = 1.3).
Joint Task
Participants were given instructions for completing the tactile
attention task in cooperation with their partners during each
of the six blocks. Within each block, there were trials during
which the participant received two tactile pulses rather than
one. Participants were instructed to count the number of
these double pulses within each block. Before beginning the
experiment, each participant received practice in distinguishing
the double pulses from the regular single pulses. For each
block, a predetermined number of double pulses was sent to
the partner, and between 3 to 12 pulses were sent to the
participant. After each block, an experimenter entered the
room and asked the participant how many double pulses he
or she had felt, and then either asked the human partner or
checked a small LCD screen on the robot. The respective totals
were summed and compared to a total that was unknown
to the participant, but was known to the experimenter. The
researcher would report the correct total, and as appropriate,
would state the number of missed double pulses. Trials with
double pulses were excluded from EEG analyses. Participants’
mean performance on the attentional task of detecting double
pulses was 92%; performance did not differ between condition
or order.
Data Acquisition
The EEG signal was acquired from 32 electrodes secured in
a Lycra stretch cap (ANT Neuro, Germany) according to the
International 10–20 format. Each electrode casing was filled with
a small amount of conductive gel. Preparation of the EEG cap
took place after participants had been given the demonstration
of the robot, before the practice trials. The EEG signals were
collected referenced to Cz with an AFz ground, and were re-
referenced offline to the average of the left and right mastoids.
Eye blinks were monitored via EOG electrodes placed above and
below the left eye. Scalp impedance at each electrode site was
kept under 25 k. All EEG and EOG signals were amplified by
optically isolated, high input impedance (>1 G) bio amplifiers
from SA Instrumentation (San Diego, CA, United States) and
were digitized using a 16-bit A/D converter (C/  2.5 V
input range) at a sampling rate of 512 Hz using Snap-Master
data acquisition software (HEM Data Corp., Southfield, MI,
United States). Hardware filter settings were 0.1 Hz (high-pass)
and 100 Hz (low-pass) with a 12 dB/octave rolloff. Bioamplifier
gain was 4000 for the EEG channels and 1000 for the EOG
channels.
Data Analysis
Preprocessing of EEG Data
Electroencephalogram analysis was performed using the
EEGLAB 13.6.5b toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004)
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implemented in MATLAB. Epochs were extracted from the
continuous EEG data. For the analysis of the nobody/self
conditions, each extracted epoch was 3500 ms in duration,
beginning 600 ms before visual cue onset and ending 1000 ms
after the onset of the tactile stimulus. For analysis of the other
conditions, each epoch was time-locked to the moment when
the participant pressed the button, which triggered stimulation
to their participant that occurred 1500 ms later. For these
trials, analysis began at -2900 ms relative to the 0 ms point
of tactile stimulation delivery, with a baseline period of the
500 ms prior to the visual cue, during the display of the fixation
point.
Independent component analysis was conducted to remove
eye movement artifacts (Hoffmann and Falkenstein, 2008). Visual
inspection of the EEG signal was used to reject epochs containing
movement artifact. Across all participants, 92.43% of trials were
retained. There was no significant difference in the number of
rejected epochs between trial type, p = 0.387.
Time Frequency Analysis
Time-frequency decompositions of single trial data were
conducted using event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP)
analysis (Makeig, 1993), for a 2500 ms window that ran
from  2000 ms prior to the onset of the tactile stimulus to
500 ms after tactile stimulation onset. ERSP was computed
using a Morlet wavelet decomposition over a frequency
range of 5–30 Hz, with 100 overlapping windows starting
with a 3-cycle wavelet at the lowest frequency. Event-related
desynchronization (ERD) was taken as an ERSP decrease relative
to the baseline.
Statistical Analyses
Mean ERSP in the mu band (8–13 Hz) over the 1000 ms epoch
leading up to the onset of the tactile stimulus was computed for
centroparietal electrodes overlying the contralateral (CP1, CP5,
P3 and C3) and ipsilateral (CP2, CP6, P4 and C4) sensorimotor
cortex. In order to assess anticipatory effects induced by the
different conditions over this region of interest, mean ERSP
was submitted to a 3  2 repeated-measures ANOVA involving
condition (human, robot, nobody) and hemisphere (contralateral,
ipsilateral). To confirm whether any condition effects were
regionally specific, we also executed a mass univariate analysis
comparing alpha ERSP amplitudes between conditions for each
of the 32 electrodes.
In order to assess differences in beta band responses following
the button press by the participants, mean beta (14–22 Hz)
ERSP over the 1000 ms epoch following the button press was
compared between the two relevant conditions (other-human,
other-robot) across three target electrode regions within a 2  3
repeated-measures ANOVA. The beta band of 14–22 Hz was
chosen based on previous research on post-movement beta
responses, in which modulation of power is most frequently seen
in the 15–20 Hz range (Pfurtscheller, 2001). The three regions
encompassed frontocentral (Fz, FC1, FC2, Cz) and centroparietal
electrodes overlying the contralateral (CP1, CP5, P3 and C3)
and ipsilateral (CP2, CP6, P4 and C4) sensorimotor cortex.
To confirm whether any condition differences were regionally
specific, we also executed a mass univariate analysis comparing
beta ERSP amplitudes between conditions at each of the 32
electrodes.
RESULTS
Tactile Anticipation
Mu Rhythm (8–13 Hz)
The ANOVA for mu ERSP indicated significant main effects
of condition, F(2,18) = 18.63, p < 0.001 and hemisphere,
F(1,19) = 22.88, p < 0.001. Further, the ANOVA indicated
a significant interaction of condition and hemisphere,
F(1,19) = 14.32, p < 0.001. Follow-up analyses indicated that
mu ERSP over the contralateral (i.e., left) centroparietal region
was significantly reduced (indicating greater desynchronization)
when participants expected tactile stimulation to self (whether
initiated by a robot, M =  0.89, SD = 0.701, or a human,
M =  1.02, SD = 0.635), compared to trials when no tactile
stimulation was expected (nobody, M =  0.94, SD = 0.411).
There was no significant difference between conditions over the
ipsilateral centroparietal region.
The mass univariate analyses confirmed regional specificity of
effects by showing that anticipatory mu ERD was significantly
different at the p < 0.01 threshold at various centroparietal
electrodes, but not over other scalp regions, when comparing
stimulation from the human to the nobody condition. These
differences were apparent at C3, t(18) = 5.31, p < 0.001, CP1,
t(18) = 3.56, p = 0.002, P3, t(18) = 3.98, p < 0.001, and CP5,
t(18) = 4.65, p < 0.001, such that mu desynchronization at these
electrodes was greater for the human condition compared to the
nobody condition. Compared with the nobody condition, there
was also significantly greater mu desynchronization in the robot
condition at C3, t(18) = 2.79, p = 0.012, and CP5, t(18) = 2.67,
p = 0.015 at the p < 0.05 threshold (see Figure 3). For the direct
comparison of mu ERSP in relation to the source of stimulation
to the self (human vs. robot), there was only a marginal difference
in amplitude observed at one electrode (CP1), F(1,19) = 2.081,
p = 0.061; ERSP at all other electrodes did not differ significantly
between the human and robot conditions.
Execution of Action
Behavioral Measures
Mean reaction time for participants’ button presses following
the visual cue did not differ between conditions (mean RT with
human partner = 278.68 ms, SD = 16.94; mean RT with robot
partner = 282.62, SD = 14.22), t(19) = 0.74, p = 0.463.
Beta Band (14–22 Hz)
The ANOVA for beta ERSP indicated significant main effects of
condition, F(1,18) = 7.45, p < 0.001 and region, F(1,19) = 21.96,
p< 0.001. The ANOVA further indicated a significant interaction
of condition and region, F(1,19) = 14.32, p < 0.001. Follow
up analyses indicated that there was a significantly greater beta
ERSP after the button press over frontocentral regions when
participants delivered tactile stimulation to a robot (M = 1.02,
SD = 0.67), compared to trials where participants delivered
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) at electrode CP1 during nobody trials and self trials (in human/robot conditions), with alpha ERD in the
time window during tactile anticipation. (B) Topographic maps showing activity in the mu/alpha (8–13 Hz) band during anticipation of tactile stimulation across
conditions. (C) Differences in 8–13 Hz desynchronization between nobody and human-self and nobody and robot-self trials, respectively. Significantly different
electrodes are highlighted, showing differences in the mu rhythm over central sites based on paired samples t-tests. The nose is located at the top of the scalp map.
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Event-related spectral perturbation at electrode Cz during other trials, with beta ERS present the time window following the button press (–1000 to
0 ms). Human-other and robot-other conditions are shown separately. (B) Topographic maps showing condition differences for post-button press activity in the beta
band (14–22 Hz) from –1000 to 0 ms, with 0 ms being time locked to the participant’s button press. (C) Differences in beta power increase between human and
robot conditions in the other trials. Significantly different electrodes are highlighted, showing differences in beta ERSP over central sites based on paired samples
t-tests. The nose is located at the top of the scalp map.
stimulation to a human (M = 0.02, SD = 0.59). There were no
significant differences between conditions at centroparietal sites.
Mass univariate analyses further indicated that the above
effect was specific to frontocentral sites, with beta ERSP being
significantly greater in other-robot trials than for other-human
trials at electrodes FC1, t(18) = 6.31, p < 0.001, and Cz,
t(18) = 5.95, p < 0.001, at the p < 0.01 threshold. Beta ERSP
was significantly greater in other-robot trials at F3, t(18) = 2.80,
p = 0.011, Fz, t(18) = 2.68 p = 0.015, FC2, t(18) = 2.60 p = 0.018,
CP1, t(18) = 2.53, p = 0.021, and C3, t(18) = 2.49, p = 0.022) at the
p < 0.05 threshold (see Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
We investigated sensorimotor oscillations during a reciprocal
touch paradigm, using EEG measures to compare aspects of
brain oscillatory responses to receiving and initiating tactile
stimulation during a joint task involving either a human
or robot partner. Our specific questions were twofold: First,
whether desynchronization of the sensorimotor mu rhythm
during anticipation of tactile stimulation differed according to the
perceived origin of the stimulation (as being initiated by a human
vs. a robot). Second, whether EEG beta band responses to the act
of initiating delivery of a tactile stimulus to another entity differed
according to whether that entity is a human or a robot.
Anticipation of Tactile Stimulation
In line with previous research (Shen et al., 2017), there was a clear
desynchronization of the EEG mu rhythm over the contralateral
central region during the anticipation of tactile stimulation to
self. A similar desynchronization was not present during the
“nobody” condition in which a cue was present and a stimulus
was triggered, but the stimulus was not directed toward anyone.
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In terms of the central question, we found little evidence for a
differential modulation of mu rhythm activity when participants
anticipated tactile stimulation that they believed was initiated by
a button press from a robot or a human partner. The extent of
anticipatory mu desynchronization did not meaningfully differ
in amplitude when the source of the tactile stimulation was
the action of a human as opposed to a robot. Given that
anticipatory mu desynchronization is considered an index of
selective attention in the tactile modality (van Ede et al., 2012;
Weiss et al., 2018), these results suggest that participants were
equally attentive in monitoring for upcoming tactile stimulation
from human and robot partners. While the directions of the
means suggested that mu ERD was somewhat greater when
participants expected stimulation initiated by a human rather
than a robot partner, only trend-level differences in amplitude
were apparent, and only at one electrode site.
One strength of our task protocol was that visual cues were
constant across conditions, in order to isolate the influence of
participant’s beliefs about the nature of their partner on the
brain responses during the task. However, it is also possible
that the salience of the manipulation could be increased by
allowing participants to observe the human or robot partner press
the button. The subtle differences we observed can be further
investigated by providing participants with contingent visual
information about the nature of the partner, or providing a more
“social” rather than physical interaction with the robot partner.
Although it is understood that the extent of anticipatory mu
rhythm desynchronization is related to subsequent perceptual
processing of the target stimulus (Zhang and Ding, 2010), little is
known about the determinants of the anticipatory mu response,
including individual differences. There remains sustained interest
in the neural processes underlying the mapping of somatosensory
experience from one own body to that of another (Keysers et al.,
2010; Marshall and Meltzoff, 2015). One study found no clear
evidence for mu desynchronization during the anticipation of
tactile stimulation delivered to another person (Shen et al., 2017),
and we did not examine this question here. Instead, the current
study took a novel approach by examining how the perceived
origin of tactile stimulation modulated the anticipatory mu
response to self. With this in mind, we considered anticipatory
processes in the context of a sustained interactive task, which also
allowed us to examine processes related to the sending of tactile
stimulation to the partner.
Execution of Action
One well-studied electrophysiological correlate of action
production (particularly finger movements, such as a button
press) is the beta rebound response, which takes the form of an
increase in beta band power after a brief reduction of power
immediately following the action (Cheyne, 2013). Here we found
modulation of the beta rebound response in the period after
participants initiated tactile stimulation to a partner, prior to
the actual delivery of the tactile stimulus. When participants
initiated tactile stimulation that was directed toward a robot,
there was greater beta ERS across central and frontal electrode
sites. The exact function and mechanism of beta ERS following
action production is not entirely understood, but it is believed to
partly reflect motor inhibition (Heinrichs-Graham et al., 2017).
In certain contexts, post-movement beta ERS relates to increases
in cortical deactivation (Pfurtscheller, 2001), particularly in the
lower beta (14–22 Hz) range used in the current study. The
greatest level of beta ERS was seen over frontoparietal sites,
which is expected based on the localization of post-movement
ERS to motor cortex (Jurkiewicz et al., 2006). The meaning of
these differences between conditions in beta ERS still needs
to be elucidated. One line of reasoning relates to the idea
that reduced beta band activity increases the capability for
cognitive and motor flexibility in terms of upcoming or future
responses (Engel and Fries, 2010). As such, enhancement of
beta band activity (i.e., a larger rebound effect) in the context
of HRI may reflect the perceived greater predictability of robot
compared to human partners. Further work can examine this
speculation as well as investigate other possible influences on
the beta response (e.g., differing button press force between
conditions).
In behavioral studies within the domain of HRI, reactions
to robots vary greatly across studies, due in part to the wide
range of robotic forms implemented across this area of research
(Hoffmann et al., 2010). In some contexts, artificial agents may
be more engaging than human counterparts (Gratch et al., 2007),
but within most natural contexts, people tend to prefer the
company of humans to machines. Increased beta ERS while
interacting with the robot could reflect a different attentional
state, or a decrease in uncertainty regarding the outcome of
the present action (Engel and Fries, 2010). This speculation
warrants further investigation, as do alternative explanations for
the differential beta rebound responses. The nature of the present
paradigm was limited in how much it immersed the participant
in interactions with the partner; beyond the initial introductions,
participants only interacted with the human or robot partner
through the delivery of tactile stimulation, without any visual,
auditory, or direct physical contact. The non-visual nature of
the present study was intentional, given the strong visual effects
found in previous research derived from aesthetic differences
between human and robotic stimuli (Press, 2011). Furthermore,
the embodiment of the robot in the current study was somewhat
limited. The addition of different sensory modalities and the use
of more sophisticated robot platforms could help to develop a
richer picture of brain responses during interactions with robots.
Implications
The results of this study provide some of the first evidence for
differences in attentional and tactile processing when interacting
with human and robotic partners. Past research on HRI has
focused largely on differences in physical appearance and abilities
(Hoffmann et al., 2010; Paauwe et al., 2015; Strait et al.,
2017), while the present study removed visual information from
the experimental procedure; differences between conditions are
therefore likely to be the result of a participant’s beliefs, rather
than visual input during the task. Previous work in HRI has
begun to identify factors which influence how people respond
to touch from robots (Nakagawa et al., 2011; Wullenkord et al.,
2016), and future work on the cognitive neuroscience of HRI will
need to incorporate these factors into the design of robots used
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in this line of research. Research in this area could also draw on
emerging work in the area of “sociomotor action control” which
has clear implications for progress in HRI (Kunde et al., 2017).
Future work with this and similar paradigms will continue
to shed light on sensory processing in the context of stimuli
that are delivered by a non-human agent. A potential follow-
up to the present study could include an additional condition
in which neither a human nor robot is present during tactile
stimulation to the participant; such a condition would allow
further exploration of the effects of other agents on sensory
processing. Given the controlled nature of the present study, the
tasks has little resemblance to a typical social interaction. Further
studies with a similar paradigm could be situated in naturalistic
contexts, such as physical therapy, wherein touch is an integral
and natural part of the interaction. Additional work could also
examine differences between protocols that involve passive touch
(as in the task used in the current study) and the more active
kinds of touch that characterizes typical human–environment
interactions.
Within research on brain-computer interfaces (BCI),
sensorimotor oscillations are most frequently targeted as a source
of input to control various machines or devices (Yuan and He,
2014). In this line of work, the beta rhythm has been targeted
most frequently, specifically post-movement beta rebound, due
to the well-timed relation between motor movements and the
corollary oscillations measurable through EEG (Pfurtscheller and
Solis-Escalante, 2009). These oscillations are of particular interest
for BCI researchers due to the range of human behaviors which
can engender them, with and without overt motor movement.
Through examination of sensorimotor activity in response to
the use of BCI, feedback loops can be created which form a
sort of continuous connection to brain-controlled machines
(Neuper et al., 2009), allowing for the control of machines
through motor imagery alone (Pfurtscheller and Neuper, 2010).
The present study can inform the creation of BCI platforms
by showing how beta rebound, and sensorimotor oscillations
in general, may be influenced by the nature of the machine
being acted upon. Follow-up work on this issue could be
conducted across a range of different types of machines from
humanoid robots and androids to simple mechanical machines.
Algorithms that are robust to psychological perturbations
on sensorimotor rhythms would be ideal in the application
to BCI.
In addition to helping us understand how to better integrate
robots in social contexts, a social-cognitive neuroscience
approach to robotics can provide insights beyond the field of
HRI (Broadbent, 2017). Robots provide a unique control in social
paradigms, as various levels of intentionality, autonomy, and
humanoid appearance can be manipulated. Human reactions to
robotic bodies varies greatly depending on the nature of the
machine and context in which it is experienced (Chaminade and
Cheng, 2009), but there appears to be something unique about
the way in which we process information about a thing when that
thing is a fellow human (Saygin et al., 2011; Urgen et al., 2013).
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Research trying to understand individual difference in the use of different social
networking sites (SNSs) is minimal. In the present study, we collected data from 714
college students in China (273 males) to assess how personality traits and psychological
factors relate to excessive use of WeChat and Weibo. We found that excessive use
of Weibo and WeChat correlated positively with neuroticism, loneliness, and external
locus of control and negatively with agreeableness, social support, and social interaction.
Furthermore, people that scored high on loneliness, lack of social support, and poor
social interaction skills excessively used Weibo more than WeChat. These results entail
that by fulfilling different needs, WeChat and Weibo attract different kinds of people;
significant lesson for future development of SNSs.
Keywords: social networking sites, Weibo, WeChat, preference, personality traits
INTRODUCTION
The internet is an essential component of our life, which influences many aspects of human
behavior. Through the internet, people play games, shop, communicate, socialize, search-for, and
spread information (Amichai-Hamburger and Ben-Artzi, 2000). Over the years, social networking
sites (SNSs) have become the most popular and fastest web sites for information dissemination and
private social interaction (Hughes et al., 2012). Popular SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter in US
and WeChat and Weibo in China, allow individuals to express themselves, exchange information,
and socialize. These sites attract and host millions of users.
An interesting question arises: considering that most SNSs attract millions of users, do these
different sites attract different users? Joinson (2004) pointed out that internet behavior is a product
of both the user and the specific tool, such that individual differences and personality can influence
computer-media choices (Amiel and Sargent, 2004; Ryan and Xenos, 2011; Hou et al., 2014). Just as
“Uses and Gratifications Theory” points out that “the audience is conceived as active” (Katz et al.,
1974, p. 20). Thismeans that, a user will use specific text to gain the valuable knowledge that they are
seeking from a program or text (Katz et al., 1974). Because in mass communication much initiative
to link media choice lies with users (Katz et al., 1974). This implies that people use the media to
fulfill individual’s specific different needs and gratifications.
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Therefore, under the “Uses and Gratification Theory,” which
seeks to understand the use of media from the perspective of
the individual and not the media, individual experiences are
important factors in determining the choice of SNSs. So, this
study seeks to understand if particular individual differences
are related to the preference for the excessive use of SNSs. We
investigated the role of individual difference in the excessive
use of SNSs in this study. This is an exploratory study
that aimed to find out the relationship between personality
traits/psychological factors and excessive use of Weibo and
WeChat. Thus, we assessed how Big-Five personality traits,
loneliness, social support, external locus of control, and social
interaction relate to the excessive use of two largest SNSs in
China- WeChat and Weibo.
WeChat and Weibo
WeChat is one of the most popular SNSs in China and currently
boosts of over 600 million active users worldwide (CNNIC,
2015). WeChat is a cross-platform communication application
combining popular features of Facebook and WhatsApp (Wu,
2014). It allows users to create a profile, search for friends or find
new friends within one’s geographical location. On this profile,
users can send instant text messages, voice notes and make free
voice calls. Further, WeChat allows users to post information,
pictures and videos of interest, and comment on friends’ posts.
All of these features makeWeChat popular for online socializing.
Another popular SNS in China is Weibo, created in 2009, and
has more than 204 million users (CNNIC, 2015). Weibo allows
users to post 140-character information. Similar to Twitter, but
unlike WeChat, Weibo focuses on sharing of opinions and
information exchange rather than on social interaction (Kwak
et al., 2010); and offers some anonymity in online communication
(Huberman et al., 2008). Weibo does not need users to post their
private information to find “friends” and it focuses less on “who
you are” and more on “what you say” (Huberman et al., 2008).
The reduction of social pressure brought about by anonymity
(Hughes et al., 2012) may mean different motivation for using
Weibo fromWeChat. Further, a previous study of interest found
that only 2 out of 10 interviewed people had used WeChat to
search for new friends (Hou et al., 2017). This entails that most
people use WeChat to keep in touch with friends they made in
real life. It is hence expected that these differences will be evident
in the relationships between individual traits and excessive use of
WeChat and Weibo.
Personality
A number of personality traits appear to be associated with the
use of SNSs. The Big-Five personality test, developed by Goldberg
(1999), is the most commonly used model in investigating the
relationship between internet use and individual personality
(Landers and Lounsbury, 2006; Ehrenberg et al., 2008). The
Big-Five personality test consists of five factors: neuroticism,
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness
(McCrae and John, 1992). Several of the factors are associated
with problematic use of online social media, such as blogs
(Guadagno et al., 2008) and SNSs (Ross et al., 2009; Amichai-
Hamburger and Vinitzky, 2010; Correa et al., 2010).
Neuroticism is characterized by anxiety, hostility, depression,
self-consciousness, impulsivity, and fragility. Individuals who
are low in this trait tend to be more stable and emotionally
resilient. Butt and Phillips (2008) found that people with high
scores in neuroticism use the Internet frequently, spent more
time on Facebook (Ryan and Xenos, 2011) and instant messenger
(Correa et al., 2010). Neurotics prefer to use the Internet to
relieve loneliness and find a sense of group belonging (Amichai-
Hamburger and Ben-Artzi, 2003; Butt and Phillips, 2008).
In the current study, we hypothesized that those with high
scores in neuroticism will excessively use Weibo more than
WeChat (H1).
Extraversion is characterized by excitability, sociability,
talkativeness, assertiveness, and high amounts of emotional
expressiveness. People who are high in extraversion (also called
extroverts) are like to be in touch with people, are full of
energy and often feel positive emotions. People who are low
in extraversion (also called introverts) are quiet, cautious, and
don’t like excessive contact with the outside world. Extraverts
have been found to be excessive users of instant messaging
and SNSs (Correa et al., 2010). They have more friends online
(Amichai-Hamburger and Vinitzky, 2010) and tend to make
even more friends offline (Ross et al., 2009). Thus, extraverts
like socializing, but they don’t take online socializing as a
substitute for real life social interaction. Thus, extraverts use
SNSs mainly for social enhancement. People with only a few
offline contacts compensate for their introversion, low self-
esteem, and low life-satisfaction by using Facebook for online
popularity (Ellison et al., 2007; Barker, 2009; Pollet et al.,
2011). In this study, we hypothesized that extraversion will
positively correlate more with excessive use of WeChat than
Weibo (H2).
Openness has the characteristics of imagination, aesthetics,
rich emotions, differences, creativity, intelligence, etc. People
who score high in this trait prefer abstract thinking and have
a wide range of interests. People who score low in this trait
are practical, preferring conventions, and more traditional and
conservative. Individuals who score high on openness have been
found to excessively use instant messaging and SNSs (Correa
et al., 2010). They have wide interests and curiosity (McCrae
and Costa, 1987), so they prefer to use Internet for information
seeking (McElroy et al., 2007). So, since Weibo can provide more
new information than WeChat, in this study, we expected that
the excessive use of Weibo would be more in open people than
WeChat (H3).
Agreeableness has qualities such as trust, altruism,
outspokenness, compliance, modesty, empathy, and so on.
People who score high in agreeableness are considerate, friendly,
generous, and helpful and willing to give up their own interests
for others. Agreeableness has been found to be unrelated to
Internet and SNSs’ use in many studies (Amichai-Hamburger
and Vinitzky, 2010; Correa et al., 2010). However, Ross et al.
(2009) pointed out that less agreeable people interact more
online and take Internet as a tool to improve social skills and
build friendships. La et al. (2009) found that females scoring
high on this trait posted significantly more pictures than females
scoring low, with the opposite being true for males. In the
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current study, we hypothesized that agreeableness will negatively
correlate more with excessive use of Weibo than WeChat (H4).
Conscientiousness shows the characteristics of competence,
impartiality, coherence, due diligence, achievement, self-
discipline, discretion, and restraint. Those who score high on
conscientiousness are responsibility, dedication to work, and
seriousness. Numerous studies have found significant negative
correlation between conscientiousness and SNSs’ use time
(Amichai-Hamburger and Vinitzky, 2010; Ryan and Xenos,
2011). Butt and Phillips (2008) suggested that conscientious
people do not allow SNSs to disrupt their important work. They
may prefer Twitter to Facebook because “tweets” are limited
to 140 characters, which mean just a temporal distraction for
them (Hughes et al., 2012). In addition to this, people with high
conscientiousness were found to have significantly more friends
and to upload significantly fewer pictures than those scoring low
on this personality trait (La et al., 2009). Thus, conscientious
people tend to cultivate their online and offline contacts more
without the necessity to share too much personal information
publicly. We hence hypothesized that conscientiousness will
negatively correlate with the excessive use of WeChat (H5), but
will not correlate with the excessive use of Weibo.
Ross et al. (2009) argued that the Big Five might be too broad
when assessing individual differences in SNS usage. Taking into
account the characteristics of SNSs, this study included different
psychological factors, namely loneliness, social support, external
locus of control, and social interaction.
Loneliness and Social Support
Loneliness is considered as one of the most important predictors
of internet addiction (Baumeister et al., 2005; Wang, 2006;
Bozoglan et al., 2013). Lonely people usually report less support
from their social network in real life (Routasalo et al., 2006).
McKenna et al. (2002) found that people who feel lonely are more
likely to prefer online social interactions than face-to-face settings
(Clerkin et al., 2013; Ye and Lin, 2015). Further, people with low
real life social support and high virtual social support tend to
draw support from online communication (Yeh et al., 2008).
Admittedly, causal direction of this relation is not clear. There
is a two-way relationship between loneliness/social support and
SNS use. On the one hand, lonely individuals are attracted to SNS
to relieve loneliness or get support; on the other hand, excessive
use of SNS has been found to increase sense of loneliness (van den
Eijnden et al., 2008). Further, through internet communication,
particularly communication with known people, lonely people
can increase sense of social support (Shaw andGant, 2002). Based
on socializing features of WeChat, which mainly features people
one interacts with in real life and the anonymity of Weibo, we
hypothesized that lonely people and those with lack of real life
social support will excessively use Weibo more than WeChat
(H6, H7).
External Locus of Control and Social
Interaction
Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe
that they can control things that affect them (Rotter, 1966).
People with high external locus of control believe that their
lives are controlled by luck, fate and chance (Ndasauka et al.,
2016) and not by their effort or ability. Such people are more
likely to engage in problematic internet use (Chak and Leung,
2004), have more online social interaction (Koo, 2009; Ye and
Lin, 2015) and have low social interaction skills (Cloitre et al.,
1992; Stipek, 1993). With diminished social interaction skills,
they prefer communicating through the internet, where they can
contact with others without face-to-face interaction (Ndasauka
et al., 2016). In the present study, we expected that external
locus of control will positively correlate with excessive use of
both WeChat and Weibo (H8). We also hypothesized that social
interaction in real life will negatively correlate with excessive use
of Weibo more than WeChat (H9).
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
Total number of participants was 714; 273 males (38.2%), 441
females (61.8%), and were recruited from 3 college campuses
in Anhui province, East China. The mean age was 19.8 years
(SD= 1.3) ranging from 17 to 21, and 11 participants were under
18 years old.
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee of the University of Science and Technology of China
(USTC). All participants gave consent to participate in the study
and principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki were
closely followed. Participants were undergraduate students.
We did not obtain informed consent from the next of kin,
caretakers, or guardians on behalf of the minors/children (under
17 years) enrolled in our study. These young college students
were considered to have comparable intelligence and ability
to adult students, and able to take charge of their behaviors.
According to the General principles of the Civil Law of the
People’s Republic of China; “A minor aged 10 or over shall be a
person with limited capacity for civil conduct and may engage
in civil activities appropriate to his age and intellect; in other
civil activities, he shall be represented by his agent ad litem or
participate with the consent of his agent ad litem” (Article 12,
Chapter II). Therefore, we obtained the same consent from these
participants between 17 and 18 as those above 18 years old, which
was also approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee
of the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC).
Small gifts (keychain and nail-cutter of not more than $1.5) were
given as incentive to participate in the study. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants.
Measures
Demographic Data
Participants answered two questions regarding their gender and
age. We also asked participants to rate themselves with regard
to their preference of WeChat and Weibo. They were asked to
choose one between Weibo and WeChat by stating which one
they preferred.
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WeChat Excessive Use Scale (WEUS)
The scale was developed to assess excessive use of WeChat (Hou
et al., 2017). It includes items such as “I check myWeChat before
something else that I need to do,” “I have used WeChat to relieve
of loneliness and stress,” and “There are times when I would
rather play onWeChat than go out withmy friends.” The 10-item
scale showed good internal consistency in the initial study, with
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.907. In the current study, the Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.899. The scale is scored on a Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (never) to 5 (always).
Microblog Excessive Use Scale (MEUS)
The scale was developed to measure excessive use of Weibo
(Hou et al., 2014). It includes items such as “How often do
you find yourself saying “just a few more minutes” when
using microblogs?,” “How often would you try to increase your
followers unconsciously by all means?,” and “How often do you
feel depressed, moody, or nervous when you are off microblogs?”
MEUS has 10 items rated on a 6 point Likert scale from
“1= never” to “6= always.” In the current study the scale showed
good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.908.
Big Five Personality Questionnaire
We used a 60-item personality questionnaire developed by Leung
(2011) to assess five different personalities, namely, Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness.
Each factor featured 12 items rated on 5-point scale ranging from
strongly disagree to strongly agree (McCrae and Costa, 1991). Four
personalities factors of Neuroticism (α = 0.708), Extraversion
(α = 0.648), Agreeableness (α = 0.573), and Conscientiousness
(α = 0.697) showed adequate to good reliability and internal
consistency in our sample. However, Openness factor showed
poor reliability and internal consistency (α= 0.371). As such, this
personality factor was not included in our analyses.
UCLA Loneliness Scale
This scale, originally developed in 1978 by Russell, Peplau, and
Ferguson, has 20 items rated on a 4-point scale from “1= never”
to “4 = often.” In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha was
0.760.
Social Support Scale
We used the Interpersonal Support/Social Support Scale; a 12-
item measure of perceptions of social support. This measure
is a short version of the original ISEL (40 items; Cohen and
Hoberman, 1983). Items are rated on a 4-point scale ranging
from “definitely true” to “definitely false.” In the current study,
the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.770.
Locus of Control Scale (LOC)
We used the multidimensional locus of control scale developed
by Levenson (1981). The scale has three dimensions: Internal
scale, which measures internal locus of control; Powerful Others
scale and Chance scale, which measure external locus of control.
In this study, we utilized the latter two scales to measure external
locus of control. The scale had 16 items and were scored on a 6-
point Likert scale from “1 = strongly disagree” to “6 = strongly
agree.” The scale showed adequate internal consistency in our
study (α = 0.738).
Social Interaction Scale (SIS)
We employed the Social Interaction Scale developed by Yan
(2011). The Social Interaction Scale contains 24 questions divided
into two parts namely- Real Life Scale (14 items) and Online
Scale (10 items). In our study, we only used the Real Life Scale to
measure interpersonal communication with classmates, friends,
parents, and other people in real life. The items are rated on a
4-point Likert scale from “1 = never” to “4 = always.” In our
study, the Real Life scale showed good internal consistency and
reliability (α = 0.808).
Data Analysis
We analyzed the data using the statistics software package
SPSS 23.0. We calculated correlations between the scales using
Pearson’s r (Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient).
To test significant differences of different levels in total scores, we
used the Kruskal–Wallis test (Kruskal–Wallis one-way analysis
of variance) and t-tests. We also used Scheffe’s post-hoc tests to
analyze significant differences between different levels. Further,
we used a method by Lee and Preacher (2013) to calculate the
difference in correlations between WEUS ↔ personality traits
and MEUS ↔ personality traits. The significance level in this
study was p ≤ 0.05.
RESULTS
Weibo vs. WeChat
With regard to preference, 386 participants (females = 261)
reported that they preferred Weibo to WeChat, while 328
participants (females = 180) reported that they preferred
WeChat to Weibo. We used the chi-square test to calculate the
gender proportion, and there was significant difference between
the usage proportion of Weibo and WeChat (χ2 = 12.184,
p< 0.001), with more females preferring Weibo to WeChat.
We analyzed the correlation between MEUS and WEUS.
Results showed significant positive correlation between the two
variables (r = 0.462, p< 0.001).
Weibo, WeChat, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and
Agreeableness
We analyzed the correlation between MEUS and the four
personality traits (see Table 1). MEUS positively correlated
with Neuroticism (r = 0.173, p < 0.001), negatively with
Agreeableness (r = −0.234, p < 0.001), and Conscientiousness
(r = −0.083, p = 0.026), but did not significantly correlate with
Extraversion (r = 0.007, p= 0.852).
We then analyzed the correlation between WEUS and the
four personality traits (see Table 1). WEUS positively correlated
with Neuroticism (r = 0.118, p < 0.001), negatively with
Agreeableness (r = −0.153, p < 0.001) but did not significantly
correlate with Conscientiousness (r = −0.025, p = 0.503)
and Extraversion (r = 0.057, p = 0.128). For the significant
correlations, we also draw the scatter plot on the relationship
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TABLE 1 | Correlation between MEUS/WEUS and personality traits, loneliness/social support, and social interaction skills in real life/ external locus of control.
Neuroticism Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Loneliness Social
support
Social interaction
skills in real life
External locus
of control
MEUS 0.173*** 0.007 −0.234*** −0.083* 0.139*** −0.111** −0.084* 0.179***
WEUS 0.118** 0.057 −0.153*** −0.025 0.025 −0.048 −0.008 0.208***
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
between MEUS/WEUS and the four personality traits (see
Figure 1).
Further, we found significant difference between correlations
of MEUS ↔ Agreeableness and WEUS ↔ Agreeableness
(z = −2.14, p = 0.033). These results were consistent with H4
and H1, H2, H3, H5 were not supported.
Weibo, WeChat, Loneliness, and Social
Support
Our results showed that loneliness positively correlated with
MEUS (r = 0.139, p < 0.001) but did not significantly correlate
with WEUS (r = 0.025, p = 0.508; see Table 1). We analyzed
the difference between these two correlations and found that
correlation between loneliness and MEUS was significantly
higher than correlation between loneliness andWEUS (z= 2.931,
p= 0.003).
Further, we found that social support negatively correlated
with MEUS (r = −0.111, p = 0.003), but did not significantly
correlate with WEUS (r = −0.048, p = 0.200; see Table 1).
For the significant correlations, we also draw the scatter plot
on the relationship between MEUS/WEUS and loneliness/social
support (see Figure 1).
We then analyzed the difference between the two correlations
and found that the two correlations were not significantly
different (z = 1.627, p = 0.104). These results were consistent
with H6 and H7 is not supported.
Weibo, WeChat, External Locus of Control,
and Social Interaction in Real Life
We analyzed the correlation betweenMEUS and external locus of
control/real life social interaction (see Table 1). MEUS correlated
positively with external locus of control (r = 0.178, p < 0.001),
and negatively with real life social interaction (r = −0.084,
p= 0.024).
We then analyzed the correlation betweenWEUS and the two
variables (external locus of control and real life social interaction;
see Table 1). WEUS correlated positively with external locus of
control (r = 0.208, p < 0.001), but did not significantly correlate
with real life social interaction (r = −0.008, p = 0.822). For
the significant correlations, we also draw the scatter plot on
the relationship between MEUS/WEUS and external locus of
control/social interaction in real life (see Figure 1).
While the correlation of MEUS and external locus of control
did not significantly differ with correlation ofWEUS and external
locus of control (z = 0.79, p = 0.429), correlation of MEUS
and real life social interaction was significantly higher than
correlation of WEUS and real life social interaction (z = 2.243,
p = 0.025). These results were consistent with H9 and H8 is not
supported.
Correcting for Multiple Comparisons
Applying the Bonferroni correction, we divided p = 0.05 by the
number of tests (10) to get the Bonferroni critical value. This
resulted in change of p-value to p < 0.005 to be significant.
Under that criterion, all tests were found to be significant except
for correlation between MEUS and Conscientiousness whose
p = 0.026 and MEUS and real life social interaction whose
p= 0.024.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to investigate some of the
individual differences associated with the use of the two largest
SNSs in China- Weibo and WeChat. We found that different
personality traits were influential in explaining the excessive use
of the two SNSs, and some correlations between these traits and
Weibo and WeChat were also significantly different.
Weibo vs. WeChat
From the item- “which one do you prefer, Weibo or WeChat?”
results showed that more females preferred Weibo to WeChat
than males. This is consistent with previous studies that females
scored significantly higher on the Weibo scale than males (Hou
et al., 2014), and women are more likely to use Twitter than men
(Smith and Rainie, 2010). By broadcasting to everyone, Weibo
allows young female students to express themselves to and seek
attention from a larger audience than they would on WeChat,
which is limited in its broadcasting and sharing of moments.
Also, we found that Weibo and WeChat had significant
moderate correlation with each other. These results may mean
that users of one also tend to use another. However, the results
may also entail that there is some difference between Weibo and
WeChat.
The Use of Weibo and WeChat
Personality Differences in the Use of Weibo and
WeChat
Neuroticism positively correlated with excessive use of both
Weibo and WeChat. This result is consistence with previous
studies that neurotic people are more likely to use SNSs for
socializing (Amichai-Hamburger and Ben-Artzi, 2000; Butt and
Phillips, 2008). However, contrary to our hypothesis, there was
no significant difference between correlations of neuroticism↔
use of Weibo and neuroticism↔ use of WeChat. These results
imply that neurotic people use both two SNSs in similar manner.
One factor that may help explain this is Weibo’s anonymity
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FIGURE 1 | Scatter plot of the correlation between MEUS/WEUS and personality traits, loneliness/social support and social interaction skills in real life/ external locus
of control.
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and other anonymity features of WeChat, like “Shake” and
“drift bottle.” This allows neurotics to interact with people
online, because these forms of interaction do not require face-
to-face contact. As Amichai-Hamburger et al. (2002, p. 127–
128) reported: “It would appear that the social services provided
on the Internet, with their anonymity, lack of need to reveal
physical appearance, rigid control of information revealed in
the interaction. . . provide an excellent answer to people who
experience great difficulty in forming social contacts due to their
introverted personality.”
Agreeableness negatively correlated with both Weibo and
WeChat. This result also is supported by Ross et al. (2009) that
less agreeable people are inclined to use SNSs more often and
sometimes in an excessive way. Further, consistent with our
hypothesis, we found significant difference between correlations
of agreeableness ↔ use of Weibo and agreeableness ↔ use
of WeChat. Thus, less agreeable people are more likely to
excessively use Weibo than WeChat. Since less agreeable people
are considered less friendly, they may find Weibo a better
alternative to fulfill their social needs than WeChat. Although
they use WeChat, Weibo provides them a wider scope of social
fulfillment because they can interact with many people with
whom they are not friends in real life.
Conscientiousness negatively correlated with the use ofWeibo
in our study, but did not significantly correlate with WeChat.
These results are a direct contrast to our hypotheses. This may
be due to the other attributes of bothWeibo andWeChat. Weibo
is a half-open platform, and for highly conscientious people, it
may increase sense of insecurity, which may not be the case
with WeChat because they may feel in control of their friends’
circle and hence feel secure to post pictures and socialize without
fear. A previous study of interest found that despite having more
friends than those scoring low in the trait, conscientious people
tend to upload significantly fewer pictures on Weibo (Amichai-
Hamburger and Vinitzky, 2010).
Loneliness and Social Support Differences in the Use
of Weibo and WeChat
Loneliness positively correlated with the use of Weibo while
social support negatively correlated with the use of Weibo.
Surprisingly however, the two factors did not significantly
correlate with WeChat. Furthermore, we found significant
difference between correlations of the two psychological factors
↔ use of Weibo and the psychological factors↔ use of WeChat.
The results suggest that individuals who are lonely and people
who lack social support in real life tend to use Weibo more
thanWeChat. Thus, becauseWeibo is half-open platform, people
can engage in identity experimentation, which brings more
gratification to lonely people than those or not lonely (Leung,
2011). Further, the open and anonymity attributes of Weibo
(Hughes et al., 2012) offer people an opportunity to jump out
of the real-life circle of friends. Through Weibo, lonely people
can make new friends, seek novelty and information of interest.
This is unlikeWeChat; whose posts are mainly from relatively the
same people one interacts with in real life. As such, WeChat may
bring the same isolated feeling for people that lack social support
and feel lonely.
External Locus of Control and Social Interaction in
Real Life Differences in the Use of Weibo and WeChat
Our results showed that excessive use of bothWeibo andWeChat
is associated with external locus of control. Thus, people who
have faith in that environment causes their life events, excessively
use Weibo and WeChat. These findings are similar to results of
previous studies (Karatas and Tagay, 2012; Ndasauka et al., 2016).
Thus, externals are lonelier (Hojat, 1982) and feel less confident
in control of their lives and behaviors (Ye and Lin, 2015) hence
they excessively use WeChat and Weibo.
Further, we also found negative correlation between Weibo
and social interaction in real life. However, we found no
significant difference between correlations of problematic use of
Weibo↔ social interaction in real life and the use of WeChat↔
social interaction in real life. This entails that people who spend
less time in socializing in real life or lack social skills in real life
tend to choose online social interaction on Weibo. Compared
to WeChat, Weibo provides them a bigger “circle of friends,”
where they can practice social skills with strangers. In addition,
the reduction of social pressure on Weibo (Hughes et al., 2012)
may be the one of the factors that attracts people with poor real
life social skills.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
Overall, the study investigated how individual difference are
associated with the use of Weibo and WeChat. Results
demonstrate that personality traits are linked to excessive use
of Weibo and WeChat. We found that personality such as
neuroticism, loneliness, and external locus of control had positive
correlations with excessive use of Weibo and WeChat, while
agreeableness, social support, and social interaction negatively
correlated to excessive use of Weibo and WeChat. Furthermore,
we compared the difference between correlations of the personal
traits and excessive use of Weibo and WeChat, and we found
that lonely people, people that lack social support and those with
poor social interaction skills tend to excessively use Weibo more
thanWeChat. These results are pertinent because they entail that
people who experience loneliness or social frustration in real life
choose sites that impose less social pressure to relieve loneliness
and maybe gain confidence for real life social interaction.
The study had some limitations that merit consideration.
Firstly, the selected respondents were only from Eastern China,
and the sample representation may not be completely correct.
Secondly, the study exclusively used self-report questionnaires
in data collection. Due to social desirability or understanding
problem, self-reporting sometimes affects reliability and validity
of the answers. Therefore, in future research, we need to combine
a variety of research methods to draw a complete picture of the
use of Weibo and WeChat in China.
RELEVANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF
STUDY
Although WeChat is considered as a more socializing platform
thanWeibo, which is viewed as platform for sharing information,
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our study has shown that people scoring high on loneliness and
neuroticism are more likely to use Weibo than WeChat. The
results of this study add to the uses and gratification theory,
which states that people engage in some activity, in this case
social networking, to meet certain psychological needs. As such,
by meeting different needs of people, WeChat andWeibo tend to
attract different kinds of people.
People using WeChat tend to mainly transfer their offline
social interaction with friends to online environment. For people
lacking social support and social interaction skills, transferring
to WeChat does not often meet their social needs in real life.
So, when dealing with people experiencing social problems, it is
more meaningful to provide them with a broader social space
and open platform than to let them practice their social skills
with known friends. As such in helping people who are struggling
with excessive use of Weibo, WeChat, or other social network
applications, it is important to focus on improving their social
skills, and reducing their social pressure and loneliness.
Further, medical practitioners dealing with people struggling
with excessive or addictive use of SNSs should pay attention to
the particular sites in which their patients are overusing. This
is because, as shown in this study, different people are attracted
and motivated to use different SNSs in that those with some
psychological traits are more likely to use one more than another
or others. Finally, these results should encourage SNSs developers
to rethink the function of their sites. When developing social
networking platforms, developers should consider how best to
meet psychological needs of different groups.
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In a previous study we could show that social fear can be induced and extinguished
using virtual reality (VR). In the present study, we aimed to investigate the belongingness
effect in an operant social fear conditioning (SFC) paradigm which consisted of an
acquisition and an extinction phase. Forty-three participants used a joystick to approach
different virtual male agents that served as conditioned stimuli. Participants were
randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions. In the electroshock condition,
the unconditioned stimulus (US) used during acquisition was an electric stimulation. In
the social threat condition, the US consisted of an offense: a spit in the face, mimicked
by a sound and a weak air blast to the participant’s neck combined with an insult. In
both groups the US was presented when participants were close to the agent (75%
contingency for CSC). Outcome variables included subjective, psychophysiological and
behavioral data. As expected, fear and contingency ratings increased significantly during
acquisition and the differentiation between CSC and CS  vanished during extinction.
Furthermore, a clear difference in skin conductance between CSC and CS  at the
beginning of the acquisition indicated that SFC had been successful. However, a fast
habituation to the US was found toward the end of the acquisition phase for the
physiological response. Furthermore, participants showed avoidance behavior toward
CSC in both conditions. The results show that social fear can successfully be induced
and extinguished in VR in a human sample. Thus, our paradigm can help to gain insight
into learning and unlearning of social fear. Regarding the belongingness effect, the social
threat condition benefits from a better differentiation between the aversive and the non-
aversive stimuli. As next step we suggest comparing social-phobic patients to healthy
controls in order to investigate possible differences in discrimination learning and to
foster the development of more efficient treatments for social phobia.
Keywords: social fear conditioning, virtual reality, fear-potentiated startle, skin conductance level, avoidance
behavior
INTRODUCTION
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most relevant anxiety disorders. It is characterized by
intense anxiety when faced with social interactions along with physical symptoms like blushing
or trembling, and extreme avoidance behavior concerning social interaction (Fehm et al., 2005;
Kessler et al., 2005; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). While learning models are relatively
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well established in specific phobia, PTSD and panic disorders,
learning paradigms for SAD are far less developed, both in animal
models and in humans. Besides the diathesis stress model, there
is evidence showing that fear conditioning may play an essential
role in the development and maintenance of SAD (Mineka and
Zinbarg, 2006; Mineka and Oehlberg, 2008).
Cognitive-behavioral therapy is the method of choice for the
treatment of SAD; it is widely supported by current research
and therefore assumed to be a reliable approach for overcoming
anxiety (Arch et al., 2012). Cognitive-behavioral therapy is also
often combined with exposure to feared situations in order to
maximize the therapeutic success (Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this treatment approach is not
always satisfactory and a high number of non-responders remain
(Norton and Price, 2007).
Empirical findings show that conditioning mechanisms play
an important role in the etiology of the elementary processes of
SAD, making them essential to examine in order to maximize the
impact of psychotherapeutic interventions (Mineka and Zinbarg,
2006; Mineka and Oehlberg, 2008). Classical fear conditioning
(according to Pavlov) is a form of associative learning in which
an organism learns to associate two stimuli with each other
(Pavlov, 1927). E.g., hearing someone laugh (unconditioned
stimulus: US) while giving a speech may result in the speaker
showing a fear response (unconditioned response: UR). As a
result, the previously neutral stimulus (giving a speech), now
called conditioned stimulus (CS), triggers the newly learned fear
reaction (conditioned response: CR). Classical fear conditioning
is considered a central pathogenic pathway in anxiety disorders
(Lissek et al., 2005; Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006; LeDoux, 2014).
Operant fear conditioning (learning by consequences) may be
also be relevant for the development of anxiety disorders,
because it relates to stimuli that reinforced or punished the
person during approach behavior. E.g., if voluntarily presenting
a paper is followed by the lecturer harshly criticizing the
presentation, a student might no longer report voluntarily in
the future. Thus, other persons and social interactions might
be prototypical stimuli involved in operant learning processes.
However, until now little research has been conducted on operant
fear conditioning in SAD.
Fear conditioning in mice in social as well as non-social
contexts is addressed in the social fear conditioning (SFC)
approach investigated by Toth et al. (2012). In this paradigm,
naturally occurring preference behavior of male rodents toward
an unknown conspecific was paired with an aversive US, namely
an electric stimulus applied to the foot for 1 s. During acquisition
phase, the rodents learned to associate the appearance of the
negative stimulus with the conspecific, which induced social fear
including avoidance behavior. In a following extinction phase on
the next day, different male conspecifics were presented to the
experimental animals in their cage without any negative US. It
could be observed that avoidance and fear-driven behavior were
extinguished and replaced by the naturally occurring preference
behavior again. Therefore, in the course of the experiment,
acquisition and extinction of fear were demonstrated. These
results suggest that, using the applied paradigm, it is possible
to draw conclusions about the etiology of SAD and potential
leverage points for future treatment approaches (Toth et al., 2012;
Toth and Neumann, 2013; Zoicas et al., 2014).
Many uncontrollable contextual and environmental factors
can play a role and therefore turn out to be confounding
variables in human experimental as well as therapeutic settings.
A way to circumvent this problem is conducting experiments
in virtual reality (VR), which also allows for the creation of
paradigms of SAD development and the exploration of potential
treatment improvements. The use of an artificially designed
virtual environment minimizes potentially confounding variables
by presenting standardized situations to participants. Subjects are
able to interact with their environment and diverse stimuli can be
applied in a multimodal manner (Bohil et al., 2011). Furthermore,
it is possible to directly record the participant’s reactions to
the stimuli in the form of verbal ratings, fear-potentiated
startle or electrocardiographic data (Mühlberger et al., 2007).
Thus, VR allows conducting SFC related experiments in a
realistic, standardized environment in an economic and easily
administrable manner. An additional advantage of VR that is
particularly important in the treatment of SAD is the prevention
of avoidance behavior, which often leads to the reinforcement of
anxiety symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In
general, the results of conditioning processes in VR are hugely
satisfying (Huff et al., 2010).
Shiban et al. (2015) implemented a procedure similar to
the SFC paradigm designed for mice by Toth et al. (2012) in
order to investigate SFC in humans in VR. In this experimental
setting, participants had to actively approach different agents in
VR using a joystick. During the acquisition phase, one of the
agents, referred to as CSC, was paired with an US, a loud female
scream combined with an air blast. During the extinction and
the following generalization test phase, no US was administered.
In line with the initial hypotheses, participants rated the CSC
as significantly less pleasant than the CS  after the acquisition
phase. These results were also supported by the heart rate pattern,
as the heart rate was higher for the CSC than for the CS  after
acquisition. After the extinction phase, the ratings returned to an
equal level and the fear-potentiated startle response decreased.
Interestingly, during the generalization test, the more socially
fearful participants rated every agent as less pleasant, compared
to the less socially fearful participants who only rated the CSC as
less pleasant. This indicates that more socially fearful participants
tend to generalize the unpleasantness of social stimuli to a
broader context. In sum, SFC could be induced and extinguished
successfully, thus emphasizing the role of operant conditioning in
social fear learning. Nonetheless, the study has some limitations,
which could be addressed in order to potentially improve the
paradigm.
For instance, it is possible to manipulate the intensity of
the social contact between the agent and the participant to
investigate the specificity of the paradigm for social situations.
We believe that our paradigm provides the opportunity for basic
social interaction between the agent and the participant (via eye
contact, self-regulated movement of the avatar and movement
toward the agent). In the current study we improved upon this
aspect by designing a social threat condition and comparing
it to a conventional electroshock condition. Furthermore, it
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could be criticized that the amount of social interaction in the
preliminary study was quite low, as the agent did not directly
communicate with the participant. This has been taken into
account in the current study, as in the social threat condition the
agent verbally insults and spits at the participant is much more
ecologically valid than the mere administration of an air blast or
an electrical stimulation. We assume that it enables us to better
use the paradigm for social fear research. In addition, the facial
expressions of the agents were adjusted to the verbal utterance in
order to create a more realistic and therefore more threatening
experience. This also provided the opportunity to investigate the
belongingness effect, since the accordance between the US and
the CS plays an important role in conditioning. This concept
was investigated in a study conducted by Hamm et al. (1989),
in which pairs of unconditioned and neutral stimuli were rated
according to their belongingness. After a classical conditioning
process using rating-defined high- and low-belongingness pairs,
finger pulse responses revealed significantly stronger acquisition
and resistance to extinction for high-belongingness pairs.
Our current study is a further investigation of the SFC
paradigm in VR in a human sample using an operant
conditioning setting, which consisted of acquisition and
extinction phases similar to those in the preliminary study. In the
current study, we tried to maximize the immersion in VR using a
head-mounted-display with a larger field of view as suggested in
our first SFC study (Shiban et al., 2015). During the SFC process,
fear and contingency ratings as well as physiological (fear-
potentiated startle and skin conductance level) and behavioral
data were collected. In order to take the above-mentioned effects
of belongingness into account, a second experimental condition
was added to the previous design. Besides the electroshock
condition, in which an electrical stimulation to the lower arm
serves as an US, an air blast combined with virtual spitting and
insulting was employed as the US in the social threat condition.
Because the subjective experience of (un)pleasantness was only
partly in accordance with the physiological measurements in
our first SFC study, we decided to use the skin conductance
level (SCL) as an additional measure of distress during social
interaction (e.g., Mesa et al., 2014). Moreover, we investigated the
avoidance behavior quantified as the time in non-motion before
the approach as well as the time in motion of the approach.
In our current study, we expected that (1) in the operant
conditioning process, fear and contingency ratings for
CSC would increase after the acquisition phase compared
to the baseline phase. Furthermore, (2) the amplitude of the
fear-potentiated startle and the SCL as well as the time in
non-motion before approaching the CSC and time in motion
of the approach toward CSC were expected to increase. (3)
After the extinction phase, fear and contingency ratings of the
CSC were supposed to return to baseline levels along with the
electrophysiological reactions and the behavioral variables. (4)
For the CS  and neutral stimulus (NS), no such changes were
expected, i.e., the ratings and physiological measurements should
remain stable. (5) The acquisition and the resistance to extinction
were expected to be higher for the social threat condition than
for the electroshock condition due to the belongingness effect of
spitting and insulting to socially frightening situations and thus
the more realistic simulation of social interaction. Finally, (6) a
stronger manifestation of the conditioning process was expected
in more socially fearful participants in comparison to less socially
fearful participants.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-four healthy volunteers were recruited through
advertisements at the University of Regensburg. Exclusion
criteria were age below 18 or above 55, a current diagnosis
of psychiatric disorder, psychological treatment, history of
psychotropic drug use, color blindness and uncorrected vision or
hearing deficits. These criteria were assessed via a questionnaire
after written informed consent had been obtained. Participants
were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions. As
one participant was excluded due to a technical error during
data acquisition, the study comprised a total of forty-three
participants (22 participants in the electroshock condition: 68.2%
female, aged between 18 and 25, M D 21.10, SD D 1.80; and
21 participants in the social threat condition: 81% female, aged
between 19 and 30, M D 21.95, SD D 2.84). All of the volunteers
were students at the University of Regensburg and were offered
credit points as compensation for their participation (see
Table 1). The Ethics Committee of the University of Regensburg
approved the study.
Apparatus
The VR environment consisted of one room (see Figure 1A),
in which all three phases (baseline, acquisition and extinction)
took place. In every phase the participant was positioned at one
end of the room and could see the agent at the opposite end of
the room. The agents gazed dynamically at the participant and
moved their head and upper body slightly (see Figures 1B,C). In
75% of the conditioning trials an aversive consequence followed
when the participant reached the agent. Aversive consequences
consisted of an electric stimulus to the participant’s lower arm
in the electroshock condition or of an air blast to the right
side of the participant’s neck (2 bar, 10 ms) accompanied by
a sound of spitting followed by an insult in the social threat
condition. In addition, when the participant approached the
agent a startle sound was administered with a contingency
of 75% in all phases. A compressed air tank was regulated
via a magnetic valve system channeled the air blast through
a tube that was fixed to the participant’s torso. A cuff was
fixed to the participant’s right lower arm to administer the
electric stimulus. Each participant’s individual pain threshold
(M D 2.42 mA, SD D 1.82 mA) was determined before the
VR session started. To this end, different strengths of electrical
current were administered to the participant’s lower arm and then
rated on a pain scale from 0 to 10. The amperage with a mean
rating of 5 was used as the US during the VR session. The VR was
presented to participants via an Oculus Rift DK2 head-mounted
display (HMD; Oculus VR Inc., Irvine, CA, United States; see
Figure 1D) and was generated via Steam Source engine (Valve
Corporation, Bellevue, WA, United States). The presented VR
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TABLE 1 | Demographic variables and questionnaire data.
Electric shock condition Social threat condition
(n D 22) (n D 21)
Demographics M SD M SD df t p
Age 21.10 1.80 21.95 2.84 41  1.195 0.239
SPIN 12.95 9.23 16.67 11.71 41  1.157 0.254
n % n % df χ2 pa
Gender [female] 15 68.2 17 81.0 1 0.920 0.337
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) and also t- and p-values are given for all participants for the variables age and SPIN (German version of the Social Phobia
Inventory by Stangier and Steffens, 2002). Numbers of participants (n) and percent (%) for gender is given; aChi square test, two-tailed.
FIGURE 1 | Virtual environment. (A) Room where all three phases took place. (B,C) Social stimuli (agents) used for the conditioning. (D) Setting (VR was presented
via a head-mounted display) during the experiment (laboratory room was darkened).
environment was controlled by “cybersession” software (VTplus
GmbH, Würzburg, Germany) (see Figure 1C). The participant’s
head position was monitored via the Oculus’ electromagnetic
tracking device (Oculus VR Inc., Irvine, CA, United States),
which adjusts the field of view to any head movements.
Sounds were presented over headphones (Sennheiser HD-215,
Sennheiser electronic GmbH, Germany). Participants used a
joystick (Logitech Extreme 3D Pro Joystick, Logitech GmbH,
Germany) to move in the VR environment. Physiological data
were monitored, digitally amplified (V-Amp, Brain Products
GmbH, Germany) and recorded (Brain Vision Recorder software,
Version 1.20, Brain Products GmbH, Germany).
Measures
Participants filled out a demographic questionnaire (age, sex,
education, and current occupation) and the Social Phobia
Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000; German Version: Stangier
and Steffens, 2002) to assess social fear.
The SPIN consists of 17 items that assess fear, avoidance,
and physiological symptoms of social phobia in the previous
week. Answers are given on a five-point Likert scale (from
0 D “not at all” to 4 D “extremely”). The German version
of the SPIN was evaluated by Sosic et al. (2008). Internal
consistency was excellent for a representative sample of
2043 Germans (Cronbach’s Alpha D 0.95). Convergent and
divergent validity are satisfactory. Furthermore, the German
version of the SPIN is a sensitive and specific measure
for social phobia as it distinguishes successfully between
social phobia and other psychiatric disorders (Sosic et al.,
2008).
In order to measure the experienced fear and contingency of
the agents, ratings were assessed verbally during the presentations
of the agents in the rating phase following each of the three
phases (“Estimate your fear now”; “How likely would an aversive
stimulus have been?”). These ratings had a range from 0 (very low
fear/very unlikely) to 100 (very high fear/very likely).
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental procedure. The experimental procedure took place
as described above. As unconditioned stimulus (US), electrical stimulation
(electro shock condition) or an air blast combined with virtual spitting and
insulting (social threat condition) were applied. CS+ = agent paired with
aversive US; CS– = agent without aversive US; NS = agent without aversive
US and not appearing during the acquisition phase.
Besides the subjective measures, physiological data were
collected. To record the electromyography of the musculus
orbicularis oculi as a measure of fear-potentiated startle, four
surface electrodes (Ag/AgCl, Ø D 8 mm) were affixed under
the right eye of the participant and on the mastoid bones
as reference and ground electrodes. Two additional surface
electrodes (Ag/AgCl, Ø D 8 mm) were placed on the base of the
thumb on the radial side of the palm of the non-dominant hand
in order to record the SCL. The avoidance was measured as the
time in non-motion (in s) before approaching the agents and the
time in motion (in s) of the approach.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of the questionnaire phase, the baseline
phase, the acquisition phase and the extinction phase [total
duration was 60 min (30 min in VR); see Figure 2].
The baseline phase consisted of four blocks. One block
consisted of three presentations of each agent (CSC, CS , NS),
resulting in a total of 12 presentations of each agent per
participant. The order within each block was randomized
and no US was administered. Which agent was presented as
CSC/CS /NS, was balanced across participants. A startle noise
(white noise: 103 dB, 10 ms) was presented with a contingency
of 75%.
Conditioning was conducted in 12 blocks. One block consisted
of two presentations of both conditioned stimuli with aversive
reinforcement in terms of electric stimulus or air blast combined
with virtual spitting and the negative utterance “Get lost!” (CSC)
and without aversive reinforcement (CS ), resulting in a total of
24 presentations per participant. The NS agent did not appear
in this phase. The order within each block was randomized. The
CS-US contingency was set at 75%. As in the baseline phase, the
startle noise was presented with a contingency of 75%.
The extinction phase consisted of 12 blocks designed in exactly
the same way as those in the acquisition phase, except for the
absence of the US and the reappearance of the NS agent. Because
three agents were presented instead of two, the total number of
trials was 36 in this phase. Also in the extinction phase the startle
noise was presented with a contingency of 75%. After the baseline,
acquisition and extinction phase, a rating phase took place in
which each agent was presented (presentation 8 s, inter-stimulus
interval 20 s) again without US or startle noise.
In the first session participants were briefed and the informed
consent form was signed. After filling out the demographic
questionnaire and the SPIN, participants were prepared for the
VR part of the experiment. The electrodes, the air blast device,
the cuff for the electric stimuli, the HMD and the headphones
were adjusted. During the experiment the laboratory room was
darkened and participants received recorded instructions via the
headphones.
Before the baseline phase started, participants were able
to walk around a desk standing in the middle of the room
with gray walls and floor in VR. After exploring this virtual
environment, the room faded into a gray background and
participants relaxed for 2 min in VR. After the baseline
phase, participants received the recorded instruction: “You will
now meet virtual human beings. Please use the joystick to
approach the person. Please try to move directly toward the
person. Press the joystick forward to move straight forward
and approach the person.” Participants had to approach the
agents actively using the joystick and as soon as they reached
a specific distance to the agents (the equivalent of about 30 cm
in the real world), lights faded out and the next agent was
presented at the opposite wall. Each trial lasted about 10 s
(depending on how fast participants approached the agents).
Theoretically, participants could move laterally, diagonally or
away from the agent, however, we observed no such behavior.
Because the field of view was adapted to head movements,
participants could theoretically look away while moving toward
the agent. After the baseline phase, the first rating took place;
participants approached each of the three agents and as soon
as they reached the previously specified distance to the agents,
lights faded out and the participants were asked to verbally
rate their subjective fear and the contingency of aversive
events.
During the acquisition phase, participants again received the
recorded instruction to approach the agents actively via joystick
and, as soon as they reached the pre-determined distance to the
agents, the lights faded out. At this moment, the US was presented
for CSC agents in 75% of the trials. After the acquisition phase,
participants rated the agents again as described above.
The following extinction phase differed from the acquisition
only in the reappearance of the NS and the absence of aversive
US. After the third rating, the experiment was complete.
Statistical Analyses
Physiological data were preprocessed with Brain Vision Analyzer
2.0 software (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) and
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FIGURE 3 | Fear ratings (n = 43) for CS+, CS– and NS in the three rating phases for the electro shock and social threat condition. CS+ = agent paired with aversive
unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; NS = agent without aversive US and not appearing during the acquisition phase; electro
condition = electrical stimulation; social condition = air blast combined with virtual spitting and insulting; Rating 1 = after baseline phase; Rating 2 = after acquisition
phase; Rating 3 = after extinction phase. Mean fear ratings (0 = very low fear to 100 = very high fear) were given. Significant differences are indicated with an
asterisk. Standard errors are presented by error bars.
further analyses were performed in SPSS 22.0 (IBM Corp.,
Armonk, NY, United States).
For each physiological outcome variable (fear-potentiated
startle, SCL) and avoidance behavior, means were calculated
for the baseline phase, while the first four reactions and
the last four reactions in the acquisition and the extinction
phase were computed as the means of the beginning
and the end of the acquisition and extinction phase,
respectively.
For the fear-potentiated startle, first, differences between
the two electromyography electrodes were computed (see
Blumenthal et al., 2005). Then, a 250 Hz high cut-off filter,
a 30 Hz low cut-off filter, and a 50 Hz notch filter were
applied, the data were rectified, and a moving average (50 ms)
was calculated. For each fear-potentiated startle a baseline
correction was conducted using the mean value of the 50 ms
before each startle tone as baseline. Next, peaks were marked
automatically, controlled manually and corrected if necessary.
Finally, T-values for the startle magnitude were calculated.
Due to technical errors during data acquisition, six participants
had to be excluded from data analysis of the fear-potentiated
startle.
For the analysis of the SCL, the difference between the two
electrodes was computed, a 1 Hz high cut-off filter and a baseline
correction of 1-s duration applied and the SCL exported in order
to calculate T-values for the SCL. Due to technical errors during
data acquisition, five participants had to be excluded from data
analysis of the SCL.
The avoidance behavior was assessed via time in non-motion
(latency) and time in motion. Time in non-motion (in s) was
defined as the time before approaching the agent. Time in motion
(in s) was computed subtracting the time in non-motion from the
total time needed for reaching the specific distance to the agent.
The means for each agent (CSC, CS , NS) of the subjective
variable (fear and contingency ratings) measured at the three
rating phases (rating 1–3) were calculated.
Participants were divided into two groups (low vs. high social
anxiety) via a median split of the SPIN score (median D 13.5
in this study) in order to differentiate between highly and less
socially fearful participants.
Two repeated-measures ANOVAs with the within-subject
factors phase (rating 1 vs. rating 2 for acquisition and rating 2
vs. rating 3 for extinction) and stimulus (CSC vs. CS  vs. NS)
and the between-subject factors social anxiety (low vs. high) and
condition (electroshock condition vs. social threat condition)
were conducted for both subjective variables.
For each physiological and behavioral outcome variable,
repeated-measures ANOVAs with the within-subject factors
time (baseline vs. beginning vs. end of acquisition) and
stimulus (CSC vs. CS ) and the between-subject factors social
anxiety (low vs. high) and condition (electroshock condition
vs. social threat condition) were conducted for the acquisition
phase. For the extinction phase repeated-measures ANOVAs
with the within-subject factors time (beginning vs. end of
extinction) and stimulus (CSC vs. CS ) and the between-
subject factors social anxiety (low vs. high) and condition
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TABLE 2 | Significant results of the ANOVAs for the fear ratings of the acquisition
and extinction phase.
Effect df F η2 p
Acquisition
Total
Phase 1, 39 32.1 0.45 <0.001
Stimulus 2, 78 13.9 0.26 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 78 20.5 0.34 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus  Condition 2, 78 4.96 0.11 0.009
Electroshock condition
Phase 1, 20 14.4 0.42 <0.001
Stimulus 2, 40 4.72 0.19 0.014
Phase  Stimulus 2, 40 11.8 0.37 <0.001
Social threat condition
Phase 1, 19 17.6 0.48 <0.001
Stimulus 2, 38 10.2 0.35 <0.001
Time  Stimulus 2, 38 13.1 0.41 <0.001
Extinction
Total
Stimulus 2, 74 22.7 0.38 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 74 10.6 0.22 <0.001
df D degrees of freedom; 2 D effect size; Phase D Rating 1 vs. Rating 2 for
the acquisition and Rating 2 vs. Rating 3 for the extinction; Rating 1 D after
baseline, Rating 2 D after acquisition, Rating 3 D after extinction; Stimulus D CSC
vs. CS  vs. NS; CSC D agent paired with the aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US), CS  D agent without aversive US, NS D agent without aversive US and not
appearing during the acquisition phase; Condition D electroshock vs. social threat
condition; Social Anxiety (low vs. high) was measured with the German version
of the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; median split D 13.5, Stangier and Steffens,
2002).
(electroshock condition vs. social threat condition) were
conducted.
Measuring generalization effects, ANOVAs with the within-
subject factor phase (baseline vs. end of extinction) and
the between-subject factors social anxiety (low vs. high) and
condition (electroshock condition vs. social threat condition)
were conducted for the NS as well.
In additional analyses of significant effects of time, stimulus,
or social anxiety Student’s t-tests were performed. Partial η2 (η2p)
scores and Cohen’s d were used as indices of effect size. The
significance level was set at two-tailed alphaD 0.05.
RESULTS
Fear Ratings
Figure 3 shows the fear ratings 1–3 (after the baseline, acquisition
and extinction phase, respectively). As we can see, in the
beginning, (baseline) fear ratings are almost equal for all three
stimuli, but slightly higher in the electroshock than in the social
threat condition. After the acquisition phase, fear ratings for CSC
are clearly higher than for CS  and NS in both US conditions.
Fear ratings for CS  are higher in the electroshock than in
the social threat condition, while fear ratings for NS barely
differ after acquisition. After the extinction phase, fear ratings
for CSC decrease in both conditions. However, fear ratings for
CSC decreased more in the social threat condition than in the
electroshock condition. CS  did not change in either condition
over time, whereas the NS increased in the electroshock condition
and decreased in the social threat condition. After extinction, all
three stimuli are generally rated with higher fear and contingency
levels in the electroshock condition than in the social threat
condition.
An ANOVA comparing fear ratings before and after
acquisition confirmed significant interaction effects of Phase
 Stimulus and Phase  Stimulus  Condition (please see
Table 2 for all significant results of the ANOVA). A follow-up
ANOVA was conducted for each condition. For the electroshock
condition, a significant interaction effect of Phase  Stimulus
could be detected. A follow-up t-test showed that the fear ratings
increased significantly for CSC, t(21)D -5.04, p< 0.001, dD 1.12,
and for CS , t(21) D  2.46, p D 0.023, d D 0.54, and decreased
significantly for NS, t(21) D 2.59, p D 0.017, d D 0.31, from
pre to post acquisition. For the social condition, an interaction
effect of Phase  Stimulus was also significant. Follow-up t-test
revealed that fear ratings increased significantly only for CSC,
t(20) D  5.67, p < 0.001, d D 1.52, from pre to post acquisition,
but not for CS  or NS. Therefore, the fear rating results indicate
that successful SFC took place under both conditions.
An ANOVA comparing fear ratings before and after extinction
confirmed a significant interaction effect of Phase  Stimulus.
Follow-up t-test showed that fear ratings decreased significantly
for CSC, t(40) D 3.92, p < 0.001, d D 0.60, from pre to
post extinction, but not for CS  or NS. The fear rating results
indicate that social fear extinction was also successful under both
conditions.
Contingency Ratings
Figure 4 shows contingency ratings 1–3 (after baseline,
acquisition, and extinction phase, respectively). In the beginning,
contingency ratings are almost equal for both conditions and
all three stimuli. After the acquisition phase, contingency
ratings for CSC are higher than for CS  or NS in both US
conditions. Regarding the CS , contingency ratings are higher
in the electroshock than in the social threat condition. In both
conditions the contingency ratings for NS decrease slightly after
acquisition. After the extinction phase, the contingency ratings
for CSC decrease strongly in both conditions. Contingency
ratings for CS  decrease in the electroshock condition and
increase slightly in the social threat condition. Conversely,
contingency ratings for NS increased slightly in the electroshock
condition and decreased slightly in the social threat condition.
An ANOVA comparing contingency ratings before and
after acquisition confirmed significant interaction effects
of Phase  Stimulus, Stimulus  Social Anxiety, and
Phase  Stimulus  Condition (please see Table 3 for all
significant results of the ANOVA). Follow-up ANOVA was
conducted for each condition. In the electroshock condition,
significant interaction effects of Phase  Stimulus, and
Stimulus  Social Anxiety could be detected. Follow-up
t-test conducted for Phase  Stimulus interaction showed
that contingency ratings increased significantly for CSC,
t(21) D  7.49, p < 0.001, d D 1.88, and for CS , t(21) D  2.38,
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FIGURE 4 | Contingency ratings (n = 43) for CS+, CS– and NS in the three rating phases for the electro shock and social threat condition. CS+ = agent paired with
aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; NS = agent without aversive US and not appearing during the acquisition phase; electro
condition = electrical stimulation; social condition = air blast combined with virtual spitting and insulting; Rating 1 = after baseline phase; Rating 2 = after acquisition
phase; Rating 3 = after extinction phase. Mean contingency ratings (0 = very unlikely to 100 = very likely) were given. Significant differences are indicated with an
asterisk. Standard errors are presented by error bars.
p D 0.027, d D 0.48, from pre to post acquisition, but not for
NS. Follow-up tests of the significant Stimulus  Social Anxiety
interaction revealed a significant difference for the less socially
fearful participants between CSC, CS , and NS (p < 0.020),
and for the higher socially fearful participants between CSC and
CS  (p< 0.003), but not NS. Means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 4. In the social threat condition an interaction
effect of Phase  Stimulus reached significance level. Follow-up
t-test showed that contingency ratings increased significantly for
CSC, t(19)D 7.50, p< 0.001, dD 1.88, and decreased for CS ,
t(19) D 2.47, p D 0.023, d D 0.72, from pre to post acquisition.
This pattern could not be found for NS. Thus, contingency rating
results also indicate that SFC was successful.
An ANOVA on contingency ratings before and after extinction
showed significant interaction effects for Stimulus  Condition,
Stimulus  Social Anxiety, Phase  Stimulus, and a marginally
significant interaction effect of Phase  Stimulus  Condition.
Follow-up ANOVAs were conducted separately for the
two conditions. In the electroshock condition, interaction
effects of Phase  Stimulus and Stimulus  Social Anxiety
reached significance level. Follow-up t-test conducted for the
Phase  Stimulus interaction effect showed that contingency
ratings decreased significantly for CSC, t(20) D 5.88, p < 0.001,
d D 1.66, and for CS , t(20) D 2.66, p D 0.015, d D 0.46, from
pre to post extinction, but not for NS. Follow-up tests of the
Stimulus  Social Anxiety interaction revealed a significant
difference both for the less socially fearful participants between
CSC and NS (p < 0.020), and for the highly socially fearful
participants between CSC, CS  and NS (p < 0.022). In the
social threat condition, interaction effects of Phase  Stimulus
and Stimulus  Social Anxiety reached significance level.
Follow-up t-tests of the Phase  Stimulus interaction revealed
that contingency ratings decreased significantly for CSC,
t(19)D 5.91, p< 0.001, dD 1.58, but not for CS  or NS. Follow-
up tests of the significant Stimulus  Social Anxiety interaction
revealed a significant difference both for the less socially fearful
participants between CSC, CS  and NS (p < 0.001), and for the
highly socially fearful participants between CSC, CS  and NS
(p < 0.030). These results indicate that social fear extinction was
successful according to the contingency ratings as well.
Fear-Potentiated Startle
Figure 5 depicts fear-potentiated startle response for the baseline,
acquisition and extinction phase. In the electroshock condition
fear-potentiated startle response is higher for CS  than for CSC
at the baseline and both stimuli increase at the beginning, until
both decrease to the end of the acquisition. In the extinction
phase CSC response is higher than CS , but the responses to
both stimuli decreased from the beginning to the end. In the
social threat condition fear-potentiated startle response is higher
for CS  than for CSC at the baseline. CSC response increases
whereby CS  do not change at the beginning, until both decrease
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 197944
fpsyg-08-01979 November 10, 2017 Time: 15:12 # 9
Reichenberger et al. Social Fear Conditioning
at the end of the acquisition. In the extinction phase both stimuli
decrease from the beginning to the end.
For the acquisition phase, an ANOVA confirmed a significant
main effect of time, F(1,33) D 7.51, p < 0.001, η2p D 0.19, and
stimulus, F(1,33)D 5.20, pD 0.029, η2p D 0.14, but no significant
interaction effects. Figure 5 shows an increase of fear-potentiated
startle at the beginning and a fast habituation process at the end
of the acquisition phase in both conditions.
For the extinction phase, there was a significant main effect of
time, F(1,31)D 8.46, pD 0.007, η2pD 0.21, but no other significant
TABLE 3 | Significant results of the ANOVAs for the contingency ratings of the
acquisition and the extinction phase.
Effect df F η2 p
Acquisition
Total
Phase 1, 38 10.8 0.22 0.002
Stimulus 2, 76 33.9 0.47 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 76 51.3 0.58 <0.001
Stimulus  Social Anxiety 2, 76 3.29 0.08 0.042
Phase  Stimulus  Condition 2, 76 5.76 0.13 0.005
Electroshock condition
Phase 1, 20 15.5 0.44 <0.001
Stimulus 2, 40 10.8 0.35 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 40 25.4 0.56 <0.001
Stimulus  Social Anxiety 2, 40 3.98 0.17 0.027
Social threat condition
Stimulus 2, 36 28.0 0.61 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 36 30.9 0.63 <0.001
Extinction
Total
Phase 1, 37 13.6 0.27 <0.001
Stimulus 2, 74 71.5 0.66 <0.001
Stimulus  Condition 2, 74 8.04 0.18 <0.001
Stimulus  Social Anxiety 2, 74 6.72 0.15 0.002
Phase x Stimulus 2, 74 31.9 0.46 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus  Condition 2, 74 3.06 0.08 0.053
Electroshock condition
Phase 1, 19 6.49 0.26 0.020
Stimulus 2, 38 26.0 0.58 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 38 20.2 0.52 <0.001
Stimulus  Social Anxiety 2, 38 4.30 0.19 0.021
Social threat condition
Phase 1, 18 7.71 0.30 0.012
Stimulus 2, 36 49.3 0.73 <0.001
Phase  Stimulus 2, 36 14.9 0.45 <0.001
Stimulus  Social Anxiety 2, 36 4.51 0.20 0.018
df D degrees of freedom; 2 D effect size; Phase D Rating 1 vs. Rating 2 for
the acquisition and Rating 2 vs. Rating 3 for the extinction; Rating 1 D after
baseline, Rating 2 D after acquisition, Rating 3 D after extinction; Stimulus D CSC
vs. CS  vs. NS; CSC D agent paired with the aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US), CS  D agent without aversive US, NS D agent without aversive US and not
appearing during the acquisition phase; Condition D electroshock vs. social threat
condition; Social Anxiety (low vs. high) was measured with the German version
of the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; median split D 13.5, Stangier and Steffens,
2002).
main or interaction effects. For NS, a significant main effect of
time, F(1,32)D 7.98, pD 0.008, η2p D 0.20, could be detected.
Skin Conductance Level
Figure 6 depicts SCL for the baseline, acquisition and extinction
phase. In the baseline, SCL for CSC response is slightly higher
than for CS  in both conditions. In the electroshock condition,
for CSC the SCL increase from the baseline to the beginning
and decrease to the end of the acquisition, whereas it decrease
for CS  from the baseline to the end of the acquisition. In the
beginning of the extinction, SCL for CSC is higher than for CS ,
at the end of the extinction both stimuli do not differ. In the
social condition, SCL for CSC also increase from the baseline
to the beginning and decrease from the beginning to the end of
the acquisition. SCL for CS  decrease from the baseline to the
beginning and subsequently increase to the end of the acquisition.
In the beginning of the extinction, both stimuli do not differ and
both increase slightly at the end of the extinction.
For the acquisition phase, an ANOVA confirmed significant
main effects of stimulus, F(1,34) D 15.4, p D 0.010, η2p D 0.18,
as well as significant interaction effect of Time  Stimulus,
F(2,68) D 18.5, p < 0.001, η2p D 0.35. Follow-up t-tests revealed
that SCL for CSC and CS  only differed at the beginning of
the acquisition, t(37) D 6.26, p < 0.001, d D 1.35. Thus, there
was a significant increase in SCL for CSC and a significant
decrease for CS  from the baseline to the beginning of the
acquisition. The SCL results indicate that successful SFC took
place under both condition, but also a fast habituation during
acquisition.
For the extinction phase, an ANOVA showed a
significant main effect of condition, F(1,32) D 4.95,
p D 0.033, η2p D 0.13, and a significant interaction effect of
Time StimulusCondition Social Anxiety, F(1,32)D 101.8,
p D 0.044, η2p D 0.12. A follow-up ANOVA was conducted
TABLE 4 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for contingency ratings during
acquisition and extinction for high- and low-social anxious and both conditions.
CSC CS  NS
M SD M SD M SD
Acquisition
Electroshock condition
Low socially fear 49.9 22.5 35.4 30.5 24.6 22.4
High socially fear 53.4 18.8 35.0 15.3 45.9 24.2
Extinction
Electroshock condition
Low socially fear 51.7 22.2 33.9 28.6 23.4 19.3
High socially fear 57.2 22.3 38.4 28.1 43.3 21.8
Social threat condition
Low socially fear 63.6 13.9 15.6 19.4 27.5 22.4
High socially fear 44.6 19.5 16.7 19.7 29.1 17.3
CSC D agent paired with US, CS  D agent without aversive US, NS D agent
without aversive US and not appearing during the acquisition phase; Social Anxiety
(low vs. high) was measured with the German version of the Social Phobia Inventory
(SPIN; median split D 13.5, Stangier and Steffens, 2002).
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FIGURE 5 | Fear-potentiated startle response (n = 37) for CS+ and CS– in the three phases (baseline, acquisition, and extinction) for the electro shock and social
threat condition. CS+ = agent paired with aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; electro condition = electrical stimulation; social
condition = air blast combined with virtual spitting and insulting. Mean fear-potentiated startles (presented in T-values) was given. Standard errors are presented by
error bars.
FIGURE 6 | Skin conductance level (n = 38) for CS+ and CS– in the three phases (baseline, acquisition, and extinction) for the electro shock and social threat
condition. CS+ = agent paired with aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; electro condition = electrical stimulation; social
condition = air blast combined with virtual spitting and insulting. Mean skin conductance level (presented in T-values) was given. Significant differences are indicated
with an asterisk. Standard errors are presented by error bars.
separately for both conditions. In the electroshock condition,
no significant main or interaction effects were found. In
the social threat condition, a significant interaction effect of
Time  Stimulus  Social Anxiety, F(1,17) D 4.48, p D 0.049,
η2p D 0.21, was detected. Follow-up t-tests conducted separately
for higher and less socially fearful participants neither showed
significant differences between SCL for CSC and CS  at the
beginning nor at the end of the extinction. For NS, a significant
main effect of time, F(1,33) D 7.39, p D 0.010, η2p D 0.18, could
be detected.
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FIGURE 7 | Time in non-motion (n = 36) for CS+ and CS– in the three phases (baseline, acquisition, and extinction) for the electro shock and social threat condition.
CS+ = agent paired with aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; electro condition = electrical stimulation; social condition = air blast
combined with virtual spitting and insulting. Mean time in non-motion (in s) was given. Significant differences are indicated with an asterisk. Standard errors are
presented by error bars.
Avoidance (Time in Non-motion)
Figure 7 shows time in non-motion for the baseline, acquisition
and extinction phase. In the electroshock condition, avoidance
for both stimuli decreases from the baseline to the end of the
acquisition phase as well as from the beginning to the end of
the extinction phase. In the social threat condition, avoidance for
CS  is higher than for CSC at the baseline, and to the end of
the acquisition phase it decreases for CS , whereas avoidance
increases for CSC from the baseline to the beginning until it
decreases at the end of the acquisition. In the extinction phase,
both stimuli do not differ at any point.
For the acquisition phase, an ANOVA confirmed significant
interaction effects of Time  Stimulus, and Condition  Social
Anxiety (please see Table 5 for all significant results of the
ANOVA). Follow-up ANOVA was conducted separately for
both conditions. In the electroshock condition, no significant
interaction effects were found. In the social threat condition,
a significant interaction effect of Time  Stimulus could be
detected. Follow-up t-tests showed that avoidance for CSC
increased from the baseline to the beginning of the acquisition
phase, t(18) D  2.13, p D 0.047, d D 0.33, and decreased from
the beginning to the end of the acquisition phase, t(18) D 3.32,
p D 0.004, d D 0.84. Avoidance for CS  decreased from the
baseline to the beginning of the acquisition, t(18) D 2.35,
p D 0.031, d D 0.53, as well as from the beginning to the end
of the acquisition, t(18) D 2.77, p D 0.013, d D 0.51. Therefore,
the time in non-motion results indicate that successful avoidance
behavior for CSC took place in the social threat condition, but
also a fast adaptation to the US occurred toward the end of the
acquisition.
For the extinction phase, an ANOVA confirmed a significant
interaction effect of Time  Condition. Follow-up ANOVA was
conducted separately for both conditions. In the electroshock
condition, only a significant main effect of social anxiety was
found. In the social threat condition, no significant effects were
found. For NS, a significant main effect of time, F(1,32) D 4.81,
pD 0.036, η2p D 0.13, could be detected.
Avoidance (Time in Motion)
Figure 8 shows time in motion for the baseline, acquisition and
extinction phase. In the electroshock condition, the avoidance of
CS  is higher than of CSC during the baseline. Avoidance toward
CS  decreases from the baseline to the end of the acquisition,
whereas it increases for CSC from the baseline to the beginning
and decreases to the end of the acquisition. In the extinction
phase participants move faster toward CS  and slower toward
CSC from the beginning to the end of the extinction. In the social
threat condition, time to approach both stimuli are equally long
during baseline and increase at the beginning of the acquisition,
until avoidance to both stimuli stay approximately at the same
level at the end of the acquisition. In the extinction phase, the
avoidance of CSC decreases during the extinction, whereas for
CS  it stays on an equal level.
For the acquisition phase, an ANOVA confirmed significant
interaction effects of Time  Stimulus and Condition  Social
Anxiety (please see Table 6 for all significant results of the
ANOVA). Follow-up ANOVAs were conducted separately for
both conditions. In the electroshock condition, a significant
interaction effect of Time  Stimulus could be detected. Follow-
up t-tests revealed that only the CSC significantly increased from
the baseline to the beginning of the acquisition, t(37) D  2.45,
p D 0.026, d D 0.77. In the social threat condition, no significant
interaction effects were found. Therefore, time in motion results
indicate a successful SFC at the beginning of the acquisition in
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TABLE 5 | Significant results of the ANOVAs for avoidance (time in non-motion) of
the acquisition and extinction phase.
Effect df F η2 p
Acquisition
Total
Time 2, 64 10.5 0.25 <0.001
Stimulus 1, 32 9.83 0.24 0.004
Time x Stimulus 2, 64 9.34 0.23 <0.001
Condition  Social Anxiety 1, 32 5.42 0.15 0.026
Electroshock condition
Time 2, 30 4.06 0.21 0.027
Stimulus 1, 15 6.71 0.31 0.020
Social threat condition
Time 2, 34 7.82 0.32 0.002
Stimulus 1, 17 5.27 0.24 0.035
Time  Stimulus 2, 34 7.02 0.29 0.003
Extinction
Total
Social Anxiety 1, 32 4.71 0.13 0.038
Time  Condition 1, 32 4.25 0.12 0.047
Electroshock condition
Social Anxiety 1, 15 9.56 0.39 0.007
df D degrees of freedom; 2 D effect size; Phase D Rating 1 vs. Rating 2 for
the acquisition and Rating 2 vs. Rating 3 for the extinction; Rating 1 D after
baseline, Rating 2 D after acquisition, Rating 3 D after extinction; Stimulus D CSC
vs. CS  vs. NS; CSC D agent paired with the aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US), CS  D agent without aversive US, NS D agent without aversive US and not
appearing during the acquisition phase; Condition D electroshock vs. social threat
condition; Social Anxiety (low vs. high) was measured with the German version
of the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; median split D 13.5, Stangier and Steffens,
2002).
the electroshock condition, but also a fast adaptation to the US
occurred toward the end of the acquisition.
For the extinction phase, an ANOVA confirmed significant
interaction effects of Time Stimulus Condition, and Time
Stimulus  Condition  Social Anxiety. Follow-up ANOVA for
the electroshock condition revealed a significant interaction effect
of Time  Stimulus, and Time  Stimulus  Social Anxiety.
Further follow-up ANOVAs were conducted separately for the
low and high social fear groups, but no significant main or
interaction effects were found. No significant effects were found
in the social threat condition or for the NS.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to replicate and extend the findings
of our previous study we conducted on social fear learning
(Shiban et al., 2015). In order to improve the paradigm, we
investigated the “belongingness effect” (Hamm et al., 1989). To
this end, we designed a social threat condition and compared it to
an electroshock condition during the different phases (baseline,
acquisition and extinction) of the social fear conditioning
paradigm (SFC). Participants actively approached virtual agents
using a joystick in a setting similar to the one used by
Shiban et al. (2015). Social fear learning was examined via
subjective ratings (fear and contingency ratings), physiological
TABLE 6 | Significant results of the ANOVAs for avoidance (time in motion) of the
acquisition and extinction phase.
Effect df F η2 p
Acquisition
Total
Time 2, 64 139.8 0.81 <0.001
Social Anxiety 1, 32 7.07 0.18 0.012
Time  Stimulus 2, 64 4.68 0.13 0.013
Condition  Social Anxiety 1, 32 6.37 0.17 0.017
Electroshock condition
Time 2, 30 75.1 0.83 <0.001
Stimulus 1, 15 5.60 0.27 0.032
Social Anxiety 1, 15 9.18 0.38 0.008
Time  Stimulus 2, 30 4.67 0.24 0.017
Social threat condition
Time 2, 30 5.10 0.25 0.039
Extinction
Total
Time  Stimulus  Condition 1, 32 5.87 0.16 0.021
Time Stimulus Condition
 Social Anxiety
1, 32 6.45 0.17 0.016
Electroshock condition
Time  Stimulus 1, 15 5.02 0.25 0.041
Time  Stimulus  Social
Anxiety
1, 15 6.91 0.32 0.019
df D degrees of freedom; 2 D effect size; Phase D Rating 1 vs. Rating 2 for
the acquisition and Rating 2 vs. Rating 3 for the extinction; Rating 1 D after
baseline, Rating 2 D after acquisition, Rating 3 D after extinction; Stimulus D CSC
vs. CS  vs. NS; CSC D agent paired with the aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US), CS  D agent without aversive US, NS D agent without aversive US and not
appearing during the acquisition phase; Condition D electroshock vs. social threat
condition; Social Anxiety (low vs. high) was measured with the German version
of the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; median split D 13.5, Stangier and Steffens,
2002).
(fear-potentiated startle, skin conductance level) and behavioral
measures (avoidance).
Social fear acquisition was successful according to the fear
and the contingency ratings. In both conditions, these measures
clearly increased for CSC compared to CS  from the baseline
to the end of the acquisition phase. Interestingly, there was a
higher differentiation between CSC and CS  in the social threat
compared to the electroshock condition, which might reflect
a tendency toward higher belongingness in the social threat
condition. Regarding the physiological outcome variables, the
fear-potentiated startle results did not confirm our hypotheses,
as no discrimination between CSC and CS  could be detected.
However, with respect to the SCL, successful fear conditioning
took place at the beginning of the acquisition, whereas a
fast habituation was found toward the end of acquisition,
diminishing any discriminant effects between the CSC and CS .
Furthermore, the avoidance behavior clearly increased for CSC
compared to CS  at the beginning of the acquisition phase for
the time in non-motion in the social threat condition and the time
in motion in the electroshock condition.
Fear extinction was evident in the ratings, as the
differentiation in terms of fear and contingency ratings between
the CSC and the CS  that followed acquisition vanished during
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FIGURE 8 | Time in motion (n = 36) for CS+ and CS– in the three phases (baseline, acquisition, and extinction) for the electro shock and social threat condition.
CS+ = agent paired with aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); CS– = agent without aversive US; electro condition = electrical stimulation; social condition = air blast
combined with virtual spitting and insulting. Mean time in non-motion (in s) was given. Significant differences are indicated with an asterisk. Standard errors are
presented by error bars.
the extinction phase for both experimental groups. However, no
statistically significant extinction was found in the physiological
and behavioral variables. It is possible that the physiological
level had already been subject to a fast extinction process that
can be expected in non-socially phobic individuals before the
designated extinction phase of the experiment.
According to our data, social fear can be induced and
extinguished confirming the operant conditioning paradigm.
Participants did not simply explore the virtual room and the
agents in our (operant) fear conditioning paradigm, but actively
(using a joystick) approached the agents. They were free to
decide how fast they wanted to approach the agents and to
which degree they wanted to avoid them. With participants being
punished while approaching the stimuli (virtual male agents),
our SFC paradigm reflects operant conditioning rather than
classical conditioning processes. Interestingly, less socially fearful
participants differentially evaluated the contingency of CSC,
CS , and NS after extinction in the electroshock condition and
only rated the contingency of the CSC as high, whereas higher
socially fearful participants rated the contingency of the CSC and
the NS on a similar level. Thus, we found a generalization effect in
the contingency ratings between CSC and NS for higher socially
fearful participants. No generalization effect was reflected by the
physiological measures.
Summarizing the results for the subjective ratings as well as the
physiological and behavioral data, our initial hypotheses could be
partially confirmed. The habituation at the end of the acquisition
phase might reflect a fast adaptation to the aversive US. Possibly
the US was not aversive enough to evoke long-lasting fear or the
social anxiety of the sample was too low. Due to the belongingness
effect, a higher differentiation in the subjective ratings between
CSC and CS  in the social threat condition was found.
Our SFC paradigm might have induced an approach-
avoidance conflict. This conflict occurs when a person is faced
with the decision to either pursue or avoid something that is
advantageous in some respects but disadvantageous in others.
In the social threat condition, the avoidance behavior (time
in non-motion) clearly differed between aversive (CSC) and
non-aversive (CS ) stimuli at the beginning of the acquisition.
By comparison, in the electroshock condition the avoidance
behavior (time in motion) clearly increased toward aversive
compared to non-aversive stimuli at the beginning of the
acquisition. Avoiding social situations is a core feature of SAD.
Our paradigm showed increased fear and a partial increase in
avoidance after the presentation of the first four aversive agents
during conditioning. Besides behavioral avoidance, eye-gaze, a
non-verbal social cue, is an important aspect of human social
behavior. Future studies may therefore consider measuring
behavioral approach-avoidance conflict via an eye-tracking
method and analyze the recorded movement trajectories as
an index of avoidance behavior for social anxiety. Identifying
approach- and avoidance-related responses to social stimuli like
emotional face stimuli (e.g., via reaction times for pressing a
button or joystick responses, or through eye-gaze), has already
been investigated in different studies (Mühlberger et al., 2008;
Wieser et al., 2009, 2010; Radke et al., 2013). Wieser et al.
(2010), e.g., reported that high anxiety was related to less gaze
contact and greater backward head movement in response to
male virtual agents, which showed a direct gaze. Furthermore,
Dechant et al. (2017) revealed that highly fearful participants
showed more avoidance in a social fear virtual paradigm than low
fearful participants. It should be noted that avoidance behavior
is a crucial element not only in fear learning but also in the
maintenance of fear. In this study, we only focused on the
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fear learning process. In order to investigate the mechanisms
of avoidance behavior in SAD in its entirety, we recommend
future research to also study the role of safety behaviors in the
maintenance of SAD.
In past studies using stimuli of low ecological validity with
regard to the nature of SAD, it remained unclear whether socially
fearful persons react more sensitively to socially relevant stimuli.
Our social threat condition utilizes social stimuli, which are
likely to be disorder-relevant for SAD. Thus, our social threat
condition might be more suitable for investigating social anxiety
due to a higher belongingness between the CS and the US
and consequently an enhanced ecological validity of the design.
Furthermore, not using electric shocks may make the recruitment
of clinical samples easier for future studies. Empirical findings
indicate that successful conditioning in highly fearful individuals
cannot only be induced by effective non-social US (i.e., electric
shocks), but also by social stimuli, such as emotional facial
expressions paired with compatible verbal feedback (Lissek et al.,
2008) or isolated verbal comments (Ahrens et al., 2014). In
the present study, conditioning was successful and avoidance
behavior could be observed in both conditions. Still, there was a
better differentiation between aversive and non-aversive stimuli
in the social threat condition. One explanation for not having
observed an enhanced belongingness effect in our study could
be that the high social anxiety group showed a low SPIN score
(median score D 13.5) as well. According to Connor et al. (2000)
a SPIN score of 19 distinguishes between social phobia subjects
and controls.
It is noteworthy that participants undergoing electrical
stimulation typically have a more robust fear response both
before and after acquisition and extinction (Schmitz and Grillon,
2012) and rate the shock as more aversive than alternative stimuli
such as a female scream (Glenn et al., 2012), suggesting that
they tend to overestimate the probability of aversive stimuli
when being physically harmed. However, this effect could
not be found in the contingency ratings, and although the
subjective fear ratings before acquisition were generally higher
for subjects in the electroshock condition, the fear ratings for
the CSC after acquisition barely differed. Furthermore, we found
a better differentiation between the CSC and the CS  both
after the acquisition and the extinction phases in the social
threat condition than in the electroshock condition, indicating
that the social threat is more realistic than the electroshock
condition. These findings partially confirm our hypothesis that
acquisition and resistance to extinction are intensified by a sense
of belongingness between the CS and the applied US. This is an
important fact which should be taken into consideration in future
research.
An issue regarding the experimental setting is the linguistic
label of the fear ratings. Many subjects reported that it was not
actually fear they had experienced, but a feeling comparable
with unpleasantness or, especially in the case of the virtual
spitting, even disgust. Being spat at might not only induce
social fear (as expected for a socially fearful person) but
also cause disgust. Still, being spat at along with hearing the
agent say “go away” is a social situation that is expected
to elicit emotions similar to the ones induced in a social
fearful or phobic patient. In order to investigate if conditioning
had caused social fear or simply disgust, we could have
asked participants which emotions had been elicited by the
conditioning paradigm. Updating the understanding of SAD,
future studies should measure disgust and similar emotions.
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that the three
virtual agents differed in clothing, hair color and facial design,
which might have led to an association of the US with the
external stimuli instead of the situation. As a further limitation
of the current study, our non-clinical sample was limited to
young students with a high proportion of female students, which
should be taken into account when generalizing the results to
a broader population. However, as social phobia is twice as
prevalent in women than in men, females are an interesting
target group for our paradigm (Bandelow and Wedekind,
2014).
Despite these facts, all in all our paradigm has been shown
to be suitable for investigating the acquisition and extinction
of social fear in a VR setting similar to the paradigm used by
Shiban et al. (2015). As in this previous work, results support
the translation of the SFC paradigm by Toth et al. (2012) from
the mice model to human studies. Further research is needed
to expand these findings by increasing the sample size and
by testing patients suffering from social phobia. Treatment for
this widespread health issue could potentially be enhanced by
optimizing the extinction process that is strived for in exposure
therapy. Furthermore, it is an interesting research question
if patients suffering from social phobia could benefit from
extinction processes in different contexts as Dunsmoor et al.
(2014) could verify for healthy humans.
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Those Virtual People all Look the
Same to me: Computer-Rendered
Faces Elicit a Higher False Alarm
Rate Than Real Human Faces in a
Recognition Memory Task
Jari Kätsyri*
Brain and Emotion Laboratory, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands
Virtual as compared with real human characters can elicit a sense of uneasiness in human
observers, characterized by lack of familiarity and even feelings of eeriness (the “uncanny
valley” hypothesis). Here we test the possibility that this alleged lack of familiarity is literal in
the sense that people have lesser perceptual expertise in processing virtual as compared
with real human faces. Sixty-four participants took part in a recognition memory study
in which they first learned a set of faces and were then asked to recognize them in a
testing session. We used real and virtual (computer-rendered) versions of the same faces,
presented in either upright or inverted orientation. Real and virtual faces were matched
for low-level visual features such as global luminosity and spatial frequency contents. Our
results demonstrated a higher response bias toward responding “seen before” for virtual
as compared with real faces, which was further explained by a higher false alarm rate
for the former. This finding resembles a similar effect for recognizing human faces from
other than one’s own ethnic groups (the “other race effect”). Virtual faces received clearly
higher subjective eeriness ratings than real faces. Our results did not provide evidence of
poorer overall recognition memory or lesser inversion effect for virtual faces, however. The
higher false alarm rate finding supports the notion that lesser perceptual expertise may
contribute to the lack of subjective familiarity with virtual faces. We discuss alternative
interpretations and provide suggestions for future research.
Keywords: artificial faces, face recognition, face memory, face inversion, uncanny valley hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
Virtual environments and augmented realities are not only changing the way we perceive “reality”
but also the way we perceive and interact with its real and virtual inhabitants. Even though many
individuals frequently encounter realistic virtual characters in video games and other media (e.g.,
animation films), most of our perceptual expertise is arguably still shaped by our interactions with
our biological companions. For example, parents’ faces are among the very first things newborns
encounter after being born, and an innate interest in human faces remains characteristic to typically
developing children. According to the “uncanny valley” hypothesis (Mori, 1970), artificial entities
bearing a near-identical resemblance to real humans elicit a sense of uneasiness, characterized
by lack of familiarity and even feelings of eeriness, even though increasingly realistic artificial
52
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characters in general tend to elicit more positive responses.
Although empirical evidence for the pronounced unfamiliarity
of near-human entities still appears inconsistent, the bulk of
studies support the overall positive association between realism
and familiarity (Kätsyri et al., 2015). Abundant exposure to
real human faces from an early life could possibly explain the
lack of subjective familiarity with virtual faces. In this case,
human observers should conversely possess lesser perceptual
expertise in processing virtual as compared with real faces. In
the present study, we investigate whether participants are indeed
impoverished in processing virtual faces—that is, faces that are
close yet distinguishable computer-generated approximations of
real faces.
Several lines of evidence suggest that the human visual system
possesses perceptual expertise with faces that is shaped by
exposure (even though social-cognitive motivational factors may
also play a role; e.g., Bernstein et al., 2007). One of the earliest
and best documented examples is the tendency for perceivers
to have more accurate recognition memory for faces from one’s
own ethnic group in comparison to faces from other ethnicities
(Meissner and Brigham, 2001; Young et al., 2012). Algorithmic
analysis of three-dimensional head scans has provided support
for one prerequisite of this effect, the existence of ethnicity-
characteristic facial features (O’Toole et al., 1991; Salah et al.,
2008). More accurate recognition of own-ethnicity faces has
become widely known as the other-race effect, own-race bias, or
cross-race effect. Such terms may be misleading, however, given
that this effect is not only biologically determined. For example,
individuals from one country who were adopted into another
country at an early age showed a reversal of the effect such that
they recognized faces originating from their adoption country
better than faces originating from their birth country (Sangrigoli
et al., 2005). In a similar vein, training has been shown to reduce
the recognition disadvantage for other-ethnicity faces (e.g., Hills
and Lewis, 2006; Tanaka and Pierce, 2009). Guiding participant’s
attention to features that are characteristic of other-ethnicity
faces can also eliminate the effect (Hills et al., 2013). Such
findings both exemplify the malleability of the other-ethnicity
effect and argue against its biologically or racially determined
origins. Furthermore, the term “race” itself has been called into
question both in biology and neuroscience because of its inexact
and prejudiced nature (Yudell et al., 2016; Cubelli and Della Sala,
2017). Hence, following Valentine et al. (2016), we refer to this
phenomenon as the own-ethnicity bias (OEB). Biases resembling
the OEB have been demonstrated also for other variables besides
ethnicity—for example, men have better recognition memory
for male than female faces, whereas the opposite holds true for
women (Wright and Sladden, 2003). This suggests that also the
processing of own-gender faces may be fine-tuned by possibly
greater exposure to same-gender individuals.
Most studies documenting the OEB effect have used a
standard old-new recognition memory paradigm in which
participants are first asked to memorize a set of faces and then
tested for their ability to discriminate between previously seen
(target) and previously unseen (distractor) faces (Meissner and
Brigham, 2001). Typical findings show a “mirror effect” in which
own-ethnicity faces yield a higher proportion of hits (targets
identified as previously seen) and a lower proportion of false
alarms (distractors identified as previously seen) as compared
to other-ethnicity faces (e.g., Meissner et al., 2005). Inflated
false alarm rate for other-ethnicity faces means that people
tend to confuse individuals from other ethnic groups readily
with one another—a phenomenon which could be characterized
anecdotally with the statement “They all look the same to me”
(e.g., Ackerman et al., 2006).
The finding that ethnicity modulates not only the proportion
of hit rates but the proportion of false alarms as well has been
previously explained in the framework of the face-space coding
model of Valentine (Valentine, 1991; Valentine et al., 2016).
Generally speaking, this model suggests that faces are represented
mentally in a multidimensional space. These dimensions can
correspond to any features that serve to discriminate between
individuals (e.g., mouth shape or inter-ocular distance); however,
they are not explicitly defined by the model. Face-space model
posits that these dimensions are selected and scaled to optimize
discrimination of frequently encountered faces. Hence, these
dimensions are optimized for own-ethnicity faces that are
by definition encountered frequently but, assuming infrequent
encounters with other ethnic groups, they are less efficient for
encoding differences between other-ethnicity faces (cf. Valentine,
1991). As a result, different other-ethnicity faces can share
identical values on several dimensions, which means that they
end up being clustered more densely in the face-space than own-
ethnicity faces. Conversely, encountering an other-ethnicity face
activates more exemplars in the face-space, which makes it more
difficult to determine whether that face was in fact encountered
previously or whether it is merely similar to other previously seen
faces. According to the model, this ultimately generates a higher
proportion of false alarms for other-ethnicity faces as compared
with own-ethnicity faces.
Inversion effect, or the slower and much less accurate
recognition of upside-down as compared with upright faces,
is considered one of the hallmarks of perceptual expertise
with faces or other well-learned objects (Maurer et al., 2002).
Allegedly, inversion has a greater effect on configural (or holistic;
perceiving relations among features) than featural (or piece-meal;
processing individual features) processing of faces. A possible
alternative explanation based on the face-space model could be
that face inversion, similarly as many other impairments (e.g.,
blurring, adding noise, or presenting photographic negatives),
simply introduces noise to face encoding (Valentine, 1991).
Although the interaction between the OEB and inversion is
not entirely uncontroversial (for a review, see Young et al.,
2012), evidence exists for a greater inversion effect in own-
ethnicity than other-ethnicity faces (e.g., Rhodes et al., 1989;
Vizioli et al., 2011). Such findings are consistent with the
notion that individuals possess more perceptual expertise with
own- as compared with other-ethnicity faces. Furthermore, they
contradict the notion that inversion would simply add noise to
face encoding because if this were the case, inversion should elicit
even greater impairment on the already impoverished encoding
of other-ethnicity faces. Hence, these findings also suggest that
other-ethnicity faces may be processed in a more featural or
piece-meal fashion than own-ethnicity faces.
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We next turn to the question of whether the processing
of virtual faces could be similar to other-ethnicity faces when
it comes to face encoding; or more specifically, mirror and
inversion effects in face recognition. First, however, we note that
contemporary computer-rendering methods do not yet tap face
processing expertise fully to the same extent than real human
faces. Arguably, FaceGen Modeler (Singular Inversions) is one
of the most versatile and most commonly used programs for
face perception experiments (e.g., Cook et al., 2012; MacDorman
et al., 2013; Balas and Pacella, 2015; Crookes et al., 2015). This
program can be used to create both reconstructions of real faces
and randomly generated novel faces in a parametric space derived
from a large number of three-dimensional face scans (Blanz
and Vetter, 1999). Recently, Crookes et al. (2015) contrasted
the OEB for real and FaceGen-generated virtual faces using face
recognition memory and perceptual discrimination tasks. Their
results demonstrated reduced accuracy for virtual faces in both
tasks, and an attenuated OEB for virtual as compared with real
faces in the recognition memory task. These findings hence show
that virtual faces based on FaceGen software are close but not
perfect reconstructions of real human faces, and that they elicit a
similar but weaker OEB effect than real faces. In a similar recent
study, Balas and Pacella (2015) contrasted recognition memory
and discrimination accuracy between virtual and real faces, where
the former were again generated by FaceGen. Their results
demonstrated that participants were less accurate in recognizing
virtual faces in comparison to real faces. Similarly, participants
were less accurate in matching two faces to an immediately
preceding face image in an ABX matching task.
Even though these two studies demonstrate that FaceGen-
generated virtual face stimuli perform less efficiently than
real human faces, it is questionable whether their results can
be generalized to other virtual faces as well. An important
distinction between other-ethnicity faces and virtual faces is that
whereas other-ethnicity faces may possess genuine ethnicity-
characteristic features (cf. O’Toole et al., 1991; Salah et al., 2008),
virtual faces are recognized as “virtual” only when they fail
to replicate some characteristics of their reference stimuli (real
faces). For example, it is possible that FaceGen-generated virtual
faces are artifactual or less detailed replications of real faces, or
that they differ from real faces in terms of brightness, contrast,
or colors. The extent to which such trivial low-level differences
could explain previously observed differences between real and
virtual faces is presently not known.
An unfortunate characteristic of all virtual faces is that they
can in fact have very little in common. This raises the question of
whether it is at all justifiable to consider virtual faces as a unified
category of research stimuli. Previous studies investigating
continua from virtual to real faces have, however, shown that
virtual faces are perceived categorically; that is, equally spaced
image pairs are discriminated better when they straddle the
virtual–real category boundary than when they reside on the
same side of it (Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Cheetham et al.,
2011). Changes in virtual–real category in sequentially presented
faces are also known to elicit fMRI responses in category
learning and uncertainty related neural networks (Cheetham
et al., 2011). These findings suggest that virtual and real faces
are typically perceived as distinct categories, similarly as faces
of different species (Campbell et al., 1997) or faces of different
ethnic groups (Levin and Angelone, 2002). Furthermore,
exposure may also modulate categorization and evaluation of
virtual faces. Burleigh and Schoenherr (2015) demonstrated
that more frequent exposure to specific morph levels between
two computer-generated faces improves categorization accuracy
for these levels. Frequency-based exposure was also found to
modulate participants’ subjective ratings, albeit at a statistically
non-significant level.
In the present investigation, we operationalize virtual faces
using FaceGen but also correct them for most obvious artifacts,
and match real and virtual faces with respect to specific low-
level visual features. The purpose of this procedure is to increase
the generalizability of present results beyond that of a specific
computer-rendering method. A justifiable concern after such
matching procedure, however, is whether real and virtual faces
can still be discriminated from each other. Trivially, if computer-
generated images were sufficiently similar to real images, the two
would be indistinguishable from each other even by experts (cf.
Lehmuskallio et al., 2018).
STUDY 1
In this study, we first investigate whether real and virtual face
images can be differentiated from each other even after they have
been matched for the following low-level visual features: spatial
frequency contents (level of details), brightness, contrast, and
colors. Most obvious artifacts are also removed from the virtual
faces. Importantly, this matching is done for whole images, that
is, at global level. It is possible that even after such global-level
matching, local features such as the shapes of individual features
may serve to differentiate between real and virtual faces. Subtle
artifacts may also remain in the local features of virtual faces.
Furthermore, it is possible that low-level visual features still vary
at the local level after they have been matched globally. For
example, it is possible that nose and eye region brightness might
differ in two images even though their averages remained the
same. Conversely, we predict that real and virtual faces can still
be differentiated from each other based on any of such local
differences. Hence, wemake the following hypothesis for Study 1:
H1: Real and virtual faces can be differentiated from each other,
even after global-level matching for spatial frequency contents,
brightness, contrast, and colors.
In practical terms, colors add extra complications to
psychophysical experiments given that one has to consider
matching three color channels between images instead of only
one luminosity channel. Hence, our secondary research question
is whether colors truly contribute to differentiating virtual from
real faces. Previous studies suggest that real and virtual faces are
easier to discriminate from color than grayscale images (Fan
et al., 2012, 2014; Farid and Bravo, 2012). However, given that
these studies used different image sets for real and virtual faces, it
is conceivable that these results would reflect differences between
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 136254
Kätsyri Recognition Memory for Virtual Faces
the employed image samples. Hence, we also aim to test the
following secondary hypothesis.
H2: Real and virtual faces are discriminated better from color than
grayscale images.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 48 (29 women) university students whose age
ranged from 18 to 30 years (M = 20.9 years). All participants
identified themselves as Caucasian in ethnic origin. Participants
signed to the study anonymously using the SONA system
(http://www.sona-systems.com) of Maastricht University, and
received course credit in compensation for their participation.
All participants gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The present studies were
reviewed and approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty
of Psychology and Neuroscience.
Design
The study had a 2 (face type: real, virtual) × 2 (spatial frequency
matching: strict, lenient) × 2 (colors: grayscale, color) within-
subjects design.
Stimuli
Research stimulus samples are shown in Figure 1. Real face
stimuli were 12 neutral face images (half female) from Glasgow
(Burton et al., 2010) and Radboud (Langner et al., 2010) face
image sets. Virtual face stimuli were created using FaceGen
Modeler (Singular Inversions; Version 3.13). Real faces (frontal
images only) were imported into FaceGen, and an initial
alignment was provided using a number of feature points.
Reconstructed and original faces were aligned and matched with
each other to the extent possible with respect to small variations
in head position, gaze direction, and facial expression. Major
artifacts (in particular, black line between the lips) were corrected
in Photoshop (Adobe; Version CS6). All images were oval-
masked to conceal external features (ears and hair), which would
otherwise have been clearly unrealistic in the virtual stimuli. Final
images were 246× 326 pixels in size.
All further image manipulations were carried out in Matlab
(The Mathworks Inc.; Version R2016a). Grayscale images
were produced by weighting original RGB channel values.
Inhouse functions based on SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel
et al., 2010) were used for standardizing images. Two methods
were used for matching energy at different spatial frequencies
across the images: matching the whole Fourier spectra (“strict
matching”) and matching only the rotational average of the
Fourier spectra (“lenient matching”)—for details, please refer
to Willenbockel et al. (2010). We used the latter matching
procedure in place of original (non-matched) images, given
that leniently matched and original images were practically
identical and led to similar results in pilot tests. Prior to
spatial frequency matching, image backgrounds were substituted
by the average pixel intensity values within the masked face
regions to reduce sharp transitions in the images. Mean and
standard deviations for the pixel values within the masked
region were standardized across images, and backgrounds in
the final images were substituted with a constant gray color.
For color images, image matching was carried out separately
for each RGB channel (cf. Kobayashi et al., 2012; Railo et al.,
2016).
Procedure
This study was carried out as an online evaluation, which was
programmed and hosted through Qualtrics platform (http://
www.qualtrics.com). Only participants using a laptop or a
desktop computer with a sufficiently large display (minimum
12”) were included. A total of 96 stimuli (8 conditions ×
12 actors) were presented in a pseudo-randomized order.
Participants were asked to identify whether each stimulus
portrayed a human or a virtual face in a one-interval forced
choice task with two response alternatives. Participants were also
asked to indicate how confident they were of their choice using
a 5-step Likert scale (1—uncertain, 2—somewhat uncertain,
3—somewhat certain, 4—certain, 5—absolutely certain). The
questionnaire was self-paced, but participants were instructed to
answer each question as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Participants were required to carry out the questionnaire in a
single session without breaks.
Preprocessing
Hit and false alarm rates for the identification task were
transformed into sensitivity index d’ and response bias index
c, calculated according to signal detection theory using the
following standard formulae (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999;
Chapter 2 in Stevens and Pashler, 2002).
d′ = z (H)− z (F)
c = −
1
2
(z (H)+ z (F))
Here, hit rate (H) refers to the proportion of real faces identified
correctly as human, and false alarm rate (F) refers to the
proportion of virtual faces identified incorrectly as human.
Following the guidelines of Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), H and
F were corrected using log-linear method to avoid incalculable
values. In the present study, d′ reflects the extent to which
participants were able to differentiate between real and virtual
faces. Theoretically, c can be understood as the difference
between participants’ response criterion and neutral point where
neither response alternative is favored. In the present one-
interval task, response criterion can be interpreted in terms of
“human” responses. Positive values refer to more conservative
response criterion or a tendency to respond “virtual,” whereas
negative values refer to more liberal response criterion or
tendency toward responding “human” for all faces.
Results and Discussion
Results for different conditions are illustrated in Figure 2.
For testing H1, we first compared d′ scores to zero using
one-sample T-tests. Test results showed that d′ scores were
significantly above zero in all conditions, T(47) > 10.01,
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d > 1.44, which indicates that real
and virtual faces were clearly differentiated from each other
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FIGURE 1 | Sample images for one actor extracted from the Glasgow face set (Burton et al., 2010). Upper row: color images, bottom row: grayscale images. From
left to right: real face after lenient spatial frequency matching, virtual face after lenient matching, real face after strict matching, and virtual face after strict matching.
Only strictly matched color images (surrounded by dark-yellow square on the top-right corner) were used in Study 2.
FIGURE 2 | Mean (and SEM) values for d’ sensitivity index, c response bias index, hit rate, and false alarm rate for the identification task by color and spatial frequency
matching conditions. Statistically significant differences between color and grayscale images are denoted with an asterisk (“*”).
in all experimental conditions. Next, a 2×2 within-subjects
ANOVA was used to assess the influence of color and
spatial frequency matching on d′ scores. Significant main
effects were observed for spatial frequency matching, F(1, 47)
= 26.08, p < 0.001, np
2
= 0.36, and color, F(1, 47) = 25.34,
p < 0.001, np
2
= 0.35. Strict matching elicited lower d′
sensitivity scores than lenient matching (Figure 2). As predicted
by H2, color images elicited higher d′ scores than grayscale
images.
For completeness, we also analyzed response bias values
using similar analysis. We observed a significant main effect for
color, F(1, 47) = 25.17, p < 0.001, np
2
= 0.35, and a significant
interaction between spatial frequency matching and color, F(1, 47)
= 5.25, p = 0.027, np
2
= 0.10. Specifically, color images elicited
higher c values (bias toward responding “virtual”) than grayscale
images. This effect was weaker for strictly than leniently filtered
images (Figure 2), which may suggest that it was partly obscured
by the strict filtering procedure (however, similar effect was
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not observed for false alarm rates; see below). To understand
these results better, we next analyzed hit and false alarm rates
individually. Color images elicited a lower proportion of false
alarms than grayscale images, F(1, 47) = 30.38, p < 0.001, np
2
= 0.39. In other words, when shown in color, virtual faces
were mistaken less frequently for real faces. There was also
a non-significant tendency toward a higher false alarm rate
for strictly rather than leniently filtered faces, F(1, 47) = 3.91,
p = 0.054, np
2
= 0.08. Interaction between spatial frequency
matching and color was not significant, F(1, 47) < 1, p =
0.432, np
2
= 0.01. No significant effects were observed for hit
rates, which suggests that both sensitivity and response bias
findings were driven mainly by changes in false alarm rates.
We interpret these results to mean that colors are particularly
important for recognizing virtual faces as artificial but have
a smaller role for the correct recognition of real faces as
human.
Confidence ratings were additionally analyzed using a 2
(color) × 2 (spatial frequency matching) × 2 (face type) within-
subjects ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect for
spatial frequencymatching, F(1, 47)= 75.30, p< 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.62,
and a significant interaction effect for color and face type, F(1, 47)
= 7.19, p = 0.010, np
2
= 0.13. Strict as compared with lenient
spatial frequency matching elicited generally lower confidence
ratings regardless of face type (M = 3.47 and 3.77, SD = 0.48
and 0.49). Simple effect tests showed that confidence ratings for
color and grayscale images differed only for virtual faces (p =
0.003). Specifically, participants rated higher confidence when
categorizing virtual faces from color rather than grayscale images
(M = 3.81 and 3.56, SD = 0.49 and 0.55). This finding further
corroborates the importance of colors for recognizing virtual
faces.
Not surprisingly, the present results showed that the
“strict” spatial frequency matching procedure elicited lower
discrimination performance and lower confidence ratings than
the “lenient” procedure, which we considered analogous to
unmatched stimuli. At the same time, our results confirmed
that highly realistic virtual faces (cf. Figure 1) could still be
differentiated from real human faces relatively easily even after
the strict matching procedure. Given that any experimental
comparison between unmatched real and virtual faces would be
confounded by differences in spatial frequency contents (e.g.,
overall lack of details in virtual faces), we hence decided to adopt
the strict matching procedure for our second experiment. Our
other findings replicate the previous finding (Fan et al., 2012,
2014; Farid and Bravo, 2012), with slightly better controlled
stimuli, that real and virtual faces are differentiated better
and with higher confidence from color as compared with
grayscale images. A closer inspection of false alarm rates as
well as participants’ confidence ratings suggested that colors are
particularly important for the correct recognition of virtual faces.
Interestingly, visual inspection of Figure 2 would suggest that
color has a roughly similar effect on discrimination accuracy
than the present choice of spatial frequency matching. Hence, we
conclude that adopting color rather than grayscale images can be
used to compensate for the loss of discrimination accuracy caused
by strict spatial frequency matching.
STUDY 2
In the second study, we continue to investigate whether our
rigorouslymatched virtual faces tap perceptual expertise similarly
as real human faces. We expect to observe a similar mirror
pattern as in previous OEB studies in which other-ethnicity faces
elicited both a lower proportion of hits and a higher proportion of
false alarms than own-ethnicity faces (e.g., Meissner et al., 2005).
Following this pattern, aggregatemeasures based on hits and false
alarms have previously indicated lower discrimination accuracy
(discrimination between previously seen and novel faces) and
lower response bias (overall tendency to respond “previously
seen” to all faces) for other-ethnicity faces. We predict analogous
effects for virtual faces. That is,
H1: Virtual faces will elicit lower discrimination accuracy than
real faces.
H2: Virtual faces will elicit lower response bias than real faces.
Previous findings suggest that inflated false alarm rate for
other-ethnicity faces—or the “They all look the same to me”
phenomenon—is a major factor driving the OEB effect. One
explanation for this is that facial encoding dimensions in the
face-space model of Valentine (Valentine, 1991; Valentine et al.,
2016) are optimized for discriminating frequently seen own-
ethnicity faces but that they are suboptimal when it comes to
the discrimination of other-ethnicity faces. Assuming that virtual
faces contain sufficiently different or distorted features with
respect to real human faces, we predict a similar effect for virtual
faces as well. That is, we predict that:
H3: Virtual faces will elicit a higher proportion of false alarms than
real faces.
In the present study, we also investigate the effect of inversion
on the recognition of virtual faces. In their previous study,
Balas and Pacella (2015) observed an equally large inversion
effect for virtual and real faces in a perceptual discrimination
task. Performance was close to ceiling level for both upright
and inverted faces, however, which leaves open the possibility
that a more difficult task might be more sensitive to differential
inversion effects in real and virtual faces. A diminished inversion
effect for virtual faces could be taken as evidence that virtual faces
are processed in a more piece-meal and less “face-like” manner
than real faces. Here we test the following prediction:
H4: Real faces will elicit a greater inversion effect asmeasuredwith
discrimination accuracy than virtual faces.
Previous factor-analytic research on participants’ self-reports
have demonstrated that the typicality (or distinctiveness) of
faces is composed of two orthogonal components: memorability
and general or context-free familiarity (Vokey and Read, 1992;
Meissner et al., 2005). For the present context, it is interesting
that the latter factor combines familiarity with attractiveness
and likability. That is, faces resembling frequently encountered
faces evoke not only a heightened sense of familiarity, but more
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favorable evaluations as well (Vokey and Read, 1992). Even
more interestingly, own-ethnicity faces are known to receive
higher ratings in terms of these items than other-ethnicity
faces (Meissner et al., 2005). One way to interpret this is that
familiarity with specific kinds of faces breeds more positive
affects, which could also explain why all virtual faces appear more
strange and unpleasant—or even eerie—than real human faces
(Kätsyri et al., 2015). Another line of research has demonstrated
that inversion can eliminate grotesqueness caused by distorted
configural features. In particular, this seems to be the case for
the so-called Thatcher illusion, in which eyes and mouth are
flipped vertically (Stürzel and Spillmann, 2000). If typical human
features are distorted in virtual faces, virtual faces should elicit
less favorable evaluations than real human faces. Furthermore, if
these features are at least partly configural in nature, inversion
should reduce their effects. These two hypotheses are stated
explicitly below.
H5: Virtual faces receive higher eeriness ratings than real faces.
H6: Inversion decreases the eeriness of virtual as compared with
real faces.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 64 (32 men and 32 women) university
students or university graduates in the age range 18 to 36 years
(M = 22.6 years). Participants were recruited via the SONA
system of Maastricht University, flyers placed in the campus,
and social media. Two original participants who scored high
on PI20 prosopagnosia self-report questionnaire (Shah et al.,
2015) and additionally received low overall scores in the present
recognition memory task were excluded and replaced with
new participants. Male and female participants did not differ
statistically significantly on PI20 scores (M = 39.1 and 40.7,
SD = 8.1 and 7.7), T(62) = 0.84, p = 0.407. The majority (89%)
of participants reported having played video games with realistic
human-like characters at most once per month during the last
year. That is, most participants had little experience with realistic
virtual characters. All participants identified themselves as
Caucasian in ethnic origin. Participants received a 7.5 e voucher
in compensation for their participation. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The present studies were reviewed and approved by the
ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience.
Stimuli
Research stimuli were 80 neutral face images (half female) from
Glasgow (Burton et al., 2010) and Radboud (Langner et al., 2010)
face image sets, replicated both as real and virtual versions. Face
images were selected on the basis of distinctiveness preratings
(cf. Valentine, 1991; McKone et al., 2007) from a larger set of
100 face images. These initial images were oval-masked and
matched for luminance, contrast and colors but not for spatial
frequency contents. Twenty-five participants who did not take
part in the actual study rated the images for distinctiveness
on a 7-step semantic differential scale ranging from “very
typical/very difficult to recognize” to “very distinctive/very easy
to recognize.” Twenty images were dropped on the basis of
individual consideration and the remaining 80 images were
divided evenly into eight stimulus sets based on their mean
ratings. Finally, the selected images were replicated as real and
virtual versions and matched for low-level features similarly as
the strictly matched color images in Study 1 (Figure 1).
Procedure
The present study design was adapted from two previous OEB
studies that included both face ethnicity and inversion as factors
(Rhodes et al., 1989; Vizioli et al., 2011). In particular, participants
completed standard recognition memory tasks separately for real
and virtual faces, with the task order counterbalanced across
participants. Recognition memory tasks for real and virtual faces
were separated by a 2-min break. Both tasks consisted of a
study and a test phase. During the study phase, participants were
asked to view and memorize 20 faces presented in a pseudo-
randomized order. Each face was presented for 5 s and preceded
by a fixation cross for 2 s. All study faces were shown in upright
orientation.
In the test phase, the 20 old faces (seen during the study phase)
were interleaved with 20 new faces, and all faces were presented
in a pseudo-randomized order. Half of the images were shown in
upright orientation and the other half in inverted (rotated 180◦)
orientation. Participants were instructed to answer as quickly
and as accurately as possible whether they had seen each face
during the study phase or not using response buttons “S” and
“L” on the keyboard. The assignment of response buttons was
counterbalanced across participants. Each image remained on the
screen until a response was received from the participant, and
images were separated by 2-s fixation cross trials. Participants saw
only real or virtual faces during the same study-test cycle. The
eight stimulus sets were counterbalanced with the face type, trial
type, and orientation conditions. Male and female participants
were assigned evenly into counterbalancing conditions. Prior to
the actual recognition memory tasks, participants practiced the
study-test procedure with 20 faces which were not included in
the actual study.
After the recognition memory tasks, participants were asked
to evaluate how human-like and eerie the faces appeared on
a 7-step Likert scale ranging from total disagreement to total
agreement. Eeriness was defined as “being so mysterious, strange,
or unexpected as to send a chill up the spine.” Participants
rated the same 80 faces they had seen during the memory tasks,
each with the same face type (real or virtual) and orientation
(upright or inverted). To test whether the order of human-
likeness and eeriness ratings would bias the results, participants
gave these ratings in either separate blocks beginning from
human-likeness (16 participants), in separate blocks beginning
from eeriness (16 participants), or simultaneously in the same
block (32 participants). In the former two conditions, human-
likeness and eeriness were only explained prior to the beginning
of their respective blocks. Male and female participants were
assigned evenly into these conditions. All tasks were programmed
and presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA), and displayed on a 24” Asus VG248QEmonitor.
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Preprocessing
Hit and false alarm rates were transformed into d′ sensitivity
and c response bias indices similarly as in Study 1. In this study
sensitivity d′ reflects the extent to which participants were able
to differentiate between old (seen during the study phase) and
new (not seen) faces, whereas response bias c refers to the general
tendency to respond “seen” or “not seen.” Positive c values refer
to more conservative response criterion or a tendency to respond
“not seen” for all faces, whereas negative values refer to more
liberal response criterion or tendency toward responding “seen”
for all faces.
Results
Recognition of Real and Virtual Faces
We used 2×2 within-subjects ANOVAs to analyze the effects of
face type and orientation on sensitivity (d′) and response bias
(c) indices on the one hand, and hit and false alarm rates on
the other. We also tested whether any of these indices were
influenced by the order of real and virtual face blocks but failed
to observe any significant effects for block order or its interaction
with face type (p > 0.270, η2p < 0.02). This suggests that block
order did not exert substantial generic or face type specific effects
in the present study. Given that we had clear a priori predictions
for our results, we did not adopt multiple-comparison correction
in further analyses.
Recognition memory results are illustrated in Figure 3.
Although visual inspection of this figure suggests that sensitivity
scores were slightly higher for real as compared with virtual
faces, as predicted by H1, this effect failed to reach statistical
significance, F(1, 63) = 2.75, p= 0.102, η
2
p = 0.04.
Hypothesis H2 predicted a more lenient response bias (i.e.,
lower c scores) for virtual faces. Figure 3 suggests that response
bias may have been less conservative for virtual than for real
faces, but only in the upright condition. Given that face inversion
exerted a considerable impairment on the processing of faces (see
below), stronger response bias effects should in fact have been
expected particularly for upright faces. In support, we observed
a borderline significant interaction effect between face type and
inversion, F(1, 63) = 3.94, p = 0.052, η
2
p = 0.059. Consequently,
we decided to test H2 specifically for upright faces. This analysis
confirmed a statistically significant and moderately large (Cohen,
1992) effect for face type in upright faces, F(1, 63) = 4.40,
p = 0.040, η2p = 0.650, but not in inverted faces, F(1, 63) = 0.78,
p= 0.381, η2p = 0.012.
Following the above logic, we next tested the effect of face
type on false alarm rates in upright condition. In support of H3,
our results demonstrated a significantly higher false alarm rate
with a moderate effect size for virtual rather than real faces in
upright orientation (see Figure 3), F(1, 63) = 6.14, p = 0.016,
η
2
p = 0.089, but not in inverted orientation, F(1, 63) = 0.00,
p = 1.000, η2p = 0.00. For hit rate, the effect of face type was
not significant in either upright orientation, F(1, 63) = 0.33,
p = 0.568, η2p = 0.005, or in inverted orientation, F(1, 63) = 1.75,
p = 0.191, η2p = 0.027. These findings suggest that the more
lenient response bias for upright virtual faces was driven mainly
by false alarm responses, that is, participants’ higher tendency
to answer “seen before” to novel virtual faces. The 95% CI for
the false alarm rate difference between virtual and real faces was
[0.01, 0.10].
Inversion had a statistically significant and large effect on
sensitivity, F(1, 63) = 94.73, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.601, and response
bias, F(1, 63) = 15.39, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.196. As can be seen
in Figure 3, inverted faces received lower sensitivity scores and
more liberal response criterion (lower c scores). Looking at this
the other way, inverted faces received moderately lower hit rates,
F(1, 63)= 5.58, p= 0.021, η
2
p = 0.081, andmuch higher false alarm
rates, F(1, 63) = 78.67, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.555, than upright faces
(Figure 3, lower panels). For inverted and upright faces, the 95%
CI for the false alarm rate difference was [0.15, 0.24].
Contrary to H4, the interaction effect between face type and
inversion on d′ was not statistically significant, F(1, 63) = 0.15,
p = 0.700, η2p = 0.002. Conversely, simple tests confirmed a
significant and large inversion effect for both real, F(1, 63) = 70.69,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.529, and virtual faces, F(1, 63) = 41.63, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.398.
Self-Report Ratings
We first tested whether rating order (human-likeness first,
eeriness first, or both together) had significant main or
interaction effects for face type at a lenient significance threshold
of p < 0.100. Because no significant effects were observed for
either human-likeness (p > 0.128) or eeriness (p > 0.440), this
confound variable was dropped from further analyses. Hence,
self-report ratings were analyzed using a 2 (face type) × 2
(inversion) within-subjects ANOVA.
Human-likeness and eeriness ratings are illustrated in
Figure 4. Real as compared with virtual faces received
significantly higher human-likeness ratings with a large effect
size, F(1, 63) = 78.41, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.554. That is, similarly
as in our pretest, participants were clearly able to discriminate
virtual from real faces. There was also a significant interaction
between face type and inversion such that inversion decreased
the human-likeness difference between real and virtual faces (cf.
Figure 4), F(1, 63) = 31.25, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.332. Looking at this
the other way, real faces received lower human-likeness ratings
when inverted (p < 0.001), whereas inversion did not have a
statistically significant effect on virtual faces (p= 0.083).
In H5, we predicted that virtual faces would receive higher
eeriness ratings than real faces. This prediction was confirmed,
given that the difference between virtual and real faces was
statistically significant and large, F(1, 63) = 40.34, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.390. Finally, in H6 we predicted that inversion would
reduce or eliminate the eeriness of virtual faces. At first sight, this
hypothesis appeared to receive support, given that the interaction
between face type and inversion was significant with a moderate
effect size, F(1, 63) = 5.50, p = 0.022, η
2
p = 0.080. However, as
can be seen in Figure 4, inversion in fact increased rather than
decreased eeriness for both virtual (p= 0.009) and real faces (p<
0.001). Apparently, the interaction effect was significant because
this increase was greater for real rather than virtual faces and
not because inversion decreased the eeriness of virtual faces in
particular.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean (and SEM) values for d′ sensitivity index, c response bias index, hit rate, and false alarm rate for the recognition memory task. Statistically significant
differences between virtual and human faces are denoted with an asterisk (“*”).
FIGURE 4 | Mean (and SEM) human-likeness and eeriness ratings for upright
and inverted, real and virtual faces.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present investigation, we set to find out whether highly-
realistic virtual faces tap perceptual expertise similarly as real
human faces. Unlike faces of different ethnic groups in humans,
virtual, and real faces tend to differ with respect to low-level visual
features, which might contribute to differences in perceptual
processing. In Study 1, we demonstrated that virtual faces can still
be differentiated from real faces even after these two types of faces
have been matched for spatial frequency contents, brightness,
contrast, and colors. We interpret this to mean that individuals
are able to use local features or their configurations to decipher
whether a face is real or virtual. In Study 2, we showed that in
a recognition memory task, virtual as compared with real faces
elicit a less conservative response bias and a higher proportion
of false alarms. Virtual and real faces did not differ with respect
to discrimination accuracy or the magnitude of inversion effect,
however.
The present findings resemble OEB findings in recognition
memory studies with real human faces. Such studies have,
however, typically identified a mirror pattern in which other-
ethnicity faces receive both a lower proportion of hits and
a higher proportion of false alarms than own-ethnicity faces
(Meissner and Brigham, 2001). This mirror pattern has also
been seen as lower discrimination sensitivity in the aggregate
index that pits hits against false alarms. In contrast, we
observed a difference in response bias but not in discrimination
sensitivity. Given that the aggregate response bias measure
depends positively on both hits and false alarms, and virtual as
compared with human faces elicited a higher proportion of false
alarms with a slight tendency toward higher proportion of hits as
well (cf. Figure 3), this pattern of results is not surprising.
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Importantly, the higher proportion of false alarms for virtual
faces was predicted on the basis of the highly influential face-
space model (Valentine, 1991; Valentine et al., 2016). Here
the reasoning was that individuals’ hypothetical face-space
representation is optimized for real human faces, and that this
representation is not necessarily appropriate for encoding virtual
faces whose features or feature configurations differ from those
of real faces. Similarly as for other- vs. own-ethnicity faces,
differences between virtual faces are hence encoded imperfectly,
which leads to a denser representation in the face-space. When
individuals are making judgments in a recognition memory task,
virtual faces then allegedly activate more face exemplars than
equivalent real faces, which leads to a false sense of familiarity
and a higher proportion of false alarms. The present study hence
suggests that, similarly as other- vs. own-ethnicity faces, virtual
faces tap perceptual expertise less efficiently than real faces. This
effect is particularly evident in false alarm choices. The present
study hence makes a contribution to existing research literature
by demonstrating this theoretically predicted false alarm effect
for virtual faces.
The present investigation is similar to that of Balas and Pacella
(2015), given that both they (in their Experiment 1) and we (in
Study 2) carried out a recognition memory task for real and
virtual faces. The major difference between these studies is that
we used stimuli that were matched for low-level features, spatial
frequency contents in particular. The present results suggest that
such matching eliminates the discrimination advantage for real
faces observed by Balas and Pacella. In contrast, their results did
not support different response bias or false alarm effects for real
and virtual faces. We suggest that this difference originated from
other methodological differences. First of all, the present study
may have had higher statistical power for detecting a response
bias effect because of a higher number of participants (64 against
18) and a within- rather than between-subjects design. Second,
the response bias effect may have been more pronounced in the
present study because of the less demanding recognitionmemory
task (with 40 instead of 90 faces). The present investigation also
differed from the study by Balas and Pacella because we studied
inversion effects in a recognition memory task and considered
the subjective evaluations of virtual and real faces.
Previous research evidence gives reason to believe that
inversion effect is a hallmark of perceptual expertise for faces
and other well-learned stimuli (Maurer et al., 2002), and that this
effect is stronger for own- as compared with other-ethnicity faces
(e.g., Rhodes et al., 1989). Unexpectedly, Balas and Pacella (2015;
Experiment 2) demonstrated a similar inversion effect for real
and virtual faces in a perceptual discrimination task, possibly due
to ceiling effects in their results. The present study replicates this
finding in a more difficult and different (recognition memory)
task. If inversion effect is a hallmark of perceptual expertise,
why did inversion then elicit roughly equal degradation on real
and virtual faces? Similarly as Balas and Pacella (2015), we
suggest that the human visual system processes virtual faces in
a highly face-like manner. This statement is perhaps particularly
uncontroversial for such highly realistic virtual stimuli as those
used in the present study (cf. Figure 1). Inversion had a drastic
overall effect on the proportion of false alarms (lower 95% CL
for the difference 15 percentage units), which was clearly larger
than the effect of face type in upright faces (upper 95% CL for the
difference 10 percentage units). Hence, we suggest that inversion
compromised face processing to the extent of concealing the
more subtle processing differences between real and virtual faces.
Given that face inversion is thought to influence configural
processing more than featural processing, the observed findings
do not support the suggestion that virtual faces would be
processed in a less configural manner than real faces. However,
although this was not a specific aim in the present study, the
human-likeness ratings from Study 2 suggest that configural and
featural information may have played a different role on the
recognition of human-likeness in the case of real and virtual
faces. Specifically, our results showed that inversion elicited
decreased human-likeness ratings for real faces but had lesser
or no influence on virtual faces. This suggests that configural
processing, which was impaired by inversion, was important for
identifying real faces as human. On the other hand, virtual faces
were still recognizable as non-human after inversion, plausibly
because this judgement was mainly based on individual features.
There is some previous evidence suggesting that eyes could be a
particularly important feature for differentiating real from virtual
faces (Looser and Wheatley, 2010).
Overall, the present self-report findings from Study 2 confirm
the previous observation that virtual faces are always considered
more eerie than real faces. The results also demonstrated that
this difference is smaller for inverted than for upright faces.
At first sight, this seemed to support the prediction that
inversion can eliminate the eeriness of virtual faces similarly
as with “Thatcherized” faces (Stürzel and Spillmann, 2000).
However, a closer inspection of our results showed that inversion
elicited increased eeriness for both real and virtual faces but
that this increase was larger for real faces. It is plausible
that the overall heightened eeriness for inverted faces reflected
more effortful processing caused by increased encoding error
(Valentine et al., 2016). Furthermore, human-likeness ratings
suggested that inversion had a larger effect on the categorization
of real as compared with virtual faces. Given that eeriness ratings
closely parallel these findings, it is possible that inversion had a
differential effect on real and virtual faces simply because inverted
real faces were more difficult to recognize as human than upright
real faces. Hence, the present findings cannot be taken as support
for the prediction that inversion would eliminate the eeriness of
virtual faces by reducing configural differences between virtual
and real faces.
We want to address some potential limitations of the present
investigation and to suggest directions for future research. First,
similarly as Balas and Pacella (2015) and Crookes et al. (2015),
we used FaceGen software as the basis for our virtual stimuli.
However, unlike them, we additionally matched virtual and
real faces with respect to various low-level visual features. It
could be argued that after this matching, the present virtual
stimuli were no longer representative of typical virtual faces. We
want to emphasize, however, that the above two studies have
already demonstrated the limits of typically used stimuli (e.g.,
those generated by FaceGen), and that our aim was instead to
test whether real and virtual faces are still processed differently
after they have been matched for most obvious low-level visual
confounds. Hence, the important question is not whether our
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stimuli were high in mundane realism (i.e., whether they were
similar to modern computer-rendered faces) but whether they
were high in psychological realism (i.e., whether they tapped
psychological processes relevant for perceiving animacy in faces)
(cf. Shadish et al., 2002). This question was addressed in Study
1, which clearly showed that the present stimuli were perceived
distinctly as human and non-human stimuli.
Nevertheless, we want to acknowledge other confounds that
could still have influenced the present stimuli even after the
matching procedure. Because virtual stimuli were generated by
replicating real faces in the FaceGen software’s parametric space,
it is possible that virtual faces or some of their features (e.g., nose
shapes) might have been more similar to each other than was the
case for original faces. This reduced variability could then trivially
explain the inflated false alarm rate for virtual faces. We also note
that featural matching was only done at the global level, that is,
across whole images. After such global matching, local features
might still have had for example varying brightness levels (for
example, darker nose region in one image and darker skin region
in the other). With more detailed local-level matching, however,
maintaining whole-image consistency would have become a
practical impossibility. Given these shortcomings, we cannot fully
exclude the possibility that the present results were still specific to
the present stimuli. We suggest that this problem in fact applies
to all studies using virtual stimuli, given the obvious impossibility
of creating virtual faces that are visually identical to real faces yet
at the same time discriminable from them. Future studies might
want to consider using more than one method for producing
virtual stimuli to increase the generalizability of their results;
however, even this approach does little to solve the fundamental
problem related to the lack of unequivocal operationalization of
“virtual” or “artificial” stimuli.
An ideal solution to this problem might be to keep the stimuli
constant but to present them in varying contexts. We give some
suggestions for future research, which at the same time refine
the present research questions. First, the effect of perceptual
expertise could be tested directly by training participants with
either virtual or real faces before the experimental task, for
example by adopting a similar training paradigm as Burleigh
and Schoenherr (2015). Second, perceptual expertise could also
be tested by preselecting participants with high or low exposure
to realistic virtual faces in video games and other digital media.
Third, future studies could test whether the processing of virtual
faces is prone to similar social-cognitive and motivational factors
as other-ethnicity and out-group faces (see Young et al., 2012).
For example, Bernstein et al. (2007) demonstrated that merely
assigning other people as in-group vs. out-group members—
for example, members of the same or other universities—elicits
higher discrimination sensitivity in a recognition memory task.
Similarly, labeling the same ambiguous real/virtual faces (cf.
Cheetham et al., 2011) or even the same human faces as either
real or virtual might provoke different processing strategies in
individuals. Importantly, all of these hypotheses can be tested by
holding the same stimuli constant, which eliminates the influence
of visual differences on obtained results.
We would also like to note that performing recognition
memory task separately for real and virtual faces could possibly
have elicited different processing strategies, which could then
have inflated existing response bias differences between them.
This effect would in fact resemble the effect of arbitrary labeling as
hypothesized above, and it would mean that the present response
bias finding was relatedmore to social-cognitive processes than to
visual differences between the stimuli. Future studies are required
to explore this possibility, however. In particular, the present
study could be replicated by interleaving virtual and real faces
within the same blocks.
To summarize, the present findings show that virtual faces
evoke a higher proportion of false alarms than real faces
in a recognition memory task, which suggests that virtual
faces do not tap face processing expertise to the same extent
than real faces. Furthermore, the present findings suggest that
this literal lack of familiarity might then contribute to the
uneasiness or even eeriness virtual faces trigger in human
observers, which was also observed in the present investigation.
The present investigation makes a significant contribution to
previous literature by considering low-level visual confounds in
the stimuli, by demonstrating that the differential processing of
virtual and real faces is particularly evident in false alarm choices,
and by linking this result to the qualitative evaluation of virtual
faces.
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Perceived Ownership of Avatars
Influences Visual Perspective Taking
Christian Böffel* and Jochen Müsseler
Institute of Psychology, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
Modern computer-based applications often require the user to interact with avatars.
Depending on the task at hand, spatial dissociation between the orientations of the
user and the avatars might arise. As a consequence, the user has to adopt the avatar’s
perspective and identify herself/himself with the avatar, possibly changing the user’s
self-representation in the process. The present study aims to identify the conditions
that benefit this change of perspective with objective performance measures and
subjective self-estimations by integrating the idea of avatar-ownership into the cognitive
phenomenon of spatial compatibility. Two different instructions were used to manipulate
a user’s perceived ownership of an avatar in otherwise identical situations. Users with
the high-ownership instruction reported higher levels of perceived ownership of the
avatar and showed larger spatial compatibility effects from the avatar’s point of view
in comparison to the low ownership instruction. This supports the hypothesis that
perceived ownership benefits perspective taking.
Keywords: avatars, ownership, stimulus-response compatibility tasks (SRC), perspective-taking, human
computer interaction (HCI)
INTRODUCTION
When we are confronted with avatars in the virtual world, we often have to adopt their perspective
in order to complete our task. Sometimes it is necessary to control an avatar; sometimes we merely
interact with avatars controlled by others. Avatars are used to represent the user in the digital world
and the user is able to interact with the virtual world through the avatar. In both situations, seeing
the world through the avatar’s eyes can be useful to plan actions or to interpret the actions of
others. This process, referred to as visual perspective taking (PT), was observed in various situations
and toward a large variety of targets. It occurs toward human confederates (Frischen et al., 2009;
Freundlieb et al., 2016, 2017) and even non-human targets like triangles (Zwickel, 2009) or arrows
(Santiesteban et al., 2014). In the case of avatars, the distinction between an object and a person
is not clear-cut. It is sometimes unclear if someone else controls the avatar or if the avatar is an
independent agent controlled by the program itself. While we are generally able to identify objects
as non-human, we still tend to attribute human-like agency and mental states to them (Heider and
Simmel, 1944). This agency attribution seems to aide visual PT (Zwickel, 2009). In past studies
we showed that PT occurs toward avatars, regardless of whether PT is needed to complete the
task (Müsseler et al., 2017) or not (Böffel and Müsseler, 2017). In the present study we confronted
participants with an avatar that was presented opposite to them on a computer screen in a top–
down view. Our goal was to take a closer look at how this avatar is interpreted and how this
interpretation can benefit or inhibit PT in a top–down manner.
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People have the remarkable ability to incorporate objects —
like avatars — into the mental representation of their bodies.
The most famous example of this is the rubber hand illusion
experiment by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) in which participants
were able to feel the touch on a rubber hand. To achieve this
illusion, a rubber hand was placed in front of the participants
while their real hand was hidden from sight. When the rubber
hand and the real hand were brushed synchronously, participants
started to “feel” the stimulation on the rubber hand instead of
their own and reported that the rubber hand seemed to be part
of their body. This sense that an object belongs to the person’s
own body is referred to as ownership. Ma and Hommel (2013)
demonstrated that virtual objects — such as virtual hands —
could also become part of mental body representations akin to
the rubber hand.
Several factors were identified that lead to this sense of
ownership. Makin et al. (2008) showed the importance of spatial
congruency between the real and the artificial hand for perceived
ownership, whereas Shimada et al. (2009) demonstrated the
necessity of temporal congruency between the tactile stimulation
and the visual perception of this stimulation on the fake hand.
Tsakiris (2010) underlined the importance of visual similarity
between real and artificial body parts and argued that the
artificial body part has to resemble the real body part in
order to be embodied. However, this assumption has been
called into question by recent experimental findings. Armel and
Ramachandran (2003) were able to observe ownership of a table,
Ma and Hommel (2015a) demonstrated ownership of objects like
balloons and squares and Guterstam et al. (2013) were even able
to observe embodiment of empty space. These effects are overall
comparable to the perceived ownership of artificial hands even
though the objects had no resemblance of real hands or body
parts.
A different factor that seems to influence ownership is a sense
of connectedness between the actions of the person and the action
effects on the side of the object. This controlling aspect — or
perceived agency over the object — leads to ownership (Ma and
Hommel, 2015a,b) and it can be used to induce a rubber hand-
like illusion without the need for tactile stimulation (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2014). Overall, perceived agency over an object
is a promising mechanism for inducing ownership that also
influences visual PT. When comparing PT in situations in which a
person was actually controlling the arms of an avatar to situations
in which this control was merely imagined, only the conditions
with actual control were associated with visual PT (Böffel and
Müsseler, 2017). Combined with the results of Zwickel (2009),
two conflicting characteristics of a situation can be identified
that seem to benefit PT: on the one hand perceiving the target
as an individual agent seems to aide PT, because it can help us
understand someone’s actions (Tversky and Hard, 2009), on the
other hand, actual control over the target also seems to lead to PT.
Both processes seem exclusive, because we cannot see an avatar
as an independent agent and attribute intentions to it, if it fully
obeys our every command. Our goal is to solve this conflict in the
present study.
The results of previously mentioned studies point toward
the importance of bottom–up processes in the integration of
objects into a person’s representation of their action and body. It
therefore seems plausible that action representation is a gateway
that leads to ownership: if a person’s action reliably causes
a certain effect, even when this effect is produced through
seemingly unconnected mediating objects (e.g., a rubber hand
or a balloon), the action effect becomes a relevant part of the
action code and the person is able to anticipate this effect as a
consequence of her/his action. We believe that ownership of the
object that produces the action effect is inferred as a result. We
expect that once ownership is acquired, visual PT often follows to
facilitate the planning of future actions through the object that is
now perceived as part of the person’s body.
Because ownership is observed in different situations and of
different objects, it seems very likely that ownership toward an
avatar is rather easily achievable, especially if the person controls
the avatar. Although past studies point to the importance of
bottom–up processes for ownership, we aim to demonstrate that
it is also subject to top–down modulation. The acquisition of
ownership via bottom–up processes seems to be an automatic
process and top–down modulation of automatic processes has
been demonstrated before (for an overview see Kiefer, 2007).
We believe that when confronted with an object, two different
explanations of the same situation are able to alter the framework
that influences how ownership of an object is acquired. In a high
ownership explanation, the participants might shift attention to
situational features that support their sense of control, while in
the low ownership explanation the opposite is expected. The
use of two different instructions that target this sense of control
should therefore be able to alter the interpretation of the situation
resulting in different levels of perceived ownership of an avatar
(measured via self-report questionnaire). Such a result could
further our understanding of the nature and dependencies of
automatic processes.
When examining visual PT, two different — although
similar — tasks have been used in the past: the own body
transformation task that asks participants to judge on which
side of a shown body a certain salient feature is located, and
the avatar-in-scene task that uses laterality decisions of objects
from an avatars point of view. Both tasks share the problem
that the results are potentially influenced by stimulus–response
compatibility (SRC) effects with unknown consequences (May
and Wendt, 2013). SRC refers to the observation that certain
mappings of responses to stimuli lead to performance advantages
over others (Fitts and Deininger, 1954) and result in faster
reaction times and lower error rates. When using stimuli and
responses that carry spatial information, SRC is in most cases
aligned with spatial correspondence of stimulus and response
positions. Conditions in which stimulus and response occur in
the same hemifield are generally compatible, whereas conditions
with opposing positions are incompatible (for an overview see
Proctor and Vu, 2006). A theoretical framework often used to
explain SR compatibility are the so called dual-route models
(e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990). These models propose that stimulus
presentation causes the activation of two routes: the automatic
route leads to a direct activation of a response code that spatially
corresponds to the stimulus position. A stimulus presented on
the left would activate a left response code. A second route
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uses the SR mapping, for example given by an instruction,
to retrieve the correct response. In the case that both routes
activate the same correct response the execution of the response
is facilitated, otherwise a conflict occurs that has to be resolved.
This conflict leads to slower reaction times and increased
error rates. As a consequence of SRC, both, facilitation and
interference can be observed (Wallace, 1971). Because SRC effects
are often attributed to an overlap of certain features of the task’s
mental representation, we can use these effects to infer how a
certain stimulus is mentally represented. More importantly, it
allows us to identify if the stimulus position is coded from the
participants own point of view, leading to the typically observed
advantages of spatially corresponding stimulus–response parings,
or if it produces different compatibility effects indicating that
the stimulus position is coded from the avatar’s point of view
instead. The results of this coding process — referred to as
feature codes — are often seen as abstract representations and
independent of the modality that was used to create them
(Hommel et al., 2001). As consequence, a stimulus coded as “left”
from the participant’ point of view would form the same feature
code as a stimulus coded as “left” from an Avatar’s point of view,
although they do in fact occupy different locations.
In the present study we use SRC effects to measure visual
PT (Böffel and Müsseler, 2017; Müsseler et al., 2017). Previous
studies that follow a similar approach point toward a complicated
situation. On one hand, studies find that objects are generally
coded from the person’s own perspective when no agency
instruction is used (Gardner and Potts, 2011; Taylor et al., 2016).
However, this observation doesn’t seem universal. Gardner and
Potts (2010) and Taylor et al. (2016) show that under certain
circumstances feature codes can be created from the objects
perspective instead. Müsseler et al. (2017) demonstrated that
SRC effects can arise from an avatar’s point of view, rather than
the person’s own in situations that force the person to take
the avatar’s perspective in a SRC task and Böffel and Müsseler
(2017) showed that these effects can occur even in a Simon task,
in which the avatar’s orientation is irrelevant. However, these
compatibility changes only occur when the dimensional overlap
between stimulus and response position from the participant’s
point of view is low, or the participant’s control over the avatar’s
movements is high. The latter is likely linked to ownership of the
avatar that is acquired through bottom–up processes and effect
anticipation.
Overall, PT toward avatars is able to influence SRC, which
indicates a change in the mental representation of the situation, if
the right conditions are met. As a result, PT can lead to an effect
of spatial correspondence as seen from the avatar’s point of view
rather than the person’s, effectively reversing the expected effect
of spatial compatibility under certain circumstances (Böffel and
Müsseler, 2017; Müsseler et al., 2017). Assuming that SRC effects
arise based on the mental representation of a task, it is a useful
tool to quantify PT because it allows us to infer how the stimulus
location is coded (Ottoboni et al., 2005; Hommel, 2011). A tool
that we also rely on in the present study.
Based on the described mechanisms, we expect that an
increase in perceived ownership aids the incorporation of the
avatar and its movements into the person’s mental representation
of the task. This should lead to an increase of visual PT to facilitate
action planning and therefore induce larger compatibility effects
from the avatar’s perspective. We hope to show what is ultimately
more beneficial: high ownership of the avatar or low ownership
but higher levels of autonomy on the side of the avatar. We
believe that although PT can be an effective mechanism for
understanding someone else’s actions (Tversky and Hard, 2009) it
is even more vital when it helps to plan our own actions through
the means of an avatar. Or to put it differently: we think that
planning our own actions evokes a stronger need for visual PT
than understanding someone else’s.
To summarize the goals of this study: first, we want to show
that the otherwise automatic acquisition of perceived ownership
of an object can be influenced in a top–down manner by a
framework provided in the instruction of the task. And second,
we want to demonstrate that this change in perceived ownership
is associated with changes in visual PT as measured with stimulus
compatibility effects. Therefore, we want to pose the following
hypotheses.
Hypotheses
We expect that the two different instructions produce
quantifiable differences in perceived ownership of the avatar,
measured by the avatar-ownership questionnaire with higher
self-reported perceived ownership in the high-ownership group
in comparison to the low ownership group. We further predict
that SRC effects are dependent on perceived ownership. In the
high ownership group, we expect a larger benefit of spatially non-
corresponding conditions compared to the low ownership group
where compatibility drifts toward the participant’s perspective
rather than the avatar’s. This should result in an interaction of
spatial correspondence and instruction.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We used two different instructions for the same task to top–
down influence perceived ownership of an avatar: the setup
and the avatars used were similar to the ones of Böffel and
Müsseler (2017) and Müsseler et al. (2017). The participants were
confronted with an avatar that was displayed on a screen and
sitting opposite them (Figure 1). One instruction described the
avatar as fully controlled by the participant, much like a tool
(high ownership condition), and the second tried to establish
the avatar as an individual agent (low ownership condition). The
participants were asked to respond to dark/light blue disks with
key presses that resulted in avatar hand movements. In both
groups, stimuli, responses, and action effects were identical. The
action goal was defined in the same way in both groups: act so
that the avatar moves a certain arm. This was done to avoid the
influence of different action goals that could otherwise lead to
SRC effects related to the location of the action goal rather than
response location as described by Hommel (1993a).
Participants
In total 48 students (39 females) from RWTH Aachen University
with a mean age of M = 21.6 (SD = 3.9) participated in this
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FIGURE 1 | Example condition that demanded a contralateral response,
before (left) or after (right) a right key-press.
experiment for course credit or a monetary compensation of 5
€. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and Stimuli
MatLab and the Psychtoolbox Extension v3.0 (Brainard, 1997;
Pelli, 1997) were used for stimulus presentation and reaction time
measurement. The stimuli were presented on a 2200 CRT monitor
(Iiyama Visionmaster Pro 514 with a resolution of 1024  768
and 100 Hz refresh rate). The participants were seated 70 cm
in front of the monitor and responded with their left and right
index fingers on response keys (Figure 2). Dark blue (RGB 36
115 254) and light blue circles (RGB 98 193 254), each with a
diameter of 50 pixel (1.79) were used as targets, presented 1.61
to the left or right of a central fixation cross and in front of a gray
background (RGB 155 155 155). The avatar had a size of roughly
240  200 pixels (8.73  8.56) and was facing the participants
with its hands pointing toward the stimuli positions (Figure 1).
Procedure
The participants gave written informed consent to the terms
of the experiment, including data storage and data usage for
publication purposes. After that, half of the participants were
instructed to control the avatar’s hands by pressing the respective
key on the response board: a right key-press moves the right
hand and a left key-press moves the left hand. This lead to
effector congruency between the participant’s hands and the
hands of the avatar. The second group was instructed to imagine
the avatar as an independent agent that acts according to its
own goals and always wants to move both hands. However, the
participant can prevent the avatar from moving the ipsilateral
hand with a key press. For example, a right key-press stops
the avatar’s left hand from moving. As a result, the avatar
once again only moves its right hand. This means that in
both groups the same key press lead to the same observable
action effects and the main objective was the same in both
instructions: act in such a way that only the contralateral hand
is moved if the target is light-blue and only the ipsilateral
hand is moved if the target is dark-blue. The mapping of
light-and dark-blue targets to ipsi- and contralateral responses
FIGURE 2 | Experimental setup.
was counterbalanced between participants. Because the avatar
always showed the same hand movements after a certain key
is pressed, regardless of the instruction used, and the goal of
the action was always the same only the interpretation of the
situation was changed by the instruction. A central fixation
cross and the avatar remained visible throughout the experiment.
The targets were presented without a time limit until the
participants responded. If the response was incorrect, slower
than 1,500 ms (lapse) or faster than 100 ms (anticipation)
it was labeled as an error and followed by a feedback tone.
The waiting period between the response and the beginning
of the next trial was 2,250 ms and increased by additional
1,500 ms after an error occurred. Each participant performed 10
blocks, including 8 repetitions of each combination of stimulus
position and stimulus color. The first block was a practice
block that was excluded from the analysis. The order of trials
was randomized within each block. Overall each condition was
repeated 80 times over the course of the experiment resulting
in a total of 320 trials per participant, excluding practice-trials.
The participants needed approximately 25 min to complete the
experiment.
After the experiment the participants were asked to fill in
a questionnaire that featured the perception of the avatar. The
avatar-questionnaire was based on an instrument used by Ma
and Hommel (2015b) that targeted the perceived ownership of
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virtual hands and is a modified version of the questionnaire
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) used to examine the rubber hand
illusion. Our modified questionnaire asked the participants to
rate 10 statements regarding ownership of the avatar and its
hands (e.g., “It felt as if the avatar’s hands were part of my
body” “The hands of the avatar began to resemble my hands
in terms of shape or skin tone”) on a seven-step Likert scale
ranging from 1 “I strongly disagree” to 7 “I strongly agree.” The
complete list of items used is shown in Table 1. We altered the
items used by Ma and Hommel (2015b) to closer resemble the
avatar setting while trying to maintain the general objective of
the instrument. Three items were omitted because they targeted
tactile perceptions, which were not included in our experiment.
The instrument was used in a German translation. We calculated
an overall perceived ownership score as the sum of the responses
for each participant. The possible range of ownership values was
therefore 10 to 70 and higher values indicated higher levels of
perceived ownership.
Design
The experimental conditions consisted of all possible
combination of stimulus position, response position and
instruction. Stimulus and response position were used to
determine spatial correspondence. The conditions in which
stimulus and response positions were both on the participants
left or right were labeled as spatially corresponding, others
as non-corresponding. This resulted in a 2  2 design with
the within-subjects factor spatial correspondence (non-
corresponding vs. corresponding) and the between-subjects
factor instruction (high ownership vs. low ownership).
RESULTS
Reported Ownership
The analysis of the avatar-questionnaire data revealed
instruction-based group differences: the high-ownership
TABLE 1 | Items used in the ownership questionnaire.
Q1: It felt as if the avatar’s hands were part of my body.
Q2: It seemed that my hand was in the location where the hand of the
avatar was.
Q3: I lost the feeling where my hands were located.
Q4: It seemed that my hands were no longer part of my body.
Q5: I had the feeling that I might have additional hands.
Q6: Sometimes I felt as if my hands were turning virtual.
Q7: The hands of the avatar began to resemble my hands in terms of shape
or skin tone.
Q8: It appeared (visually) as if the hands of the avatar were drifting toward
my hands.
Q9: It seemed like I could have moved the hand on the screen if I wanted,
as if it were obeying my will.
Q10: It felt as if my hands took on the same size as the avatar’s hands.
The items are based on the instruments used by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and
Ma and Hommel (2015b).
instruction was associated with overall higher levels of self-
reported ownership (M = 22.3; SD = 10.9) compared to the low
ownership instruction (M = 17.8; SD = 7.0). This effect was
statistically significant [t(39.15) = 1.69; p.one tailed/ = 0.05], df
were Welch-adjusted to account for differing variances in both
groups.
Reaction Times and Percentage Errors
Reaction times longer than 1,500 ms or shorter than 100 ms
were regarded as errors and were removed from the RT analyses.
A total of 254 trials (1.7%) were excluded this way along with 821
false responses (5.3%) for a total of 1075 errors (7.0%). Mean RTs
and percentage errors (PE) were analyzed separately using 2  2
mixed design ANOVAs with the within-subjects factor spatial
correspondence (corresponding vs. non-corresponding) and the
between subject factor instruction (high vs. low ownership).
Results are shown in Figure 3. The analysis of mean reaction
times revealed a significant influence of spatial correspondence
F(1,46) = 5.51, p = 0.023, 2p = 0.11, overall favoring spatially
non-corresponding stimulus–response pairings (Mcorr: = 649 ms
vs. Mnon corr: = 630 ms). This effect was significantly influenced
by the factor instruction F(1,46) = 7.04, p = 0.011, 2p = 0.13
with a 40 ms advantage of non-corresponding conditions in
the high ownership instruction group compared to a 2 ms
advantage of spatially corresponding conditions in the low
ownership group. Analyzed separately, the 40 ms advantage of
non-corresponding conditions in the high ownership condition
is statistically significant with [t(23) = 3.69, p = 0.001, two tailed]
while the 2 ms advantage of spatially corresponding conditions
in the low ownership group is not [t(13) = 0.20, p = 0.84, two
tailed].
The analysis of percentage errors showed a marginally
significant main effect of spatial correspondence F(1,46) = 3.58,
p = 0.065, 2p = 0.07 that interacted significantly with
instruction F(1,46) = 4.40, p = 0.041, 2p = 0.09. Spatially non-
corresponding SR-mappings were associated with lower error
rates compared to corresponding ones in the high-ownership
instruction (Mcorr: = 8.1% vs. Mnon corr: = 5.6%) but not when
paired with the low ownership instruction (Mcorr: = 7.1% vs.
Mnon corr: = 7.2%). Similar to the reaction times only the 2.5%
points advantage of non-corresponding conditions in the high
ownership condition is statistically significant with [t(23) = 3.57,
p = 0.002, two tailed] while the 0.1% points advantage of spatially
corresponding conditions in the low ownership group is not
[t(13) = 0.13, p = 0.90, two tailed] when analyzed separately.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of the avatar-questionnaire data revealed
instruction-based group differences that were consistent with
our expectations. The high ownership instruction resulted in
significantly higher values of self-reported ownership compared
to the low ownership instruction. We therefore conclude that the
manipulation was successful. Overall this supports the idea that
top–down processes influence perceived ownership.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction times (RTs) and percentage errors (PEs) as a function of spatial correspondence and instruction (high vs. low ownership). Error bars
represent 95% within-subject CIs (Morey, 2008).
The analysis of reaction times and error rates showed that
both instruction cause different effects of spatial correspondence
in otherwise identical scenarios. While the correspondence
effect was negligible in the low ownership condition, it was
significantly (more) negative in the high-ownership condition.
The high ownership conditions therefore cause compatibility
effects that are based on the avatar’s point of view instead
of the participant’s own. This means that the observed effects
are similar to the effects we would expect if the participant
would actually see the scene from a rotated point of view.
We think this is a very strong indicator that the stimuli are
coded from the avatar’s viewpoint and that the resulting mental
representation is the important factor that determines spatial
compatibility rather than the actual physical location of the
stimuli. As a result, stimuli presented on the left produced
compatibility effects as if they were presented on the right
and vice versa. A stimulus presented on the left side of the
avatar lead to the formation of the same feature code as a
stimulus presented on the left of the person, even though
their position is in fact different. This is apparently not the
case in the low ownership condition which indicates that both
conditions lead to different mental representation of the same
scene.
The absence of a correspondence effect in the low ownership
could point toward the possibility that the task was complicated
enough to eliminate the influence of the automatic activation
of spatially corresponding responses a phenomenon that can be
observed in mixed SRC tasks (Shaffer, 1965). This is most likely
a result of a reactive inhibition rather than proactive suppression
of the automatic route in complex situations and was described
by Proctor and Vu (2010). A similar case could be made for
the low ownership condition in our experiment, because the
instruction might be sufficiently complex to cause a similar
effect. This is apparently not the case in the high ownership
condition where an advantage of spatially non-corresponding
conditions was observed. The analysis of reaction times showed
higher mean reaction times in the high ownership group.
Although this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.17) it
seems unlikely that the low-ownership condition is overall more
complex.
Why do we still observe a correspondence effect and why is the
automatic route not inhibited in the high ownership group? The
high-ownership condition has the advantage that the task can be
broken down into several steps: step 1: perspective taking, step 2:
recoding of the stimulus position, step 3: action. While each step
is relatively simple, the completion of all steps combined might
cause higher reaction times. The PT in step 1 is also associated
with costs that would explain the numerically higher reaction
time compared to the low ownership group (Janczyk, 2013). We
propose that after PT is completed, the spatial information of
the stimulus would be coded within the new frame of reference
from the avatar’s point of view. At this point the task is identical
to a typical SR compatibility task. It leads to the expected
effects when accounting for the new mental representation of
the stimulus. This mechanism could be similar or identical to
the concept of referential coding (Hommel, 1993b) that lays the
groundwork for the coding of stimulus features based on different
reference frames. The new reference frame provided by the avatar
would be rotated by 180 from the participant’s point of view
and constitutes a rather drastic example of conflicting reference
frames. This supports the theory that referential coding of the
same situation can either be based on an egocentric or alternative
reference frame, based on expectations and knowledge about the
situation.
An alternative explanation for the absence of compatibility
effects in the low ownership condition might be that both
reference frames are activated equally strong, leading to the
stimulus position being coded as neutral. The stimulus would
cause the formation of both feature codes: “left” and “right.”
This conflict might result in an overall compatibility effect of
zero. Alternatively, one frame of reference may always overwrite
the other but both reference frames win this conflict equally
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often, resulting in a zero-sum of spatial correspondence effects.
The participant might therefore switch between both reference
frames, but only one of them would be active at a given time. If
the latter is the case, the automatic route of the dual-route model
might still be active but its effects are evened-out over the course
of the experiment. An alternating activation of the egocentric
and allocentric reference frame within the same condition could
effectively cause further mixing of compatible and incompatible
mappings within those conditions and cause an elimination of
SRC effects as described earlier (Shaffer, 1965). It is also possible
that the low ownership instruction was interpreted differently
by different individuals, leading to PT and reversed spatial
correspondence effects in some, but classic correspondence
effects in others, again evening out.
Overall this study provides evidence for the influence of top–
down processes in perceived ownership, but to conclude that
bottom–up processes are not important in the present situation
might be a mistake. In this experiment the situation included
a reliable congruency between the participant’s responses and
the movement of the avatar. Such characteristics are expected
to invoke a sense of ownership of the avatar (Ma and Hommel,
2015b) that should require no further explanation or instruction.
Based on the results of the present study it seems more likely
that top–down processes can suppress perceived ownership of an
avatar even if the situation would otherwise induce it.
Although we tried to ensure that the final action goal was the
same in both instructions, we ultimately cannot rule the influence
of sub-goals out. The imagined grabbing of the avatars ipsilateral
hand is the most likely example of such a sub-goal. While the
final intention is always to produce an avatar movement that
is contralateral to the key press, this sub-goal would have an
ipsilateral location of intention, in this case the prevention of a
movement. A conflict of goal and sub-goal location could be a
contributor to the absence of spatial correspondence effects in
the low ownership group. How this prevention of an action effect
as an intention influences action planning is not entirely clear,
although there is some evidence that the location of intention is
more important than the location of the actual effect (Hommel,
1993a; Müsseler et al., 2012).
There are some limitations of this study that are noteworthy.
First, measuring ownership with a self-report questionnaire
might not be ideal. It is unclear whether participants are able
to consciously perceive ownership of the same magnitude as it
actually influences their actions. On one hand, it might very well
be possible that the artificial setting in this study prevents higher
degrees of reported ownership, because it seems difficult to agree
to the items used in the questionnaire and the process could be
largely subconscious. As a result, true ownership effects might
be underreported. On the other hand, social desirability bias
might have caused an overestimation of ownership. As a result,
other means of measuring ownership might be more feasible
than self-report. The second limitation lies in the abstract nature
of the avatars used in this experiment. The avatars offered no
customization and were the same for each participant. While this
design-choice ensured constant conditions for all participants,
it might have had negative impact on perceived ownership.
A higher degree of physical similarity between participant and
avatar might result in higher ownership and stronger effects.
Customization is a feature that is often, although not always,
present in applications that use avatars. Whether the tradeoff
of visual constancy for all participants at the cost of higher
variability in similarity between participant and avatar is justified
is up for debate. From a psychophysics point of view, constancy is
crucial whereas from an applied perspective it is often negligible.
Since this study relies on a SR compatibility task — a classic
experimental paradigm — we chose the first option. Last but
not least, it is also likely that the two instructions not only
influenced perceived ownership but also the social character
of the situation. With high ownership, the situation might be
perceived as less social and closer to a tool-use scenario compared
to the low ownership instruction that established the avatar
as an independent agent. This is particularly interesting, since
PT is often seen as a social phenomenon, yet in this study
it is only measurable in the situation that is effectively less
social.
The result of this study can be applied in the design of human–
computer interactions (HCIs). When the user is required to
act from the perspective of an avatar in the presence of other
avatars, establishing those distracting avatars as independent
agents could prove useful to prevent PT toward these distractors.
Such unwanted PT could create additional reference frames
that are potentially associated with costs and conflicting SRC
relations. On the other hand, stressing the control over an avatar
might facilitate PT toward this avatar.
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Enacting Space in Virtual Reality: A
Comparison Between Money’s Road
Map Test and Its Virtual Version
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In the field of spatial cognition research the mutual relationship between perception and
action that brings out spatial orientation was lately investigated. Besides, the sameness
between creating a cognitive map from the exploration of a not simulated environment,
from the use of an allocentric (survey-like) sketched map, and from the interaction with
egocentric (route-like) 3D virtual environments, is generally contrived. To understand if
different embodied affordances could provide different knowledge organization during
wayfinding through the use of distinct spatial simulations, the same group of 61 healthy
subjects experienced both the classical version of the Money’s Road Map test (M-
RMT) and a virtual reality version of the Road Map test (VR-RMT). The M-RMT requires
a allocentric to egocentric right/left reasoning to explore a stylized city provided in a
survey perspective. The VR-RMT is a 3D version of the same environment through which
participants can actively navigate by choosing egocentric-based right/left directions in
a route perspective. The results showed that the different embodiments afforded by the
two environments and the increasing complexity in turn types provides different spatial
outcomes. Results were discussed according to the sensorimotor coupling theory
provided from the enactive cognition approach and significances for spatial cognition
research were provided.
Keywords: enactive cognition, spatial cognition, virtual reality, Money’s Road Map test, egocentric and allocentric
coordinates
INTRODUCTION
The rearmost neuroscientific findings have implied a large overlaying between action and
perception inserting the challenge of a spatial cognition research within the enactive approach. This
cognitive framework change requires the reshaping of what “interaction” means (Morganti, 2016).
Within the embodied cognition perspective, in fact, is the sensorimotor coupling of the agent’s
action and of her environmental perception that shapes the possibilities for spatial exploration
(Gibson, 1979; Varela et al., 1991; Thompson and Varela, 2001). Thus, spatial cognition derives
from the agent’s management of an action and from the maintenance of her moment-by-moment
sensorimotor schema. This schema “guides” the agent in how to appropriately execute her
movements in the specific situation in which she finds herself and what sorts of feedback to expect
from the environment (Carassa et al., 2005).
The enactive approach on interaction has some unequivocal implications for spatial cognition
research. Orientation, in fact, is a high level cognitive ability that comprises the construction
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and use of a spatial representation of the context within which
an action is performed. To be effectual it exacts information
originated from multiple domains, the perpetual placement of
the individual who is acting, combined with the planning of
behaviors that are claimed to be ranged with the agent (Gramann
et al., 2005). Through catching the opportunities for actions
during a new environment exploration, the agent organizes
spatial knowledge through egocentred maps (derived from routes
traveled in which borders and landmarks can be individuated)
and, in the meanwhile, to place herself in the environment by
using allocentred maps (based on survey pathway combination)
(Brunyeì et al., 2012). Together route and survey viewpoints can
be contemplated as “commonplace.” Moreover, their reciprocal
conversions are an essential procedures backing a productive
navigation of intricate environments (Hartley et al., 2003;
Ishikawa and Montello, 2006).
Therefore, wayfinding can be conceived as based on the
continuous equilibrium between egocentric and allocentric
perspectives during the agent’s perception–action coupling.
Thus, the allocentric perspective supports spatial understandings
while the agent is involved in a wayfinding that provides
her with egocentric information. Nevertheless, by underwriting
what surrounding dynamics are the most befitting among the
numerous available at the time, an agent has possibility to plan
in advance a path, even in a partly unknown environment, by
creating spatial inferences (Morganti et al., 2007). Spatial plans, in
fact, can’t be considered as pure allocentric action representations
(that have to be followed thoughtlessly), but they turn out to be
controllers for action to be additionally detailed in the egocentric-
based interaction with the surrounding space.
Neuroscience studies support this allocentric/egocentric
balance for spatial cognition (Serino et al., 2014), benehating
the role of the retrosplenial cortex in the merging of the
allocentric data (provided by the Papez circuit) with the
egocentric ones received from parietal areas (Burgess, 2006).
These neuroscientific evidences evoke how the spatial orientation
is inseparable from the embodied perspective and from the
specific opportunities for action caught in the explored context
(Gunzelmann, 2008).
Thus it is possible to assume that, during a new environment
exploration, an agent bodily enacts with a context in a continuous
developing process. Accordingly, exploration can be considered
as not simply guided by agent goals or motor actions, rather
from the everlasting “hook up” of perceptions and actions that
creates the agent’s way of experiencing the context in which she
is included. Moreover, when an agent and a specific environment
interact, they are structurally coupled and they co-emerge.
In the last decade, due to the progression of technology, virtual
reality simulations were widely introduced in neuroscience and
experimental psychology (Morganti, 2004). Together with paper
and pencil simulation of environments (such as building plans,
city maps, and so on) they were largely used to study spatial
cognition. Both these kind of simulations have been generally
considered as equivalent to natural place explorations. Moreover,
virtual reality by the use of motion devices (such as head-
and limb-trackers) can provide a configuration of “natural-like”
sensorimotor coupling within the digital environment, providing
the agent with the possibility of actively catch opportunities for
action in a computerized three-dimensional space. Even if the
spatial knowledge organization derived from virtual environment
simulation can be linked to an embodied perception grounded
on a situated action, a research question arises here: might the
coupling between an agent and the perceptive data provided
by the digital environment create a different kind of spatial
knowledge representation from the one obtainable to classical
map-use? Might it have an impact on actions’ choice that
an explorer can perform within the environment? Adopting
the enactive perspective to spatial simulation-based interaction,
in fact, requires reconsidering the definition of the nature of
the coupling between the agent and the context and of the
possible reciprocal modifications and changes between them
(Mellet-d’Huart, 2006). Map-based and virtual reality simulated
contexts can provide an agent with specific affordances, and
with the possibility to obtain spatial representations from a
peculiar coupling with a device-mediated sensorimotor system.
This could result in form of agent-environment regularities (e.g.,
spatial invariants) different in virtual reality simulated and map-
based spaces understanding. We consider that as the main issue
of our research.
To study how the agent-environment coupling could be in two
different spatial simulations, the same group of healthy subjects
experienced both the classical paper version of the Money’s
Road Map test (M-RMT – Money et al., 1967) and a virtual
reality version of the Road Map test (VR-RMT – Morganti et al.,
2009). As it includes the allocentric egocentric coordination and
it is considered an ecologically-like spatial simulation, in the
neuropsychological evaluation of spatial ability after brain injury
the classical version of M-RMT is generally included. To be
solved, in fact, this task requires to egocentrically think about
a right/left rotation during the exploration of a sketched city
map provided in the allocentric perspective. As the other side
of the medal the nowadays exist a virtual VR-RMT that provides
participants with an explorable three-dimensional version of the
M-RMT in which there is the possibility to actively choose the
right/left turns from a egocentric perspective.
The main aim of research is to compare the M-RMT and the
VR-RMT in order to understand whether there is any difference
between set-out a right/left turn on a body axis (as in the M-RMT)
and performing it (as in the VR-RMT) in order to obtain a spatial
perspective from the simulated world. Accordingly, our research
methodology requires the following steps from participants:
- In the M-RMT condition, participants first look at the map,
then delineate how to move on the body axis and finally
obtain (and have to keep in mind) the spatial perspective
derived from the turn.
- In the VR-RMT condition, participants first look at the
map, then in the virtual environment can actively turn right
or left on the body axis and obtain the spatial perspective
accordingly.
The comparison between M-RMT and VR-RMT proposed
here introduces two different spatial simulations that might
provide participants with different embodied affordances. They
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can, in fact, be considered as tightly linked with different sensory-
motor coupling situations. In particular, in the VR-MRT an
agent is required to plan in advance a right/left turn and
to continuously create relationships between the perspectives
obtained in the environment with the result of each turns. While
in the M-RMT the agent has to translate information perceived
on a map to a possibility of action that can be performed in
the environment (but only imagined and taken in mind during
exploration). Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that to observe
the resulting of a right/left turn in the virtual environment
requires unalike cognitive efforts than to ground it on a pure
internal cognitive process as in the M-RMT process. These
differences in the sensorimotor coupling between the perceptual
information and the turn possibilities on the VR-RMT and
M-RMT involves a different idea of body (device mediated and
not-mediated ones) and it might create different experience for
the agent during navigation. Moreover, the invariants of the
physical world, obtainable from the active interaction within
the virtual environment (the peculiar spatial perspectives faced
after a right/left turn in the VR-RMT) might guide the agent’s
wayfinding in a different manner from the ones provided by the
necessity inference on how a spatial perspective can be following
a right/left turn in the M-RMT.
Accordingly, it is hypothesized here that the non-identical
activities performed in the differently simulated environments
will result in distinguishable orientation outcomes. Thus, the
main hypothesis is that the peculiar M-RMT and VR-MRT
sensorimotor coupling can have role in performing wayfinding
and also in facing the increasing complexity of the right/left turns
during exploration. Finally, we would like to understand whether,
only for the VR-RMT, some individual differences exist in spatial
orientation derived from age and computer interaction expertise.
We expect that the rotation in VR can be difficult to perform
if the participant does not have sufficient expertise in managing
computer-based simulations or might present a slight cognitive
frailty due to their specific age cohort.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Materials
The M-RMT (Money et al., 1967) is a test of left–right
discrimination. It consists of a stylized city map, depicted in
Figure 1, in which participants indicate on a 32-step dotted
pathway the direction taken at each turn (left or right) in order to
follow a designated route. The answers require an allocentric to
egocentric based reasoning, because the dotted pathway follows
an erratic trace both away from and toward the agent, who is not
allowed to turn the map or to make head and body movements to
give the correct answer.
The VR-RMT (Morganti et al., 2009), is a virtual reality version
of the M-RMT, in which the paper and pencil version is turned
into an actively navigable city from an egocentric perspective. No
landmarks are depicted as navigation cues, and all the buildings
in the virtual simulation have the same texture. The VR-RMT was
developed with 3D Game Studio software by which 3D buildings
were developed on the basis of buildings’ shape and position in
the paper and pencil version of the test. The navigation speed was
constant. It was approximately 5 m and 40 per second.
The VR-RMT was administered on an Intel personal computer
and was presented on a wall by a video projector that provides
a 1,50 m  1 m image. The participants was seated in a chair
approximately 2 m from the virtual environment image depicted
on the wall and moved in the virtual environment using a
facilitate narrow keyboard (The QueenKey 2.5  2.5 narrow
keyboard) placed on a small table in front of them.
A snapshot of the M-RMT and VR-RMT was provided in
Figure 1.
Participants
In this study, we administered both the M-RMT and the VR-RMT
to 83 healthy right-handed volunteers aged from 30 to 80 years.
Sixty one participants remains enrolled in the study after the
assessment of keyboard use and virtual reality familiarity whose
mean age was 56.82 and SD = 15.47. We divided participants into
three groups according to their age. The experimental population
presents 19 Young Adults (YA, from 30 to 49 years old), 19 Adults
(A, from 49 to 64 years old), and 23 Old Adults (OA, from 65
to 80 years old). In order to avoid confounding variables, such
as sex differences in spatial skills, male and female gender was
balanced. The participants included 31 females and 30 males
with 5 to 19 years of education (Mean = 12,08; SD = 3,62). All
subjects participated as volunteers and gave informed consent
for their data treatment. No participant had a clinical history of
neurological and mood disorders such as anxiety/depression.
Procedure
In order to exclude participants with deficits in cognitive
domains, the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE – Folstein
et al., 1975) was performed. Participants who had a poor
performance (cut off value 24/30) on the MMSE were excluded.
After the cognitive evaluation, participants were introduced to
the experimental phase.
Using a different virtual environment from the experimental
one, a 10-min training session was run to familiarize the
participants with the use of a keyboard for navigating in virtual
reality. After 10 min, if participants felt comfortable with the
keyboard and had satisfactorily demonstrated their ability to
guide themselves within the environment, the participants were
included in the experimental study. If the participant was not
able to navigate the training virtual environment, she was
excluded from participation in the experiment. The participants
included in the study were also evaluated as slight/average/good
in computer interaction by the experimenter, according to the
expertise they showed in managing the narrow keyboard to
move in the virtual environment. If, according to three expert
observers, they were able to quickly move in the keyboard
and understanding the correspondence between their finger
movements and the effect of them in the virtual environment,
they were classified as good. If they require some more training
they were classified as average, if they ask for some support from
the experimenter they were classified as slight. Nevertheless, all
the participant at the end of the training session have to perform
the task without experimenter help to be enrolled in the study.
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FIGURE 1 | Snapshots of VR-RMT and M-RMT used in the study.
In the experimental phase, the participants were tested
individually. They were asked to perform both the M-RMT
and the VR-RMT. The two versions of the test were randomly
presented to participants. Half the participants performed the
M-RMT first and the other half of the participants performed the
VR-RMT first. In both the version of the tests, the starting point
and the target point were clearly indicated.
In the M-RMT, we asked participants to follow on the
sketched map a route taken by a hypothetical traveler. The
participant was seated facing the examiner. She was asked to
imagine herself moving along a 32-turn (choice points) route
indicated by the experimenter on the map. Then, she had to
spatially rotate himself to ascertain whether a right or left turn
was demanded at each multiple-choice intersection. At each turn
point, the participant had to answer the examiner’s question:
“In order to follow the depicted route, at this point would you
be turning right or left?” The map always remained in a fixed
position in front of the subjects, who were not allowed to alter
their position to facilitate right–left judgments.
In the VR-RMT, the participants viewed virtual environment
depicted on the screen with the paper version of the test placed in
the table in front of them. While the examiner followed with her
finger the route indicated by a dotted line on the paper version of
the test, the participant decided which direction she must turn in
the virtual environment and turned at each of 32 intersections.
In the M-RMT condition at the top side of the paper the
north direction can be easily visible. In the VR-RMT, a sun
straight visible from the participant’s starting point indicated the
corresponding north direction. Before the start of the VR-RMT
exploration, the correspondence between the starting position on
the paper and in the virtual environment was clearly indicated to
participants. Participants could see the paper version of the test
during VR-RMT navigation, but they can’t rotate the paper in
order to follow to the direction taken in the virtual environment.
Participants could use the north-sun correspondence to re-
orientate themselves during the virtual exploration. Each time the
participant considered one of the 32 turn points she had reached,
she had to orally relate her decision to the experimenter.
In both the M-RMT and VR-RMT, there were equal numbers
of right and left turns. A 10-min time limit was imposed for
completing the test.
RESULTS
In the first global analyses of performance, both for M-RMT and
VR-RMT one point was given for a correct answer—the correct
direction (right or left) at each turn—for a maximum of 32 points
for each test. In order to test environment consistency first we
had a positive correlation between the M-RMT and the VR_MRT
(Pearson’s r = 0.58; p< 0.001).
In order to analyze the differences in exploring the two
versions of the same environment a repeated measure 2x2x3
ANOVA was conducted. The statistic model includes as within
factor Environment (2 levels: M-RMT/VR-MRT)  Presentation
Order (2 levels: M-RMT first/VR-MRT first)  Age Group
(3 levels: YA/A/OA) as between factors. Descriptive data are
depicted in Table 1.
Results showed a significant difference [F(399.21), p < 0.001]
for the factor Environment. Participants better performed the
spatial task in the M-RMT (Mean = 27.10; SD = 4.6) than in
the VR-MRT (Mean = 11.34; SD = 8.08). Moreover, there is a
significant difference in the interaction between Environment
and Age Group [F(8.164), p < 0.001]. Post hoc analysis with
Bonferroni adjustment revealed significant differences between
YA, A, and OA. When it comes to the M-RMT, there is a better
performance by the YA (p < 0.001) and the A (p < 0.001)
compared to the OA; there are no significant differences between
the YA and A. As far as the VR-MRT is concerned there is a better
performance by the YA compared to the A (p< 0.001) and to the
OA (p < 0.001); there are no significant differences between A
and YA.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 241076
fpsyg-09-02410 December 5, 2018 Time: 16:30 # 5
Morganti Enacting Space in Natural and Virtual Reality
TABLE 1 | Participant’s performances at the M-RMT and VR-RMT according to
presentation order and age groups.
Task order Age group Mean SD Participants
M_RMT 1 M-RMT
first
YA (from 30 to 49) 30,18 2,040 11
A (from 50 to 64) 28,00 3,521 6
OA (from 65 to 80) 24,67 4,670 15
Total 27,19 4,425 32
2 VR-RMT
first
YA (from 30 to 49) 31,13 1,126 8
A (from 50 to 64) 27,69 3,276 13
OA (from 65 to 80) 21,75 4,862 8
Total 27,00 4,877 29
Total YA (from 30 to 49) 30,58 1,742 19
A (from 50 to 64) 27,79 3,259 19
OA (from 65 to 80) 23,65 4,839 23
Total 27,10 4,607 61
VR_RMT 1 M-RMT
first
YA (from 30 to 49) 20,00 8,050 11
A (from 50 to 64) 11,17 7,387 6
OA (from 65 to 80) 6,60 3,269 15
Total 12,06 8,455 32
2 VR-RMT
first
YA (from 30 to 49) 19,25 9,377 8
A (from 50 to 64) 7,92 3,499 13
OA (from 65 to 80) 6,12 2,800 8
Total 10,55 7,721 29
Total YA (from 30 to 49) 19,68 8,387 19
A (from 50 to 64) 8,95 5,071 19
OA (from 65 to 80) 6,43 3,057 23
Total 11,34 8,083 61
FIGURE 2 | Differences in M_RMT and VR-RMT for age groups.
Moreover, pairwise means comparison (t-test) revealed that
there are significant differences between the Environments for all
the three Age Groups. Data are depicted in Figure 2.
Finally there was no significant difference in Presentation
Order [F(1.133), p = 0.292], nor in Environment  Presentation
Order [F(0.224), p = 0.638], nor in the Environment 
Presentation Order  Age Group [F(1.16), p = 0.321].
From the literature, we know that the spatial task in the
M-RMT involves different levels of difficulty, defined by the
direction of the virtual traveler on the map as seen from the
subject’s position (Vingerhoets et al., 1996; Rainville et al., 2002).
In order to account for the fact that left–right discrimination
and mental rotation are two different abilities involved in
the Road Map spatial task, both for M-RMT and VR-RMT
the 32 turns were divided into three types according to
the differentiation described by Vingerhoets et al. (1996). As
indicated by Vingerhoets and colleagues, we classified the 32
turns of the tests, placing each turn in one of the three following
categories:
(a) the correct left–right turn doesn’t require mental rotation
[no rotation (NR)];
(b) the correct left–right turn requires a 90 mental rotation
[half rotation (HR)];
(c) the correct left–right turn requires a > 90, < 180 mental
rotation [full rotation (FR)].
Both the paper and the virtual Road Map present 8 NR, 16 HR,
and 8 FR points.
Accordingly, a repeated measure 2x3x3 ANOVA was
conducted. The statistic model includes as within factor
Environment (2 levels: M-RMT/VR-MRT)  Turn Type (3 levels:
NR/HR/FR)  Age Group (3 levels: YA/A/OA) as between factor.
Results showed a significant difference [F(648.83), p < 0.001]
for Turn Type, for the interaction between Turn Type and
Environment [F(179.53), p < 0.001] and for the interaction
between Turn Type and Age Group. There was no statistical
significance [F(2.34), p = 0.059] in the interaction between Turn
Type, Environment, and Age Group.
With regards to the Environment, pairwise means comparison
(t-test) revealed significant differences between M-RMT and VR-
MRT for NR [t(60) = 17.86; p < 0.001], HR [t(60) = 18.69;
p < 0.001], and FR [t(60) = 16.63; p < 0.001]. Performances
in M-RMT revealed higher means compared to performances in
VR-MRT.
With regards to the Turn Type, post hoc analysis with
Bonferroni adjustment revealed significant differences between
NR and HR (p < 0.001), HR and FR (p < 0.001), but no
significant differences between NR and FR (p = 0.544) in the
M-RMT. There are significant differences between NR and HR
(p < 0.001), HR and FR (p < 0.001), and between NR and
FR (p < 0.001) in the VR-RMT. Finally, significant differences
between M-RMT and VR-RMT are observed for the three turn
type(s).
At last, a post hoc analysis with Bonferroni adjustment revealed
that Age Group influenced differently Turn Type performances
in M-RMT and VR-RMT. For all the three types of rotations there
are significant differences between YA and OA (NR p< 0.001; HR
p< 0.001; FR p< 0.001), and between A and OA (NR p< 0.005;
HR p< 0.003; FR p< 0.05) in M-MRT; while there are significant
differences between YA and A (NR p < 0.001; HR p < 0.001; FR
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p< 0.001), and between A and OA (NR p< 0.001; HR p< 0.001;
FR p< 0.001) in M-MRT. Detailed values are depicted in Table 2.
CONCLUSION
Starting from the enactive cognition approach the main research
question proposed in this study was about the equivalence
between a spatial orientation assessment obtainable from
a classical neuropsychological test and the one obtainable
from a virtual reality based one. Specifically, as in clinical
neuropsychology the classical tests generally provide the patients
with an allocentric simulation of space (e.g., a maze or a sketch
map) the evaluation of spatial ability might differ from the
one derived providing patients with the egocentric perspective
possible in the virtual environments. In the classical assessment,
in fact, an agent has to translate the allocentric perception in
egocentred action, while during the virtual assessment the agent
is allowed to move within the environment in the egocentric
perspective. As the concept of enaction have introduced the
notion of the coevolution of the agent and its environment,
the main research question was about if it is possible to create
equivalent representations of the surrounding environment in
terms of opportunities for action (affordances) and sensorimotor
invariants both in allocentred and egocentred spatial simulations.
In exploring a virtual environment an agent took embodied
opportunities for action that are granted to the her from the
simulation, on the basis of the atypical interaction provided by
the computer simulated environment. These kind of affordances
are not provided by the environment per se but from the
interaction between the explorer and the virtual environment.
Consequently, it appeared to be necessary to determine if
the orientation obtainable from a virtual environment might
differ from the spatial orientation obtainable from other
TABLE 2 | Means and Standard deviations for rotation type, task and age group.
Age group Environment Rotation Mean SD
YA (form 30 to 49) M-RMT No rotation 7,421 0,223
Half rotation 15,368 0,432
Full rotation 7,632 0,233
VR-RMT No rotation 4,789 0,348
Half rotation 9,684 0,677
Full rotation 5,421 0,327
A (from 50 to 64) M-RMT No rotation 6,895 0,223
Half rotation 13,895 0,432
Full rotation 7,000 0,233
VR-RMT No rotation 2,053 0,348
Half rotation 4,263 0,677
Full rotation 2,632 0,327
OA (from 65 to 80) M-RMT No rotation 5,870 0,203
Half rotation 11,609 0,393
Full rotation 6,174 0,212
VR-RMT No rotation 1,391 0,316
Half rotation 2,913 0,616
Full rotation 2,130 0,297
kind of simulations (e.g., an analogical simulation like a
sketched map). Thus, the different kind of body–environment
coupling was analyzed here in two different forms of the same
neuropsychological test.
Even if spatial cognition in virtual environment is comparable
to the spatial orientation obtainable from the navigation other
simulated spaces, due to the “sense of presence” experienced in it
(Carassa et al., 2005; Riva et al., 2011), the present study revealed
several significant differences between these two experimental
conditions. The VR-RMT appears to be more complex to solve
than the M-RMT. This difference between the two tests seems
to be directly addressable to the complexity of the turn type in
spatial exploration.
Considering nature of the tasks it is possible to observe that in
the VR-RMT, the half of participants were asked to use the paper
version of the test to perform turns in the virtual environment.
It could have be interpreted as a dual task condition, requesting
participants to first take a decision about the turns through using
the paper-simulated environment and thus to translate the same
decision in the virtual-simulated environment. To perform the
VR-MRT requires a continuous attention focus change between
the two simulations and a perspective switch between the survey
of the M-RMT and the route of the VR-MRT. Thus, the finding
that the performance was worse in this condition may not be very
surprising.
Primarily it is possible to solve the M-RMT by imagining
egocentric spatial transformations (Schultz, 1991) whereas in the
VR-MRT, participants took decisions for each turn point being in
front of the screen and by acting according to the appropriateness
of their choices. The M-RMT and the VR-RMT differs in the
imagined/perceived perspective taking because in the first task
the agent have to set-out how to modify the turn on her body axis
and how to derive a new perspective from that turn, whereas in
the second task, the agent directly perform the turn on the body
axis and directly perceive the point of view modification derived
from it. Moreover, the VR-RMT does not require the participant
to continuously re-locate herself looking at the map, because the
track of each position is done by the experimenter and doesn’t
require an additional cognitive effort.
Following the second interpretation, we expected a
presentation order effect (between the group who experienced
the M-RMT or the VR-RMT first) and also a better performance
on the VR-RMT. Instead, the participants don’t express a
presentation order effect and performed worse on the VR-RMT.
Thus, independently from the presentation order, the VR-RMT
was more complicated to perform than the M-RMT. A possible
explanation of this experimental result may be related to the
difference between simulation and action: rotating the body on
its vertical axis toward the point of reference in virtual reality is
more difficult than rotating the body in a mental space. Tversky
(2009) underlines that human being continuously experience
their own body from inside, influencing the peri-personal space
that is independent from the physical environment per se.
Moreover, it is possible to consider perspective taking and mental
rotation as dissociated. When perspective taking, in fact, includes
thinking about the changing of the owns egocentric perspective
with respect to the surroundings, the mental rotation includes
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thinking about the effects of modifying the placements of objects
in the surroundings during the maintenance of owns actual
perspective in the environment (Hegarty and Waller, 2004).
In addiction, Hintzman et al. (1981) describe spatial
knowledge as derived from orientation-specific perspectives, and
of relational propositions. Accordingly Kozhevnikov and Hegarty
(2001) indicate as the main strategy used in understanding a
more than 90 perspective task is to imagine oneself reoriented
with respect to the scene. This strategy could have to be used
from this study participants. For both the M-RMT and VR-RMT,
in order to follow the route participants have to imaginatively
anticipate themselves in specific orientation. Generally, an agent
is able to move on the gravitational axis while the environment
doesn’t provide variations. This kind of embodied turn creates
an expectation about the spatial perspective (defined by Gibson’s
affordance theory as “invariants of the physical world”) that could
have been more efficacious in updating an imaginative world
compared to the one of the virtual environment.
These results appear to be partially incongruent with current
research in the field. As introduced by Gray and Fu (2004),
in interacting with computer-based simulation, individuals were
given the option of using the external visualizations to perceive
the effect of their actions rather than relying on internal
visualization to imagine the effect. In accord with Keehner
et al. (2008), it is possible to think that in the VR-MRT task
the agents matched the virtual environment snapshots with
the right/left turn intentions in looking for the match between
the obtained perspectives and the effect of each turns. This
continuous reference matching can be considered as tightly
coupled with internal cognitive processes. The possibility to
externalize representations provided by VR-RMT (by observing
the perspective resulting from a right/left turn) may have
required more effort than to base it on the embodied imaginative
process (as in the M-RMT). This data interpretation is also
consistent with the perspective proposed by Di Paolo (2005).
Accordingly, here we can suggest that in the VR-MRT, a failure of
the sensorimotor coupling between the perceptual information
and the turn response on the virtual scenario that doesn’t
involve the entire body, might have created a meaningless
experience for the agent during navigation. Thus the failure of
the sensorimotor coupling has been considered as quite useless
for spatial orientation.
It is also possible to mention that in the VR-RMT, each
mistake in turn taking provides a difference between the agents’s
expected and taken perspective in space that might influence the
next turns affecting the final result more in the VR-RMT than
in the M-RMT. This interpretation of the data appears to be
supported by the analysis of our results on turn type. Managing
HR/FR appears to be easier in the imaginative task than in
the virtual one. This is largely observable from the individual
differences in the analysis of our data: the results from Age Group
comparison showed that our participants were not all equally
able to use external visualizations to support spatial orientation
in virtual reality. Moreover, the ability to orient them VR-RMT
decreases with age. The interaction between Environment and
Age Group, in fact, revealed how there is a difference between the
younger groups (YA and A) and the older population wayfinding
performed in the M-RMT. It reveals a decline with age in the
allocentric to egocentric spatial translation. Whereas in VR-MRT
there is a difference of the YA both when compared to A and OA.
This result confirms that the orientation task both in M-RMT
and VR-RMT is not equal for all individuals but that it is strictly
dependent on the participants’ age. Moreover, our data appear
to be consistent with the recent findings in age-related decline
for wayfinding in complex environments Harris and Wolbers
(2014). By using a complex virtual environment for wayfinding
ability evaluation in young and old populations they found a
wide role of age on the capacity to change from route knowledge
to survey one in order to find a target location. Moreover, in
their work older participants showed evidence of difficulties in
route to survey switching performance, confirming that it can
be at least partly explained in terms of prefrontal-noradrenergic
network impairment, responsible for egocentric to allocentric
coordinating switching behavior.
Finally, the interaction between age group and spatial
performances could be also addressed to a computer expertise
that can be derived from the age of our participants. We have
assumed, in fact, that our age cohorts reflect the possible everyday
use of computer or other technological devices in the participants’
everyday lives. We had the YA group that could be defined as
a “digital native” and were largely exposed to computer-based
interactions, the A group that is still a working population
and could be quite expert in computer use, and the Old Adult
group that is probably retired from work and might not have
a large expertise with technologies. These groups appear to be
different between M-RMT and VR-RMT. In VR-RMT it appears
clear how OA had difficulties in managing turns and that it
could be related to the participants’ expertise in using computer-
based simulations. The data derived from VR-RMT condition are
consistent with the evidence that a variability between subjects in
spatial task performance is high in virtual reality spaces (Klatzy
et al., 1998; Waller et al., 1998). Most of the cognitive abilities
involved in understanding space in a virtual simulation seems to
be higher cost demanding.
As described above, by considering the sync between both
the perspective as essential for spatial navigation and wayfinding,
the differences in spatial evaluation obtainable from mainly
allocentric or mainly egocentric environment simulations (and
from the possibility of interaction they differently provide)
have been deeply investigated. Consequently, in order to obtain
solid data seems to be necessary to think about an assessment
tool specific for virtual environment application (Belingard
and Péruch, 2000; Waller, 2000, 2005). Otherwise, within the
enactive perspective on cognition, data derived from spatial
tasks performed through virtual reality simulations in largely
restrictive action possibilities (e.g., neuroimaging studies) could
be considered as not completely reliable.
As cognition is the form of embodied action in which
cognitive processes arise from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of
perception and action (Thompson, 2005), the coupling between
organism and environment modulates the construction of a
relational domain that is not internally represented in the brain
but it is created from the activity and the peculiar coupling
with the specific environment. This evidence suggests that
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the opportunity of including virtual environments in cognitive
evaluation is not exclusively technological, but epistemic.
Thus, for spatial cognition evaluation, beyond considering
the virtual simulation appropriateness, is equally important to
understand the enaction stance that acknowledges orientation
as derived from egocentric/allocentric sensorimotor invariance.
Data presented here revealed how this sensorimotor invariance
differed from the possibility of offloading spatial knowledge, as in
the classical and virtual version of M-RMT.
Hence, enactive cognition can be considered ad a privileged
point of view in examining virtual reality as more than purely
digital place, but as a technical challenge in which an agent is
able to find spatial invariants, and to progressively evolve them
through the dynamics of the sensory-motor coupling. In this way
she understand the environment and the possibilities for action
in it.
Thus, the introduction on virtual reality in cognitive science
research have to consider how this kind of simulation more
than being “realistic” has to technically support the agents’
possibility to potentially distinguish the moment-by-moment
different paths of encounters with the environment (Di Paolo,
2005, 2009). The peculiar possibilities of sensorimotor coupling,
defined for example from the environment characteristics
and from the interaction design possibilities provided to
the agent can supply explorers with “virtual reality- based”
affordances for action and differentiated information feedbacks.
Each of these should be deeply considered in order to
understand how they could provide distinctive effort for spatial
knowledge.
At last, the inclusion of virtual environments within the
assessment tools for spatial cognition in neuropsychology may
provide an interesting alternative to paper and pencil-based
approaches but data derived from this evaluation have to be used
with extremely caution. Virtual environments in fact appear here
to not involve the same embodied spatial information derived
from the navigation performed in other types of environments.
Even if it remains a great challenge for enactive cognition research
(Varela, 1990).
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Over the evolution, humans have constantly developed and improved their technologies.
This evolution began with the use of physical tools, those tools that increase our
sensorimotor abilities (e.g., first stone tools, modern knives, hammers, pencils). Although
we still use some of these tools, we also employ in daily life more sophisticated tools
for which we do not systematically understand the underlying physical principles (e.g.,
computers, cars). Current research is also turned toward the development of brain–
computer interfaces directly linking our brain activity to machines (i.e., symbiotic tools).
The ultimate goal of research on this topic is to identify the key cognitive processes
involved in these different modes of interaction. As a primary step to fulfill this goal, we
offer a first attempt at a common framework, based on the idea that humans shape
technologies, which also shape us in return. The framework proposed is organized
into three levels, describing how we interact when using physical (Past), sophisticated
(Present), and symbiotic (Future) technologies. Here we emphasize the role played
by technical reasoning and practical reasoning, two key cognitive processes that
could nevertheless be progressively suppressed by the proficient use of sophisticated
and symbiotic tools. We hope that this framework will provide a common ground
for researchers interested in the cognitive basis of human tool-use interactions, from
paleoanthropology to neuroergonomics.
Keywords: tool use, technology, brain–computer interface, automation, technical reasoning
INTRODUCTION
Have you already wondered how researchers living 70 years ago could contact an editor to know
whether their manuscript was still under review or not after 5 months? They certainly had to
write a mail and wait for a response, perhaps 5 weeks after. Nowadays, we send emails and expect
an answer by 2 or 3 days. Perhaps in 1000 years, researchers will just have to think of this and
they will receive the answer instantly. These different modes of interaction illustrate the constant
modification of our technologies over time, a phenomenon that characterizes our species (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985). The ultimate goal of research on this topic is to identify the key cognitive
processes involved in these different modes of interaction. As a primary step to fulfill this goal,
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we offer a first attempt at a common framework, based on the idea
that humans shape technologies, which also shape us in return.
The framework proposed is organized into three levels,
describing how we interact when using physical (Past),
sophisticated (Present), and symbiotic (Future) technologies1.
The temporal gradient introduced here implies that, at the species
level, physical technologies are anterior to sophisticated ones,
which are anterior to symbiotic ones, so that the theoretical
proportion of use for each kind of technology is supposed to
evolve over time (Figure 1). The distinction made between these
different kinds of technology is also theorized here at a cognitive
level, based on the idea that our modifications on the world
are first guided by an intention, needing then the selection of a
practical solution (i.e., the practical level), and finally the selection
and application of a technical action (i.e., the technical level;
Figure 2). The thesis defended here is that the technical evolution
from physical to sophisticated and symbiotic technologies tends
to progressively suppress the technical and practical levels.
Three caveats need to be made at this point. First, there
is no overview in the literature about the cognitive processes
involved in the different interactions we have with tools and
technologies. The major reason for this lack is that this requires a
critical, epistemological development as to the way of organizing
the field so that researchers from different topics (e.g., stone
tools, brain–computer interaction) could communicate within
a single and comprehensive framework. The goal of this paper
is to fill this gap, by attempting to provide a structured way
of organizing the literature based on the evolution of our
technology over time. This attempt could be a good starting
point for developing such a framework in the future. Second,
many cognitive processes are involved in our interactions with
tools and technologies. Here we could not address all of them
and preferred to concentrate our attention on two key cognitive
processes, namely, technical reasoning and practical reasoning.
Of course, further theoretical development would be needed
to complete our analysis. Third, as with other humans, our
interactions with tools and technologies can take different forms
according to the role taken by technology (e.g., competition,
collaboration). These different levels of interaction that most
directly deal with the “social” aspect will be addressed partly
in this paper, particularly in the third section. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that a more comprehensive review based on this
level of analysis could complete the present review, discussing
the potential parallel between our interactions with social (e.g.,
humans) and non-social (e.g., technologies) agents.
THE PAST: PHYSICAL TOOLS
Physical tools can be defined as those tools that increase our
sensorimotor abilities (Virgo et al., 2017). Although we still use
a wide variety of physical tools (e.g., hammer, knife), it can be
considered that they correspond to the first tools humans have
made and used in pre-history. At a cognitive level, the use of
1The terms tool and technology will be hereafter used interchangeably and in
a broad sense to refer to any environmental object useful to increase the user’s
sensorimotor or cognitive capacities (Osiurak et al., 2010).
all physical tools shares the need for the user to understand
physical principles (e.g., percussion, cutting). The characteristics
of early stone tools indicate that makers showed evidence of a
basic understanding of stone fracture mechanics (Hovers, 2012).
The use of physical tools by modern humans also requires this
form of physical understanding (Bril et al., 2010).
Some patients can meet difficulties to use everyday tools after
left brain damage (Osiurak and Rossetti, 2017). The difficulties
concern not only the selection of the appropriate tool, but
also the mechanical action performed (e.g., pounding a nail
by rubbing it on the nail instead of hammering with it). The
same difficulties can be observed when they are asked to solve
mechanical problems by using novel tools (Goldenberg and
Hagmann, 1998; Jarry et al., 2013). Taken together, these findings
indicate that the use of physical tools is grounded on the ability
to reason about physical properties of tools and objects based on
mechanical knowledge. This is what we call “technical reasoning”
(Osiurak et al., 2010; Osiurak and Badets, 2016). This reasoning
is critical to form a mental representation of the mechanical
action intended. It is also the key process allowing us to generate
instances of “technical misusage” (Figure 2) also called “function
creep,” corresponding to the use of a tool in an unusual way
(Osiurak et al., 2009). Such instances can be observed relatively
early in humans. A 2-years-old child can, for instance, use a tea
spoon to hammer a piece of cheese in his mashed carrots, calling
the spoon “a hammer.” This child knows that the spoon is not a
hammer but finds funny to hammer the cheese and handy to use
the spoon to do so at that time.
Technical reasoning could be unique to humans (e.g., Penn
et al., 2008), explaining a certain number of our specificities such
as the use of one tool to create another (e.g., stone knapping)
or the use of complex tools that transform our motor energy
into different mechanical energies (Osiurak, 2017). Convergent
evidence from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience
indicates that technical reasoning could engage the area PF within
the left inferior parietal cortex (Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009;
Reynaud et al., 2016), which does not in macaques and other
non-human primates (Orban and Caruana, 2014).
Before going on to the next section, one important aspect
needs to be considered. Technical reasoning is critical for the
making of any technology (physical, sophisticated, symbiotic).
For physical technologies, there is no real distance between the
maker and the user in that the user needs to mentally make
the technology before the use (Osiurak and Heinke, 2017). If
you intend to cut a tomato, you are free to select a wide variety
of tools. Nevertheless, your selection is based on the physical
properties of the tomato, leading you to choose a tool with
the appropriate physical properties relatively to the tomato. In
a way, you first make your tool mentally (e.g., thinking about
something sharp and solid enough) and then you select it really
accordingly. Things are different for sophisticated technologies,
which mainly correspond to interface-based technologies (e.g.,
computers). A key characteristic of these technologies is that the
maker/designer has facilitated the interaction, so that the user
has no longer to understand the physical principles underlying
the use. In this case, the user does not make mentally the tool
before the use but learn the arbitrary relationship between the
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FIGURE 1 | Theoretical proportion of physical, sophisticated, and symbiotic technologies used over time. The core idea is that, at the species level, physical
technologies are anterior to sophisticated technologies, which are also anterior to symbiotic technologies. Over time, physical technologies (e.g., stone tools, knifes,
hammers) tend to decrease and could be completely absent in a far future. Sophisticated technologies have appeared later and are now a great part of the
technologies we use (i.e., interface-based technologies). Again, it can be hypothesized that this kind of technologies will be less and less used. Finally, symbiotic
technologies are developing now even if they remain rarely used (e.g., brain–computer interfaces). In a far future, it can be thought that humans will profusely and
uniquely use these technologies. The three colored panels correspond to the three time periods (Past, Present, and Future). The color associated to each kind of
technologies corresponds to the color of the period where a given technology is dominant (Past: the reign of physical technologies; Present: the reign of
sophisticated technologies; Future: the reign of symbiotic technologies).
motor response and its effect. The corollary is that sophisticated
technologies may not require, at the technical level (Figure 2),
technical reasoning skills, but more basic cognitive processes
such as associative learning and procedural memory (Osiurak
and Heinke, 2017). At least two lines of evidence support
this view. First, interface-based technologies (e.g., touchscreens)
can be easily used by infants, despite moderate skills to use
physical tools (Beck et al., 2011). Likewise, many non-human
animals including tool users (e.g., baboons) can use touchscreens
very quickly in the absence of any signs of physical tool use
(Claidière et al., 2014). Second, patients with damage to the left
inferior parietal cortex are impaired to use physical tools, but
not interface-based technologies. The opposite pattern can be
observed in patients with deficits of procedural memory (e.g.,
Parkinson’s disease), indicating a double dissociation between
the ability to use physical versus sophisticated technologies (see
Osiurak, 2014, 2017).
THE PRESENT: SOPHISTICATED TOOLS
Stopping the alarm clock after waking up, using tramways,
driving a car, interacting with a smartphone, taking the elevator,
and so on. With the sophistication of tools and the advent of
cognitive tools (e.g., computer spreadsheet) the distance between
the making and the use has dramatically increased, so we use
many tools we could never build in a lifetime. This does not
change the way we interact with tools: the purpose of a tool is not
in the tool itself, but in the user’s intentions. A computer screen
can be used to stick notes, as a visual barrier, as a mirror, and
so forth (i.e., technical misusage). This fact remains whatever the
nature of the tool considered, from a very simple stone tool to
the most advanced smartphone (e.g., reflecting sunlight). There
is a limit, however, in the lack of freedom offered by sophisticated
tools to its users at the technical level, because the use of these
tools for their usual function needs to master pre-established
procedures (see above).
Some sophisticated tools, often referred as automation, do
not tend to extend humans but rather to replace them (Young
et al., 2007). Those tools that replaces us tend to be poorly
accepted by individuals (Navarro et al., 2011). The design of these
tools also questions about the human role in our societies, and
about what should be automated or not (Hancock, 2014). For
instance, a highly automated task completion is often considered
as dehumanizing (Coeckelbergh, 2015). People also select an
automatic completion of the task only if much more effective than
a manual completion (Osiurak et al., 2013; Navarro and Osiurak,
2015, 2017), as if humans tend to avoid the loss of freedom
associated to sophisticated tools (Figure 2).
Tool use is not neutral for users. Of course, tools are
changing the way humans do things, but tools also change
humans themselves (Hancock, 2007). All the data available on
the Internet provide considerable benefits, yielding information
easily. But, it also alters the way people memorize information
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FIGURE 2 | Neurocognitive processes involved in physical, sophisticated, and symbiotic technologies. The core idea is that humans develop technologies in order to
satisfy intentions (I). To do so, they have to select appropriate practical solution (S), leading then to the selection and application of technical actions (A). In the case
of physical technologies, the intention can be to communicate information (I1). This can be achieved either by projecting information to a wide surface (S1) or writing
a document (S2). There is no bijection between the “domain” of intentions and the “domain” of practical solutions in that a given intention can be achieved through
two different practical solutions and, inversely, the same practical solutions can be useful to achieve a given intention. At this practical level, humans have to imagine
the most appropriate practical solution. Then, once a given practical solution selected (e.g., S1), it has to been operationalized by selecting and applying a technical
action (e.g., A1). For instance, if the practical solution is to project information to a wide surface, the technical solution can be tracing by using a pencil on a wall.
Again, there is no bijection between the “domain” of practical solutions and the “domain” of technical actions. For physical technologies, humans have to do
technical reasoning to select and apply the appropriate technical actions. However, for sophisticated technologies, this technical level is suppressed, people having
just to learn the procedure thought by the maker/designer to interact with the technology (e.g., pressing a button to activate a given function). Interestingly, for both
physical and sophisticated technologies, people are still free to reason at a practical level in order to select which practical solutions to choose. For symbiotic
technologies, this practical level is suppressed, with the idea that the intention is directly implemented, without having to decide between different practical solutions
and, as a result, technical actions. Bold and thin lines represent, respectively, usages and misusages, that is, the usual or unusual path a user can follow to satisfy an
intention. Sophisticated technologies tend to suppress misusages at a technical level, because people have no other possibilities than pressing buttons, for instance,
to power PowerPoint. However, they can still divert the pre-established use of PowerPoint (i.e., communication device) in order to fulfill another intention (i.e.,
external memory). For symbiotic tools, both technical reasoning and practical reasoning from the user could be suppressed, because the user intervenes neither at
the technical level, nor at the practical level.
itself in favor of a recall of where to access it Sparrow et al.
(2011). Is it for the best or for the worst? This is not a new
question, at least in the cognitive ergonomics field. Parasuraman
and Riley (1997) stated that automation “changes the nature
of the work that humans do, often in ways unintended and
unanticipated by the designers of automation” (p. 231). Use is
described here as the human proneness to activate automation
when available. Besides a correct use of automation, misuse (i.e.,
overreliance on automation) and disuse (i.e., underutilization of
automation) have been reported. Thus, the human is reasoning
about its interactions with sophisticated tools to adjust his/her
behavior according to the context and his/her own objectives
(Leplat, 1990). For instance, automation use was found to be
related to a balance between trust in automation and user
self-confidence (Lee and Moray, 1994). These data can be
interpreted as the human nature to keep reasoning based on
internal and external assessments (i.e., practical reasoning). This
is what we refer to as practical misusage, that is, the ability to
divert the pre-established use of a tool (e.g., PowerPoint as a
communication device) to fulfill another intention (e.g., storing
information; Figure 2). A research issue to investigate is the
neural bases that support this “practical reasoning.” Are there
(a) partly the same as those required by technical reasoning?
(b) Rather common to those associated to logical reasoning? Or
(c) implying areas known to be engaged in interactions with other
humans that would be recycled to reason on human–machine
interactions?
Another aspect specific to sophisticated tools is that the
perception or inference of tool functions could be sometimes
complicated because of the distance between the maker and the
user, favoring the occurrence of inappropriate and ineffective
use. To counter this phenomenon, a human-centered design has
been proposed (Billings, 1991). This design process widely used
in a variety of domains (François et al., 2016) is based on the
rationale that tool designers should take into account as much
as possible users’ logic and characteristics during the tool design
process. In a way, the consideration of the user in the design
process aims at reducing the distance between the maker and
the user. Nevertheless, if we assume that humans are keen on
practical reasoning, this quest is necessary deceptive as there is no
universal reasoning process and, thus, neither universal human–
tool interaction, nor natural interaction with sophisticated tools.
Inversely, the human–tool interaction is rather artificial because
based on an artifice (i.e., a sophisticated tool) for which the user
ignores, at least part of, the design philosophy and the working
principle.
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THE FUTURE: SYMBIOTIC TOOLS
Kid #1: “You mean you have to use your hands?”
Kid #2: “That’s like a baby’s toy!”
—Back to the Future Part II
Predicting the future of our technology could be a fortune
teller’s job, had there not been a few mesmerizing anticipation
movies and books, featuring great inventions feeding from
contemporary science, the society’s aspirations, and feeding back
companies striving for developing them: inventions such as the
Blade Runner flying autonomous cars or the gesture-based user
interface from Minority Report prefigure the tools of the future.
Some may never be created, some may be part of our everyday
lives in 30 years, as the video calls from the first Blade Runner
movie are part of our modern lives. This sneak peek into the
future shows that all these tools have one thing in common:
they seem to be operated seamlessly and conveniently by the
user, reducing or abolishing four main constraints: mechanics,
space, time, and effort (Osiurak, 2014). Although the depicted
vision of our future world is always more technology-oriented,
machines never overwhelm the user, who is becoming a part of a
human–machine system, as the “commander-in-chief.”
Most of the promised futuristic and fantastic tools are
operated by thought, voice, or gestures. Because human–machine
interaction through devices such as a mouse or keyboard is slow,
inefficient, and sometimes not even feasible, the possibility of
communicating with machines directly from our thoughts has
emerged (Schalk, 2008). The brain–computer interface (BCI)
(Wolpaw et al., 2002) field has then rapidly gained interest,
first because it could be used in motor rehabilitation programs
(Chaudhary et al., 2016), as the aim of BCI is to translate
brain activity (“thoughts”) into commands understandable by a
machine. For achieving this, brain activity is captured by the
means of sensors, pre-treated, and assigned to a corresponding
action to be performed by the artificial system through an
adaptive algorithm that learns to discriminate classes in the brain
signals recorded (Mitchell, 1997; Bishop, 2006). A successful BCI
interaction very often includes a learning phase attuning the
technology to the specificity of the user’s cognitive system. The
structural inter-individual heterogeneity of the brains themselves,
the functional differences, even the intra-individual differences
from a time to another, will push the need for the learning
algorithms to be highly adapted to a particular individual, if not
to his particular mood.
Following this, the tantalizing promises of body-and-mind-
operated tools, responding efficiently to the user’s intentions,
come with the need of individualizing the technology operating
the machine. Brain–machine communication needs to be truly
adapted to each specific individual for brain patterns to be
successfully converted into thoughts. In this ultra-individualized
technology, the individual and the tool will then form a
system in a tight relationship, depending on each other to
“perform” appropriately. The tool is then embodied within
the user, and the system they form could be designated as
a “symbiotic tool” (Licklider, 1960; Brangier and Hammes-
Adelé, 2011). Within this tight interaction, the human has the
intention, then the tool operates the technical and practical
choices (i.e., suppression of the technical and practical levels;
Figure 2).
On the journey to a Future in which Technology and Man
form a symbiotic system, a few issues remain to be addressed.
The first one is the acceptation issue (Davis, 1989). Are we
designed to pair with synthetic devices? Can we and shall we
accept to be part of a man–machine system? Tools of the Present
need the user to accept them. We postulate that the future
symbiotic tools will need the user to incorporate them. The
second point is to explore the limits of the human cognitive
system in terms of BCI performance. To function as smoothly
and perfectly as in the Avatar movie for example, many technical
issues have to be solved from the maker: the sensors need to
be implanted, miniaturized; the algorithms need to be fast and
reliable, etc. (Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006). If the machine-related
issues will without any doubt be resolved at some point, only
few researches have tackled the man-related issue. Are the neural
signals encoding our thoughts specific and reliable enough to be
translated into a crystal-clear command? For how long can we
maintain a neural state corresponding to a sustained command?
Are we (all) designed to be good BCI-commanders, and always?
Studies on BCI illiteracy show that 20% of the population cannot
produce the brain patterns required for a BCI system to function
properly (Vidaurre and Blankertz, 2010). Are their brains faulty,
or the techniques immature?
These questions relate to the fundamental enigma of the
cognitive system: how can our complex thoughts, dreams,
feelings, creativity, instinct, etc. be encoded into less than 1015
signals? How can an infinite and unexplored mental world be
created by a finite and defined material support? The birth
of neuroergonomics (Hancock and Szalma, 2003; Parasuraman,
2003) will certainly help to start answering these issues, and to
develop efficient channels of communication with technology.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we depict the different cognitive modes of
interaction we have with physical, sophisticated and symbiotic
tools. The key idea is that there could be a trend to progressively
suppress our involvement at technical and practical levels
(Figure 2). Interestingly, when considering symbiotic tools, users
might be, a day, restricted to produce only intentions and will
delegate all remaining efforts and choices to machines. The key
issue is whether this restriction has to be viewed as a source of
freedom or not? After all, should this scenario be true, what will
humans do to occupy their available brain time? We are also
aware that this review is biased by our ability to envision future
tools, and how technology will evolve in a far future. Perhaps our
conception of symbiotic tools is limited, considering only tools
that transform our conscious intentions into responses. However,
perhaps we will be able to develop technologies that will produce
responses based on unconscious thoughts, thereby anticipating
our needs even if we are unable to correctly generate them – or
even before we generate them (e.g., sending an email to an editor
before we intend to do so). In this respect, a critical question for
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future research is to determine whether our technological cultural
evolution will reach an asymptote as suggested here, or whether
other forms of technological interactions will emerge in a far
future, again shaping our cognition in return.
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In an increasingly technology-textured environment, smart, intelligent and responsive
technology has moved onto the body of many individuals. Mobile phones, smart
watches, and wearable activity trackers (WATs) are just some of the technologies that
are guiding, nudging, monitoring, and reminding individuals in their day-to-day lives.
These devices are designed to enhance and support their human users, however, there
is a lack of attention to the unintended consequences, the technology non-neutrality
and the darker sides of becoming human-tech hybrids. Using the extended mind theory
(EMT) and agential intra-action, we aimed at exploring how human-tech hybrids gain
collective skills and how these are put to use; how agency is expressed and how this
affects the interactions; and what the darker sides are of being a human-tech hybrid.
Using a qualitative method, we analyzed the experiences of using a WAT, with a specific
focus on how the tracker and the individual solve tasks, share competences, develop
new skills, and negotiate for agency and autonomy. We contributed with new insight
on human-tech hybridity and presented a concept referred to as the agency pendulum,
reflecting the dynamism of agency. Finally, we demonstrated how the EMT and agential
intra-action as a combined theoretical lens can be used to explore human-tech hybridity.
Keywords: hybridity, extended mind, agential intra-action, wearable activity trackers, agency
INTRODUCTION
Throughout time, humans have utilized the capabilities and skills derived from interacting with
external tools, entities, devices, and artifacts to complement their own cognitive abilities (Thacker,
2003; Dinerstein, 2006; Herbrechter, 2012; Heersmink, 2017). There are many ways that human
cognition can be enhanced with external artifacts, some of which are rather mundane, including
shopping-lists, books, diaries, recipes, calculators, spreadsheets, and, more recently, mobile phones.
The extended mind theory (EMT) is a helpful theoretical apparatus when considering how and
in which ways, cognitive processes can become extended across multiple human and nonhuman
entities. The EMT reflects Clark and Chalmers (1998) argument that cognitive processes (e.g.,
memory, information retrieval, and processing) can take place outside of the human mind. Hence,
cognitive abilities are a collection, an ensemble (Clark, 2015), of human and other external entities
that together perform tasks and solve problems.
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The EMT has previously been used as a theoretical lens to
explore a number of different contexts, such as the musically
extended mind (Krueger, 2014), spirituality and Christian life
(Brown and Strawn, 2017), treatment of sex offenders (Ward,
2009), social ant behavior (Bosse et al., 2005), as well as other
studies that explore cognitive integration and the extended mind
(Menary, 2010), and sense-making (Thompson and Stapleton,
2009). However, studies like these that adopt the EMT are
typically conceptual and do not seem to engage directly with
research subjects to understand, in practice, how cognitive
capabilities become distributed and contribute to the formation
of hybrids. In the context of human-tech hybridity, there is a need
for further research into the ways in which agency is acquired,
expressed and lost as well as the darker sides of these hybrid
formations.
We adopt the empirical context of people who use or have
recently used wearable activity trackers (WATs) to manage
their health and well-being and the trackers that collect, store,
and reproduce the health and well-being data. We rely on
their accounts of interacting with the WATs and are interested
in their lived experiences. WATs are interesting to study
in this context, as the technology has gained an on-body
position, constantly capturing movements and activities with the
potential to influence the person’s behaviors, decision-making,
and information access. The WATs undertake certain activities
with few instructions from the user, e.g., automatically starts
monitoring sleep and determines which kind of physical activity
the person is performing, while in other situations the person
inputs information (e.g., food items), which the WAT transforms
into visualizations. We seek to contribute to other recent studies
(e.g., Bode and Kristensen, 2016; Etkin, 2016; Fotopoulou and
O’Riordan, 2016; Nelson et al., 2016; Rapp and Cena, 2016; Smith
and Vonthethoff, 2016) that have used self-monitoring and self-
tracking as the empirical context to investigate various areas of
human-tech engagement.
We apply the EMT and Barad’s (2003) concept of agential
intra-action as a combined theoretical lens to explore how
cognition is extended to the WATs to solve tasks and provide
new insight, while also expressing agency (Clowes, 2018). In
this way, the paper builds on the EMT by examining the non-
neutrality of the WATs and how they acquire agency in particular
situations, which is further conceptualized through our concept
of the agency pendulum. As such, this research believes that
technology can act as cognitive extensions and at the same time
express agency. Hence, we put forward that distributed cognition
and distributed agency can be detected when exploring human-
tech interactions and that these are important to understand what
it means to be a human-tech hybrid.
We posit that hybridity is not a stable condition with
predetermined roles and affects. Rather, it is an ongoing process
that interweaves the human biological and cognitive with the
abilities of other entities. Clark (2007, p. 279) underlines how the
human emerges as a “soft self,” ready to adapt and be adapted by
technological others:
The realization that we are soft selves, wide open to new forms
of hybrid cognitive and physical being, should serve to remind
us to choose our bio-technological unions very carefully, for in
so doing we are choosing who and what we are.
Using the EMT and agential intra-action, we aimed at
exploring how human-tech hybrids gain collective skills and how
these are put to use; how agency is expressed and how this affects
the interactions; and what the darker sides are of becoming a
human-tech hybrid.
The literature review starts with a focus on the EMT to explain
the core concepts of extended cognition, collective problem
solving, coupled systems, and non-neutrality. This is followed by
a review of Barad’s (2003) agential intra-action concept.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Extended Mind
Situated approaches to understanding cognition, such as
embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended, have come to
challenge the traditional cognitivist paradigm (Heersmink,
2017). Situated cognition is a form of cognitive extension
that can be expressed in a multitude of ways through
engagement with a person’s external environment. The situated
cognition movement has developed primarily since the late
1970s and offers an alternative paradigm for exploring and
conceptualizing the mind (Wilson and Clark, 2009). At its core,
situated approaches consider human thought as affected by
the external socio-technological environment (Hutchins, 2014).
Hence, when the external environment changes, the individual’s
cognitive abilities are also impacted. Therefore, when taking a
situated approach to cognition, the external socio-technological
environment is an important source of influence on human
thought.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) concept of extended mind is
an attempt to question the locus of cognition as belonging
intrinsically and only to the human mind and body. Instead,
they advocate that the human mind and cognition is extended
across larger systems of different kinds of entities. The focus of
the extended mind is how internal and external resources operate
together in “driving more-or-less intelligent thought and action”
(Sutton et al., 2010, p. 525). Clark (2001, p. 134) explains:
We – more than any other creature on the planet – deploy
non-biological elements (instruments, media, notations) to
complement our basic biological modes of processing,
creating extended cognitive systems whose computational and
problem-solving profiles are quite different from those of the
naked brain.
It is collective problem-solving, involving both a person’s
internal resources, e.g., the ability to recall items to purchase
from the supermarket, combined with the resources afforded by
an external entity, e.g., a shopping list with items to purchase.
Another example is the internal ability a person may have
to find their way around the streets of London to reach a
particular destination. This ability is based on the person’s
prior knowledge and experience of the network of streets,
shortcuts and traffic patterns. The task of getting from A
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to B, however, is often complemented by the directions and
visualizations offered by an external resource; a digital map on
the person’s smartphone, for example. Hence, to complement
the human mind’s limited capacity (Norman, 1993), artifacts
are created and used as scaffolding to help the person perform
certain tasks. Artifacts that offer cognitive scaffolding thereby
complement the human information processing capacity by
providing information, resources, or capabilities, as and when
required, in order to perform the task (Clark, 2015). The human-
artifact hybrids gain new capacities (Wilson and Clark, 2009),
which in turn affect behaviors, decision-making, and identity
formation. Rowlands (2009) also believes that humans use the
world around them to extract relevant information which is
used to support basic functions such as perception, memory and
reasons. These cognitive processes, he believes, take on a hybrid
form as they “straddle both internal and external operations”
(Rowlands, 2009, p. 2). This need to externalize thought in
order to enhance processing capabilities through the use of
complementary technologies is an inherent feature of the human
experience.
Clark (2015) explains that devices, such as, for example,
laptops and smartphones, can be considered bio-external
devices that offer resources (e.g., information) for specific tasks,
depending on the context and the level of uncertainty. Hence, the
context that the human-artifact hybrid is in has an impact on the
types of resources needed and the ability of each agent (internal
and external) to provide and share the necessary resources. The
person and the scaffolding can be so strongly coupled that they
become one single cognitive system. Heersmink (2017) explains
that the more a person depends on the external information
to perform tasks that require cognitive abilities, the deeper the
external information, or artifact that provides the information,
is integrated with their internal cognitive system. In this way,
it is a dynamic relationship and the extent to which the person
and the artifact become a single cognitive system, is contingent
on factors such as the intensity of information flow, accessibility
of the scaffolding artifact, durability of coupling, amount of
trust in the scaffold’s information, among other (Heersmink,
2015).
To sum up, the concept of extended mind argues for an
approach to cognition that is distributed and extended across
human and other entities. The surrounding environment is seen
as always affecting human thought, memory, decision-making,
and actions. Hence, individuals undertake tasks in collaboration
with artifacts and can even become a single cognitive system.
As such, the EMT considers objects, people, systems, and other
external components as part of a larger cognitive system.
In the Section “Coupled Systems,” we explore the nature of
the human-artifact coupling in further detail through Clark and
Chalmers (1998) concept of coupled systems.
Coupled Systems
The concept of coupled systems is the linking of the human
organism with an external entity in a two-way interaction, which
creates a new cognitive system (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).
These human and external entities interact in one system where
each plays an active role and acquires collective behavioral
competences. If external parts are de-coupled from the system,
the collective competences are reduced or even lost. The external
parts, or features, that are embedded in the coupled system have
the ability to act and influence the overall system. Clark and
Chalmers (1998, p. 51) argue that the external features possess
an “ineliminable role,” as, if changed, the behavior of the person
is likely to change too, even if the internal structure (e.g., the
capacity to recall information, plan behavior, etc.) remains the
same.
Coupling is one of the more contentious areas of the EMT
and is also referred to as the coupling-constitution fallacy
(Rowlands, 2009). According to Aizawa (2010), Clark’s (2008)
argument that a causal dependency between a cognitive process
(A) and some other process (B) can make B or A-B constitute
a cognitive process is flawed. Clark (2008) has defended this
core pillar of EMT by arguing that all couplings are not
automatically considered to constitute an extended cognitive
process. Rather, focus should be on the effect of the coupling
and its ability to surface information that is useful within a
specific situation of problem-solving. This perspective is further
emphasized in Clark and Chalmers (1998) concept of active
externalism. Active externalism is grounded in the belief that
the external features (e.g., a book, watch, to-do-list, fitness
tracker) directly impact the person and the person’s behaviors.
In this way, the external features play an active role in the
creation of the here-and-now and the capabilities of the human-
artifact hybrid (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Often, external
features will be taken in use in order to enhance cognitive
hybridization by acquiring the ability to process large amounts
of information, faster and with a greater level of accuracy
(Heersmink, 2017).
There are certain criteria that affect the strength of the human-
artifact coupling (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Heersmink, 2015)
and therefore also the extent to which the external features
become constitutive of a cognitive process. The coupling needs
to be reliable, which means that the external feature or resource
needs to be accessible as and when it is required. For example,
a shopping list needs to be available when the person needs
it in order to solve the particular task, for it to become part
of the cognitive resources that the person has available to
draw on (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). To create this coupling,
it requires a high level of portability, and more importantly,
accessibility, to ensure that the coupling is reliable. Clark and
Chalmers (1998) argue that occasional decoupling, damage,
loss, or malfunction does not put into question this unified
cognitive system. They point to how a person’s internal cognitive
capabilities may also be challenged at times (e.g., from a lack
of sleep, illness, or intoxication) and as along as the external
features are available when required, then that constitutes a
coupling. It is further important that the information that flows
from the external source is trusted by the person receiving it.
If the information is not trusted, its role as a guide for action
will be challenged. Heersmink (2015) adds further detail to the
notion of trust. He argues that (dis)trust can be either explicit
or implicit. The main difference between explicit and implicit
trust is that for explicit trust, the information is consciously
evaluated before determining whether it is trustworthy or not.
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For implicit trust, the information is assumed either trustworthy
or not trustworthy. We tend to trust information implicitly if
we have endorsed it in the past, if many people rely on this
information to guide their action, or if it is relevant to achieving
set goals (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). Tripathi (2010) explains that
the more we depend on technologies to carry out or mediate
our everyday activities, the more we will need to trust them
to do so.
To sum up, a person and an external entity can become a
new cognitive system through two-way interaction. However, the
external entity needs to possess a high degree of trust, reliance,
and accessibility and it must have been endorsed by the person at
some point in the past in order to become part of this new system
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998).
As we continue to explore facets of EMT as a perspective to
understand human-WAT hybridity, it is of great relevance to
consider the role the technology plays in shaping intentions and
effects. We provide a brief review of the literature on the non-
neutrality of technology, which leads us to further explore the
agentic expressions of technological entities.
Non-neutrality
The concept of non-neutrality should be seen in the context
of human-tech hybridization and as a contrasting perspective
to the views that technology is always enhancing (i.e., positive)
or that hybridization is neutral (i.e., means to an end).
Verbeek (2006) explains that technologies always mediate
and shape action. Ihde (1990) and Heersmink (2017) support
this argument that human-tech hybridization is not neutral,
as technologies do shape intentions and effects. Ihde (2004,
p. 120) explains that “To take instruments either for granted
or as simply transparent, is to make an implicit assumption
that instruments are ‘neutral’.” Heersmink (2017) identifies
three ways to understand the non-neutrality of technology.
First, technologies can embody moral and political values.
For example, a non-smoking sign encourages smokers not
to smoke and instead adopt a behavior that is typically
supported by health authorities. Second, technologies can
mediate and transform experiences and perspectives on
the world. The experience of being-in-the-world is affected
by the technologies an individual interacts with, whether
that is a motorbike, a heart monitor, or a computer game.
The impact a technology has can be detected by paying
attention to which aspects of an experience that it amplifies
and which it reduces (Tripathi, 2010). For example, the use
of whiteboards to mindmap ideas and thoughts amplifies the
ability to organize, inter-relate, and prioritize information
and, potentially, share it with others. Third, technologies
can be seen as having unintended consequences, which are
difficult to affect or change. For example, social networking
platforms were designed to bring people together, but,
unintentionally, have also contributed to issues of social anxiety
and isolation for some users. Other unintended consequences
can be seen with something as mundane as word processing
software and the in-built spell checking feature. Users of this
software, may experience their spelling deteriorate due to
their misspelling automatically being corrected, sometimes so
quickly that the person may not even notice the correction being
made.
As technology becomes more ubiquitous and present in day
to day tasks and interactions, there is a risk of over-reliance on
the external information that the technologies provide (Carr,
2011). This may lead to a reduction in the cognitive abilities, as
tasks, information storing, and problem-solving are outsourced
to technologies, and therefore not learned or practiced by the
individual.
The non-neutrality of technology underlines the idea that
technological entities shape intentions and effects, some of which
can be unintended consequences or side effects, which are
unexpected. In the final section of this review of the literature,
we continue to explore the role of technology in the making of
human-tech hybridity.
Agential Intra-action
Like the EMT acts to challenge the traditional cognitivist
paradigm, Barad’s (2003) work on agential intra-action also takes
an oppositional stance. It encourages a re-think and re-view
of our relations with the external world by de-centering the
dominant human actor and instead focusing on the intertwined
nature of humans and other entities (Pickering, 2013).
Agential intra-action considers agency to be emergent and
distributed over human and nonhuman forms. Hence, from
this perspective, agency is not deterministic, absolute or, indeed,
only a human practice. As such, agential intra-action also
challenges the dominant human subject (Puig de la Bellacasa,
2009). Nonhuman entities, such as technology, are also seen
to express agency, affect, and influence relationships as well as
the collective practices, capabilities, and cognitive abilities of
human-tech hybrids.
Barad’s (2003) focus is on understanding the co-created
and co-constructed behaviors, decisions, and experiences, which
take place within these hybrid relationships. She explains that
“Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings
of the world” (Barad, 2003, p. 818). In other words, entities,
whether human or other, are seen to express agency (e.g., the
ability to influence a situation) as they interact with other
entities in the world. This is what Barad (2003, p. 817) refers
to as the “ebb and flow of agency.” Hence, situations, relations,
and identities are ongoing and evolve between actors, who
through those intra-actions become and act. To understand
how different human and nonhuman entities become, it is
important to account for both human and nonhuman forms
of agency (Barad, 2003). It is also important to emphasize
that, in this view, agentic expressions by nonhuman entities
are not purely extensions or transferals of human agency.
Pickering (2013, p. 25) explains that it is useful not to think
about agency in terms of “will, intention, calculation, and
representation,” but rather in terms of performance, doings,
actions, impact, and influence. In other words, agency is
expressed in places of action, of consequence, of impact – in
places where change occurs. Pickering (1995, p. 102) refers to
this as the “open-ended dance of agency.” Hence, that it is
through intra-actions that agency is enacted and that agentic
expressions flow back and forth between actors. As such,
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human-tech (and other) relationships are always dynamic, always
unfolding.
In summary, agential intra-action provides an opportunity to
acknowledge nonhuman agentic expressions, doings and actions
as the human and technology interact. Adopting this lens in
combination with the EMT enables an investigation of how
agency becomes distributed across the users and the WATs
in situations of extended cognition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A qualitative approach to inquiry was adopted to collect and
critically evaluate a multitude of perspectives from individuals
who have a range of experiences with WATs. The aim of the study
was not to provide generalizations across all users of WATs, but
rather to explore in-depth the subjective, lived experiences, and
human-WAT relationships, which each participant in this study
is involved in co-creating. We intend to empirically identify and
evaluate a range of experiences, actions, emotive responses, and
skills attainment, which can help to illuminate what it is like to be
a human-WAT hybrid. This insight, consequently, demonstrates
the usefulness of adopting the EMT and agential intra-action as a
set of combined theoretical perspectives and drivers to investigate
people’s relationships with technology. This is a timely inquiry
due to technology’s fast advancement, interactive nature, and
ubiquitous involvement in a multitude of daily life experiences
and decisions.
Research Participants and Sampling
The purpose of the empirical data collection and analysis was
to understand how human-tracker hybrids gain collective skills
and how these are put to use; how agency is expressed and
how it affects the interaction; and whether these human-tracker
relationships have darker sides. In order to capture insight from
users of WATs in relation to these research areas, the research
team used stratified purposive sampling (Ritchie et al., 2003)
to select eight female participants, living and working in the
United Kingdom.
We adopted this sampling approach to ensure that our
participants met specific criteria and would be able to contribute
with new insight in relation to the main objectives of the study,
while also being individually comparable (Bryman and Bell,
2011). This study is part of a larger research inquiry currently
focused on women’s experiences of using digital devices, such as
WATs, to manage health and well-being. Therefore, only female
users of WATs were considered for this study, although in future
studies this is likely to extend to also include male users.
Beyond gender, prior experience of using and interacting with
a WAT to manage own health and well-being was a primary
factor for sample selection. All participants had used a WAT for
at least 6 months. In line with the stratified purposive sampling
approach, we wanted to ensure some diversity of the sample and
to take an inclusive approach (Ritchie et al., 2003). Hence, we
further sampled according to specific usage levels. To capture a
wider range of experiences, it was important not only to include
individuals who were highly engaged with their WAT, but also
TABLE 1 | Sampling of participants.
Name Interest in monitoring day-to-day activities Level of intensity
Joanna 0 0
Christine 0 0
Mary 1 1
Jane 1 1
Sofia 2 2
Catherine 1 2
Paula 2 2
Maria 1 2
those who had a lower engagement level and those who had
become non-users after having used a WAT in the recent past. In
terms of defining engagement, we identified this as a combination
of two behavioral attributes. First, the extent of interest in
monitoring day-to-day activities (e.g., the frequency of checking
performance analytics), and second, the level of intensity of the
relationship with the WAT in terms of the amount of activities
logged. Table 1 provides an overview of the participant sampling.
A “0” reflects current non-engagement (due to no longer using
the WAT), while a “2” reflects the highest level of engagement.
There were many other sampling criteria which could have
been adopted to select a sample, for example, the reasons for
initiating the use of the WAT, types of job/job function (e.g.,
sedentary versus active), type of WAT (e.g., brand, functional
features, position on body), and life stage (e.g., single, couple,
family). We chose not to limit the empirical scope of our inquiry
beyond engagement level, as we were, primarily, interested in
the participants’ day-to-day interactions with the WAT, the
collective skills acquisition and the, potential, darker sides of the
relationship.
We used two of the authors’ professional networks to identify
and obtain access to participants who fulfilled the sampling
criteria. This proved a key strength of our study due to the
prior familiarity between the interviewer and interviewee, which
allowed us to capture personal insight, stories, and experiences,
which the participants felt comfortable sharing (Easterby-Smith
et al., 2012).
Table 2 details the participants taking part in the research,
including their age group, profession, lifestyle characteristics,
activities tracked, and engagement level. To ensure ethical
integrity and our participants’ anonymity, each individual was
given a pseudonym (Ogden, 2008) and details shared, which
could enable others to identify them, were also removed or not
used explicitly in the study.
Data Collection and Analysis
Participant interviews took place over a period of four months.
The interviews were guided by a semi-structured checklist of
areas, which were informed by our central research questions.
We themed the questions into six categories: About the research
participant, About the WAT, Usage, Behavior, Relationships,
and Drawbacks/Downsides. Hence, we were interested, not only
in the positive aspects of participants’ interactions with the
WAT, but also those that were perceived to be of a more
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TABLE 2 | Participant profiles.
Name Age Profession Lifestyle Type of tracker Tracking activities Engagement level
Joanna 25–30 Business
development
Very active and attends the
gym several times a week.
Highly competitive and driven.
Often participated in challenges
via the activity tracker.
Felt addicted to the tracker.
Enjoys team sports.
Family orientated.
Fitbit Charge Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Food and
water logging, Distance, Stairs
climbed, Caller ID
Used to track:
Activities
Steps
Used to be a
Hyper-engaged user.
The WAT needed
resetting which has not
been done.
Has decided not to
continue using it.
Christine 25–30 Business
development
Very active and attends the
gym several times a week.
Highly competitive and driven.
Often participated in challenges
via the activity tracker.
Was motivated to challenge
others.
Felt addicted to the tracker.
Fitbit Charge Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Food and
water logging, Distance, Stairs
climbed, Caller ID
Used to track:
Steps
Sleep
Activities
Used to be a
Hyper-engaged user.
Currently, the WAT is
broken and not in use.
Mary 30–35 Human
Resources
Very active and attends the
gym several times a week.
Wants to stay in control and
has reduced the number of
activities tracked.
Wants to be healthy rather than
calorie-focused.
Does not use the activity
tracker app.
Accesses data via the tracker
itself.
Fitbit Alta Monitors: Automatic
sleep tracking, Steps, Smart
tracking of activities, Food and
water logging, Distance, Move
reminders
Steps Engaged
Jane 55–60 Operations
management
Recovering from surgery.
Important to do a good number
of steps each day.
Walking and jazz dance help
her to recover and move away
from being incapacitated
post-surgery.
Fitbit Flex Monitors: Manual
sleep tracking, Steps, Activities,
Food and water logging,
Distance
Steps
Water intake
Activities
Engaged
Sofia 35–40 Training and
development
Highly competitive and enjoys
the outdoors.
Equestrian at a competitive
level.
Attends the gym regularly.
Walks the dog.
More focus on physical activity
than gym-based exercise.
Always exceeding the targets
set.
Jawbone UP Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Calories,
Water intake, Distance
Activities
Sleep
Steps
Hyper-engaged
Catherine 50–55 Operations
management
Very active.
Family focused and community
orientated.
Attends the gym regularly.
Is highly aware and interested
in fitness and health.
Fitbit Charge Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Calories,
Water intake, Distance, Stairs
climbed, Caller ID
Heart rate
Steps
Sleep
Competes against
others in work
Engaged
Paula 35–40 Business
development
Very active.
Recently had knee surgery.
Attends team sport.
Attends the gym regularly and
enjoys weight training.
Partner is a personal trainer.
Evaluates performance on a
weekly basis.
Fitbit Charge Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Calories,
Water intake, Distance, Stairs
climbed, Caller ID
Training purposes,
specific exercises
rather than daily use,
heart rate for intensity
training
Monitors almost
everything
Hyper-engaged
Maria 30–35 Program
coordinator
Active lifestyle.
Often busy on the weekend.
Important to always wear the
tracker.
Highly reliant on tracking sleep.
Needs the data to verify daily
activity.
Fitbit Charge Monitors: Heart
rate, Automatic sleep tracking,
Steps, Activities, Calories,
Water intake, Distance, Stairs
climbed, Caller ID
Sleep
Heart rate
Steps
Activities
Engaged
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negative or challenging nature. Specific questions directed at all
participants included whether the WAT had made them feel
guilty, underperforming and regretful of looking at the analytics.
The semi-structured interview template was used to ensure
that similar areas were explored for each participant for
comparability and depth of insight (Irvine et al., 2013). It
was important to create a dialog and conversation with
each participant, enabling them to speak openly about the
experiences that reflect their tracker relationship. Therefore, it
was important to create a good rapport with each participant
by showing interest in their stories, using listening techniques
and asking for clarifications and examples at appropriate
times during the interviews (King and Horrocks, 2010). To
encourage this conversational and open interview format,
we, at times, allowed for participants to influence the
direction of the interviews (Stern et al., 1998) and describe
situations, experiences, and feelings which came to mind
(Thompson et al., 1989). In this way, not all interviews were
conducted using the same ordering of questions from the
interview template, although all areas were covered within each
interview.
The interviews were audio recorded and thereafter transcribed
verbatim. Each interview lasted between 45 and 60 min. We
conducted a thematic analysis through an inductive process
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The first stage of the data analysis
involved a broad coding of themes that was not confined to
specific assumptions or directions to allow for a multitude of
interpretations and themes. This was a process initiated by the
author unfamiliar with the research participants, who shared
the initial themes with the research team. Thereafter the other
authors read the transcripts, took notes, and identified initial
themes. This was followed by several collaborative research
meetings where each member of the research team presented
their findings and rationales. From this iterative and collaborative
process (Spiggle, 1994), the core themes were refined and agreed
on. At this stage, we were highly alert to the themes’ relevance
to the central research questions. We focused on those themes
that best reflect our participants’ experiences of their interactions
with and usage of the WAT and its cognitive resources and
how agency becomes distributed across the participants and the
WATs.
The validity of the research process can be assessed by
the ability of the research team to capture the experiences,
actions, emotive responses, and collective skills of the interview
participants (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) and the extent to which
the research and analysis methods were effective in addressing
the central research questions. The sampling of individuals
with varying WAT engagement levels exposed us to a greater
breadth of insight, while still focusing on the same core research
questions. As all members of the research team were actively
involved in the coding, analysis, and theming of the data along
with several collaborative research meetings, this enhanced the
credibility and validity of the research findings, while also
minimizing bias (Denzin, 1989). The main limitation of this
approach maybe the reliance on participant self-reporting. In the
interviews, participants were required to share their experiences,
feelings, and behaviors related to their interactions with the WAT,
rather than, for example, presenting the actual WAT engagement
reports. It was important for this study to go beyond and behind
performance dashboards to explore and understand participants’
subjective experiences and feelings about their interactions with
the WAT.
From the iterative and inductive process and guided by
our research questions, we identified three themes. With the
presentation of these themes, we illuminate how our research
participants gain new skills and capacities, ways they become
empowered by the WAT and also the darker sides of becoming
a human-WAT hybrid.
RESULTS
This empirical investigation has multiple inter-linked purposes.
First, we wanted to explore how our participants and the WATs
interacted with a particular focus on the role of the WATs
in helping the participants to undertake tasks, solve problems,
and gain insight. Second, we focused on the distribution of
agency within the human-WAT hybrids to illuminate how the
varied expressions of agency affect the human-WAT coupling and
thereby also the degree of extended cognition. We relied on the
human participants’ experiences of these events, situations, and
daily practices.
Collective and Extended Skills
From the participants’ accounts of their experiences, the WATs,
as external resources, have played an important educational role
in their lives. They have contributed with new insight about
their activity levels, calorie burn/in-take, sleep patterns, and
other body metrics. The main interfaces for this sharing of
knowledge were the WATs and the WATs’ mobile and desktop
software applications. The performance visualizations acted as a
gateway to systemized and categorized records of performance
that were automatically logged by the WATs (e.g., sleep data) and
some which were manually kept updated by participants (e.g.,
food/calorie/water intake). Initially, participants had found the
WATs’ abilities to collate and visually represent the biometric data
intriguing and exciting, as they felt they were given access to an
“X-ray” of themselves. Catherine, who had been using her WAT
for a few months, explained:
I think it is quite interesting. I watch the activity tracker all the
time. How many steps I have taken during the day. I think it
gets you to be more active. If I have been racing around, I like
to also keep an eye on my heart rate too, just keep an eye on it.
And the steps, I am also looking at the steps. I try to do at least
15,000 a day (Catherine).
This was a typical reaction among the participants, who
believed it was helpful to use the WATs to keep taps on themselves
and track their performance throughout the day. As the WATs
were set to track the participants, they were able to provide real-
time feedback that gave participants instant insight into how
their body was reacting to certain activities (e.g., by tracking
heart rate) and their progress toward meeting set goals (e.g.,
by counting steps). Several participants believed that using the
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WAT to capture, store, and visually present the various biometric
data had affected how they went about making certain decisions
related to their health management, including eating habits, sleep
patterns, and activity levels.
The automation of biometric data collection was mentioned
as the primary role and responsibility of the WATs. Participants
expected the WATs to have these abilities in order to help
them fill in the “blank spots” of knowledge related to their
health management. It transpired that all participants had the
perception that health-related decisions that were informed by
data were better decisions than those simply informed by their
own opinions, feelings, and experiences. This belief was a major
reason for using and interacting with the WATs. It was clearly
the participants’ view that the WATs contributed with a new set
of competencies, which assisted them to better understand and
assess calories in food items, create and manage sleep routines,
and estimate step counts.
The WATs not only contributed to skills related to capturing,
storing, and visualizing performance data, but were also expected
to provide certainty and reassurance. For Sofia, the WAT was
used specifically as an external resource to evidence to herself
and others that she not only meets, but exceeds her daily activity
targets and therefore has the right to feel tired in the evening. The
WAT provided the data and visualizations, which complemented
her own internal resources (e.g., ability to remember and explain
to others about her daily routines) to feel reassured and to
reassure others of her high levels of activity. The process of
creating evidence and reassurance was further enabled as the
WAT acted as a diary, containing all past performances and
goals exceeded. This is data and insight that would have been
challenging for Sofia to memorize accurately without the support
of some sort of cognitive scaffolding.
I keep getting grief because people say I am tired. But when you
walk the dogs before work and you look after two horses after
work, generally on a good day, I am not normally home until
half 8, 9 o’clock. I was tired. So, it is quite interesting to know
how much I am doing each day. I love the sleep data! Telling
me how much sleep I have had. I love what it tells me! To
have an idea about how much I am doing each day. I normally
exceed my targets by 140–150%. So, it is also quite interesting
to know that when you say you have had a busy day. I love data
like that (Sofia).
Participants tended to trust the data that the WATs collected
and presented to them. This trust was an important aspect of the
interaction between the participants and their WATs and affected
their willingness to respond to and interact with the WATs. By
not questioning the data, the WATs were relied on for their
information, analytics, and input as external resources and seen
as important components toward achieving a higher level of daily
activity.
It was evident that the WATs were active in nudging and
prompting participants to either adopt or avoid a particular
behavior or decision. For some participants, the notifications
and performance updates provided by the WATs caused them
to make time for a walk during their lunch break, review
current decisions on types and amounts of food intake, and
systemize movement throughout the day by using alerts. Mary,
for example, enabled her WAT to nudge her once an hour
to get up and take 250 steps. She felt too sedentary in her
job and needed the WAT to remind her to be systematically
active. Similarly, Jane had become more conscious of her
activity levels after she started using the WAT. She used
the WAT to gain a status report of her actively levels at
lunch time and if the performance was low, she would make
purposive efforts in the afternoon to walk and meet her step
targets. In this way, the participants’ ways of thinking and
evaluating different actions and options related to their health
and well-being, were affected by the WATs ability to track,
monitor, store, and present their performance data in real-
time.
The participants had acquired their WAT for different
purposes. Some sought its support as encouragement to achieve
a heightened level of exercise, some looked to the WAT to simply
document an already active lifestyle and others wanted the WAT
specifically to guide them toward a weight loss. Some wore it day
and night to track many different activities, while others wore it
mainly at the gym or when completing specific types of exercise
(e.g., running). Therefore, some participants set their WAT to
track and monitor many different kinds of activities, while others
were more selective of when they wanted the WAT to monitor
and track their performance.
Despite the different reasons for having acquired the WAT, all
participants looked to the WAT as an external source of certainty.
The data and visualizations of performance complemented
participants’ internal knowledge about healthy eating habits
and exercise. It acted to remove some uncertainty by over-
ruling participants’ own subjective gut feelings and estimates and
provided a perception of an objective truth. The participants’
trust in the WATs’ data capture and visualizations was heightened
by their own inability to gather and process this kind of
information with a similar degree of accuracy and speed. For
Maria, she used the WAT’s sleep tracking feature to monitor the
quality of her sleep. She trusted the WAT’s ability to provide a
truthful representation of whether she had had a good or a poor
night’s sleep and did not question it.
I track sleep because then I can justify why I am tired. I can see
that I have had a bad night’s sleep. I didn’t buy the tracker so
that I could track my sleep. It is more of a side benefit. But I do
like to track sleep to feel justified why I am tired. I feel better
when the data tells me that I have had a bad night’s sleep. I
don’t like it when I feel like I have had a very bad night’s sleep
and my tracker tells me that I have had a good night’s sleep.
That annoys me! Then I don’t have an excuse to feel tired. And
I believe it. I trust it. So, I have no excuse to feel tired. I just
have to get on with it. I know it’s odd! (Maria)
In addition, the overarching purpose for acquiring a WAT
was to complement participants’ own abilities to estimate and
assess their level of activity, calorie intake, and sleep patterns.
They acknowledged that these assessments were often inaccurate,
faulty, or simply not possible to undertake and keep track of.
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This expertise was instead expected of the WATs. For some
participants, the WATs helped them to establish new activity
routines and give greater insight into calorie consumption, step
counts of certain routes and how to achieve better sleep pattern
results.
Human Empowerment Through
Technology Extension
Participants expressed how the data and visualizations generated
by the WATs made them feel empowered. It was seen as a
source of simplification of choices and decisions due to the
transparency of performance and progress the WATs provided
as and when requested by the participants. The WATs and the
related mobile phone application kept participants updated on
progress throughout the day and this was experienced to increase
their confidence in decision-making.
For Sofia, who already had an active lifestyle before she started
using the WAT, the role of the WAT was not to encourage her
to be more active; rather the opposite. The role of the WAT was
to help her manage her need to live up to societal expectations
of how much one ought to weigh, exercise, eat, and so on. The
analyses created by the WAT became a “pressure releaser” by
alerting her of when she had met the set targets and providing
the quantitative evidence.
It tells me “It’s OK, you’re doing enough.” You know you
read so much, watch so much about how much exercise you
are meant to be doing, what the average is, from a fitness
perspective, from a weight perspective and that kind of stuff.
And I find myself thinking, I don’t have much more time in a
day. Do I go to the gym? No, I don’t have time in a day, unless
I maybe take 20 min at lunch to do that. So it is making me
go “You do enough Sof.” Instead of telling me that I should be
doing more, mine is about taking pressure off, instead of telling
me that I need to go for a run (Sofia).
This example demonstrates how the WATs can reduce
pressure and stress that participants put on themselves to be
active. In fact, it can help participants to make decisions not to
exercise by confirming that their level of activity is already high
and they are meeting the set goals. Here, the WATs contribute
with objectivity and analytical evidence to support participants’
otherwise subjective assessments.
Participants tended to either become more reliant on the WAT
in order to make health, fitness, and food related decisions, or
grow in confidence to make their own decisions with little input
or guidance from the WAT. The more dependent participants
needed the data to ascertain their own performance and used it as
encouragement to continue. Other participants reported seeing
their confidence grow as a result of learning from the tracker
and acquiring their own, internalized capacity to manage their
health and well-being. This indicates the presence of a knowledge
transfer, where some participants learn from the WATs’ ability
to measure, monitor and track. Participants had gained new
knowledge of the length of a particular walking route, the speed
at which they walked a mile, the calorie amounts of different
foods, and the calories burnt from different types of exercise.
This learnt knowledge had built confidence in them to make
more independent decisions related to measuring, monitoring,
and evaluating their activity levels, eating habits, and sleep. These
were abilities that previously were possessed mainly by the WATs.
Joanna explained how she is no longer using her WAT, but that it
has helped her to establish an active routine, which she has been
able to continue with despite not using the WAT.
Beyond providing the performance data, participants
particularly enjoyed receiving the WATs’ buzzing vibrations
when a goal had been achieved. This provided a tactile
interaction between the WATs and the participants that was
effective in eliciting a positive emotion in participants, who felt
proud and happy to have reached their goals. These vibrations
created a physical connection between the WATs and the
participants who were able to feel the WATs and were alerted
to their communication. When the WATs were “silent” (e.g.,
not vibrating or making a sound), they also became invisible as
participants would forget that they were on their wrists. They,
however, remained accessible to give updates on performance.
Most often, participants would turn to the WATs’ mobile
phone applications to gain more in-depth performance updates,
whereas the WATs on their wrists provided a quick snapshot
of progress. The buzzing vibrations and other indicators of
reached goals (e.g., flashing lights, sounds) were ways that the
WATs directly interacted with the participants and influenced
their actions, behaviors, and decisions in real-time. Participants
anticipated these interactions with the WATs and were open to be
influenced; whether that was to be reassured (e.g., performance
is on track) or encouraged (e.g., to heighten activity levels).
They trusted the guidance provided by the WATs and used it in
real-time to make decisions.
Some participants even wanted the WAT to take on a more
proactive and influential role. Paula explained:
I probably want my tracker to be a scary, sort of, army person.
In my ideal world, it would be someone who would be like
“Come on, get your act together, let’s get to the gym.” That is
the kind of motivation that I like and the kind of motivation
that I need as well. I like to be told what to do and “Come on,
try a bit harder” (Paula).
The WATs not only used vibrations and sounds to affect
participants’ decision-making, but also used the color green to
induce behavior change. The green color was used in the WATs’
mobile applications when goals were met. Participants explained
how seeing this color, and knowing this was a sign of success,
prompted them to feel happy, self-fulfilled, and positive. The
green color signaled goal completion and became synonymous
with accomplishment and encouragement.
It is a very clever dashboard in the sense that if you have
achieved your goals it is in green. I don’t know who has chosen
green, but green does make you feel happy, it’s like “Yeah
go, you have achieved what you needed!.” If you have only
achieved 75% of your target, then it is amber orange. So, it is
like a traffic system almost (Paula).
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The WATs also used other ways to communicate with and
affect participants such as smileys, badges, and trophies, which
they received from completing their goals and taking part in
competitions.
The WATs also contributed with more socially enabled
capacities to encourage participants to be active. Such capacities
included step competitions, which allowed participants to
compete against other WAT users. The competitions were mainly
daily and weekly step challenges and were effective, for some,
in increasing activity levels. Participants often competed against
colleagues at work and were keen to keep an eye on everyone’s
progress. However, not everyone was interested in participating
in these challenges. For Joanna and Christine, the competitions
had initially provided much fun and excitement, but turned out
to be a short-term fad, which did not sustain their interest.
Some WATs were perceived as friendly supporters that
mainly offered encouragement, advice, guidance, and data-driven
insight. However, for Mary, this was her second WAT. The
interactions with her first WAT had been strained, not because
there was anything technically wrong with the WAT; it did what
it was supposed to do, however, that was exactly the problem.
She had felt controlled by the WAT and described it as a
“relentless task master.” Comparatively, the new WAT was more
like an “ally that cheered her on.” The interactions with the
new WAT reflected a different dynamic. She limited the WAT’s
influence by carefully managing how she interacted with it and
how deeply embedded it was in her daily life. She did this by
setting more realistic goals, reducing the number of activities it
could track and she requested more infrequent updates from the
WAT’s mobile phone application. Consequently, she became less
obsessed with knowing her weight and less critical of her physical
appearance. She started to appreciate her interactions with the
WAT and found it helpful when it vibrated and nudged her to
be active because she experienced a greater extent of control.
This illuminates that within the human-WAT cognitive system,
there is an on-going negotiation over influence, which affects
decision-making, control, and competencies.
In this theme, it has been evidenced how participants used the
WATs and performance data to gain insight, which, for many,
was experienced as a form of self-empowerment and extended
ability to make better health-related decisions. However, there are
also darker sides of relying on WATs and their resources. In the
following section, we present further evidence of the complexities
of these dynamic human-tech interactions.
Darker Sides of Human-WAT Hybridity
We observed that the hybridity with the on-body, always-
accessible WAT also led to some negative experiences for the
participants. These experiences reflect the WATs’ non-neutrality
as well as some of the unintended consequences of an extended
mind.
The cognitive abilities that the WATs contributed with (e.g.,
learning about food calories, calorie burn/in-take, real-time
activity levels) made some participants feel insufficient, poor
performing, and negative about themselves. Hence, what had
started as an exciting experience, turned, for some, into a source
of self-loathing and disappointment. Mary explained how she
had taken a break from her first WAT because it was constantly
reminding her of how she was not meeting her targets, which
made her feel guilty about her inability to change her behaviors:
I didn’t feel that it [the WAT] was actually working for me and
my routine. I think it just kept telling me that I was gaining
weight and I got angry and I stopped using it. I think it was the
realization of having all that data, it was actually making me
realize how unhealthy I was at the time (Mary).
Some participants reported feeling exposed and confronted
with what they perceived to be bad habits (e.g., over-eating
and a lack of exercise). This led to some emotional distress. By
extending monitoring and measuring capabilities to the WATs,
it surfaced behavioral traits and habits, which did not match
up with some participants’ ideal perception of self. The WATs
provided quantifiable data, which previously had been ignored,
suppressed or simply unknown to the participants.
As the participants expressed a high level of trust in the
biometric data, it led to a sense of bodily disconnect for some.
This disconnect was expressed as a form of alienation between the
participant and her own body, fueled by an increased uncertainty
about how to best manage and build a strong and healthy
body. One participant explained this by saying that she had
stopped listening to her internal body and had become reliant
on what the WAT told her. The perceived superiority of the
WAT to provide a more truthful and accurate assessment affected
especially those participants who had become reliant on the
WAT’s abilities to capture, store, and analyze their data. Some
participants were reliant on the data to confirm that they had
indeed completed the particular activity. Hence, when the WAT
was physically absent, which also led to an absence of the data,
they experienced a reduction in the ability to monitor, measure,
and assess their activity levels. In this way, participants did
not feel capable of completing the tasks that the WATs could
undertake.
If I forget to charge it or forget to put it on then I get very
annoyed. Because then I have done steps but there is no data
to prove that. I don’t like that. It is a very bad habit. One day I
did a lot of activities and I had forgotten to put it on and I felt
very disappointed, even though it is just me who looks at the
data. I want to have the data. If you have done the steps and
you haven’t recorded it, have you really done it? (Maria).
Some participants had developed an intensive dependency
relationship with the data, feeling obsessed with checking
it. This included tracking progress, analyzing performance,
and responding to the data. It offered the capability not
only to track performance in real-time, but also to store
this data for later comparisons, evaluation, and analysis. This
meant that participants’ interactions with the WATs were not
just real-time, but also involved understanding longer term
performance trends. Joanna reflected on how the cognitive
capabilities provided by the WAT had led to a sense of
obsession:
It was obsessive. It would be all you thought about. You would
be constantly checking your steps. How many have I done?
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You’d walk to the toilet and then check how many steps that
was. Always refreshing the app to see if anyone else had done
more steps. I’d be like “Oh no she is ahead of me I need to go
for a walk.” It definitely disturbed me during the day. I’d have
my phone on my desk, so I’d be like “Let’s have a little look”
when its after lunch, because people would have gone to the
gym and I’d be like “Oh I need to go for a walk.” So yeah, it
probably didn’t help productivity in my work life (Joanna).
The extended capabilities of the WATs were not always a
positive influence on participants, but led to feelings of stress, self-
blame, and the need to improve the performance data even if it
was inconvenient or unwanted by the participant. Jane explained
how the presence of the data made her determined to meet her
targets and when she did not achieve these, she felt angry with
herself. She put additional pressure on herself to catch up with
the “lost steps” the following day.
I feel cross with myself. All I had to do was to go around the
block to meet my target. I should have gone around and done
that. I was a bit cross with myself. I should have done that
and today I’ll try and do 12,000 steps to make up for yesterday
(Jane).
The need to reach targets was intensified if targets were part
of a competition with other WAT users. Christine and Paula
explained how the new capability of tracking and quantifying
their exercise and being part of competitions had become a
dominant influence on their lives:
It is ridiculously addictive, actually got a bit stupid because it
started to interfere with my life and if I hadn’t reached a certain
amount it would be like 10 o’clock in the evening and I would
be like, “I’m going for a run.” I’m going out just so that I can get
my steps up, just to beat the people that I was in a competition
with. Your life had become a constant challenge (Christine).
It is addictive. So, at the very beginning, reaching the goal of
the steps was quite important. If someone invites you into a
challenge then it gets quite competitive and you do try and beat
the other people, especially when it is a narrow margin (Paula).
Some participants took action to change the capabilities of
the WAT. They did not stop using the WAT as an external
feature, but they purposively reduced the WAT’s ability to
influence them. Participants explained a number of moves
taken to change the outcomes of the WAT’s biometric data
processing. Some participants inputted a lower food calorie
amount for the items eaten to keep their daily calorie intake
below the maximum target set on the WAT. Some kept the
WAT’s step count target purposely low to ensure that they
would meet, or even exceed, the target. This would then
trigger the WAT to congratulate them on their achievements,
consequently inducing positive emotions. Others were strategic
about when to request the WAT to sync their performance
data from the WAT wristband to the mobile application.
In particular, when competing in challenges/competitions,
participants requested this sync of data only on the final day
of the challenge/competition so not to reveal their progress to
the others in the competition. Others were selective about the
types of activities they requested the WAT to track, de-selecting
some low-performing categories (e.g., sleep and high-intensity
activities).
The influence of using the WAT as external scaffolding also
became apparent in how the WAT was able to make visible
specific performance targets. The mere presence of these targets
created the expectation that these needed to be met. When
they were not met, it often elicited feelings of frustration and
disappointment for participants. Feeling that these performance
targets needed to be met meant that participants, at times,
adopted behaviors and actions which they would have rather
not. Mary, for example, explained how the ability of her first
WAT to monitor and assess her eating and drinking habits made
her feel disempowered. As she inputted her food and drinks
consumption, her habits became quantified, stored, and visually
presented to her in the WAT’s mobile application. These were
habits that had not previously been a concern to her, but the
trend data presented by the WAT made her feel embarrassed.
It came to a point when she could no longer continue with
her normal eating and drinking habits without a high amount
of self-doubt. Consequently, the WAT became a source of self-
loathing.
It came to the point where I was thinking “Do I have those two
glasses of red wine or not?” I was too embarrassed, my Fitbit
embarrassed me every day (Mary).
In summary, the investigation revealed that participants’
experiences of using WATs to undertake specific monitoring,
tracking, and analytical tasks were not without challenges. Darker
sides of attaining extended cognitive abilities transpired in the
form of self-doubt, bodily alienation, and a mindset fixated on
goal/target completion. As a consequence, all participants made
moves to limit the WATs’ influence and/or the accuracy of its
analytics by adjusting the biometric or food input. This was a way
of managing the new situation, where cognitive processes related
to health management were supported by the abilities of external
devices.
DISCUSSION
The study demonstrates that our relationship with technology is
complex, even when the technology is relatively mundane and
simple, such as WATs. In this study, the EMT has been shown
to be an effective analytical apparatus to explore how cognition
can become extended beyond the human and the impact this has
on decision-making, behaviors, and experiences. The EMT is best
adopted as a theoretical lens when the distribution of cognition
occurs in relation to specific tasks for which the human needs the
support and resources of external entities.
This study builds on the EMT by examining the non-neutrality
of the WATs and how they acquire agency in particular situations.
Agential intra-action supports the view that external entities
are not neutral or non-expressive, but can, in their intra-action
with others, for example humans, become expressive, shape
intent, and action (Barad, 2003). This dimension of human-tech
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relationships is important alongside the EMT as it helps us to
illuminate, not only distributed cognition, but also distributed
action and effects. With our empirical investigation, we have
contributed with insight on human-tech hybridity, and also
demonstrated how the EMT and agential intra-action can be used
in conjunction to drive knowledge in empirical studies.
It has become evident that those who use a WAT interact
with it with the purpose of generating personal data and insight
that can lead to certainty and which would be challenging to
attain without the support of a WAT. This is similar to findings
in the work of Schroeder et al. (2018) who investigated how
people use self-tracking technology to better manage migraines.
It was found that many people track symptoms and use app
alerts to try to predict when a migraine is likely to come on,
hence empowering the person to reduce the factors leading
to a migraine or better prepare for it. In this way, the self-
tracking technology, much like the WATs, is an external resource
that can enhance people’s capabilities to predict and make
decisions.
The WATs become influential external resources in an
environment where individuals are focused on identifying
the best ways to manage their health and well-being and
struggle to trust their internal instinct and gut feel to do so.
Hence, the WATs are used as scaffolding (Norman, 1993) to
reduce perceived uncertainty and gain support in decision-
making.
Table 3 provides an overview of the types of tasks where the
WAT offer its resources to complement the human cognitive
abilities through enabling extended memory, data capture, and
analytical capabilities. The WATs supplement the humans with
additional resources, which make the humans better able to
judge and take decisions about how to attain a certain calorie
intake, maintain a certain intensity of activities (e.g., steps,
calorie burn, movement notifications), and review and assess past
performance trends. While an individual could capture much of
the information related to exercise and food/drinks consumption
using a manual logging method, the WATs provide efficiency,
automation, objectivity (unless the human manipulates what is
logged), consistency, and real-time analytical capabilities based
on large and diverse sets of data. Moreover, was the human
to undertake these tasks manually, the tools used to capture
the information, e.g., notebooks and pens, would also become
external scaffolding.
Our study found that initially the WATs are exciting external
entities that enable access to biometric information, considered
to give new and enhanced decision-making abilities. It is
an example of a bio-external device (Clark, 2015) that is
flexible and individualized in the way it can share its resources
(e.g., data trends, visualizations, notifications, goals) with the
individual who draws on its resources and capabilities. In
this way, the interactions between the individual and the
WAT are dynamic, as the more the person uses it and also
manually logs activity, the more data the WAT has to capture,
store, analyze, and make available to the person [see also
Rapp and Tirassa’s (2017) work on a new theory of the self
and related guidelines for the design of personal informatics
technology].
In most situations, the analyzed and visualized outputs are
considered to be trustworthy, which is based on the individuals’
implicit trust in the data (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). The individuals
do not question what the WATs tell them. Although in some
cases, an individual may not like the outputs that the WAT
presents them with, for example, a display of poor sleep
patterns, and chooses for the WAT to stop monitoring this
activity. This, however, is typically not because the data is
mistrusted, but often because it is disliked. In addition to
trustworthy, the data outputs are also considered to be reliable
and, due to the WATs’ on-body position, accessible at almost
all times. These factors have an impact on the strength of
the coupling (Heersmink, 2017) between the person and the
WAT.
Coupled systems of heterogeneous entities can create new
cognitive systems, where each entity takes on an active role
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998). In this study, it is evident that
both the WATs and the individuals co-constitute new hybrids
that have emerged as a consequence of the human-WAT intra-
actions (Barad, 2003). The WATs affect, and for some transform,
the experience of being-in-the-world, as they provide a new
layer of quantified “life data.” At the same time, the individuals
also contribute to the coupling by giving the WATs access to
trackable and quantifiable behaviors and allowing the devices
to be present throughout the day and, for some, the night.
However, Rapp and Tirabeni (2018) point to a potential loss
of agency and control a person may feel over own body
when engaging in self-tracking activities. In their study on
mechanisms of externalization of the body among amateur and
elite athletes, it appears that elite athletes are better at regulating
their interactions with the tracker and know when to trust their
subjective sensations, whereas amateur athletes are more reliant
on the data to assess their performance. Hence, it seems that the
human-WAT relationships may also be affected by the human’s
existing “practice in relation to her body” (Rapp and Tirabeni,
2018, p. 14).
In this study, it was observed that the WATs have attained
an ineliminable role in most human-WAT hybrid relationships
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998). This is seen in how the collective
competences acquired by the human-WAT hybrids are affected
when the WATs are absent. This absence leads to an inability
to accurately estimate the number of steps taken, calories burnt,
and other data, which the WATs normally collate. This loss
in ability is not something the individual believes he or she
can restore through their own cognitive abilities. The absence-
induced reduction in cognitive information gathering and
processing further highlights what it is that the WATs impact and
contribute with (Tripathi, 2010); namely, the ability to record,
store, analyze, and visually present, at the individual’s request,
insight into the individual’s health and activity performance
and progress. Not all people, however, feel unable to make
estimates about their activities when the WAT is absent. Some
have internalized new behaviors as a consequence of interacting
with the WAT and have, as a result, heightened their confidence
in making health-related decisions without the input from
the WAT. Therefore, when the WAT is absent, they become
less affected and are able to make unassisted estimates related
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TABLE 3 | WAT resources supporting and enabling human cognitive processes.
Task WAT resources Human cognitive processes
To capture, store, analyze, systemize and
categorize real-time biometric data
The ability to record, store, analyze and visually
present performance data. The ability to undertake
various analyses of the data based on the human’s
request.
The ability to operate the WAT, manage settings
and enable/disable the WAT’s biometric data
collection abilities. The cognitive ability to set up a
sync between the WAT, the WAT’s mobile phone
app and the WAT’s desktop interface. The cognitive
ability to set health and activity goals.
To ascertain times when an increase in
movement/exercise is recommended
The ability to manage large biometric datasets,
undertake pattern recognition analysis, compare
performance with set goals, and provide
notifications/nudges.
The ability to judge whether to respond to the
notification/nudge, which may depend on other
situational factors.
To monitor and track calorie intake The ability to store, categorize and visually present
consumed calories over time and according to
food/drinks categories.
The ability to identify the best match between a
selected food/drinks item and food/drinks items
available on the WAT’s mobile app or desktop
interface.
To gain insight into sleep patterns and rhythms The ability to automatically detect when sleep is
initiated (or respond to sleep mode being activated)
and record hours slept, sleep patterns and present
a daily analysis of sleep quality.
The ability to manage the sleep mode setting.
To monitor heart rate in real-time The ability to monitor and record heart rate in
real-time, quantify heart rate performance, and
provide notifications/nudges when deemed above
an advisable level.
The ability to judge whether a change in behavior is
required to either increase or reduce the heart rate.
To gain certainty about the activities required to
attain a healthy and active lifestyle
The ability to generate real-time and quantitative
information that reflects in-the-moment
performance as well as analyses that are based on
longitudinal performances.
The ability to process the information and analyses
produced to complement own information
processing capacity.
to calorie intake, distance covered, and the quality of their
sleep.
From the participants’ accounts, the access to activity and
performance data helped to create a sense of heightened control
and reduced fear of making poor decisions (Schulz, 2011)
related to their health. Schüll (2016) emphasizes that self-
tracking devices are both sources of responsibility and delegation.
People who self-track wish to make informed decisions and
take responsibility for their actions and behaviors, but at
the same time, they also delegate part of the responsibility
for this to an external device. Specifically, what is delegated
to the external technology is the responsibility to “calculate
and act upon itself.” This is seen in how the WATs
are given the responsibility for calculations and assisting
the individual’s decisions through nudges and notifications.
However, the darker sides of the human-WAT hybrid also
reveal that relying on the resources of a WAT is not
uncomplicated.
Drawing on the views of Ihde (1990); Pickering (2013)
and Heersmink (2017) in terms of the non-neutrality of
technology and the belief that technology, like humans, can
also express agency, we contribute with the concept of the
agency pendulum. The agency pendulum draws inspiration
from Barad’s (2003) rendition of agency; that it is enactments
which emerge from intra-actions between all sorts of entities
including those that are not human. Hence, agency is not
a constant and it is not an attribute assigned to an entity
(Ewalt, 2016). Instead, it is played out, expressed, and
seen through effects and collective capabilities (Pickering,
1995).
The agency pendulum swings between the human and the
WAT, which means that, at times and in specific situations,
the human is enabled to affect and create change; in other
situations, it is the WAT that influences and impacts decisions
and behaviors (Table 4). The agency pendulum does not reflect a
symmetrical division of agency. Its movements are individualized
to the specific human-WAT hybrid and are affected by, for
example, how much the human cares about, listens to, and
becomes affected by the expressions of the WAT as well as the
expressive abilities of the WAT. The agency pendulum acts as
a metaphor for distributed agency and attempts to highlight
the non-neutrality of the WATs as they intra-act with the
humans.
The human enacts agency in situations when the individual
limits or extends the WAT’s presence and influence by increasing
or decreasing the collection of particular biometric data. Nafus
TABLE 4 | Agentic enactments.
Human
 Change the settings to increase or decrease the number and types of metrics
being tracked
 Prevent the WAT from synching with the mobile phone app or WAT’s desktop
interface
 Alter the WAT input data to generate particular results from the WAT’s analysis
WAT
 Send real-time notifications and nudges that lead to behavior change or affect
decision-making
 Share health data that alter attitudes toward food and drink consumption
 Gain trust as an objective and truthful reflection of health performance
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and Sherman (2014) describe these kinds of practices as forms
of “soft resistance” to the automatic collection of personal
informatics. The soft resistance becomes visible when people
purposely choose when automatic data collection is a helpful
external exercise and when they would rather use internalized
decision-making criteria. In our study, human agency is also
expressed when the WAT is prevented from synching the
captured data with the mobile phone app or desktop interface.
This prevents the WAT from undertaking the analysis and
visualization of the data, which is a central task. The human is
also seen to express agency when the data inputted is altered
to achieve certain outputs. This could be food calorie data that
is lowered or a step count target that is set purposely low. In
these situations, the agency pendulum swings toward the human,
as the human carries out acts that affect him/herself, the intra-
action with the WAT and the influence that the WAT can
have. These acts challenge the “reflexive monitoring self,” which
is often described as a “rational, motivated, and data-centric”
individual (Lupton, 2016, p. 115). Rather, at times, the human
acts to reduce or alter the pattern of tracking and consequent
self-surveillance.
When the agency pendulum swings toward the WAT, it
is often when the WAT makes expressions, which end up
affecting the human. These acts are outcomes of the WAT’s
design, but nonetheless, when they are expressed, they have
an influence on human behavior and decision-making. When
the WAT sends notifications and nudges the individual to
adopt or avoid a particular behavior or make a particular
decision, then that is an assertion of the WAT’s agency. At
times, this leads participants to feel a loss of control over own
actions, a wish to reclaim control and an experience that the
decisions they are making are not truly their own. Similarly,
when the WAT presents food and drinks consumption trend
analytics, then this is a situation that can impact the individual’s
decision-making or feeling about self. The WAT also enacts
agency when it acquires a position of trust, i.e., the human
considers it trustworthy and is willing to trust the information it
communicates based on its information processing and analytics.
The WAT is provided the autonomy to conduct these calculations
and visualizations and communicate them to the human, taking
on the position of an autonomous system (Ohlin and Olsson,
2015).
The agency pendulum acts as a helpful metaphor when
exploring this intersection of distributed cognition and
distributed agency. It enables an illumination of the impacts and
influences of the external features beyond their roles as offering
cognitive scaffolding. It can add a further dimension of insight to
understand the dynamics of human-tech hybridity by including
a focus on distributed action and impact. Considering the EMT
and agential intra-action as part of a connected exploration,
enables an investigation that examines both how cognition is
extended to other entities to solve tasks and also how these
external entities, in their intra-actions with the human, come to
enact agency, i.e., become expressive, shape intent, and action.
Hence, we put forward the notion that distributed cognition and
distributed agency are not capacities that are mutually exclusive,
but are in fact closely tied together.
CONCLUSION
The EMT and the concept of agential intra-action can be used
as a combined theoretical apparatus to explore the distribution
of cognition from the human to other external entities and
the dynamism of agentic enactments, as both the human and
the external entities attain the ability to influence, impact, and
create change. The theoretical lenses provide specific concepts
that can be applied to surface how abilities, competences and
capacities can become co-constituted in human-tech hybrid
relationships and how these affect the ability to make decisions
and solve problems. The research identified specific ways in
which the WATs support the humans’ cognitive abilities by
contributing with an extended memory, data capture and analysis
capabilities.
The research also highlighted that, while technologies, such as
WATs, can contribute with new abilities and insight, there are
unintended implications of this engagement between the human
and the WAT. Attaining an extended mind and interacting
with an external entity that has the ability to influence,
guide, and illuminate health-related behaviors through constant
monitoring and tracking, can lead to some experiences of
stress, disappointment, and self-blame. Hence, as entities and
new technologies are developed to support human cognition,
it is important to also consider the side effects and non-
neutrality of the technology and how that impacts the human
experience.
To further capture and conceptualize the dynamism of
distributed agency, we presented the concept of the agency
pendulum. The agency pendulum swings between the human and
the external entity, which means that, at times and in specific
situations, the human is enabled to affect and create change;
in other situations, it is the external entity that influences and
impacts decisions and behaviors.
We posit that it is particular useful to consider distributed
agency as an additional layer of theoretical exploration when
considering the EMT in order to also capture the non-neutrality
of the external entities that support human cognitive abilities.
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Designing Smart Objects to Support
Affording Situations: Exploiting
Affordance Through an
Understanding of Forms of
Engagement
Chris Baber*
School of Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
In this paper I consider how the concept of “affordance” has been adapted from
the original writings of Gibson and applied to interaction design. I argue that a clear
understanding of affordance shifts the goal of interaction design from one of solely
focusing on either the physical object or the capabilities of the person, toward an
understanding of interactivity. To do this, I develop the concept of Forms of Engagement,
originally proposed to account for tool use. Finally, I extend this concept to interacting
with modified tangible user interfaces, or “animate objects.” These animate objects not
only sense how they are being used, but also communicate with each other to develop a
shared intent, and provide prompts and cues to encourage specific actions. In this way,
the human-object-environment system creates affording situations in pursuit of shared
intentions and goals. In order to determine when to provide prompts and cues, the
objects need to have a model of how they ought to be used and what intention they
are being used to achieve. Consequently, affordances become not only the means by
which actions are encouraged but also the manner in which intentions are identified and
agreed.
Keywords: affordance, smart objects, animate objects, interactivity, forms of engagement
INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by three simple questions: (i) how do people know how to use smart objects
(i.e., how do people respond to the form and function of smart objects in order to achieve goals)? (ii)
how do objects make sense of the manner in which they are being used (i.e., can objects recognize
different ways in which a person interacts with them)? (iii) how should designers design smart
objects to enable people to use these appropriately (i.e., is it possible to better inform design practice
so that we can predict the successes and challenges of interacting with smart objects)? Unpacking
this a little, a “smart object” (Kortuem et al., 2010) is some artifact with which a person can interact,
but which is capable of sensing that it is being interacted with, capable of making inferences from
these sensor data, capable of communicating these inferences with other artifacts, and capable
of guiding the person to perform further actions. Knowing how to use an object could involve
problem-solving in which features of the object are associated with functions, and these functions
associated with a plan to act. But often, there is little overt, conscious awareness in performing the
action.
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By way of a motivating example, imagine that you are reaching
to pick up a cup containing a hot drink.The handle of the cup
could be grasped in a particular way (say, two fingers through
the handle and the thumb resting on the top), or the body of
the cup could be held in your palm with fingers and thumb
wrapping around it. Which grasp you select depends on, among
other things, the heat of the contents of the cup, whether the cup
is full to the brim, whether the handle is on one side or the other.
However, it is unlikely that your selection arises from conscious
deliberation: you simply pick up the cup. As Wittgenstein noted,
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden
because of their simplicity and familiarity.” (Wittgenstein, 1958,
p.50). The concept of affordance helps frame this activity and
explain how it can be performed without conscious intervention.
In other words, very often, we simply “know” what to do.
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, this knowledge
has been termed “procedural” (Anderson, 1981), tacit (Polyani,
1966), “implicit” (Berry and Broadbent, 1988), or “automatic”
(Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). It
is from these different traditions that one can appreciate what
“affordance” involves. Relating this to design, one could also
suggest that understanding such implicit, subliminal interaction
could align neatly with some formulations of the concept of
nudging, in which people might be encouraged to perform
actions on certain ways and where such encouragement would
be at the edge of conscious awareness (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). Nudging could, for example, involve the cup prompting
the user to pick it up (perhaps to encourage the person to drink
more water) or it could encourage picking the cup up with one
hand rather than the other (perhaps as part of rehabilitation)
or it could encourage the person not to pick it up (perhaps to
discourage the person from drinking coffee after a certain time
of day). In these instances, the cup takes on the role of a smart
(possibly irritating, possibly helpful) partner in performing an
action. For me, the question is whether this partnering could be
both beneficial and performed without conscious awareness. So,
could interaction with a smart object be described in terms of
affordance. I begin this paper with a short account of how the
concept of affordance has developed, with particular reference to
interaction design.
A Brief History of “Affordance”
For many people working in the field of Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI), their first encounter with the concept
of “affordance” probably came from Norman’s (1988) The
Psychology of Everyday Things [he later, in 2002, rewrote this as
The Design of Everyday Things]. In this book, Norman presents
“affordance” as an act of interpretation, in which the form
of an object is seen in relation to a specific action. So, the
flat plate on a door “affords” pushing. From this perspective,
the “affordance” is a visual clue, provided by the object, as to
its intended functioning: “Plates are for pushing. Knobs are
for turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for
throwing or bouncing.” (p. 9). What is deceptively attractive
about this notion, for design at least, is the implication that the
physical form of the object corresponds with a conceptual model
that the user of the object brings to the interaction. In other
words, Norman’s (1988) definition, while it looks to be based
on perception, is really about interpreting the object’s functions
in terms of specific features, and linking this interpretation to
a goal that one wishes to achieve. Returning to our example
of picking up a cup, this implies that one needs to selectively
determine which features of the cup (and its contents) are most
salient to the goal of drinking from it (under certain constraints,
like not spilling the contents or scalding one’s hand). In other
words, there is an implication that, prior to performing an action,
one engages in a sort of problem-solving which allows salient
features to be elicited and interpreted. Later, Norman (1999)
distinguished “perceived affordances” from what he defined as
Gibsonian or “real affordances.” It is worth noting at this point
that there are extreme differences between “perceived” and “real”
affordances. For one thing, Gibson’s (1977, 1979) claim is that
we have a perceptual system which is tuned (through evolution,
experience, learning) to the environment. This means that there
is no requirement for any form of interpretation of information;
we just “see” (or hear or otherwise perceive) a pattern to
which we can respond. To repeat our example, a cup full of
steaming hot coffee is “seen” as a different object (supporting
different actions) to a half-full cup of cold milk. When Norman
uses the word “perceive,” this is not in the same manner that
Gibson uses it; Norman seems to suggest that perception is
an active process of extracting features and assigning meaning,
whereas for Gibson, perception is the capability of being sensitive
to information. Later still, Norman (2008) separated “real
affordances” from signifiers, i.e., perceptual information about
objects.
It is worth tracking the term “affordance” back further.
Gibson taught a course on the phenomenological philosophy
of Merleau-Ponty, and the Gestalt psychologist Koffka was a
colleague of Gibson’s in the 1930s (Kaufer and Chemero, 2015).
Key to Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) Phenomenology is the notion
of intentionality, which is concerned with how we “see” an
object in terms of how we will interact with it (rather than as
a collection of features). That is, we see the intentional object
in relation to our intended action. One way of appreciating
this, is through the concept of “Gestalt” (with which Merleau-
Ponty was familiar), which is not some property of the object
but rather the combination of the sensory stimulation evoked
by an object in a given context. In Norman’s (1988) glossing
of “affordance,” the object becomes imbued with meaning in a
way that Gibson (and Gestalt psychologists, and Merleau-Ponty)
resisted. This means not only that the “Gestalt” is more than
the sum of its parts, but also that the object can be interacted
with differently under different conditions. This reiterates our
distinction between cups of hot coffee and cold milk. In order
to interact with an object, the individual must have the ability
to act upon or with that object; and so, the individual can be
considered in terms of effectivities (Turvey and Shaw, 1979). In
this respect, environmental constraints (in terms of properties
of objects) are responded to in terms of bodily constraints (in
terms of effectivities). Stoffregen (2003) and (Chemero, 2003;
Chemero et al., 2003) dispute the implication that “affordance”
arises because the object elicits a dispositional response in the
user, and they propose that this should not be regarded in
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terms of dispositions (that is, consistent responses to objects)
but rather in terms of abilities (that is, flexible and adaptive
styles of interaction). Furthermore, as Osiurak et al. (2017)
point out, the notion of effectivity conflates two kinds of action
possibilities—those offered by the body and those provided by
objects.
In terms of Gestalt psychology, Lewin (1936) developed the
concept of Aufforderungscharaktere (translated as “demand
character,” “invitation-character” or “prompt-character”)
indicating the properties of an object which call for a certain
behavior. This describes interaction with an object in a context,
in terms of “valences” (which are a function of the person’s
(motivational) state and the properties of the environment in
which they are acting). This implies (I feel) that the relationship
between object and action would vary according to person
and environment (much as Merleau-Ponty, 1945 suggests). In
contrast, Gibson (1979) claims that “affordances” are invariant
and quotes his colleague Koffka as saying, “Each things say what
it is. . . a fruit says ‘Eat me’, water says ‘Drink me’, thunder says
‘Fear me’. . . ” (Koffka, 1955, p.7). My problem with this claim
is that it seems to return us to the idea that an “affordance”
is a property of the object and is independent of the viewer.
In contrast, in order to perceive an object’s affordance, one
needs to have prior experience of using objects of this type and
a set of beliefs as to how such objects ought to be used. This
gives a strong cultural and experiential basis to the response to
affordance in ways that Gibson was seeking to avoid through his
insistence that perception of affordance was a direct response
to the visual appearance of an object. Gaver (1991) suggested
that one could separate affordance from perceptual information,
and introduced terms such as “false affordance” (in which the
form of object implies a possible action, say a decal on a product
that looks like a button) and “hidden affordance” (in which
perceptual information is obscured). Although the notions of
“false” and “hidden” affordance are useful, this relies on the
conflation of “affordance” with function. This creates further
confusion in the application of affordance to design—should
we be concerned with designing visual signifiers that cue an
action (which is, surely, much the same as stating that the
form of an object signifies its functions, which designers know
anyway) or does affordance provide another perspective on
design?
From his interpretation of Gibson’s various proposals about
“affordance,” Chemero (2009) suggests that, “Affordances are
neither properties of the animal alone nor properties of the
environment alone. Instead, they are relations between the
abilities of an animal and some feature of a situation.” (p.191).
This observation is significant to the current paper for three
reasons. First, it recognizes that affordances arise through
relations in animal-object-environment systems (rather than
existing as properties of any constituent component). This raises
questions about what the designer is designing in order to
support affordance. My answer to this is that design, in this
context is less about the fashioning of objects (although, of
course, these are important) and more about choreographing
situations in which people interact with objects. Second, the idea
that affordances are relations implies that people rarely attend
to the specific features of the context in which these relations
occur. In their discussion of affordance, Still and Dark (2013)
suggest that people respond to affordances “automatically,” i.e.,
with little or no conscious awareness or need for attentional
control. Similarly, the use of highly familiar objects would involve
minimal attentional demand, but when confronted with a novel
or unfamiliar object, there would be a need to construct a plan
of how to interact with it (Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys et al.,
2010). Furthermore, if affordances guide action then this could
only be for someone able to perceive the relevant “information,”
able to perform the relevant action, and able to relate the
action to a desirable goal (Roux and Bril, 2005; Fairlie and
Barham, 2016). As Kirsh (2013) has it, “goals make perception
enactive” (Kirsh, 2013, p. 10). To illustrate this, he gives the
example of a stonemason (or bricklayer) who “. . .will look at
bricks for places to apply cement; when looking at an odd
brick he will ‘see’ the particular trowel shape that is needed.”
(Kirsh, 2013, p. 9). For someone without the experience of
bricklaying, there is less likely to be distinctions between bricks
and less likely for these distinctions to result in changes in
action.
Formally Describing Affordance
Lewin (1936), who we have already noted as a providing a
precursor definition of what became known as “affordance,”
developed a simple equation (Equation 1) to model behavior (B)
as a function f of Person (P) and environment (E).
B = f (P, E) (1)
This simply states that behavior of a person is directly connected
to the environment in which they act. In order to address some of
the issues surrounding the debate over what “affordance” might
be, Turvey (1992) proposed a formal definition (Equation 2
which one can see is inheriting Lewin’s idea). This can be
expressed as:
Wp, q = j(Xp, Zq) possesses r (2)
In other words an Environment or World, W, has properties
p and q which can be defined as the joining, j, of an object X
(with property p) and an animal Z (with effectivity q) in order to
produce an affordance relationship, r. In this account, the animal
has a set of dispositions, characterized in terms of effectivity,
which enable it to respond to object properties. So, an adult
human hand can grasp the handle of a full cup and lift it in
a way that a child’s smaller hand might not be able to: from
Equation (2), the cup_handle (for the adult) affords grasping
(because its property, p, defined by its size and shape, matches
the disposition, q, of the person, defined by hand-size), and the
full_cup affords lifting because of the adult’s strength. As noted
previously, Stoffregen (2003) questioned Turvey’s (1992) claim
that effectivities are dispositions. He suggested that it makesmore
sense to regard these as abilities that can be called upon in a given
situation. This is useful because it means that the response that a
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designermight expect to elicit using a given form could be correct
in terms of effectivity but not ability, and so, affordance is about
matching ability not disposition.
For Stoffregen (2003), affordance emerges from the World-
Object-Animal system and is not a property of any one of these
in isolation. Thus, Stoffregen (2003) offered Equation (3).
Wp, q = (Xp, Zq) possesses h (3)
What the formal descriptions struggle to present is the discretion
with which such responses are made. In other words, is it
possible to not respond to an object’s “solicitation” of a response?
Certainly, this is not easy to see from Turvey’s (1992) account.
For Stoffregen (2003), the post-hoc description of an affordance
as something that has occurred in a system, rather blurs this
problem.
To consider the problem more concretely, the notion of
Stimulus-Response Compatibility has been a staple part of
Ergonomics design thinking for the past half century. To
illustrate this idea, imagine that you have a row of 4 lights in
front of you (labeled 1–4), and between you and the lights is a row
of 4 buttons (labeled A–D). The buttons and lights are arranged
so that 1 and A are adjacent, etc. When one of the lights turns
on, you must press one of the buttons to turn off this light as
quickly as possible. In the adjacent (or congruent) arrangement,
when light1 turns on, you press button A. In an incongruent
arrangement, when light 1 turns on, you have to press, say, button
C. Not surprisingly, the congruent arrangement leads to much
faster performance. Early accounts of the SRC suggested that
the performance differences were due to “translation” (Fitts and
Seeger, 1953; Fitts and Deininger, 1954; Welford, 1976). People
prefer arrangements in which the elements (light and button) are
congruent, and this is termed a Population Stereotype (there is
some work to suggest that different cultures might have slightly
different Population Stereotypes). Furthermore, most people
produce faster responses with fewer errors in Sets of stimulus-
response pairings which have this preferred arrangement, and
this defines Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC). A popular
explanation of SRC relates to the ability to extract salient
features and pair these with an appropriate response. This is
the “dimensional overlap” model (Kornbulm et al., 1990) and
broadly contrasts the overlap of dimensions (elements) in a set
(i.e., the congruence of arrangements) with the relevance of
elements within a set (i.e., how the features of a stimulus relate
to a response). For example, button presses could conceivably
be made in response to proper names. In this case, there is no
overlap between the layout of the buttons and the nature of
the stimulus, and there is no relevance of stimulus content to
response. On the other hand, button presses might be to the lights
(which might be labeled with proper names). In this case, there
is no relevance of the names, but there might be overlap between
the position of the light and the position of the button. Finally, the
congruent condition (arranging buttons and lights as described
earlier) has both overlap and relevance.
The relevance of SRC to HCI has been recently reviewed
in a paper by Proctor and Vu (2016), and they suggest that
it continues to provide useful guidelines for design. There is
much to be said for the empirical evidence from SRC. From
the perspective of affordance, it could be argued that SRC arises
when information from environment (stimulus) relates to ability
(response). In other words, there is potential argument that
removes the need to appeal to a “translation” or a “dimensional
overlap” to explain this. In their paper, Proctor and Vu (2016)
argue against “affordance” and suggest that it merely describes
a particular form of spatial compatibility. I felt that they
misrepresented the basic ideas of affordance and agree with
Stins and Michaels (1997), who argued that, in SRC studies,
the “information” could include more than just the position of
the response buttons (as SRC tends to assume). Crossing one’s
hands in SRC experiments leads to an increase in reaction time,
even when the position of stimulus and response objects remain
constant, and this does not seem to be the result of a simple
biomechanical constraint; reactions using crossed hands cannot
be explained solely by conflict management, as proposed by the
dimensional overlap model. This suggests that the relationship
between response and stimulus involves more than the simple
mappings that SRC assumes. Further, SRC studies often fail to
control properly for the different compatibility effects that could
arise from the use of different response actions that are required.
Finally, SRC studies do not seem to be able to account for how
changes in ability can lead to changes in performance. Having
said that, the formal approaches to affordance outlined, above
do not account for this either. If we refer back to the formalisms
outlined in Equations (2) and (3), it is difficult to see how these
could account for the differences in SRC. In both congruent
and incongruent conditions, Xp would be “light on,” and Zq
would be “press button.” So, perhaps, we need to elaborate the
Xp description to include Xp1 “light on” + Xp2 “light adjacent
to button” (in the congruent condition), and to elaborate Zq1
“associate light label with button label” + Zq2 “press button” in
the incongruent condition.
While the formal descriptions of Turvey (1992) and
Stoffregen (2003) are directed at the immediate relationship
between an object and its user, this does not fully capture the
situation in which the relationship arises. For Kirlik (2004), a
problem with Stoffregen’s (2003) equation is that there does
not appear to any constraint on how to define the parameters.
Abbate and Bass (2017) develop a variation of Stoffregen’s (2003)
formalism that works with a priori constraints (Equation 4):
Possesses(affordancei)(Xp, Zq) (4)
This relationship becomes expandable with specific values of
the elements of X that are relevant to a given “goal” and
with specific values that define the ability of Z required to
respond to these features. As an example, Abbate and Bass
(2017) propose that an aircraft cabin door is plugged into its
fitting under high external pressure, and that (on the ground)
the door can be opened by pulling out a lever and then
turning it. So, in this case, there are two affordances of interest,
i.e., leverLiftable, and doorOpenable. These can be defined
as follows:
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possesses(leverLiftable)(Xp, Zq)= true if:
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp1[Slot][bottom_of]=overlapping ∧
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.p1 x (Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.p1 - Xp.Airspacep1)+ Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp2 ≤
Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverq1[position_up]
possesses(doorOpenable)(Xp, Zq)= true if:
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.Leverp1[Slot][top_of]=overlapping ∧
Xp.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.p2 [Cabin][left_of]= contained_within ∧
Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.q1[position_back]= true ∧ Zq.Airspace.Aircraft.Cabin.Door.q1[translate_left]=true
This formal description elaborates the context under which the
lever “affords” lifting and the door “affords” opening (in terms
of external air pressure and the position of the lever, and in
terms of the action performed by the person). In order for the
person to perform the action, they need to apply the appropriate
force to the lever—so this is intended to reflect ability rather
than disposition. However, there is somethingmissing from these
formal accounts, and that is the rationale for performing the
action in the first place. One way of considering this is to turn to
suggestions that “affordance” is hierarchical and can be described
in terms of different levels.
Levels of Affordance
Although Abbate and Bass (2017) relate values for X and Z to
an affordance relationship, they do not say how the affordance
itself relates to a particular “goal,” such as lift_lever or open_door.
McGrenere and Ho (2000) use the term “possibility for action”
to indicate that there might be levels of affordance. One way of
thinking of this is in terms of “sequential affordance” (Gaver,
1996). For example, grasping a lever handle “affords” lifting,
which then releases the door and, so “affords,” opening the
door. In this sequence, affordances are “nested,” i.e., the lever’s
“graspability” is nested in the door’s “openability.” I am not
convinced that it makes sense to call this a “sequence of
affordances,” so much as a sequence of actions, but can see how
one could apply the formal descriptions outlined above to each
“state” in the ongoing sequence of interactions between person
and object. What is interesting about this perspective is that
the “door_handle” contributes to several “affording situations.”
Consider, for example, turning the door handle when you were
carrying a pile of books or a cup of coffee, as opposed to turning
it with an unencumbered hand.
The notion that affordances could have multiple instances was
also discussed by Hartson (2003) who suggested that affordances
could be: cognitive, physical, sensory, with each of these helping
users to perform cognitive, physical or sensory action. This seems
to me to conflate different notions of “affordance” in ways that
are not helpful. For instance, while affordance describes the
relationship between the form of an object and the person’s
action, it is not obvious how this relates to cognitive and
sensory actions. Similarly, Turner (2005) contrasted what he
termed “simple affordance” (which draws on Gibson’s definition)
with “complex affordance” (which involves interpretation and
response to an object’s form in terms of the user’s culture,
history, praxis). However, applying the term “affordance” to such
different behaviors can only serve to increase confusion. To this
end, I proposed a different terminology to describe these different
levels.
Forms of Engagement
In order to explore the concept of affordance further, and tomake
use of the suggestion that there are different levels of “affordance”
that provide constraints of the ways in which we interact with
objects, I developed the idea of forms of engagement (Baber,
2003, 2006). In this, the focus is on the ways in which we engage
with objects and how different forms can serve to support and
constrain each other. The most recent version of this concept
is illustrated by Figure 1. The arrows are intended to indicate
the relation “constrains.” Note that, at the center of Figure 1
is a dotted box which is labeled “affordance.” This describes a
relationship between the ability to recognize salient features in an
object (Environmental Engagement) and the ability to act using
that object (Motor Engagement).
Figure 1 separates the effectivity of the person, in terms
of Morphological Engagement, from ability, in terms of motor
engagement. There are two reasons for this: first, morphology
is partly dispositional, e.g., in terms of the size of the hand;
and second, hand shaping will be influenced by subsequent
actions, e.g., when reaching to grasp an object, hand shape is
modified in anticipation of the type of grip required to respond
to properties of the object, such as weight, fullness, slipperiness
etc. (Wing et al., 1986), and this will also be influenced by Motor
Engagement, i.e., Rosenbaum et al. (1992) notion of “end-state
comfort” explains why peoplemight adopt an uncomfortable grip
at the beginning of an action, in order to end an action with a
comfortable grip. For example, if a wine glass is upside down on
the table, you will probably twist the hand awkwardly to pick it
up in order to turn it right-way up. So, there are a limited set of
ways in which an object can be grasped by the human hand and
the selection of grasp combines object properties with intended
movements. That is, a hand of a given size will have limits of how
it can grasp objects, but how the grasp is performed reflects the
ability and intentions of the person, which will vary according to
a host of situational factors, as well as prior experience.
In order to act on an object, there is a need to respond to the
“information” that it conveys. I am using the word information
in a Gibsonian sense, and apply the term Environmental
Engagement to reflect this. Consequently, an affordance arises as
the result of the relationship between Environmental and Motor
Engagement. For example, people can make rapid judgements
about whether to turn their body to fit through narrow apertures
as they approach these (Warren andWhang, 1987) and can make
such judgements even when their bodies have been modified
to an unfamiliar size, e.g., when wearing “pregnancy packs” on
the front (Franchak and Adolph, 2014), or when wearing rugby
shoulder pads (Higuchi et al., 2011). Furthermore, increasing
the weight of the body, e.g., by wearing a heavy rucksack, can
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FIGURE 1 | Forms of Engagement (2017 version).
alter judgements of the steepness of a hill (Profitt, 2006). The
implication is that there is a “body-scaled” perception of some
features of the environment that can guide some actions (Warren,
1984; Fajen, 2007). In other words, people are able to “see” aspects
of the object, or the environment, in terms of an action that they
both want, and are able, to perform. We can directly relate this
proposal to Equation (2), e.g., imagine we are interested in stair-
climbing, and the property of the world,Xp, is the height of a stair
riser, and the property of the person, Zq, is their leg length.
This could, of course, be termed “perception-action coupling”
(which is a common expression of Gibson’s ideas and a
reasonable explanation of affordance from the perspective
adopted in this paper). So, I retain the term “affordance” for
the specific relationship between object and action—and regard
this as an emerging property of the world-object-person system.
However, this relationship is bounded by the other forms of
engagement. The suggestion that Motor Engagement is directed
toward subsequent action implies an intention, but I argue that
there is equal scope that the “intention” can be defined in
response to the Motor Engagement (opportunistic or situated
action). At the very least, there is a two-way exchange between the
action-as-performed and the goal-state of that action. The role of
Cognitive Engagement is to provide this high-level management
on ongoing actions. Across the various forms of engagement,
Perceptual Engagement relates salient features to changing state
of the object-person system. Finally, the notion of an “acceptable”
goal could relate to the culture in which one is acting. This
Cultural Engagement relates to the idea of “complex affordance”
(Turner, 2005). It could also relate to the concept of “cultural
affordances” developed by Ramstead et al. (2016).
The basic concept of Forms of Engagement is intended to
retain “affordance” as a simple relationship between the actions
a person performs to the features of the object that they are
using. The connections between the different forms represent the
constraints that shape and respond to this relationship. I claim
that this provides a useful way of conceptualizing interaction,
and use this to explore ways in which one can design animate
objects.
Animate Objects
Having proposed that interaction comprises a number of Forms
of Engagement, one can relate these to the possible inferences that
animate objects could make as they are being interacted with. At
the most basic level, sensors on the object could provide data to
characterize the motion, orientation, position, etc. of the object.
However, what would be most useful is not just identifying that
a movement has been made but also to identify how well that
movement has been made, e.g., has it been performed smoothly,
hesitantly, with tremor etc. In this way, the object would be able to
make inferences about the user’s Motor Engagement and abilities.
Additional sensing capability could be added to monitor hand
shape andmovement as it approaches the object, in order tomake
inferences concerning Morphological Engagement. This could
be used to determine the type of action that the person might
be intending to make, even before picking up or handling the
object. Previously I have contrasted these as epistemic or ergotic
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gestures, to reflect the fact that such actions could be treated as
“gestures” which have the intention of altering the state of the
user’s environment (Baber, 2014).
The object, assuming that it can modify its appearance,
could encourage Environmental Engagement through changes
that emphasize specific features. So, when a handle rises on
the side of a cup, people are more likely to use the hand
on that side of the cup to pick it up (Baber et al., 2017).
Having some knowledge of where the object is being used could
also influence the definition of appropriate actions, through
Cultural Engagement. Combining inferences drawn from Motor
and Morphological Engagement, the object could infer the
most likely intention of the person, and use this inference
to provide additional cues and guidance (Jean-Baptiste et al.,
2015).
Let us assume that the “smart object” looks like something
familiar, say a cup, which has been fitted with sensors (Gellersen
et al., 1999; Baber et al., 2017). On the one hand, this is an
object that we “know” how to use, but on the other hand, this
is an alien object that is capable of doing things that we do
not, necessarily, fully understand. The cup could, for example,
be part of a system that monitors our daily liquid intake and
the system could have a “goal” of ensuring that we drink a
specified quantity of liquid, or it might be part of a system that
has the “goal” of reducing our caffeine intake. One way in which
such “goals” could be communicated to the user would for the
artifacts themselves (through lights, sounds, movement etc.) to
provide feedback and prompts to the person. In this way, the
form of the objects could display their function. I am interested
in this relationship between form and function (both in terms
of “normal” and “smart” objects), and how the “function” of an
object corresponds to the action in which it is used. There are
many instances in which the “action” is quite different from the
designed “function,” e.g., a laptop could be used to prop the leg
of a wobbly desk, or as a tray to carry several coffee cups, or as a
weapon.
Implications for Design
I close this paper with some observations on how the concept
of Forms of Engagement could apply to broader areas of HCI
design. There seems to me to be a division between those
practitioners who are interested in usability and those interested
in user experience (Baber, 2015). The “usability” focus tends
to emphasize performance (although, of course, International
Standards Organization definitions of usability include efficiency,
effectiveness and experience), while “user experience” tends to
focus on the emotional response (from pleasure to frustration)
that users get from their interactions with technology. Broadly,
I would suggest that usability takes as its “context of use,” the
region in Figure 1 that is defined by Environmental, Motor,
Morphological, Perceptual and Cognitive Engagement, while
“user experience” takes as its focus the region in Figure 1 that
is defined by Cultural, Cognitive and Perceptual Engagement. Of
course, I am not claiming that there is not overlap between these
regions, but it seems to me that the differences in practice relate
to the different levels of analysis that practitioners emphasize.
It would, one hopes, be profitable and useful to merge these
practices of evaluation of HCI.
A final point for this paper is that I do not believe that it
is possible to “design affordance” into an object. This is the
fundamental argument made in this paper. However, I do believe
that it is possible to create affording situations—and that this is
what good design has always sought to achieve. Knowing how a
person with given ability would interact with an object to achieve
a given goal in a given context is central to ISO definitions of
Human-Centred Design. What I have offered in this paper is a
conceptual framework that illustrates this goal, and relates it to
an unambiguous interpretation of the concept of “affordance.”
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While substantial effort has been invested in making robots more reliable, experience
demonstrates that robots operating in unstructured environments are often challenged
by frequent failures. Despite this, robots have not yet reached a level of design that
allows effective management of faulty or unexpected behavior by untrained users. To
understand why this may be the case, an in-depth literature review was done to explore
when people perceive and resolve robot failures, how robots communicate failure,
how failures influence people’s perceptions and feelings toward robots, and how these
effects can be mitigated. Fifty-two studies were identified relating to communicating
failures and their causes, the influence of failures on human-robot interaction (HRI),
and mitigating failures. Since little research has been done on these topics within the
HRI community, insights from the fields of human computer interaction (HCI), human
factors engineering, cognitive engineering and experimental psychology are presented
and discussed. Based on the literature, we developed a model of information processing
for robotic failures (Robot Failure Human Information Processing, RF-HIP), that guides
the discussion of our findings. The model describes the way people perceive, process,
and act on failures in human robot interaction. The model includes three main parts: (1)
communicating failures, (2) perception and comprehension of failures, and (3) solving
failures. Each part contains several stages, all influenced by contextual considerations
and mitigation strategies. Several gaps in the literature have become evident as a result
of this evaluation. More focus has been given to technical failures than interaction failures.
Few studies focused on human errors, on communicating failures, or the cognitive,
psychological, and social determinants that impact the design of mitigation strategies.
By providing the stages of human information processing, RF-HIP can be used as a tool
to promote the development of user-centered failure-handling strategies for HRIs.
Keywords: human-robot interaction, failure, user-centered, information processing, context
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INTRODUCTION
While substantial effort has been invested in making robots
more reliable, experience demonstrates that robots are often
challenged by frequent failures. The Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) for robots in field environments is often within a
few hours (Tsarouhas and Fourlas, 2016). Despite this, mobile
robots have not yet reached a level of design that allow effective
management of faulty or unexpected behavior. In fact, research
suggests that the relationship between symptoms and cause of
failure is often not clear even to trained roboticists (Steinbauer,
2013). Having to rely on a professional to understand and
resolve a robot’s faulty behavior is a barrier to acceptance
amongst untrained users. Customer support also becomes costly
when users are unable to differentiate between technical errors
(software bugs or hardware failures) and problems resulting
from improper use (misuse; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) or
unrealistic expectations. Moreover, how a robot manages failure
influences willingness to use the robot again (Lee et al., 2010),
the degree of deterioration in task performance (Ragni et al.,
2016), user trust in the robot (Hamacher et al., 2016), and
people’s perceptions of the robot (Gompei and Umemuro, 2015),
suggesting that failure handlingmay have substantial commercial
and economic benefits. Yet, little is known about how to create
failure management tools for robots that are appropriate for
untrained users. We shed light on this topic, with the goal
of developing design tools and design guidelines that facilitate
development of robot interactions that enable untrained users to
quickly and easily identify and act on failures, while maintaining
a positive user experience.
To tackle the challenging problem of failure handling for
untrained users, it is first necessary to review the cognitive
considerations that critically influence naive users’ ability to
detect and solve robot failures, and evaluate whether these
considerations have been properly addressed in the existing
Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) literature. This paper presents
a detailed look at the literature in HRI regarding when people
perceive and resolve robot failures, how robots communicate
failure, how failures influence people’s perceptions and feelings
toward robots, and how these effects can be mitigated.
Since little research has been done on these topics within
the HRI community, insights from the fields of Human
Computer Interaction (HCI), human factors engineering,
cognitive engineering and experimental psychology are presented
and discussed. To the best of our knowledge, a thorough review
of robotic failure handling from a user-centered perspective
has not yet been conducted. Based on the literature, we
developed a model of information processing for robotic failures
(the Robot Failure Human Information Processing Model, RF-
HIP) that guides the discussion of our findings. As robots
become more present in day-to-day life, especially for elderly
users who are inexperienced with robotic applications (Beer
and Takayama, 2011), we anticipate that such reviews and
models will become increasingly useful. Researchers could use
them to better understand what influences failure handling
in HRIs, to identify possible knowledge gaps and to promote
future research directions. Roboticists, engineers, and designers
could use them to guide design choices that will increase
user acceptance and decrease customer support costs. Policy
makers could use them to decide on standards for the necessary
failure-handling techniques required to make robots safe for
general use.
The paper is organized as follows: first, the types of failures
that may occur during HRIs are discussed. Second, search criteria
and an overview of the relevant HRI literature that matched
these criteria is presented. Third, cognitive determinants that
are likely to influence a person’s ability to perceive and resolve
failures are combined with current research in robotic user-
centered failure handling to create a model of information
processing. Finally, gaps in the HRI literature are presented and
discussed.
DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING ERRORS
Various definitions exist for the terms “failure,” “error,” and
“fault.” In line with (Laprie, 1995; Carlson and Murphy, 2005;
Steinbauer, 2013; Brooks, 2017), we adopted terminology in
which failure refers to “a degraded state of ability which causes
the behavior or service being performed by the system to deviate
from the ideal, normal, or correct functionality” (Brooks, 2017).
This definition includes both perceived failures, unexpected
behavior and actual failures, which is consistent with findings that
suggest that intentional yet unexpected or incoherent behaviors
are sometimes interpreted as erroneous (Short et al., 2010;
Lemaignan et al., 2015). Failures result from one or more errors,
which refer to system states (electrical, logical, or mechanical)
that can lead to a failure. Errors result from one or more faults,
which refer to anything that causes the system to enter an error
state. For example, a robot may experience a failure resulting
from an error in face-recognition, caused by poor illumination
(fault).
It is improbable to identify all possible types of robotic
failures since mobile robots operate in unstructured changing
environments with a wide variety of possible interactions.
Yet, several taxonomies for classifying errors and failures have
been proposed. Laprie (1995) classified failures according to
severity, defining benign failures (failures whose consequences
are comparable to the benefits of the service they are preventing)
and catastrophic failures (failures with a higher cost by one
or more orders of magnitude than the service). Ross (Ross
et al., 2004) categorized system errors according to failure
recoverability, defining anticipated errors (when the agent
backtracks through the plan to achieve the same goal through
an alternate course of action), exceptional errors (when the
current plan cannot cope with the failure, and re-planning can
be done to formulate a strategy to achieve the original goal),
unrecoverable errors (when the current plan cannot cope with the
error and re-planning cannot be done), and socially recoverable
errors (when the agent can continue on with the original
plan with appropriate assistance from other agents within its
environment). Giuliani et al. (2015) classified failures according
to their type, defining technical failures (caused by technical
shortcomings of the robot) and social norm violations (when
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the robot deviates from the social script or uses inappropriate
social signals, e.g., looking away from a person while talking to
them).
Carlson and Murphy (2005) devised an extensive error
classification taxonomy by analyzing how Unmanned Ground
Vehicles (UGVs) failed in the field using studies from
urban search and rescue and military field applications. The
classification, based on Laprie (1995) and Norman (2002)
categorized errors according to the source of failure (the fault),
and included two main categories: (1) physical failures, which
are failures caused by physical errors in the system’s effectors,
sensors, control system, power sources, or communications,
and (2) human failures, which are caused by human-made
errors. They further classified physical failures according
to severity (terminal failure—terminates the system’s current
mission; nonterminal failures—degrades its ability to perform
its mission) and repairability (field repairable—repairable with
tools that accompany the system in the field; nonfield
repairable—cannot be repaired with tools that accompany the
system in the field), and human failures according to design
failures (errors introduced during design, construction, or post-
production modifications, e.g., programmed to greet people
with “goodbye”) and interaction failures (errors introduced
by unintended violations of operating procedures). Interaction
failures included mistakes (performing an action that is wrong),
and slips [attempting to do the right thing unsuccessfully,
e.g., accidentally pressing the wrong button (Barakova et al.,
2015)].
While the (Carlson andMurphy, 2005) taxonomy is extensive,
there are additional interaction failures that were not accounted
for. For example, it did not consider other types of human errors,
such as lapses, which occur as a result of lapses of memory and/or
attention (e.g., forgetting to turn the robot off), and deliberate
violations, which are intentional illegitimate actions (e.g.,
directing the robot to run into a wall) (Reason, 1990). Three main
taxonomies of human errors are frequently cited in the literature
(Stanton and Salmon, 2009): (1) Norman’s error categorization
(Norman, 1981), which divides human errors into those that
result from misinterpretations of the situation, those that result
from faulty activation of schemas (knowledge structures) due to
similar trigger conditions, and those that result from activating
schemas too early, too late, or not at all; (2) Rasmussen’s
error categorization (Rasmussen, 1982), which divides human
errors by the level of cognitive control within which they
occur (skill-, rule-, or knowledge-based), and (3) Reason’s
categorization (Reason, 1990), which builds on Rassmussen’s
ideas and divides human errors into slips, lapses, mistakes
and violations (described above). Moreover, the (Carlson and
Murphy, 2005) taxonomy doesn’t consider uncertainties in the
interaction that result from varying environments and other
agents. (Sutcliffe and Rugg, 1998) described 10 environmental
and social factors that may increase the likelihood of errors, and
classified them into group level judgement, working environment,
and organizational flaws.
Steinbauer (2013) collected information regarding failures
that occurred to teams in RoboCup competitions, and classified
them into four categories: Interaction (problems that arise
from uncertainties in the interaction with the environment,
other agents, and humans), algorithms (problems in methods
and algorithms), software (design and implementation faults
of software systems), and hardware (physical faults of the
robotic equipment). They used several attributes to classify
faults and their properties, including the fault’s relevance to
different robotic systems (relevance), the context in which the
fault occurred (condition), indicators used to identify the failure
(symptoms), how the failure impacted the mission (impact:
non-critical, repairable, and terminal), and the frequency of
the occurrence of a fault (frequency: never, sporadic, regularly,
frequently).
Brooks (2017), based on Lutz and Woodhouse (1999),
identified two main types of failure: communication failures
and processing failures. Communication failures are related to
data being passed between modules, including missing data
(incomplete messages or dropped packets), incorrect data (data
generated incorrectly or distorted during transmission), bad
timing (data sent too early, before the receiver is ready to
handle it, or too late, causing delays in reaction), and extra data
(data sent multiple times but only expected once, or sending
larger messages than expected). Processing failures include
abnormal terminations, that could happen due to unhandled
exceptions, segmentation fault, or dead-lock; missing events, that
could happen when a conditional statement is not triggered
or a callback or interrupt never fires; incorrect logic due
to bad assumptions or unforeseen conditions; and timing or
ordering, where events take place in a different order than
expected or a waiting period times-out before information
arrives.
We propose an inclusive human-robot failure taxonomy
that combines the above system and human oriented
classifications (Figure 1). According to this taxonomy, the
main distinction is between two types of failures: technical
failures and interaction failures. Technical failures are caused
either by hardware errors or problems in the robot’s software
system. Software errors are further classified into design failures,
communication failures, and processing failures. Following
Steinbauer’s categorization (Steinbauer, 2013), interaction
failures refer to problems that arise from uncertainties in the
interaction with the environment, other agents, and humans.
These include social norm violations and various types of
human errors as noted in Reason (1990). Each failure event,
regardless of its source, can be categorized by the following
attributes:
• Functional Severity: criticality of the failure to the robot’s
functioning (non-critical, recoverable, terminal).
• Social Severity: criticality of the failure to future acceptance of
the robot’s services (non-critical, recoverable, unrecoverable).
• Relevance: relevance of the fault to different robot systems,
which can be high (relevant to almost all robotic systems),
medium (relevant only to some robotic systems), or low
(highly specialized failures).
• Frequency: how often the failure occurs (never, sporadic,
regularly, frequently).
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FIGURE 1 | A human-robot failure taxonomy.
• Condition: the context in which the fault and failure occurred.
• Symptoms: indicators used to identify the failure.
LITERATURE REVIEW ON
USER-CENTERED FAILURE HANDLING
Various search engines were used to conduct the online
literature search on human-centered failure handling in robots,
including Google Scholar, IEEE, ACM, Science Direct, Springer,
Sage Journals, Taylor & Francis Online, and Cambridge Core.
Robotics conferences and journals covered in this search include
ICRA, IROS, RO-MAN, SMC, Robotics and Autonomous
Systems, Human Machine Systems, HRI, International Journal
of Social Robotics, Autonomous Robots, International Journal of
Robotics Research, Robotica, Intelligent Robots and Systems, and
Advanced Robotics, amongst others. Keywords used were: robot,
error, failure, recovery, reliability. Included in the review are
articles that address robotic failure-handling from the perspective
of the human operator, user or bystander, rather than from a
systems perspective. That is, we focused on studies that evaluated
some aspect of the bilateral relationship between end-user’s
needs, wants and limitations and robotic failure. Articles that
dealt with errors without addressing the user or the interaction
were not included in the review. Given the vast amount of
research on technical considerations of robot reliability and error
handling, we cannot claim our search to be exhaustive, however
given the large number of resources surveyed, we do believe it is
indicative of current trends.
Figure 2 shows the result of the literature search of HRI
articles that evaluated some aspect of user-centered failure
handling. Altogether, 52 relevant papers were identified, where 40
of them were published in conference proceedings, 8 in academic
journals, 1 doctoral dissertation, 2 theses, and 1 technical report.
Papers were classified into three main topics: (a) communicating
failures and their causes, i.e., how should a robot communicate
to its user and bystanders that an error has occurred; (b) the
influence of failures on HRI, i.e., how do failures influence user
perceptions of the robot and user behavior; and (c) mitigating
failures, i.e., approaches on how to mitigate the negative effects
of failure on HRIs. The following sections provide an overview of
methodologies used in the literature, including the types of errors
and symptoms studied, evaluation methods and metrics, the
types of robotic systems used, and experimental environments.
Errors and Symptoms Studied
Almost all errors researched in the literature exemplified
technical failures (e.g., Gieselmann, 2006; Kim and Hinds, 2006;
Gieselmann and Ostendorf, 2007; Spexard et al., 2008; Kim et al.,
2009; Groom et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Takayama et al., 2011;
Desai et al., 2012, 2013; Kahn et al., 2012; Rosenthal et al., 2012;
Shiomi et al., 2013; Yasuda and Matsumoto, 2013; Kaniarasu
and Steinfeld, 2014; Lohan et al., 2014; Cha et al., 2015; Gehle
et al., 2015; Giuliani et al., 2015; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015;
Hamacher, 2015; Knepper et al., 2015; Mirnig et al., 2015, 2017;
Mubin and Bartneck, 2015; Salem et al., 2015; Bajones et al., 2016;
Brooks et al., 2016; Hamacher et al., 2016; Hayes et al., 2016;
Ragni et al., 2016; Robinette et al., 2016; Engelhardt and Hansson,
2017; Law et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2017; van der Woerdt and
Haselager, 2017; Kwon et al., 2018). Only a few evaluated the
impact of social norm violations (e.g., Short et al., 2010; Salem
et al., 2013; Giuliani et al., 2015; Mirnig et al., 2015, 2017; van
der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017), and none focused on human
errors. Some articles did not specify the type of error used (e.g.,
Ross et al., 2004; Cassenti, 2007).
A robot’s failure symptoms in the literature include the robot
not completing a given task (e.g., Takayama et al., 2011; Rosenthal
et al., 2012; Brooks et al., 2016; Robinette et al., 2016;Mirnig et al.,
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FIGURE 2 | Distribution of user-centered failure handling by topic (Top) and by publication year (Bottom).
2017; Kwon et al., 2018), running into obstacles (e.g., Brooks
et al., 2016), performing the wrong action (e.g., Kim et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2012, 2013; Yasuda and Matsumoto,
2013; Kaniarasu and Steinfeld, 2014; Gehle et al., 2015; Mubin
and Bartneck, 2015; Salem et al., 2015; Brooks et al., 2016; Hayes
et al., 2016; Robinette et al., 2016; Mirnig et al., 2017; Sarkar
et al., 2017; van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017), performing
the right action incorrectly or incompletely (e.g., Takayama et al.,
2011; Shiomi et al., 2013; Cha et al., 2015; Hamacher, 2015;
Brooks et al., 2016; Hamacher et al., 2016; Adubor et al., 2017;
Sarkar et al., 2017; van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017; Kwon
et al., 2018), producing no action or speech (irresponsiveness)
(e.g., Gieselmann, 2006; Lohan et al., 2014; Bajones et al., 2016;
Robinette et al., 2016; Lucas et al., 2017, 2018), timing speech
improperly (e.g., Mirnig et al., 2017), failing to produce speech
(e.g., Gieselmann and Ostendorf, 2007; Mirnig et al., 2017),
producing inappropriate speech or erroneous instruction (e.g.,
Gieselmann, 2006; Gieselmann and Ostendorf, 2007; Short et al.,
2010; Gehle et al., 2015; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Lucas
et al., 2017, 2018; Mirnig et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2017),
repeating statements or body movements (e.g., Gieselmann and
Ostendorf, 2007; Spexard et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2017; Kwon
et al., 2018), producing unexpected or erratic behavior (e.g., Kim
and Hinds, 2006; Spexard et al., 2008; Short et al., 2010; Desai
et al., 2012; Salem et al., 2013, 2015; Lemaignan et al., 2015;
Robinette et al., 2016; van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017),
making knowledge-based mistakes (e.g., Groom et al., 2010;
Short et al., 2010; Kahn et al., 2012; Rosenthal et al., 2012; Salem
et al., 2015; Hayes et al., 2016; Ragni et al., 2016; Engelhardt
and Hansson, 2017; Law et al., 2017), overtly stating there is a
problem (e.g., Spexard et al., 2008; Bajones et al., 2016; Lucas
et al., 2018), asking for help (e.g., Ross et al., 2004; Hüttenrauch
and Severinson-Eklundh, 2006; Spexard et al., 2008; Rosenthal
et al., 2012; Yasuda and Matsumoto, 2013; Knepper et al., 2015;
Bajones et al., 2016; Srinivasan and Takayama, 2016), producing
body language associated with failure (e.g., Takayama et al., 2011),
and questioning for additional information (e.g., Gieselmann,
2006; Lucas et al., 2018).
Evaluation Methods and Metrics
Error recovery strategies and reactions to errors have been
evaluated using surveys (e.g., Lee et al., 2010; Takayama et al.,
2011; Cha et al., 2015; Brooks et al., 2016; Adubor et al., 2017; Kim
et al., 2017; Rossi et al., 2017b; van der Woerdt and Haselager,
2017; Kwon et al., 2018), video analysis of HRIs (e.g., Giuliani
et al., 2015; Mirnig et al., 2015), and unstructured observational
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studies (e.g., Gieselmann, 2006; Gehle et al., 2015), however most
studies used controlled user experiments (e.g., Spexard et al.,
2008; Short et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2013; Salem et al., 2013,
2015; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Knepper et al., 2015; Hayes
et al., 2016; Ragni et al., 2016; Robinette et al., 2016; Mirnig
et al., 2017; Lucas et al., 2018). One study introduced an idea
on how to improve situation awareness (SA; see Comprehension
andMemory section) in erroneous situations without any formal
evaluation (Cassenti, 2007).
User perceptions of the robot that have been evaluated
in erroneous situations include the robot’s perceived agency
(Lemaignan et al., 2015; van der Woerdt and Haselager,
2017), predictability (van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017),
apologeticness (Shiomi et al., 2013), moral accountability (Kahn
et al., 2012), friendliness (Groom et al., 2010; Shiomi et al.,
2013; Kim et al., 2017), propensity to damage (van der Woerdt
and Haselager, 2017), trustworthiness (Gompei and Umemuro,
2015; Brooks et al., 2016; Hamacher et al., 2016; Rossi et al.,
2017a; Sarkar et al., 2017; van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017;
Kwon et al., 2018), likeability (Groom et al., 2010; Salem et al.,
2013; Bajones et al., 2016; Engelhardt and Hansson, 2017; Mirnig
et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2017), reliability (Short et al., 2010;
Salem et al., 2015), familiarity (Gompei and Umemuro, 2015),
anthropomorphism (Lee et al., 2010; Salem et al., 2013, 2015;
Lemaignan et al., 2015; Mubin and Bartneck, 2015; Mirnig et al.,
2017; Sarkar et al., 2017), animacy (Engelhardt and Hansson,
2017; Sarkar et al., 2017), technical competence (Groom et al.,
2010; Short et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2013; Salem et al., 2015;
Brooks et al., 2016; Engelhardt and Hansson, 2017; Sarkar et al.,
2017), dependability (Brooks et al., 2016), intelligence (Mubin
and Bartneck, 2015; Salem et al., 2015; Bajones et al., 2016;
Engelhardt and Hansson, 2017; Mirnig et al., 2017; Sarkar et al.,
2017), belligerence (Groom et al., 2010) and safety (Salem et al.,
2015; Adubor et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2017). Studies have also
evaluated the effects of errors on engagement (Lemaignan et al.,
2015; Law et al., 2017), future contact intensions with the robot
(Short et al., 2010; Salem et al., 2013, 2015; Brooks et al., 2016;
Robinette et al., 2016; Kwon et al., 2018), the robot being a
good teammate (Kwon et al., 2018), psychological closeness with
the robot (Salem et al., 2015; Sarkar et al., 2017), rapport and
persuasion (Lucas et al., 2018), creating a shared reality (Salem
et al., 2013), compliance (Rosenthal et al., 2012; Salem et al., 2015;
Robinette et al., 2016; Mirnig et al., 2017), attitudes toward robots
(Salem et al., 2013; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Kim et al.,
2017; Sarkar et al., 2017), and participant’s emotional state (e.g.,
comfortable, safe, relaxed, confused) (Groom et al., 2010; Yasuda
and Matsumoto, 2013; Hamacher, 2015; Robinette et al., 2016).
The quality of error recovery and communication strategies
have been evaluated using various performance metrics,
including whether users managed to resolve the problems
(Spexard et al., 2008), attribution of blame (Kim and Hinds,
2006), the frequency of use of recovery feature (Spexard et al.,
2008), the number of error-free user interactions (Gieselmann
and Ostendorf, 2007; Knepper et al., 2015), time per repair
(Rosenthal et al., 2012; Knepper et al., 2015; van der Woerdt
and Haselager, 2017), time until task completion (De Visser
and Parasuraman, 2011; Rosenthal et al., 2012; Schütte et al.,
2017), user comfort (Engelhardt and Hansson, 2017), user
satisfaction (Gieselmann and Ostendorf, 2007; Shiomi et al.,
2013), task performance and completion (Gieselmann and
Ostendorf, 2007; De Visser and Parasuraman, 2011; Desai et al.,
2013; Salem et al., 2013; Knepper et al., 2015; Brooks, 2017;
Schütte et al., 2017), workload (Brooks, 2017), confidence (De
Visser and Parasuraman, 2011; Brooks, 2017), comprehension of
information (Brooks, 2017; Kwon et al., 2018), the number of
times participant had to stop their primary task to handle the
robot (Brooks, 2017), trust in robot (De Visser and Parasuraman,
2011; Rosenthal et al., 2012; Hamacher et al., 2016), the
participant’s emotional state (Groom et al., 2010) and their
influence on user impressions of the robot (Groom et al., 2010;
Shiomi et al., 2013; Bajones et al., 2016; Engelhardt and Hansson,
2017; Kwon et al., 2018). Brooks (2017) devised a measurement
scale of people’s reaction to failure called the REACTION scale,
which claims to compare different failure situations based on the
severity of the failures, the context risk involved, and effectiveness
of recovery strategy. Rossi et al. (2017b) found that people,
regardless of age or gender, are fairly consistent in how they rate
the severity of robot errors.
The method of measuring each criterion varied; to assess the
quality of interaction, research teams mainly used custom made
questionnaires with Likert scales and unstructured interviews
with a large variety of different questions (e.g., Kim and
Hinds, 2006; Short et al., 2010; Rosenthal et al., 2012; Desai
et al., 2013; Knepper et al., 2015; Hayes et al., 2016; Robinette
et al., 2016; Kwon et al., 2018; Lucas et al., 2018). The most
common structured and validated questionnaires used include
the Godspeed questionnaire (used in Salem et al., 2015; Bajones
et al., 2016; Engelhardt and Hansson, 2017; Mirnig et al., 2017;
Sarkar et al., 2017) and NASA TLX (used in Desai et al.,
2012, 2013; Hamacher, 2015; Hamacher et al., 2016; Brooks,
2017). Some evaluations were done using video-analysis (Kahn
et al., 2012; Hamacher et al., 2016; Sarkar et al., 2017); looking
at behavioral data (Kahn et al., 2012; Bajones et al., 2016;
Hamacher et al., 2016; Sarkar et al., 2017), verbal statementsmade
during the experiment (Kahn et al., 2012; Bajones et al., 2016;
Hamacher et al., 2016), and the number and type of errors made
(Bajones et al., 2016). About half of the experimental studies
were performed using the Wizard-of-Oz technique (Riek, 2012)
(e.g., Gieselmann, 2006; Groom et al., 2010; Short et al., 2010;
Kahn et al., 2012; Rosenthal et al., 2012; Yasuda and Matsumoto,
2013; Mubin and Bartneck, 2015; Lucas et al., 2018), and half
programmed erroneous behavior to be performed automatically
(e.g., Gehle et al., 2015; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Hamacher,
2015; Hayes et al., 2016). Only a few studied unplanned failures
(e.g., Giuliani et al., 2015; Knepper et al., 2015; Mirnig et al.,
2015).
The number of participants used in each study varied,
however with the exception of Gieselmann (2006), all had
more than 10, which is arguably sufficient to obtain meaningful
results through user studies (Nielson, 2000). Most experiments
were done on Americans (21) and Europeans (18). Few studies
involved non-Western participants (Shiomi et al., 2013; Yasuda
and Matsumoto, 2013; Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Kim
et al., 2017), and only one evaluated cross-cultural differences
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(Rossi et al., 2017a). Participants varied in age, however
most studies were primarily implemented on younger adults.
One study evaluated children (Lemaignan et al., 2015); none
focused on elderly participants above the age of 75. With
the exception of seven studies, the distribution between male
and female participants was relatively equal (more equal than
60–40%). Sixteen (31%) of the studies evaluated participants
with little experience with robots, 2 (3.8%) studies evaluated
experienced participants, and 30 (58%) studies did not state
the participants’ level of experience with robots. Only four
studies (7.7%) evaluated both experienced and inexperienced
participants (Hamacher, 2015; Hamacher et al., 2016; Rossi et al.,
2017a; Lucas et al., 2018).
Robotic Systems
A wide variety of robotic systems are used to study human
centered failure handling. NAO was by far the most commonly
used robot (Gehle et al., 2015; Giuliani et al., 2015; Gompei
and Umemuro, 2015; Mirnig et al., 2015, 2017; Engelhardt and
Hansson, 2017; van der Woerdt and Haselager, 2017; Lucas et al.,
2018), however several other off-the-shelf solutions were used,
including BIRON (Spexard et al., 2008), Kuka youBots (Knepper
et al., 2015), iRobot ATRV-JR (Desai et al., 2012), Robovie-
mR2 (Shiomi et al., 2013), Snackbot (Lee et al., 2010), and
Baxter (Adubor et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2017). Several systems
were custom made for the purpose of the research (Yasuda and
Matsumoto, 2013; Lohan et al., 2014; Lemaignan et al., 2015;
Mubin and Bartneck, 2015). About half of the 52 studies used
humanoid robots [robots that possess some human-like features
(Walters et al., 2008)], and half used mechanoid robots [robots
that are machine-like in appearance (Walters et al., 2008)].
Environment
Experimental evaluations were mostly done indoors, with single-
persons (86%). Only one study evaluated robotic failures in
outdoor environments (Giuliani et al., 2015), and five of the
studies evaluated robotic failures indoors when more than one
person was present (Kim and Hinds, 2006; Rosenthal et al., 2012;
Gehle et al., 2015; Lemaignan et al., 2015; Bajones et al., 2016).
With the exception of Cassenti (2007), which proposed a strategy
for helping users recover from errors after prolonged time in
which no interaction with the robot was made, all of the studies
focused on errors that occurred during interaction with the robot.
A UNIFIED INFORMATION PROCESSING
MODEL FOR USER CENTERED FAILURE
HANDLING
In order to develop interactions that enable untrained users to
easily identify and solve failures, it is critical to consider cognitive
factors that influence the ability to perceive and act upon a
robotic failure. Interacting with a robot in a moment of failure
is inherently an information-processing task—the user must
perceive information from the robot and environment, process
it to identify if an error has occurred, recall what can be done to
fix it or enter a command to obtain additional information, select
and then execute responses based on that information. Thus,
for failure-handling management tools to be easy to use, the
human-robot interface must be designed to meet the information
processing capabilities of users.
There are many theories regarding how people process
information (e.g., McClelland, 1979; Card et al., 1983, 1986;
Miller, 1988; Kieras and Meyer, 1997). One information-
processing model that seems particular relevant is the
Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP)
Model (Wogalter, 2006a), which describes the way people
process warnings. In situations of failure, indicators from the
robot, user and environment can be viewed as warnings of the
robot’s degraded state of ability. The model includes three main
parts: (1) sending the warning, (2) processing it by the receiver,
and (3) acting. The parts are described using nine stages that
must be completed for people to be compliant with a warning.
A bottleneck at any given stage can impede on processing at
subsequent stages, and feedback from later stages and additional
sources (such as environmental and personal attributes of the
receiver) can affect processing in earlier stages.
After reviewing the cognitive considerations that influence
people’s ability to detect and solve robot failures, as well as the
current literature in failure handling in HRIs, we developed an
information processing model called the Robot Failure Human
Information Processing (RF-HIP) Model, modeled after C-HIP
(Wogalter, 2006a), to describe the way people perceive, process,
and act on failures in human robot interactions (Figure 3). By
providing the stages of information processing and factors that
influence them, RF-HIP can be used as a tool to systematize
the assessment process involved in determining why a particular
approach of handling failure is successful or unsuccessful in
order to facilitate better design. The model, which will be used
to guide the presentation of the relevant literature, includes
three main parts: (1) communicating failures, (2) perception
and comprehension of failures, and (3) solving failures. Each
part contains several stages, all heavily influenced by contextual
considerations (the source, task, receiver, environment and other
agents) and mitigation strategies. The model differs from C-
HIP in three primary ways: (1) there is a separate stage for
decision making, (2) it accounts for unplanned failure indicators
(symptoms) and for subconscious behavior, and (3) it highlights
the bilateral relationship between all stages of information
processing, contextual factors and mitigation strategies. The
components of the model are discussed in the following sections.
Source
The source is the transmitter of symptoms indicative of a failure.
The source of failure is typically the robot, however it could
also be the user or other humans in the environment (e.g., in
case of human error or when a person produces behavioral
responses to robot failure). In situations where a symptom is
identified by the source, the source must determine whether it
can handle it on its own by ignoring or eliminating the problem,
or whether it needs to produce a warning of the symptom to
others. If the failure is technical, there are several automatic
methods that can be used to detect the error (e.g., Murphy
and Hershberger, 1999; Canham et al., 2003) and automatically
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FIGURE 3 | The RF-HIP Model.
determine the appropriate recovery method, without involving
human assistance (e.g., Murphy andHershberger, 1999;Mendoza
et al., 2015). Several methods also exist to predict and resolve
human error in HCI that could be applied to robots (e.g., Embrey,
1986; Baber and Stanton, 1994). Sometimes the symptom is itself
a type of warning that is outwardly projected (e.g., the robot’s
wheel falling off), so the receiver perceives it without the source
actively deciding on how to communicate the failure. In such
cases, the source may not always be aware of the symptom (e.g., a
robot may not be aware when it deviates from social norms).
Warnings can be direct or indirect: a direct warning occurs
when the person is directly exposed to the symptom or to
a warning from the source, whereas an indirect warning is
received in other ways (e.g., learning about the problem from a
family member). Various characteristics of the source influence
perceived beliefs, credibility, and relevance of symptoms and
warnings (Wogalter, 2006a).
Communicating Failures
Channel
The channel is the medium and modality which the source uses
to transmit information regarding a failure to receivers. While
some robot failures can be detected through changes in the
robot’s behavior or posture (e.g., Takayama et al., 2011; Kwon
et al., 2018), changes in the robot’s physicality (e.g., a wheel
falling off), or changes in the user’s behavior (see section Act),
other issues (e.g., missing data) produce no obvious symptoms.
Moreover, overt changes in robotic behavior may remain
undetected by users as a result of poor situation awareness,
inexperience with the robot, or lack of supervision (Brooks,
2017). Consequently, various methods have been suggested to
intentionally communicate failures and their causes to users
and bystanders of robotic systems when possible. If the source
identifies a need for a direct warning, it must determine how
the relevant agents should be warned. Depending on the source,
different channels of communication and delivery methods will
be possible.
Visual indicators on robot
Brooks (2017) investigated the use of standardized icons
displayed on the body of a robot as a method of conveying
information about an autonomous robot’s internal system state.
Specifically, they attempted to convey information about whether
the robot is safe to be around and whether it is working
properly using five target messages (ok, help, off, safe, and
dangerous). Results indicated that icons are a viable method
for communicating system state information to untrained
bystanders.
Other types of on-robot visual indicators have also been used
to indicate robotic errors. One approach is using light (or lack
of it)—the Neato robotic vacuum cleaners display an amber light
around the main button when it cannot start cleaning1; Baraka
et al. (2016) used flashing red lights to indicate path obstructions;
and Robinette et al. (2016) turned off the robot’s lights to indicate
inoperability. Another commonmethod is using on-robot screen
displays. In Sarkar et al. (2017), Baxter’s screen showed a sad
smiley face with explanatory text whenever an error was made.
Similarly, Jibo2 (a personal assistant robot) shows an error code
and message on its screen whenever there is an issue3.
The primary advantage of using visual indicators on the robot
to display failure states is that their placement allows the message
to be communicated not only to the robot operator but also to
bystanders without any mediating artifacts. Another advantage
is that insights and design principles from human factors and
HCI literature (e.g., Nielsen, 2001;Wogalter and, 2006c; Egelman
et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2013) could be used as inspiration. There
are, however, disadvantages to using visual indicators on the
robot. For one, visual indicators on the robot can only influence
people who are actively looking and paying attention to the robot.
1“Status Lights,” Neato Robotics (2017). Available online at: https://support.
neatorobotics.com/hc/en-us/articles/225370027-Status-Lights (Accessed
December 14, 2017).
2“Hey! I’m Jibo.” Available online at: https://www.jibo.com/. [Accessed: 14-Dec-
2017].
3“Jibo - Error messages.” Available online at: https://support.jibo.com/jibo/
articles/en_US/FAQ/error-messages. [Accessed: 14-Dec-2017].
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861120
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
Remote operators and people performing multiple tasks may
not notice the indicators in time to act upon them, which is
particularly important in failure situations. Second, the message
could at times be occluded, depending on the robot’s speed and
posture relative to the human observer. Third, icons and status
lights can effectively convey only simple messaging that represent
distinct alternative states of the robot. Screens on the robot can
communicatemore complex information, however it requires the
user to physically come close to the robot, which may not always
be safe for certain types of failure. Lastly, the public nature of
such indicators may not always be socially appropriate—people
may feel uncomfortable having others know about certain errors
taking place. For example, a robot unable to track the users’ legs
because they are too wide or narrow relative to its expectations
may cause embarrassment.
Secondary screens
Another method of communicating a robot’s failure state is by
using a secondary screen (such as a smartphone) to provide
additional information about the robot. This strategy is one of the
most popular in today’s commercial robots (e.g., Kuri4, iRobot
Home Robots5, Neato Robotics6) and has several advantages:
(1) it enables users to interact with the robot using familiar
methods of interaction, (2) complex information can be more
easily conveyed on-screen, and (3) status information can be
accessed remotely and covertly. The main disadvantage of this
method is that it inherently shifts the user’s eyes and attention
away from the robot and from the tasks they are performing,
which hinders situation-awareness and could be dangerous in
threatening situations. Cassenti (2007) proposed presenting a
video replay strategy using a secondary screen to quickly provide
situation awareness after prolonged times of robot neglect.
Audio and speech
Our ability to localize acoustic sources and apply selective
attention to one acoustic stream out of many, even at a
distance, makes the audio modality popular for communicating
failures. As such, many mobile robots use audio and speech
to communicate robotic failures. Some use simple audio tones
to gather user attention (e.g., Brooks, 2017), whereas others
communicate failure using more complicated speech, such as
Jibo2 and the robot in Schütte et al. (2017). Cha et al. (2015)
found that people perceived robots speaking conversationally as
more capable than those that could only maintain a functional
level of speech. However, this changed when the robot made
an error—after an error, robots with conversational speech were
perceived as less capable than those with functional speech.
This effect is similar to equivalent research in HCI (Weinstock
et al., 2012) that found that when a visually aesthetic user
interface errors, the error lowers perceptions of satisfaction,
human automation cooperation and trust more than when a non-
visually aesthetic interface errors. Several researchers suggest to
4Life with Kuri (2017). Available online at: https://www.heykuri.com/living-with-
a-personal-robot (Accessed December 13, 2017)
5iRobot Home Robots (2018). Available online at: http://www.irobot.com/
(Accessed January 06, 2018).
6Neato Robotics. Available online at: https://www.neatorobotics.com/ (Accessed
January 01, 2018).
use verbal communication cautiously since dialogue can lead to
biased perceptions of the robot’s capabilities (Fong et al., 2003;
Cha et al., 2015). Simpler audio signals can be used to signal the
existance of a problem, however, they cannot effectively explain
the cause of error.
Modality comparisons
Very few studies assessed the benefits of different modalities for
communicating failures in HRIs. Cha et al. (2016) evaluated a
robot which utilized both light and sound of varying levels of
urgency to request help from bystanders when it experienced
difficulty. Results indicated that participants interpreted light
and sound signals differently: sound alerted the user that the
robot needed help and the light indicated the level of urgency
of the help request. Moreover, participants preferred a more
attention-grabbing signal when the urgency of the request
was high, and when the urgency of the request was lower,
they preferred the robot to take into account the participant’s
level of availability by utilizing greetings and being more
polite.
Brooks (2017) compared between a designated smartphone
application and a light-and-button based interface in their ability
to help inexperienced users better detect and solve failures while
performing a secondary task. Unlike the previous example, which
used an indicator to help users detect robot requests, this example
focused also on its ability to help users solve errors. Results
indicated that participants were able to obtain information about
the robots, identify solutions to problems and allocate their time
more appropriately using the app.
Further studies from the warning literature provide insight
regarding how to create comprehensible warnings. Warnings
presented in more than one modality generally facilitate better
comprehension than those presented in a single modality
(Wogalter, 2006a). While there is conflicting evidence of whether
written text or speech are better for comprehending language-
based warnings (Mayer, 2002; Wogalter, 2006b), reading
language allows people to review the material and tends to
be faster, so it may be more appropriate for long or complex
messages. In contrast, shorter, less complex messages have a
greater impact when presented auditorily than visually, and
are generally better for switching attention (Wogalter, 2006a).
A short auditory warning that directs the users’ attention to
more detailed information could be used to capture attention
while facilitating the processing of more complex information
(Wogalter, 2006a).
Perception and Comprehension of Failures
Attention Switch and Maintenance
For a failure event to influence user behavior, attention must be
switched to it for the user to perceive the information (Wogalter,
2006a). Moreover, attention must be maintained by users to
perform desired behaviors properly and avoid certain types of
human errors, such as slips (Reason, 1990). The conditions
under which a person shifts their attention can be used to
guide the design of robotic failure indicators. Sudden changes in
the environment [e.g., change in luminance (Theeuwes, 1995),
motion onset (Abrams and Christ, 2003), and abrupt appearance
or disappearance of stimuli (Pratt and McAuliffe, 2001)] or the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861121
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
robot’s behavior (Okada et al., 2003; Sato et al., 2007) could
be used to quickly and involuntarily shift people’s attention to
urgent failure situations or to cue users to attend to information
elsewhere. These involuntary shifts of attention tend to be brief
(Buschman and Miller, 2010), and are dependent upon users’
expectations (Posner et al., 1978; Folk et al., 1992). In contrast,
long term exposure to a warning could make it unable to
attract attention at later times (“inhibition of return”; Posner and
Cohen, 1984; Klein, 2000), so the use of permanent cues must be
considered carefully.
Voluntary shifts of attention can be sustained for longer
periods of time (Welsh et al., 2009) and can result from a wider
variety of stimuli (Sears and Jacko, 2009), allowing more freedom
in the design of failure indicators. Various factors affect people’s
ability to identify and attend to a specific stimulus, including
the degree of similarity to other items in the environment (von
Grünau et al., 1994; Gorbunova, 2017), interest (Renninger and
Wozniak, 1985), temporal and physical location of warnings
(Frantz and Rhoades, 1993; Wogalter et al., 1995), the task
(Welsh et al., 2009), age (Yamaguchi et al., 1995), and practice
(Feinstein et al., 1994). This emphasizes the importance of taking
contextual factors into consideration when designing warnings
for failure. Fischer et al. (2014) found that verbal greetings
attracted attention better than simpler audio signals, but they did
not improve the likelihood of the person to perform the robot’s
request.
The design of a warning should be guided by the response
required from the user (stimuli-response compatibility; Sears and
Jacko, 2009). For example, reaction time is lower when people
are asked to respond vocally to an auditory stimulus or with
motion to a spatial attribute (Wang and Proctor, 1996). Spatial
correspondence (Fitts and Seeger, 1953; Fitts and Deininger,
1954; Reeve and Proctor, 1990), similarity (Kornblum et al.,
1990), and logical relations (rules) (Duncan, 1978) between the
stimulus and response sets have all been shown to improve
stimulus-response compatibility. Since it is not always clear in
which circumstances compatibility effects are going to occur
(Proctor and Vu, 2009), designers need to repeatedly test
warnings on users, particularly for urgent failures.
A robot’s warning can be noticed yet fail to maintain attention
long enough for the user to extract meaning from it (Wogalter,
2006a). The required duration of attention maintenance has
been shown to rely on the channel of communication as well as
on the complexity and form of the content (Wogalter, 2006a).
Generally speaking, if a warning contains too much information,
is too hard to read, or the relevance of the information is
low or unclear, people may decide it is too much effort,
lose interest and direct their attention elsewhere (Wogalter,
2006a). Moreover, as felt involvement with product information
increases, consumers have been shown to spend more time
attending to the information (Celsi and Olson, 1988). Combining
pictures with written or spoken text has been shown to increase
attention to information in comparison to text alone (Houts et al.,
2006). Visual warnings with organized information groupings
and generous white space are more likely to hold attention
than a single block of text (Wogalter and Vigilante, 2006). The
use of humor has also been shown as an effective way to gain
and maintain attention (Weinberger and Gulas, 1992). These
strategies could be used in the design of warnings to promote
compliance.
Comprehension and Memory
Users must be able to understand the meaning of a failing robot’s
symptoms or the warning it provides to understand what the
failure is and how to react. During the comprehension process,
incoming perceptual inputs that have passed attentional filters
are connected to past experiences or knowledge to construct an
understanding of the event (Harris et al., 2006). This continuing
interaction of comprehension and memory is important to
understanding what may influence a person’s ability to relate
erroneous behavior to “normal” robotic behavior, to comprehend
the meaning of a failure indicator and to resolve robotic failures.
Characteristics of memory have several implications for
robotic failure situations. While people can remember large
amounts of information over their lifetime, only a small portion
is available to them at any given time for processing (Bettman,
1979; Lang, 2000). As a result, memories and knowledge may not
become available without an external cue (Wogalter, 2006a), and
those that are readily available may quickly become unavailable
due to interference or decay (Proctor and Vu, 2009). This
emphasizes the importance of considering external factors, such
as user tasks and bystanders, and of providing informative cues
to help the user recall and resolve a failure.
In failure-handling situations, recall and comprehension of
relevant information (warnings, robotic commands, and possible
solutions) could be made easier by exploring influential factors.
Studies indicate that it is easier to recall information that is
visual (Paivio and Csapo, 1973), concrete (Butter, 1970; Sheehan
and Antrobus, 1972), repeated (Kintsch et al., 1975), specific
(Mani and Johnson-Laird, 1982), personal (Van Lancker, 1991),
novel (Kishiyama and Yonelinas, 2003), typical (Reeve and
Aggleton, 1998), humorous (Schmidt, 1994; Summerfelt et al.,
2010; Carlson, 2011) and self-generated (Wheeler and Gabbert,
2017). The likelihood a retrieval cue leads to recollection depends
on the similarity between the features encoded initially and those
provided by the retrieval cue, distinguishability from other cues,
and associationwith the newly learned information (Wheeler and
Gabbert, 2017). Storing information to memory seems to depend
on deep processing of the meaning of new material, determined
by the degree to which one understands the information to
form meaningful associations and elaborations with existing
knowledge (Bower, 2000), as well as on arousal (Butter, 1970)
and individual differences (Verhaeghen andMarcoen, 1996) [e.g.,
age (Anderson et al., 2000), mood (Bower et al., 1978)]. Various
techniques have been developed to improve recall and storage
from and to memory (e.g., Bower, 1970a,b; Ritchie and Karge,
1996; Gobet et al., 2001). Such techniques could be used by robot
designers to help select appropriate cues that help users recall
information that is relevant to the failure.
Comprehension has been shown to be influenced by
background knowledge (Tannenbaum et al., 2006), wording
(Kintsch et al., 1975), typographic design (Frase and Schwartz,
1979), personality (Sadeghi et al., 2012), felt involvement (Celsi
and Olson, 1988), motivation (Sideridis et al., 2006), expectations
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(Haberlandt, 1982), training (Dewitz et al., 1987), experience
(Macias, 2003), level of automation (Carmody and Gluckman,
1993), interface design (Canham and Hegarty, 2010), workload
(Perry et al., 2008) and stress level (Perry et al., 2008). One
common way to classify a person’s level of comprehension is
by evaluating their Situation Awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1988).
Drury et al. (2003) defined components of situation awareness
that are relevant to HRI: (1) awareness of the locations, identities,
activities, states, and surroundings of the robot and fellow human
collaborators, (2) awareness of the robot’s knowledge of the
human’s commands and any human constraints, (3) awareness
of the knowledge that the robots have of the activities and plans
of other robots, and (4) awareness of the overall goals of the
joint human-robot activities and progress toward the goal. They
then related these types of awareness to critical incidents at
an urban search and rescue competition in which the operator
or robot encountered a problem, and found that all critical
incidents resulted from awareness violations (Drury et al., 2003).
Techniques that improve situation awareness could be used by
robot designers to help prevent various types of failures.
Beliefs and Attitudes
At this stage of processing, the comprehended information
merges with existing beliefs and attitudes. A mental model
can be a useful concept for understanding this process. As
the user interacts with the robot, they receive feedback from
the system and the environment that allows them to develop
a representation (a mental model) of how they believe the
system behaves for a given task. These representations lead
to expectations, which in turn direct perception and behavior
(Stanton, 2009). Studies in the field of HCI found that users
infer models that are consistent with their experiences, even
when there is lack of evidence that supports their assumptions
(Payne, 2009). Moreover, instead of developing unified models,
they develop separate beliefs about parts of the system, processes,
or behaviors that are not necessarily complementary (Payne,
1991). While incorrect mental models can lead to difficulties
in problem solving, the use of appropriate mental models can
help people learn, remember and execute procedures faster
(Kieras and Bovair, 1984). Mental models can also explain
human errors: if action is directed by mental models, then the
selection of inappropriate models or erroneous activation of
appropriate models will lead to errors (Norman, 1981). Designers
can increase the usability of a robotic interface for handling
failures using metaphors that promote the use of applicable
mental models and by correcting inappropriate mental models
through feedback.
In the HRI literature, mistakes made by robots influence
how the robot is perceived. Failures reduce robots’ perceived
sincerity (Gompei and Umemuro, 2015), competence (Cha
et al., 2015; Salem et al., 2015; Ragni et al., 2016), reliability
(Salem et al., 2015; Ragni et al., 2016), understandability (Salem
et al., 2015), trustworthiness (De Visser and Parasuraman,
2011; Desai et al., 2013; Salem et al., 2015; Law et al., 2017),
intelligence (Takayama et al., 2011; Bajones et al., 2016; Ragni
et al., 2016), and likeability (Bajones et al., 2016; Mirnig
et al., 2017), and increase perceived familiarity (Gompei and
Umemuro, 2015). In Kahn et al. (2012), participants who
interacted with a humanoid robot that incorrectly assessed
their performance perceived the robot as having emotional and
social attributes. Research is inconclusive regarding the effect
of failures on the robot’s perceived anthropomorphism. Salem
et al. (2013) found that errors made robots seem more human,
whereas Salem et al. (2015) found that it made robots seem
less human. Mirnig et al. (2017), in contrast, did not find
differences in people’s ratings of the robot’s anthropomorphism
and perceived intelligence. These differences may be a result of
the different robots used, or the different interaction contexts
(task, environment).
User perceptions of the robot in a failure situation seem to
be influenced by a number of factors. In contrast to Salem et al.
(2015), which found that failure reduced perceived reliability,
technical competence, understandability, and trustworthiness of
a home-care assistant robot, the manufacturing robot in Sarkar
et al. (2017) was perceived in a similar manner regardless whether
it was faulty or not. According to Sarkar et al. (2017), these
differences may stem from the type of failures (Sarkar et al.,
2017 involved subtle interaction failures, whereas Salem et al.,
2015 produced physical failures with potentially irreversible
consequences), or the nature of the experimental task (the
industrial context in Sarkar et al., 2017 compared to a more
“social” setting in Salem et al., 2015). Rossi et al. (2017a)
found that errors with severe consequences lead to greater loss
of trust in the robot. Furthermore, user perceptions of the
robot in a failure situation may depend on attribution of the
cause of failure—in an online survey (van der Woerdt and
Haselager, 2017), participants were shown a video portraying
a NAO robot failing a task either due to lack of ability or
lack of effort. In case of failure, participants attributed more
agency to the robot that displayed lack of effort compared to
videos in which it displayed lack of ability. The timing of failure
also seems to influence how the failure affects perceptions of
the robot. Gompei and Umemuro (2015) investigated the effect
of a failure’s timing: when the robot made speech errors on
the first day of contact, the robot’s familiarity score did not
change; when the robot made its first speech error on the
second day of contact, the robots’ familiarity score moderately
improved as a result of the error. Similarly, Lucas et al. (2017,
2018) found that errors that occur later in a robot’s dialogue,
particularly after a period of good performance, reduce the
robot’s persuasiveness.
While robotic failures have been shown to reduce the
perceived trustworthiness of robots (De Visser and Parasuraman,
2011; Hancock et al., 2011; Desai et al., 2013; Salem et al., 2015;
Law et al., 2017), users’ compliance with robot instructions may
not be affected. Robinette et al. (2016, 2017) evaluated whether
people will trust and follow the directions of a faulty robot
in emergency evacuee scenarios. Results showed that the vast
majority of participants followed the instructions of the robot
despite erraneous behaviors. In line with this finding, Salem
et al. (2015) found that while the robot’s erratic behavior affected
its perceived reliability and trustworthiness, it did not impact
participants’ willingness to comply with its instructions, even
when the requests were unusual. Severity of the outcome affected
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compliance with robot requests (Salem et al., 2015). Similar
effects were found by Tokushige et al. (2017) as a result of
unexpected recommendations.
While there are some indicators that people may prefer
predictable behavior in robots (Mubin and Bartneck, 2015),
others suggest that people feel more engaged by unpredictable
behavior (Short et al., 2010; Fink et al., 2012; Lemaignan
et al., 2015; Law et al., 2017). Various studies seem to suggest
that failures can be a source of pleasurable interaction with
robots (Bainbridge et al., 2008; Yasuda and Matsumoto, 2013;
Gompei and Umemuro, 2015; Ragni et al., 2016; Mirnig
et al., 2017). In a study by Ragni et al. (2016) despite the
faulty robot being rated worse than the error-free robot,
participants reported greater enjoyment when the robot made
errors. Similarly, Mirnig et al. (2017) found that participants
liked faulty robots better than robots that interacted flawlessly.
Annotations of video data showed that gaze shifts, smiling and
laughter are typical reactions to unexpected robot behavior.
While these studies provide insight regarding reactions to
robotic failures, the non-criticality of the errors coupled with
low personal relevance to the participants may have impacted
results.
Desai et al. (2013) investigated the influence of varying
reliability on real-time trust and found that periods of low
reliability earlier during the interaction have a more negative
impact on overall trust than periods of low reliability later in
the interaction. In contrast, a preliminary study by Desai et al.
(2012) found that people trust a robot less when reliability drops
occurred late or in the middle of runs. Within the broader
human-automation literature there is certain agreement that
trust depends on the timing, consequence, and expectations
associated with failures of the automation (Lee and See,
2004).
Solving Failures
Motivation
Solving a robotic failure requires the user to be motivated to
solve the problem. Even if the users are not capable of solving
the failure themselves, they need to be motivated enough to
inform other agents of the problem (such as a caregiver or a
technician) in order for it to be addressed. While some problems
may significantly impact users, motivating them implicitly, other
failures may not be sufficient to motivate them enough to solve
the problem, particularly if the interface is hard to understand
or operate. Thus, creating successful failure-handling solutions
requires skills in motivating and persuading people. Captology,
the study of persuasive technologies is a relatively new endeavor
in HRI (see Siegel, 2008; Ham and Spahn, 2015). Research has
explored effect of a robot’s physical presence (Kidd and Breazeal,
2004; Shinozawa et al., 2005; Bainbridge et al., 2008), touch and
gesture (Shiomi et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2011; Nakagawa et al.,
2011; Chidambaram et al., 2012; Baroni et al., 2014), gazing
(Ham et al., 2011), robot and user gender (Siegel, 2008; Nakagawa
et al., 2011), vocal cues (Chidambaram et al., 2012; Baroni et al.,
2014), interpersonal distance (Siegel, 2008), reciprocity (Lee and
Liang, 2016), conversational errors (Lucas et al., 2018), agency
(Ham andMidden, 2011), and perceived autonomy (Siegel, 2008)
on persuasive effects. However, none of these studies focused
specifically on the influence of motivation in solving robotic
failures.
Robots are sometimes viewed as tools, and other times viewed
more as social actors (Breazeal, 2004). According to Fogg et al.
(2009), there is a difference in how computers can be used
to persuade, depending on whether they are viewed as a tool
or social actor. Computers as tools can persuade by providing
tailored information, triggering decision making, increasing self-
efficacy, and guiding people through a process. In contrast,
computers as social actors can persuade people by providing
social support via praise or criticism, modeling behaviors or
attitudes, and leveraging social rules (e.g., turn taking, politeness
norms, praise and reciprocity).
Decision-Making
Once individuals have perceived the failure symptoms and/or
warnings, comprehended them, formed beliefs and attitudes
regarding the situation, and gained enough motivation to solve
the issues, they must decide what can be done to solve the failure.
Most problems are well beyond the capacity of comprehension
to be solved optimally. Reaction time typically increases with
the number of stimulus-response alternatives (the Hick-Hyman
law; Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953). Consequently, for problem
solving to be effective in a robotic failure situation, search must
be constrained to a limited number of possible solutions or
approaches (Proctor and Vu, 2009).
A common way novice users constrain search in situations of
uncertainty is to use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Research demonstrates that our judgements are based on the
subset of relevant information most accessible in memory, and
that we rarely retrieve all relevant information (Bodenhausen
and Wyer, 1987; Schwarz, 1998). One particularly common
strategy is “satisficing” (Simon, 1956), which refers to searching
through available alternatives and choosing the first that meets
some minimum acceptable threshold. Some other examples
include (but are not limited to) representativeness (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973), availability (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973), and adjustment (Epley and Gilovich, 2006) heuristics. The
problem with using heuristics is that they often lead to cognitive
biases, which influence the quality of the decision. Many biases
in human decision making have been discovered (Croskerry,
2003) [e.g., the framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), and overconfidence effect
(Dunning et al., 1990)]. Consequently, people generally make
nonoptimal decisions.
Various efforts have been made to improve and debias
decision making, which could be implemented to better
support users during robotic failure situations. Three general
approaches have been suggested and shown to produce
positive results (Morewedge et al., 2015): (1) recalibrating
incentives to reward healthy behavior, (2) optimizing how
choice options are presented and obtained, and (3) debiasing
training interventions. Small changes in presentation and
elicitation of choices are particularly effective, cheap and
easy to implement, taking many forms such as information
framing (Levin and Gaeth, 1988; Larrick and Soll, 2008)
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and default selection (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Chapman
et al., 2010). These recommendations, alongside additional
strategies (e.g., Croskerry, 2003), could be used to help
facilitate the design of failure-management interfaces for
robots to improve the problem-solving abilities of untrained
users.
Act
This stage of processing refers to both the execution of the
person’s decision regarding how to respond to the robotic
failure, as well as automatic behaviors that are triggered without
maintaining attention. People seem to have various predictable
behavioral responses to robotic failures that can be used by
robots to identify when a failure has occurred. Failure has been
shown to influence users’ gaze patterns (Gehle et al., 2015; Hayes
et al., 2016; Mirnig et al., 2017), facial expressions (Hayes et al.,
2016; Mirnig et al., 2017), head movements (Hayes et al., 2016;
Mirnig et al., 2017; Trung et al., 2017), body movements (Mirnig
et al., 2017; Trung et al., 2017), and verbal communication
(Gieselmann, 2006; Giuliani et al., 2015). Gieselmann (2006)
found that indicators for errors in human-robot conversation
included sudden changes of the current dialogue topic, indicating
non-understanding by asking unspecific questions, asking for
additional information and repeating the previous question.
Additional indicators used to detect errors in spoken human-
robot dialogues include people being silent, asking for help,
repeating central elements or asking the robot repeatedly for
the same information, saying things that are inconsistent with
the current discourse or with the robot’s expectations, trying
to correct a preceeding utterance, hyperarticulating speech, or
asking for something they know the robot cannot do, such as
making coffee (Gieselmann and Ostendorf, 2007).
Giuliani et al. (2015) and Mirnig et al. (2015) analyzed video
data showing social HRIs in which the robot unintentionally
made an error. Results indicated that in erraneous situations,
participants often used head movements, smiled, raised
eyebrows, and looked back and forth between the robot and
experimenter or a group member if present. Moreover, the type
of error (social norm violation or technical failure) as well as the
presence of other people seemed to impact people’s reactions
to the failure. More specifically, during social norm violations,
participants spoke more, were more likely to look back and
forth between the robot and objects in front of them and say
task-related sentences to the robot than during technical failures.
When no experimenter or person was visible, participants used
fewer non-verbal social signals (e.g., smiling, nodding, and head
shaking), and more often shifted their gaze between the robot’s
hand, the robot’s head, and other objects in front of them than
when the experimenter was visible, or when interacting in groups
with the robot. The presence and response speed of these social
signals were dependent on the type of error made and the type of
task the robot was performing.
There is also reason to believe that the modality of
the failure influences people’s reactions. Short et al. (2010)
investigated people’s reactions to playing rock–paper–scissors
with a humanoid robot that either played fair, cheated through
action by changing the selected hand gesture or cheated verbally
by declaring a different hand gesture than the one used.
Results indicated that participants showed more verbal social
signals to the robot that cheated. Interestingly, verbal cheating
was perceived as malfunctions, often leading to reactions of
confusion, whereas cheating through action was perceived as
deliberate cheating, leading to more exaggerated reactions,
showing surprise, amusement, and occasionally anger.
Contextual Factors
Receiver
The receiver is the person(s) or target audience whom witness
the warning or symptom, typically the user. Personal attributes
of robot users have been shown to affect all stages of
information processing, and in turn, the stage of information
processing influences the users’ experiences and behaviors.
Contributing factors surveyed include the user’s attitudes and
beliefs, interest, practice and training, experience, background
knowledge, workload, stress level, situation awareness, mental
model, and gender.
Environment and Other Agents
External stimuli from the environment compete for the
receiver’s limited attention and comprehension resources,
limiting information processing. For instance, a friend saying
“Hi” when the robot is trying to indicate that the motors stopped
working could prevent the user from attending to a visual
warning. A noisy environment may cause the user not to hear
the robot’s low battery beep, or not to be able to concentrate
enough to lead it back to its charger. In some cases, this could
be an advantage: social norm violations, for instance, could be
missed and therefore not negatively influence the interaction. The
individual may act on the environment and change it, so there is
a bilateral relationship between the environment and the stages
of information processing. In situations where the user does not
have the know-how, ability or the tools to fix the problem, the
involvement of other agents may be necessary to solve the failure.
Task
Task refers to attributes of either the robot’s task, the person’s
task, or a joint task to be completed together. From the literature,
it is evident that the task a person is performing can compete
for their limited attention and comprehension resources and
by doing so, impact the stages of information processing. In
turn, cognitive resources devoted to the failure have an impact
on the task: an increase in automation during failure condition
reduces operator performance (the “lumberjack analogy”; Sebok
and Wickens, 2017). Several studies seem to indicate that task
performance is significantly influenced by robotic failures. In
Ragni et al. (2016), participants competed against a robot in
reasoning and memory tasks where the robot either performed
with or without errors. Results indicated that task performance
was significantly lower in the faulty robot condition. Similarly,
in Desai et al. (2012), drops in reliability were shown to
affect participants’ self-assessments of performance. Salem et al.
(2013) evaluated whether participants who were presented with
incongruent multimodal instructions by the robot performed
worse at their task than those who were presented with unimodal
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or congruent multimodal information by the robot and found
that incongruent coverbal gesturing reduced task performance.
One contrasting account is the manufacturing scenario described
in Sarkar et al. (2017), where a physical object was assembled
and then disassembled under regular and error conditions. In
this scenario, faults did not affect the successful completion of a
manufacturing task. The authors proposed that these results may
be because the types of failures they implemented (missing an
action and/or giving the wrong instructions) did not impede the
possibility of a successful manufacturing outcome.
Mitigation Strategies
Various mitigation strategies can be attempted both by the user
and robot in order to prevent and handle the negative influences
of failure. Mitigation strategies could be applied in any stage
of information processing. The stage of processing, in turn,
affects the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy applied. The
following sections discuss the various strategies that have been
implemented to mitigate the negative effects of failure in HRI.
Setting Expectations
Giving the user advance notice regarding potential failures
influences how they respond to subsequent failures. This is
consistent with studies that found that robotic errors have a
stronger negative effect after a period of good performance (Lucas
et al., 2018). One online study by Lee et al. (2010) found that
setting expectations by forewarning participants of the abilities of
the robot improved evaluations of the robot and judgments of the
quality of the service. Providing options helped increase people’s
willingness to use the robotic service again after failure, however
was not particularly effective in improving perceptions of the
robot (Lee et al., 2010). Additional studies found that providing
confidence feedback on the robot’s performance encourages
better control allocation without affecting user trust (Desai et al.,
2013; Kaniarasu et al., 2013).
Communicating Properly
Several researchers have evaluated the impact of politeness
strategies, such as apologizing (Lee et al., 2010; Peltason
and Wrede, 2011) or expressing regret (Hamacher, 2015), on
human-robot error interactions. When robots employ these
strategies, perceptions of robots and responses to disagreement
are improved (Takayama et al., 2009; Torrey, 2009). In Hamacher
et al. (2016) apologizing, expressing regret and expressing
reparation lead to similar trust ratings as a non-failing robot.
Various repair strategies have been used to help robots
gracefully recover from verbal misunderstandings and speech
errors (Gieselmann, 2006). Achievement strategies involve
explaining the meaning of an utterance, e.g., paraphrasing,
restructuring the sentence, repetition, and asking for help.
Functional reduction strategies involve replacing the original
intention by a different, simpler one, for instance, telling the
robot to go to the kitchen instead of telling it to pick up the
cup in the kitchen. Formal reduction strategies involve simplifying
the grammar or the vocabulary used, and ratification involves
confirming or repeating the last utterancemade (e.g., “yes, I asked
you to press the green button”). Gieselmann (2006) evaluated the
use of these strategies in a domestic HRI scenario, and found that
the most common error recovery strategies were achievement
strategies and functional reduction strategies.
There is little research evaluating what information should be
communicated to help users cope with robotic failure situations.
One research study (Cameron et al., 2016a) proposed a method
to evaluate whether a robot should respond to an error with
(1) simple instructions for the user to follow (e.g., “Follow
me back to the lift”); (2) competency-oriented statements that
emphasize the robot’s abilities, the current situation, and goal
(e.g., “That sign said we are on C floor and we need to go to
B floor. Follow me back to the lift”); (3) inclusion of apology-
oriented statements that emphasize attempts to relate to users
but do not indicate competency (e.g., “Sorry about the error;
we all make mistakes sometimes. Follow me back to the lift”);
or (4) inclusion of both the competency- and apology-oriented
statements. However, to the best of our knowledge, the results
of this experiment have yet to be published. Other studies
proposed communicating the cause of error with varying degrees
of success. One experiment found that having the robot place
blame for a failure reduced user trust (Kaniarasu and Steinfeld,
2014). Another study found that attributing blame to the user
led people to feel less comfortable with the robot, perceiving
it as less friendly and competent, even when the person was
likely aware that they were the source of problem (Groom et al.,
2010). Kim and Hinds (2006) found that providing the cause
of failure could facilitate more accurate blame-attribution as
long as the robots’ explanation correlated to the background
knowledge of participants. If not, providing the cause decreased
people’s perceived understanding of the system. Kwon et al.
(2018) proposed expressing physical limitations throughmotions
that communicate what the robot attempted to accomplish and
why it was unable to accomplish it. The use of these motions
was found to increase positive evaluations of the robot and
willingness to collaborate.
It also seems to be important for the robot to produce
appropriate verbal and non-verbal responses to an error.
One study evaluated how a robot’s gaze behavior (no gaze,
looking at the other, looking down, and looking away) during
mistakes change people’s impressions (Shiomi et al., 2013).
Experimental results showed that “looking at the other”
outperformed different gaze behaviors, communicating degrees
of perceived apologetics and friendliness and providing more
reflection. Takayama et al. (2011) found that showing a goal-
oriented reaction to a task outcome (i.e., disappointment in
response to failure and happiness in response to success)
made the robot appear smarter than when it did not react,
regardless of whether the robot succeeded or failed in the task.
Hamacher et al. (2016) found that demonstrating appropriate
emotions and awareness of error (e.g., regret or enthusiasm)
significantly tempers dissatisfaction with a robot’s erroneous
behavior and improves trust. Gieselmann (2006) evaluated
user reactions to different robot error indicators and found
that people preferred the robot asking a specific question
to obtain additional information when it didn’t understand
their utterance. Indicating non-understanding with unspecific
questions left users confused, since they did not know what the
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robot did not understand, hindering their ability to solve the
error.
Asking for Help
Several researchers proposed having robots request help from a
human partner when they encounter an error (Ross et al., 2004;
Hüttenrauch and Severinson-Eklundh, 2006; Rosenthal et al.,
2012; Yasuda andMatsumoto, 2013; Knepper et al., 2015; Bajones
et al., 2016). This strategy is computationally less expensive
than re-planning, however it is not always applicable (e.g., when
the people around do not have the ability or knowledge to
help the robot solve the problem). In situations where it is
applicable, asking for help can lead to negative experiences
(e.g., Mutlu and Forlizzi, 2008) and can be very expensive in
terms of monitoring time and cognitive load (Rosenthal et al.,
2012). In such cases, it seems the way the robot asks for help
matters. Knepper et al. (2015) developed a system that allows
a robot to specify the kind of help that is needed in a way
that removes as much ambiguity as possible. Users reported
that they felt the system was more effective at communicating
needs than other tested methods; preferring the precise requests
over general phrasings. Moreover, the system improved the
subjective evaluation of the robot and the speed and accuracy
of human intervention when the robot experienced a problem.
Maintaining polite communication also seems to matter: Yasuda
andMatsumoto (2013) experimented with a robotic trashcan that
spilled garbage, asked a person to pick up the trash for it and
then “bowed” in appreciation. Most people found the experience
to be positive, despite the spilled garbage and request for help.
Another study found that participants who saw the robot stating
its limitations before asking for help reported liking the robot
more than those who saw control statements (Cameron et al.,
2016b).
Rosenthal et al. (2012) sought to understand the willingness
and availability of occupants to help a service robot. In their
study, a robot visited different offices at different times of day,
with different types of requests, and recorded willingness to
provide help and the duration of that help. Participants were
equally willing to help with all types of requests. Interestingly,
willingness to help was not affected by the length of time
the question took to answer nor the incentives the occupants
received. In a related study, Srinivasan and Takayama (2016)
evaluated factors that influence people’s behavioral willingness
to help a robot, finding that it depends on the robot’s social
role (peer or assistant), familiarity (new vs. 10 years experience),
level of autonomy (autonomous or teleoperated), politeness
strategy (direct request, positive politeness, negative politeness,
or indirect request), and size of request (small or large). More
specifically, people were more willing to help a peer robot that
made smaller requests (i.e. that require less effort to fulfill), was
more familiar, and used a positive politeness strategy (attended
to the listener’s wants, conveyed liking, and made the listener
feel good about themselves). Moreover, Participants were nearly
50% quicker to help the robot when they believed that it was
behaving autonomously rather than being teleoperated by a
person.
The aforementioned work largely deals with preventing
failures related to limited capabilities or missing information
by proactively requesting help. However, some failures cannot
be foreseen in advance and may not be included in the robot’s
planner (i.e., Black Swans; Sebok and Wickens, 2017). Bajones
et al. (2016) performed a multi-user Wizard-of-Oz experiment
in which they asked participants to help a malfunctioning robot
restore the interaction flow after an error occurred. Results
indicated that all 38 participants were willing to help the robot
with repeated failure situations, regardless of the role they were
given in the interaction (“director” or “builder”). Moreover, they
found that the personwho gave the last commandwasmore likely
to help, followed by the person who was closer. Malfunctions
that could be actively fixed by the participants did not
negatively impact perceived intelligence and likability ratings of
the robot.
Mix and Match
Researchers have combined mitigation strategies in order to
increase their effect. Spexard et al. (2008) implemented a model
that decided on the best strategy based on the initiative taker and
the solution provider of an error. Hardware defects caused the
robot to inform the user of the reason why it could not move and
ask for help, mode confusion or the robot behaving unexpectedly
caused it to prompt the user to reset the system, software failures
caused the robot to inform the user about the break-down,
asking them to contact a technician. Using these help strategies,
all participants successfully coped with the problem without
external help.
There is very little work on comparing different failure
recovery strategies. One exception is Lee et al. (2010), which
investigated people’s reactions to different recovery methods
(apologies, compensation, and options for the user) in an online
survey. All the recovery strategies increased positive ratings of
the robot’s politeness, however, only the apology strategy was
effective in making the robot seem more competent, and in
making the participants feel closer to the robot and liking it
more. The compensation strategy wasmost effective in increasing
perception of satisfaction with the service, but less effective
than the apology and option strategies in increasing their
perceived willingness to use the service again. The results also
suggest that tailoring the recovery strategy to people’s orientation
to services is important—people with a relational orientation
responded particularly well to an apology whereas those with a
more utilitarian orientation responded better to compensation.
Moreover, apologies were shown to be better for people who
treated the robot more like an agent, while compensation was
better for people who treating it like a tool. Another study that
investigated different failure recovery strategies is Engelhardt and
Hansson (2017), which compared between: “ignore” (the robot
ignores that a failure has occurred and moves on with the task),
“apology” (the robot apologizes for failing and moves on) and
“problem solving” (the robot tries to solve the problem with the
help of the human). Results showed that the apology strategy
scored the lowest on likeability and perceived intelligence, and
that the ignore strategy lead to better perceptions of perceived
intelligence and animacy. Problem-solving clearly minimized
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the negative effects of failure better than apologizing, but the
“ignore” condition often scored at least as well as problem-
solving.
Several theories have been suggested to explain successful
mitigation strategies. According to Booth (1991), whether system
errors are helpful or disruptive depends on (i) the ease with
which the user can recover from an error; and (ii) the extent
to which the system provides cues or features that productively
direct the user toward a more appropriate understanding.
In line with this theory, Brooks et al. (2016) argued that
providing human support (providing information that supports
or improves the user’s situation awareness with respect to the
failure and the status of the task being performed) or task
support (helping the user complete the task they wanted to
accomplish) will mitigate negative effects caused by failure; and
that combining the two techniques should minimize problems
without negative side effects. Moreover, they hypothesized that
recovery strategies which reduce the negative effects of a failure
will also increase the likelihood of users wanting to use the
system again. To test these hypotheses, they conducted two
between-subjects survey studies (Brooks et al., 2016). Results
indicated that human support was better correlated to whether
the information conveyed could be used by the person to
affect the outcome of the situation. Task support, as well as a
combination of task support and human support, significantly
improved people’s reaction to failure in all but one scenario.
Recovery strategies that reduced the negative effects of a failure
were shown to increase the likelihood of users to want to use the
system again.
DISCUSSION
The majority of published works on robotic failures focus
on technical aspects of making the robots more reliable. Few
studies have actively worked toward making failure-handling
user friendly, however the growing number of publications on the
topic seems to indicate an increase in interest. Successful failure-
handling strategies that enable untrained users to quickly and
easily identify and solve failures require a holistic approach to
design and development. The technical knowledge of hardware
and software must be integrated with cognitive aspects of
information processing, psychological knowledge of interaction
dynamics and domain-specific knowledge of the user, the robot,
the target application, and the environment. To achieve this,
additional research is essential. By combining insights from a
large variety of fields into a single framework, RF-HIP can
be used to guide these discussions, and provides an initial
hypothesis regarding how people might process symptoms and
warnings in situations of robotic failure. In a similar manner
to how C-HIP supports the design of new warnings and alerts,
the stages of processing could be used to help determine why
a particular approach of handling failure is successful while
another is unsuccessful; leading to informed design tools and
guidelines that facilitate the development of robot interactions
that enable untrained users to quickly and easily identify and act
upon failures.
Several gaps in the literature have become evident as a
result of this analysis. First, it seems that most efforts have
been focused on how failures influence user perceptions of the
robot and user behavior, looking primarily at cause and effect.
Little work has been done on evaluating how a robot should
communicate that an error has occurred. Almost no work has
been done to understand the underlying cognitive, psychological,
and social determinants behind these relationships and how
they may impact selection of mitigation strategies. Second, there
seems to be a great asymmetry in the types of failures being
studied and subsequent failure-handling strategies proposed:
while there is a lot of emphasis on recovery strategies to cope with
technical failures, there aren’t any strategies to cope with recovery
from human errors—equivalent to cancel or undo in HCI.
Moreover, social-environmental considerations such as the work
environment, group-level judgement, and organizational flaws
have not been taken into consideration. Third, the importance
of motivation to how people perceive, comprehend and solve
robotic failures seems to be lost in the literature—studies typically
evaluate people in unnatural settings, using tasks that are low in
personal relevance. As a result, the ecological validity of most
of the studies is low. It would be interesting to evaluate how
motivation might influence responses in a more natural setting,
when participants have a real stake in whether the robot will
succeed or fail. Fourth, the failure attributes identified (functional
severity, social severity, relevance, frequency, condition and
symptoms) have not received almost any consideration in the
HRI literature in terms of how they influence the way in which
the failure should be communicated, the HRI, and the selection
of mitigation strategies. For the most part, these attributes are
unexplored territory and require targeted assessment. Lastly,
since most studies used indoor, single-person environments, the
effects of various aspects of the environment (e.g., other agents,
weather, lighting, size of space) on perceptions of failures and
preferences of communication and mitigation strategies remain
unknown.
Another challenge the robotics community is facing in
failure-handling is benchmarking and comparability. The wide
variety of robotic implementations, evaluation environments
and measures, coupled with lack of consistency on which
implementation and evaluation details are reported in scientific
publications, make it difficult and nearly impossible to compare
subjective and objective performance metrics from different
failure-handling studies. We are unaware of any frameworks
that specify how all the contextual considerations identified in
this paper should affect robot behavior in order to produce
a pleasurable experience. Development of such frameworks
are likely going to come from comparing and combining
different implementation methods with insights from a wide
variety of user studies. A common benchmark must be crafted
for a set of robots, tasks, environments, and conditions.
Consistent subjective measures and batteries of questionnaires
along with clear quantitative evaluation measures must also
be defined.
From the literature survey it is evident that many aspects
remain to be studied in the field of user-centered failure handling,
making this an exciting time to be active in the field. The
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importance of studying cognitive considerations that critically
influence naive users’ ability to detect and solve robot failures is
evident. While the current paper proposes how failure warnings
and symptoms may be perceived by people, the specifics of the
proposed framework must be thoroughly tested and verified.
Moreover, whether the RF-HIP model can be used to predict
the impact of various forms of robot design on a users’ ability
to handle failures is still to be determined. Hopefully, this
review provides a good starting point for discussing what
needs to be done in order to develop robot interactions that
enable untrained users to quickly and easily identify and solve
failures.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SH is the first author of this publication and main contributor.
TO-G is her Ph.D. advisor.
FUNDING
The first author, SH is supported by a scholarship from The
Helmsley Charitable Trust through the Agricultural, Biological,
Cognitive Robotics Center, and by Ben-Gurion University of
the Negev through the High-tech, Bio-tech and Chemo-tech
Scholarship.
REFERENCES
Abrams, R. A., and Christ, S. E. (2003). Motion onset captures attention. Psychol.
Sci. 14, 427–432. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.01458
Adubor, O., St. John, R., and Steinfeld, A. (2017). “Personal safety is more
important than cost of damage during robot failure,” in Proceedings of the
Companion of the 2017 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot
Interaction - HRI ’17 (Vienna), 403–403.
Anderson, S. J., Cohen, G., and Taylor, S. (2000). Rewriting the past: Some factors
affecting the variability of personal memories.Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 14, 435–454.
doi: 10.1002/1099-0720(200009)14:5<435::AID-ACP662>3.0.CO;2-B
Baber, C., and Stanton, N. A. (1994). Task analysis for error identification: a
methodology for designing error-tolerant consumer products. Ergonomics 37,
1923–1941.
Bainbridge, W. A., Hart, J., Kim, E. S., and Scassellati, B. (2008). “The effect
of presence on human-robot interaction,” in Robot and Human Interactive
Communication, 2008. RO-MAN 2008. The 17th IEEE International Symposium
on (Munich), 701–706.
Bajones, M., Weiss, A., and Vincze, M. (2016). “Help, anyone? a user study for
modeling robotic behavior to mitigate malfunctions with the help of the user,”
in 5th International Symposium on New Frontiers in Human-Robot Interaction
2016 (Sheffield, UK).
Baraka, K., Rosenthal, S., and Veloso, M. (2016). “Enhancing human
understanding of a mobile robot’s state and actions using expressive lights,”
in 2016 25th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive
Communication (RO-MAN) (New York, NY), 652–657.
Barakova, E. I., Bajracharya, P., Willemsen, M., Lourens, T., and Huskens, B.
(2015). Long-term LEGO therapy with humanoid robot for children with ASD.
Expert Syst. 32, 698–709. doi: 10.1111/exsy.12098
Baroni, I., Nalin, M., Zelati, M. C., Oleari, E., and Sanna, A. (2014). “Designing
motivational robot: how robots might motivate children to eat fruits and
vegetables,” in The 23rd IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human
Interactive Communication 2014 RO-MAN (Edinburgh, UK), 796–801.
Bauer, L., Bravo-Lillo, C., Cranor, L. F., and Fragkaki, E. (2013). Warning Design
Guidelines. Pittsburgh, PA. Available online at: http://repository.cmu.edu/
cylab/113/ (Access date: 14-Dec-2017).
Beer, J. M., and Takayama, L. (2011). “Mobile remote presence systems for
older adults : acceptance, benefits, and concerns,” in Proceedings of the
6th International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Lausanne),
19–26.
Bettman, J. R. (1979). Memory factors in consumer choice: a review. J. Mark. 43,
37–53.
Bodenhausen, G. V, and Wyer, R. S. (1987). “Social cognition and social reality:
information acquisition and use in the laboratory and the real world,” in Social
Information Processing and Survey Methodology, eds H. Hippler, N. Schwarz,
and S. Sudman (New York, NY: Springer), 6–41.
Booth, P. A. (1991). Errors and theory in human-computer interaction. Acta
Psychol. 78, 69–96.
Bower, G. H. (1970a). Organizational factors in memory. Cogn. Psychol. 1, 18–46.
Bower, G. H. (1970b). Analysis of a mnemonic device: modern psychology
uncovers the powerful components of an ancient system for improving
memory. Am. Sci. 58, 496–510.
Bower, G. H. (2000). “A brief history of memory research,” in The Oxford handbook
of memory, eds E. Tulving and F. Craik (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 3–32.
Bower, G. H., Monteiro, K. P., and Gilligan, S. G. (1978). Emotional mood as a
context for learning and recall. J. Verbal Learn. Verbal Behav. 17, 573–585.
Breazeal, C. (2004). Social interactions in HRI: the robot view. IEEE Trans. Syst.
Man Cybern. Part C Appl. Rev. 34, 181–186. doi: 10.1109/TSMCC.2004.826268
Brooks, D. J. (2017). “A Human-Centric Approach to Autonomous Robot Failures,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Computer Science, University. Lowell, MA.
Brooks, D. J., Begum, M., and Yanco, H. A. (2016). “Analysis of
reactions towards failures and recovery strategies for autonomous
robots,” in 25th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and
Human Interactive Communication, RO-MAN, 2016 (New York, NY),
487–492.
Buschman, T. J., and Miller, E. K. (2010). Shifting the spotlight of attention:
evidence for discrete computations in cognition. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:194.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00194
Butter, M. J. (1970). Differential recall of paired associates as a function of arousal
and concreteness-imagery levels. J. Exp. Psychol. 84, 252–256.
Cameron, D., Collins, E., Cheung, H., Chua, A., Aitken, J. M., and Law, J. (2016a).
“Don’t worry, we’ll get there: Developing robot personalities to maintain
user interaction after robot error,” in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics), Vol. 9793 (Cham; Edinburgh, UK: Springer), 409–412.
Cameron, D., Loh, E. J., Chua, A., Collins, E., Aitken, J. M., and Law, J. (2016b).
“Robot-stated limitations but not intentions promote user assistance,” in
5th International Symposium on New Frontiers in Human-Robot Interaction
(Sheffield, UK), 1–6.
Canham, M., and Hegarty, M. (2010). Effects of knowledge and display
design on comprehension of complex graphics. Learn. Instr. 20, 155–166.
doi: 10.1016/j.learninstruc.2009.02.014
Canham, R., Jackson, A. H., and Tyrrell, A. (2003). “Robot error detection using
an artificial immune system,” in Proceedings of the NASA/DoD Conference on
Evolvable Hardware, 2003 (Chicago, IL), 199–207.
Card, S. K., Moran, T. P., and Newell, A. (1986). “The model human processor:
an engineering model of human performance,” in Handbook of Perception and
Human Performance, Vol. 2. Cognitive Processes and Performance, eds K. R.
Boff, L. Kaufman, and J. P. Thomas (Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons), 1–35.
Card, S. K., Newell, A., and Moran, T. P. (1983). The Psychology of Human-
Computer Interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates Inc.
Carlson, J., and Murphy, R. R. (2005). How UGVs physically fail in the field. IEEE
Trans. Robot. 21, 423–437. doi: 10.1109/TRO.2004.838027
Carlson, K. A. (2011). The impact of humor on memory: is the humor effect
about humor? Humor Int. J. Humor Res. 24, 21–41. doi: 10.1515/humr.
2011.002
Carmody, M. A., and Gluckman, J. P. (1993). “Task specific effects of automation
and automation failure on performance, workload and situational awareness,”
in Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology
(Columbus, OH), 167–171.
Cassenti, D. N. (2007). Recovery from automation error after robot
neglect. Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet 51, 1096–1100.
doi: 10.1177/154193120705101809
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861129
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
Celsi, R. L., and Olson, J. C. (1988). The role of involvement in attention and
comprehension processes. J. Consum. Res. 15, 210–224.
Cha, E., Dragan, A. D., and Srinivasa, S. S. (2015). “Perceived robot capability,”
in 2015 24th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive
Communication (RO-MAN) (Kobe), 541–548.
Cha, E., Mataric, M., and Fong, T. (2016). “Nonverbal signaling for non-
humanoid robots during human-robot collaboration,” in 2016 11th
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI),
2016 (Christchurch), 601–602.
Chapman, G. B., Li, M., Colby, H., and Yoon, H. (2010). Opting in vs opting out of
influenza vaccination. JAMA 304, 43–44. doi: 10.1001/jama.2010.892
Chidambaram, V., Chiang, Y.-H., and Mutlu, B. (2012). “Designing persuasive
robots: how robots might persuade people using vocal and nonverbal cues,”
in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Human-Robot Interaction (Boston, MA), 293–300.
Croskerry, P. (2003). The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis
and strategies to minimize them. Acad. Med. 78, 775–780.
doi: 10.1097/00001888-200308000-00003
De Visser, E., and Parasuraman, R. (2011). Adaptive aiding of human-robot
teaming: effects of imperfect automation on performance, trust, and workload.
J. Cogn. Eng. Decis. Mak. 5, 209–231. doi: 10.1177/1555343411410160
Desai, M., Kaniarasu, P., Medvedev, M., Steinfeld, A., and Yanco, H. (2013).
“Impact of robot failures and feedback on real-time trust,” in 2013 8th
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
(Tokyo), 251–258.
Desai, M., Medvedev, M., Vázquez, M., McSheehy, S., Gadea-Omelchenko, S.,
Bruggeman, C., et al. (2012). “Effects of changing reliability on trust of
robot systems,”in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual ACM/IEEE International
Conference on Human-Robot Interaction - HRI ’12 (Boston, MA), 73.
Dewitz, P., Carr, E. M., and Patberg, J. P. (1987). Effects of inference training
on comprehension and comprehension monitoring. Read. Res. Q. 22, 99–121.
doi: 10.2307/747723
Drury, J. L., Scholtz, J., and Yanco, H., A. (2003). “Awareness in human-
robot interactions,” in IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics (Washington, DC), 912–918.
Duncan, J. (1978). Response selection in spatial choice reaction: Further
evidence against associative models. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 30, 429–440.
doi: 10.1080/00335557843000034
Dunning, D., Griffin, D. W., Milojkovic, J. D., and Ross, L. (1990). The
overconfidence effect in social prediction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 58, 568–581.
Egelman, S., Cranor, L. F., Hong, J. I., Herbsleb, J. D., and Bellovin, S. M. (2009).
Trust Me: Design Patterns for Constructing Trustworthy Trust Indicators. Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA.
Embrey, D. E. (1986). “SHERPA: a systematic human error reduction and
prediction approach,” in Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting
on Advances in Human Factors in Nuclear Power Systems (Knoxville, TN),
184–193.
Endsley, M. R. (1988). “Situation awareness global assessment technique
(SAGAT),” in Aerospace and Electronics Conference, NAECON 1988.,
Proceedings of the IEEE 1988 National (Dayton, OH), 789–795.
Engelhardt, S., and Hansson, E. (2017). “A Comparison of Three Robot Recovery
Strategies to Minimize the Negative Impact of Failure in Social HRI,” BS thesis,
Department of Computer Science and Communication, KTH Royal Institute
of Technology, Stockholm.
Epley, N., and Gilovich, T. (2006). The anchoring-and-adjustment
heuristic: why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychol. Sci. 17, 311–318.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x
Feinstein, A., Brown, R., and Ron, M. (1994). Effects of practice of serial tests of
attention in healthy subjects. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 16, 436–447.
Fink, J., Mubin, O., Kaplan, F., and Dillenbourg, P. (2012). “Anthropomorphic
language in online forums about Roomba, AIBO and the iPad,” in Advanced
Robotics and its Social Impacts (ARSO), IEEE Workshop on 2012 (Munich),
54–59.
Fischer, K., Soto, B., Pantofaru, C., and Takayama, L. (2014). “Initiating
interactions in order to get help: effects of social framing on people’s responses
to robots’ requests for assistance,” in The 23rd IEEE International Symposium
on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, RO-MAN (Edinburgh, UK),
999–1005.
Fitts, P. M., and Deininger, R. L. (1954). SR compatibility: correspondence among
paired elements within stimulus and response codes. J. Exp. Psychol. 48,
483–492.
Fitts, P. M., and Seeger, C. M. (1953). SR compatibility: spatial characteristics of
stimulus and response codes. J. Exp. Psychol. 46, 199–210.
Fogg, B. J., Cuellar, G., and Danielson, D. (2009). “Motivating, influencing,
and persuading users: an introduction to captology,” in Human Computer
Interaction Fundamentals, 1st Edn, eds A. Sears and J. A. Jacko (New York, NY:
CRC press), 109–122.
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., and Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary covert
orienting is contingent on attentional control settings. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 18:1030.
Fong, T., Nourbakhsh, I., and Dautenhahn, K. (2003). A survey
of socially interactive robots. Rob. Auton. Syst. 42, 143–166.
doi: 10.1016/S0921-8890(02)00372-X
Frantz, J. P., and Rhoades, T. P. (1993). A task-analytic approach to the temporal
and spatial placement of product warnings Hum. Factors 35, 719–730.
Frase, L. T., and Schwartz, B. J. (1979). Typographical cues that facilitate
comprehension. J. Educ. Psychol. 71, 197–206.
Gehle, R., Pitsch, K., Dankert, T., and Wrede, S. (2015). “Trouble-based group
dynamics in real-world HRI - Reactions on unexpected next moves of a
museum guide robot.,” in 24th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and
Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN), 2015 (Kobe), 407–412.
Gieselmann, P. (2006). “Comparing error-handling strategies in human-human
and human-robot dialogues,” in Proceedings of the 8th Conference National
Language Process (KONVENS) (Konstanz), 24–31.
Gieselmann, P., and Ostendorf, M. (2007). “Problem-sensitive response generation
in human-robot Dialogs,” in Proceedings of the 8th SIGDial Workshop on
Discourse and Dialogue (Antwerp), 219–222.
Giuliani, M., Mirnig, N., Stollnberger, G., Stadler, S., Buchner, R., and Tscheligi,
M. (2015). Systematic analysis of video data from different human–robot
interaction studies: a categorization of social signals during error situations.
Front. Psychol. 6:931. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00931
Gobet, F., Lane, P. C., Croker, S., Cheng, P. C., Jones, G., Oliver, I., et al.
(2001). Chunking mechanisms in human learning. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 236–243.
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01662-4
Gompei, T., and Umemuro, H. (2015). “A robot’s slip of the tongue: Effect of
speech error on the familiarity of a humanoid robot,” in 24th IEEE International
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN)
(Kobe), 331–336.
Gorbunova, E. S. (2017). Perceptual similarity in visual search for multiple targets.
Acta Psychol. 173, 46–54. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2016.11.010
Groom, V., Chen, J., Johnson, T., Kara, F., A., and Nass, C. (2010). “Critic,
compatriot, or chump?: Responses to robot blame attribution,” in 2010
5th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
(Osaka), 211–217.
Haberlandt, K. (1982). Reader expectations in text comprehension. Adv. Psychol.
9, 239–249.
Ham, J. R. C., andMidden, C. J. H. (2011). “Persuasive robots can help save energy:
the influence of the agency of a robot on its power to influence sustainable
behavior,” in The 9th International Conference On Environmental Psychology
(Eindhoven).
Ham, J., and Spahn, A. (2015). “Shall i show you some other shirts too? The
psychology and ethics of persuasive robots,” in A Construction Manual for
Robots’ Ethical Systems, ed R. Trappl (Cham: Springer), 63–81.
Ham, J., Bokhorst, R., Cuijpers, R., van der Pol, D., and Cabibihan, J. J.
(2011). “Making robots persuasive: the influence of combining persuasive
strategies (gazing and gestures) by a storytelling robot on its persuasive
power,” in Social Robotics. ICSR 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Vol 7072, eds B. Mutlu, C. Bartneck, J. Ham, V. Evers, and T. Kanda
(Berlin; Heidelberg; Amsterdam: Springer), 71–83. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
25504-5_8
Hamacher, A. (2015). “Believing in BERT: Making Good on Bad Robot Behavior,”
M.S. thesis, Department of Brain Science, University College London.
Hamacher, A., Bianchi-Berthouze, N., Pipe, A., G., and Eder, K. (2016). “Believing
in BERT: using expressive communication to enhance trust and counteract
operational error in physical Human-robot interaction,” in 25th IEEE
International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication,
RO-MAN 2016 (New York, NY), 493–500.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861130
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
Hancock, P. A., Billings, D. R., Schaefer, K. E., Chen, J. Y., de Visser, E. J., and
Parasuraman, R. (2011). A meta-analysis of factors affecting trust in human-
robot interaction. Hum. Factors 53, 517–527. doi: 10.1177/0018720811417254
Harris, R. J., Cady, E. T., and Tran, T. Q. (2006). “Comprehension and memory,”
in Psychology of entertainment, eds B. Jennings and P. Vorderer (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 71–84.
Hayes, C. J., Moosaei, M., and Riek, L., D. (2016). “Exploring implicit
human responses to robot mistakes in a learning from demonstration task,”
in 25th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive
Communication, RO-MAN, 2016 (New York, NY), 246–252.
Hick, W. E. (1952). On the rate of gain of information. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 4, 11–26.
Houts, P. S., Doak, C. C., Doak, L. G., and Loscalzo, M. J. (2006). The role of
pictures in improving health communication: a review of research on attention,
comprehension, recall, and adherence. Patient Educ. Couns. 61, 173–190.
doi: 10.1016/j.pec.2005.05.004
Hüttenrauch, H., and Severinson-Eklundh, K. (2006). To help or not to help
a service robot: Bystander intervention as a resource in human-robot
collaboration. Interact. Stud. 7, 455–477. doi: 10.1075/is.7.3.15hut
Hyman, R. (1953). Stimulus information as a determinant of reaction time. J. Exp.
Psychol. 45, 188–196. doi: 10.1037/h0056940
Johnson, E. J., and Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science 302,
1338–1339. doi: 10.1126/science.1091721
Kahn, P. H., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., Gill, B. T., Ruckert, J. H., Shen, S., et al. (2012).
“Do people hold a humanoid robot morally accountable for the harm it causes?”
in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Human-Robot Interaction - HRI ’12 (New York, NY; Boston, MA: ACM),
33–40.
Kaniarasu, P., and Steinfeld, A. M. (2014). “Effects of blame on trust in human
robot interaction,” in IEEE RO-MAN - 23rd IEEE International Symposium
on Robot and Human Interactive Communication: Human-Robot Co-Existence:
Adaptive Interfaces and Systems for Daily Life, Therapy, Assistance and Socially
Engaging Interactions, 2014 (Edinburgh, UK), 850–855.
Kaniarasu, P., Steinfeld, A., Desai, M., and Yanco, H. (2013). “Robot confidence
and trust alignment,” in 2013 8th ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Tokyo; New York, NY: ACM), 155–156.
Kidd, C. D., and Breazeal, C. (2004). “Effect of a robot on user perceptions,” in
Proceedings 2004 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and
Systems 2004 (IROS 2004) (Sendai), 3559–3564.
Kieras, D. E., and Bovair, S. (1984). The role of a mental model in learning to
operate a device. Cogn. Sci. 8, 255–273.
Kieras, D. E., and Meyer, D. E. (1997). An overview of the EPIC architecture for
cognition and performance with application to human-computer interaction.
Hum. Comput. Interact. 12, 391–438.
Kim, E., S., Leyzberg, D., Tsui, K., M., and Scassellati, B. (2009). “How people
talk when teaching a robot,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM/IEEE International
Conference on Human robot Interaction - HRI ’09 (La Jolla, CA; New York, NY:
ACM), 23.
Kim, H. Y., Kim, B., Jun, S., and Kim, J. (2017). “An imperfectly perfect robot:
discovering interaction design strategy for learning companion,” in Proceedings
of the Companion of the 2017 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-
Robot Interaction - HRI ’17 (Vienna, New York, NY: ACM), 165–166.
Kim, T., and Hinds, P. (2006). “Who should i blame? effects of autonomy and
transparency on attributions in human-robot interaction,” in ROMAN 2006
- The 15th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive
Communication, 80–85.
Kintsch, W., Kozminsky, E., Streby, W. J., McKoon, G., and Keenan, J. M. (1975).
Comprehension and recall of text as a function of content variables. J. Verbal
Learn. Verbal Behav. 14, 196–214.
Kishiyama, M. M., and Yonelinas, A. P. (2003). Novelty effects on recollection
and familiarity in recognition memory. Mem. Cogn. 31, 1045–1051.
doi: 10.3758/BF03196125
Klein, R. M. (2000). Inhibition of return. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 138–147.
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01452-2
Knepper, R. A., Tellex, S., Li, A., Roy, N., and Rus, D. (2015).
Recovering from failure by asking for help. Auton. Robots 39, 347–362.
doi: 10.1007/s10514-015-9460-1
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., and Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional overlap:
cognitive basis for stimulus-response compatibility-a model and taxonomy.
Psychol. Rev. 97, 253–270.
Kwon, M., Huang, S. H., and Dragan, A. D. (2018). “Expressing Robot
Incapability,” in Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual ACM/IEEE International
Conference on Human-Robot Interaction - HRI ’18 (Chicago, IL; New York, NY:
ACM), 87–95.
Lang, A. (2000). The limited capacity model of mediated message processing. J.
Commun. 50, 46–70. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02833.x
Laprie, J.-C. (1995). “Dependable computing and fault tolerance: concepts and
terminology,” in 25th International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing,
“Highlights from Twenty-Five Years” (Pasadena, CA) 2–11.
Larrick, R. P., and Soll, J. B. (2008). The MPG illusion. Science 320, 1593–1594.
doi: 10.1126/science.1154983
Law, E., Cai, Vicky., Liu, Q. F., Sasy, S., Goh, J., Blidaru, A., et al. (2017). “A
Wizard-of-Oz study of curiosity in human-robot interaction,” in 26th IEEE
International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication
(RO-MAN 2017) (Lisbon), 607–614.
Lee, J. D., and See, K. A. (2004). Trust in automation: designing for appropriate
reliance. Hum. Factors. 46, 50–80.doi: 10.1518/hfes.46.1.50_30392
Lee, M. K., Kiesler, S., Forlizzi, J., Srinivasa, S., and Rybski, P. (2010). “Gracefully
mitigating breakdowns in robotic services,” in 2010 5th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Osaka),
203–210.
Lee, S. A., and Liang, Y. J. (2016). The role of reciprocity in verbally
persuasive robots. Cyberpsychol. Behav. Soc. Netw. 19, 524–527.
doi: 10.1089/cyber.2016.0124
Lemaignan, S., Fink, J., Mondada, F., and Dillenbourg, P. (2015). “You’re doing
it wrong! Studying unexpected behaviors in child-robot interaction,” in Social
Robotics. ICSR 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9388 LNCS (Cham;
Paris: Springer), 390–400. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-25554-5_39
Levin, I. P., and Gaeth, G. J. (1988). How consumers are affected by the framing of
attribute information before and after consuming the product. J. Consum. Res.
15, 374–378.
Lohan, K. S., Deshmukh, A., and Aylett, R. (2014). “How can a robot signal its
incapability to perform a certain task to humans in an acceptable manner?”
in The 23rd IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive
Communication (Edinburgh, UK), 814–819.
Lucas, G. M., Boberg, J., Traum, D., Artstein, R., Gratch, Jonathan., Gainer, Alesia.,
et al. (2018). “Getting to know each other: the role of social dialogue in recovery
from errors in social robots,” in Human-Robot Interaction ’18 (New York, NY;
Chicago, IL: ACM), 344–351.
Lucas, G. M., Nagai, Y., Komatsu, T., Hanheide, M., Natale L. (2017). “The role
of social dialogue and errors in robots,” in HAI 2017 - Proceedings of the
5th International Conference on Human Agent Interaction (New York, NY;
Bielefeld: ACM), 431–433.
Lutz, R. R., andWoodhouse, R. M. (1999). “Bi-directional analysis for certification
of safety-critical software,” in 1st International Software Assurance Certification
Conference (ISACC’99) (Chantilly, VA).
Macias, W. (2003). A beginning look at the effects of interactivity, product
involvement and web experience on comprehension: brand web
sites as interactive advertising. J. Curr. Issues Res. Advert. 25, 31–44.
doi: 10.1080/10641734.2003.10505147
Mani, K., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). The mental representation of spatial
descriptions.Mem. Cogn. 10, 181–187.
Mayer, R. E. (2002). “Multimedia learning,” in Psychology of Learning
and Motivation, Vol. 41, ed B. H. Ross (Elsevier), 85–139.
doi: 10.1016/S0079-7421(02)80005-6
McClelland, J. L. (1979). On the time relations of mental processes: an examination
of systems of processes in cascade. Psychol. Rev. 86:287.
Mendoza, J. P., Veloso, M., and Simmons, R. (2015). “Plan execution monitoring
through detection of unmet expectations about action outcomes,” in 2015 IEEE
International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA) (Seattle, WA),
3247–3252.
Miller, J. (1988). Discrete and continuous models of human information
processing: theoretical distinctions and empirical results. Acta Psychol. 67,
191–257.
Mirnig, N., Giuliani, M., Stollnberger, G., Stadler, S., Buchner, R., and Tscheligi,
M. (2015). “Impact of robot actions on social signals and reaction times
in HRI error situations,” in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 9388,
eds A. Tapus, E. André, J. C. Martin, F. Ferland, and M. Ammi (Cham),
461–471.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861131
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
Mirnig, N., Stollnberger, G., Miksch, M., Stadler, S., Giuliani, M., and Tscheligi, M.
(2017). To err is robot: how humans assess and act toward an erroneous social
robot. Front. Robot. AI 4:21. doi: 10.3389/frobt.2017.00021
Morewedge, C. K., Yoon, H., Scopelliti, I., Symborski, C. W., Korris, J. H.,
and Kassam, K. S. (2015). Debiasing decisions: improved decision making
with a single training intervention. Pol. Insights Behav. Brain Sci. 2, 129–140.
doi: 10.1177/2372732215600886
Mubin, O., and Bartneck, C. (2015). “Do as I say: Exploring human response to
a predictable and unpredictable robot,” in Proceedings of the 2015 British HCI
Conference on - British HCI ’15 (Lincoln; New York, NY: ACM) 110–116.
Murphy, R. R., and Hershberger, D. (1999). Handling sensing failures in
autonomous mobile robots. Int. J. Rob. Res. 18, 382–400.
Mutlu, B., and Forlizzi, J. (2008). “Robots in organizations: the role of workflow,
social, and environmental factors in human-robot interaction,” in Proceedings
of the 3rd International Conference on Human Robot Interaction - HRI ’08
(Amsterdam; New York, NY: ACM), 287.
Nakagawa, K., Shiomi, M., Shinozawa, K., Matsumura, R., Ishiguro, H., andHagita,
N. (2011). “Effect of robot’s active touch on people’s motivation,” in Proceedings
of the 6th International Conference on Human-robot Interaction (Lausanne:
New York, NY: ACM), 465–472.
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many
guises. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 2, 175–220.
Nielsen, J. (2001). “Error Message Guidelines,” Nielsen Norman Group. Available
online at: https://www.nngroup.com/articles/error-message-guidelines/
(Accessed January 01, 2018).
Nielson, J. (2000). “Why you only need to test with 5 users,” Nielsen Norman
Group. Available online at: https://www.nngroup.com/articles/why-you-only-
need-to-test-with-5-users/. [Accessed: January 10, 2018].
Norman, D. (2002). The Design of Everyday Things. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Norman, D. A. (1981). Categorization of action slips. Psychol. Rev. 88, 1–15.
Okada, T., Sato, W., Murai, T., Kubota, Y., and Toichi, M. (2003). Eye gaze
triggers visuospatial attentional shift in individuals with autism. Psychologia 46,
246–254. doi: 10.2117/psysoc.2003.246
Paivio, A., and Csapo, K. (1973). Picture superiority in free recall: imagery or dual
coding? Cogn. Psychol. 5, 176–206.
Parasuraman, R., and Riley, V. (1997). Humans and automation: use, misuse,
disuse, abuse. Hum. Factors J. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. 39, 230–253.
Payne, S. J. (1991). A descriptive study of mental models. Behav. Inf. Technol. 10,
3–21.
Payne, S. J. (2009). “Mental models in human-computer interaction,” in Human-
Computer Interaction Fundamentals, 1st Edn, eds A. Sears, J. A. Jacko (New
York, NY: CRC press), 40–50.
Peltason, J., andWrede, B. (2011). The curious robot as a case-study for comparing
dialog systems. AI Mag. 32, 85–99.doi: 10.1609/aimag.v32i4.2382
Perry, C.M., Sheik-Nainar, M. A., Segall, N., Ma, R., and Kaber, D. B. (2008). Effects
of physical workload on cognitive task performance and situation awareness.
Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 9, 95–113. doi: 10.1080/14639220600959237
Posner, M. I., and Cohen, Y. (1984). Components of visual orienting. Atten.
Perform. X Control Lang. Process. 32, 531–556.
Posner, M. I., Nissen, M. J., and Ogden, W. C. (1978). Attended and unattended
processing modes: the role of set for spatial location.Modes Perceiving Process.
Inform. 137:158.
Pratt, J., and McAuliffe, J. (2001). The effects of onsets and offsets on visual
attention. Psychol. Res. 65, 185–191. doi: 10.1007/s004260100058
Proctor, R., and Vu, K.-P. (2009). “Human information processing: an overview for
human-computer interaction,” inHuman-Computer Interaction Fundamentals,
1st Edn, eds A. Sears and J. A. Jacko (New York, NY: CRC press), 20–38.
Ragni, M., Rudenko, A., Kuhnert, B., and Arras, K., O. (2016). “Errare humanum
est: Erroneous robots in human-robot interaction,” in 25th IEEE International
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, RO-MAN 2016
(New York, NY), 501–506.
Rasmussen, J. (1982). Human errors. A taxonomy for describing human
malfunction in industrial installations. J. Occup. Accid. 4, 311–333.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reeve, D. K., and Aggleton, J. P. (1998). On the specificity of expert knowledge
about a soap opera: an everyday story of farming folk. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 12,
35–42.
Reeve, T. G., and Proctor, R. W. (1990). The salient-features coding principle for
spatial-and symbolic-compatibility effects. Adv. Psychol. 65, 163–180.
Renninger, K., and Wozniak, R. H. (1985). Effect of interest on attentional shift,
recognition, and recall in young children. Dev. Psychol. 21, 624–632.
Riek, L. (2012). Wizard of Oz Studies in HRI: a systematic review
and new reporting guidelines. J. Human Robot Interact. 1, 119–136.
doi: 10.5898/JHRI.1.1.Riek
Ritchie, D., and Karge, B. D. (1996). Making information memorable: enhanced
knowledge retention and recall through the elaboration process. Prev. Sch. Fail.
Altern. Educ. Child. Youth 41, 28–33.
Robinette, P., Howard, A., and Wagner, A., R. (2017). “Conceptualizing overtrust
in robots: why do people trust a robot that previously failed?” in Autonomy and
Artificial Intelligence: A Threat or Savior?, eds W. Lawless, R. Mittu, D. Sofge,
and S. Russell (Cham: Springer), 129–155.
Robinette, P., Li, W., Allen, R., Howard, A. M., and Wagner, A. R. (2016).
“Overtrust of robots in emergency evacuation scenarios,” in 2016 11th
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
(Christchurch), 101–108.
Rosenthal, S., Veloso, M., and Dey, A. K. (2012). Is someone in this office available
to help me? : Proactively seeking help from spatially-situated humans. J. Intell.
Robot. Syst. Theory Appl. 66, 205–221. doi: 10.1007/s10846-011-9610-4
Ross, R., Collier, R., and O’Hare, G. M. P. (2004). “Demonstrating Social
Error Recovery with AgentFactory,” in 3rd International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (AAMAS04) (New York, NY),
1424–1425.
Rossi, A., Dautenhahn, K., Koay, K. L., and Walters, M. L. (2017a). “How the
timing and magnitude of robot errors influence peoples’ trust of robots in an
emergency scenario,” in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, eds A. Kheddar,
E. Yoshida, S. S. Ge, K. Suzuki, J.-J. Cabibihan, F. Eyssel, and H. He (Cham:
Springer International Publishing), 42–52.
Rossi, A., Dautenhahn, K., Koay, K., L., and Walters, M., L. (2017b). “Human
perceptions of the severity of domestic robot errors,” in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Vol. 10652 LNAI, eds A. Kheddar, E.
Yoshida, S. S. Ge, K. Suzuki, J.-J. Cabibihan, F. Eyssel, and H. He (Cham:
Springer), 647–656.
Sadeghi, N., Mohd Kasim, Z., Hoon Tan, B., and Sathi Abdullah, F. (2012).
Learning styles, personality types and reading comprehension performance.
Eng. Lang. Teach. 5, 116–123. doi: 10.5539/elt.v5n4p116
Salem, M., Eyssel, F., Rohlfing, K., Kopp, S., and Joublin, F. (2013). To err is
human(-like): effects of robot gesture on perceived anthropomorphism and
likability. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 5, 313–323. doi: 10.1007/s12369-013-0196-9
Salem, M., Lakatos, G., Amirabdollahian, F., and Dautenhahn, K. (2015). “Would
you trust a (Faulty) robot? effects of error, task type and personality on human-
robot cooperation and trust,” in Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction - HRI ’15 (Portland, OR;
New York, NY: ACM), 141–148.
Sarkar, S., Araiza-Illan, D., and Eder, K. (2017). Effects of Faults, Experience, and
Personality on Trust in a Robot Co-Worker. Available Online at: https://arxiv.
org/abs/1703.02335 (Submitted on: 7-Mar-2017).
Sato, W., Okada, T., and Toichi, M. (2007). Attentional shift by gaze is triggered
without awareness. Exp. Brain Res. 183, 87–94. doi: 10.1007/s00221-007-1025-x
Schmidt, S. R. (1994). Effects of humor on sentencememory. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 20, 953–867.
Schütte, N., Mac Namee, B., and Kelleher, J. (2017). Robot perception errors and
human resolution strategies in situated human–robot dialogue. Adv. Robot. 31,
243–257. doi: 10.1080/01691864.2016.1268973
Schwarz, N. (1998). Accessible content and accessibility experiences: the interplay
of declarative and experiential information in judgment. Personal. Soc. Psychol.
Rev. 2, 87–99.
Sears, A., and Jacko, J. A. (eds.). (2009). Human-Computer Interaction
Fundamentals, 1st Edn. New York, NY: CRC press.
Sebok, A., and Wickens, C. D. (2017). Implementing lumberjacks and black
swans into model-based tools to support human-automation interaction.Hum.
Factors 59, 189–203. doi: 10.1177/0018720816665201
Sheehan, P. W., and Antrobus, J. S. (1972). The Function and Nature of Imagery.
Oxford, UK: Academic Press.
Shinozawa, K., Naya, F., Yamato, J., and Kogure, K. (2005). Differences in effect of
robot and screen agent recommendations on human decision-making. Int. J.
Hum. Comput. Stud. 62, 267–279. doi: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2004.11.003
Shiomi, M., Nakagawa, K., Matsumura, R., Shinozawa, K., Ishiguro, H., andHagita,
N. (2010). “Could i have a word?’: effects of robot’s whisper,” in 2010 IEEE/RSJ
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861132
Honig and Oron-Gilad Failures in HRI
International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS) (Taipei),
3899–3904.
Shiomi, M., Nakawaga, K., and Hagita, N. (2013). Design of a gaze behavior
at a small mistake moment for a robot. Interact. Stud. 14, 317–328.
doi: 10.1075/is.14.3.01shi
Short, E., Hart, J., Vu, M., and Scassellati, B. (2010). “No fair!! An interaction
with a cheating robot,” in 2010 5th ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Osaka), 219–226.
Sideridis, G. D.,Mouzaki, A., Simos, P., and Protopapas, A. (2006). Classification of
students with reading comprehension difficulties: the roles ofmotivation, affect,
and psychopathology. Learn. Disabil. Q. 29, 159–180. doi: 10.2307/30035505
Siegel, M. S. (2008). Persuasive Robotics: How Robots Change our Minds.
M.S. thesis, Media Arts and Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA.
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychol.
Rev. 63, 129–138.
Spexard, T. P., Hanheide, M., Li, S., and Wrede, B. (2008). “Oops, something is
wrong error detection and recovery for advanced human-robot-interaction,” in
Proceedings of the ICRA workshop on Social Interaction with Intelligent Indoor
Robots (Pasadena, CA).
Srinivasan, V., and Takayama, L. (2016). “Help me please: robot politeness
strategies for soliciting help,” in Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’16 (San Jose, CA),
4945–4955.
Stanton, N. A., and Salmon, P. M. (2009). Human error taxonomies applied to
driving: a generic driver error taxonomy and its implications for intelligent
transport systems. Saf. Sci. 47, 227–237. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2008.03.006
Stanton, N., A. (2009). “Human-error identification in human-computer
interaction,” in Human-Computer Interaction Fundamentals, 1st Edn, eds A.
Sears, and J. A. Jacko (New York, NY: CRC press), 123–134.
Steinbauer, G. (2013). “A Survey about Faults of Robots Used in RoboCup,” in
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7500, eds Z. T. van der, X. Chen, P.
Stone, L. E. Sucar (Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer), 344–355.
Summerfelt, H., Lippman, L., and Hyman I. E. Jr. (2010). The effect of
humor on memory: constrained by the pun. J. Gen. Psychol. 137, 376–394.
doi: 10.1080/00221309.2010.499398
Sutcliffe, A. and Rugg, G. (1998). A taxonomy of error types for failure analysis and
risk assessment. Int. J. Hum. Comput. Interact. 10, 381–405.
Takayama, L., Dooley, D., and Ju,W. (2011). “Expressing thought: improving robot
readability with animation principles,” in Proceedings of the 6th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Lausanne),
69–76.
Takayama, L., Groom, V., and Nass, C. (2009). “I’m sorry, dave: i’m afraid i won’t
do that: social aspects of human-agent conflict,” in Proceedings of the 27th
International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI 09
(Boston, MA), 2099.
Tannenbaum, K. R., Torgesen, J. K., and Wagner, R. K. (2006). Relationships
between word knowledge and reading comprehension in third-grade children.
Sci. Stud. Read. 10, 381–398. doi: 10.1207/s1532799xssr1004_3
Theeuwes, J. (1995). Abrupt luminance change pops out; abrupt color change does
not. Attent. Percep. Psychophys. 57, 637–644.
Tokushige, H., Narumi, T., Ono, S., Fuwamoto, Y., Tanikawa, T., and Hirose, M.
(2017). “Trust lengthens decision time on unexpected recommendations in
human-agent interaction,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference
on Human Agent Interaction - HAI ’17 (Bielefeld), 245–252.
Torrey, C. (2009). How Robots Can Help: Communication Strategies that Improve
Social Outcomes. Ph.D. dissertation, Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA.
Trung, P., Giuliani, M., Miksch, M., Stollnberger, G., Stadler, S., Mirnig, N.,
et al. (2017). “Head and shoulders: automatic error detection in human-
robot interaction,” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM International Conference on
Multimodal Interaction - ICMI 2017 (Glasgow, UK), 181–188.
Tsarouhas, P. H., and Fourlas, G. K. (2016). Mission reliability estimation
of mobile robot system. Int. J. Syst. Assur. Eng. Manag. 7:220.
doi: 10.1007/s13198-015-0408-9
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging
frequency and probability. Cogn. Psychol. 5, 207–232.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases. Science 185, 1124–1131.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science 211, 453–458.
van der Woerdt, S., and Haselager, P. (2017). “Lack of Effort or Lack of
Ability? Robot Failures and Human Perception of Agency and Responsibility,”
in BNAIC 2016: Artificial Intelligence. Communications in Computer and
Information Science, Vol. 765, eds B. Bredeweg and T. Bosse (Cham: Springer),
155–168.
Van Lancker, D. (1991). Personal relevance and the human right hemisphere. Brain
Cogn. 17, 64–92.
Verhaeghen, P., and Marcoen, A. (1996). On the mechanisms of plasticity
in young and older adults after instruction in the method of loci:
evidence for an amplification model. Psychol. Aging 11, 164–178.
doi: 10.1037//0882-7974.11.1.164
von Grünau, M., Dubé, S., and Galera, C. (1994). Local and global factors of
similarity in visual search. Percept. Psychophys. 55, 575–592.
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S., Dautenhahn, K., Te Boekhorst, R., and Koay,
K. L. (2008). Avoiding the uncanny valley: robot appearance, personality
and consistency of behavior in an attention-seeking home scenario for
a robot companion. Auton. Robots 24, 159–178. doi: 10.1007/s10514-007-
9058-3
Wang, H., and Proctor, R. W. (1996). Stimulus–response compatibility as a
function of stimulus code and response modality. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 22, 1201–1217.
Weinberger, M. G., and Gulas, C. S. (1992). The impact of humor in advertising: a
review. J. Advert. 21, 35–59.
Weinstock, A., Oron-Gilad, T., and Parmet, Y. (2012). The effect of
system aesthetics on trust, cooperation, satisfaction and annoyance
in an imperfect automated system. Work 41 (Suppl. 1), 258–265.
doi: 10.3233/WOR-2012-0166-258
Welsh, T. N., Chua, R., Weeks, D., and Goodman, D. (2009). “Perceptual-motor
interaction: some implications for HCI,” in Human-Computer Interaction
Fundamentals, eds A. Sears and J. A Jacko (New York, NY: CRC Press), 7.
Wheeler, R. L., and Gabbert, F. (2017). Using self-generated cues to facilitate recall:
a narrative review. Front. Psychol 8:1830. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01830
Wogalter, M. S. (2006a). “Communication-human information processing (C-
HIP) model,” in Handbook of Warnings, ed M. S. Wogalter (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 51–61.
Wogalter, M. S. Ed. (2006b). “Warning channel: modality andmedia,” inHandbook
of warnings, ed M. S. Wogalter (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates),
841.
Wogalter, M. S., and Vigilante, W. J. (2006). “Attention switch and maintenance,”
in Handbook of Warnings, ed M. S Wogalter (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates).
Wogalter, M. S., Barlow, T., and Murphy, S. A. (1995). Compliance to owner’s
manual warnings: influence of familiarity and the placement of a supplemental
directive. Ergonomics 38, 1081–1091.
Wogalter, M., S. (2006c). “Purposes and scope of warnings,” in Handbook of
warnings, eds M. S. Wogalter (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates),
3–9.
Yamaguchi, S., Tsuchiya, H., and Kobayashi, S. (1995). Electrophysiologic
correlates of age effects on visuospatial attention shift.Cogn. Brain Res. 3, 41–49.
Yasuda, H., and Matsumoto, M. (2013). “Psychological impact on human when
a robot makes mistakes,” in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/SICE International
Symposium on System Integration (Kobe), 335–339.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Honig and Oron-Gilad. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 861133
OPINION
published: 18 April 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00558
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 558
Edited by:
Amon Rapp,
Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy
Reviewed by:
Robert William Clowes,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa,
Portugal
*Correspondence:
Alessandro Musetti
alessandro.musetti@unipr.it
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 09 October 2017
Accepted: 03 April 2018
Published: 18 April 2018
Citation:
Musetti A and Corsano P (2018) The
Internet Is Not a Tool: Reappraising
the Model for Internet-Addiction
Disorder Based on the Constraints
and Opportunities of the Digital
Environment. Front. Psychol. 9:558.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00558
The Internet Is Not a Tool:
Reappraising the Model for
Internet-Addiction Disorder Based on
the Constraints and Opportunities of
the Digital Environment
Alessandro Musetti* and Paola Corsano
Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries, Università Degli Studi di Parma, Parma, Italy
Keywords: digital environment, internet addiction, internet use, cognitive ecology, virtual reality
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Internet was born in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century; it was
initially used for military purposes but has since become a powerful instrument for nonmilitary
use, including the exchange of information all over the world, thanks to the introduction of tools
such as the web browser. From the start, the World Wide Web assumed several functions (e.g.,
recreation, education, and business) but preserved a private dimension. To connect, people needed
access to an Internet-connected computer, which represented a separation from real life, or a virtual
reality. A video-terminal device helped these people to immerse themselves in salient but virtual
images and sounds; this immersion could induce symptoms such as dissociation (Schimmenti and
Caretti, 2010). In the 1990s, scientists developed a conceptualization of the misuse of the Internet
and of Internet-addiction disorder (IAD) that was coherent with their conception of the Internet
as virtual reality. The strongest criterion for distinguishing healthy Internet use from misuse was
connection time; this criterion was supported by several empirical studies regarding its relationship
with psychopathological symptoms (Young, 1998; Quayle and Taylor, 2003; Musetti et al., 2016,
2017).
However, over the last two decades, Internet use has given rise to global sociocultural changes
and has had important implications for the functioning of people’s minds (Clowes, 2015). Today,
digital and connectable tools such as smartphones are powerful, very small, portable, and (thanks
to WiFi and cloud technology) able to store a great deal of salient information about people’s lives.
These tools thus assume the function of an e-memory (electronic memory) by expanding cognitive
memory (Clowes, 2015). Virtual reality is no longer synonymous with the Internet, so there is
a need to reformulate the conceptualization of the Internet by taking into account its evolution.
The extent of digital information in every sphere of people’s lives has caused the integration of the
Internet into the cognitive tasks people perform in their daily routines, leading to the consideration
of the Internet as part of an extended concept of cognition (Smart et al., 2017). The concept of
the Internet as a tool to connect to a virtual reality that is separate from the real world is no
longer current, so a new concept of the Internet that takes its environmental features into account
is needed. This concept is in line with Floridi’s (2014) idea of an infosphere that shapes people’s
reality. The conceptualization of the Internet as an environment rather than as a tool leads to the
reformulation of IAD theory. If the Internet is not just a tool to be utilized, the theoretical model of
IAD cannot be based on behavior connected to its overuse, misuse, or abuse.
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Based on this opinion, we present arguments in favor of
reconsidering the Internet as an environment rather than as
a tool. In the following section, we explore the Internet’s role
in cognitive ecology, as well as the inadequacy of treating the
Internet as a tool and thus of the current Internet-addiction
model.
THE INTERNET AND COGNITIVE
ECOLOGY
One conceptualization that could help explain the idea that the
Internet is a superstructure within which people operate is that of
cognitive ecology (Smart, 2017), which has been defined as “the
multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think,
sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on
the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments”
(Tribble and Sutton, 2011, p. 94). Today’s society is digital
(Lupton, 2015), and the Internet represents the main part of its
cognitive ecology. In the theory of situated cognition (Robbins
and Aydede, 2009), cognition is embodied (Gallagher, 2005),
embedded (Rupert, 2004), extended, and distributed or collective
(Smart et al., 2017). These theories reconceptualize cognition;
instead of the classical, individualistic and intra-brain conception
of cognition, these theories take into account the relationships
among the brain, the body, and the environment to determine
the functional products of the mind (Smart et al., 2017). Thanks
to the Internet’s development (in terms of devices, apps, and
social platforms), it can be seen as the principal structure
of embodied, embedded, extended, and distributed cognition.
Proponents of the embodied-cognition thesis claim that extra-
neural bodily factors shape the course of cognitive processing
(Anderson, 2003; Shapiro, 2007, 2011). Mobile or wearable
devices such as smartphones are today part of people’s daily
engagements, and they allow continuous online access, which
shapes the course of their daily activities and interactions (Smart
et al., 2017). By contrast, proponents of the embedded-cognition
thesis claim that the extra-organismic environment plays a role
(although not a constitutive one) in cognitive states and processes
(Rupert, 2004), thus reallocating cognition to within biological
boundaries (Smart et al., 2017). The Internet can be inserted
within this vision of cognition. For example, augmented reality
devices (Smart et al., 2017) such as Google Glass can enrich
the sensory experience and have repercussions on cognitive
processes. Advocates for the extended-cognition thesis claim
that cognitive processes supervene on the relation between a
cognitive agent and the social environment in which that agent
is situated (Smart et al., 2017). Internal (biological) structures
and external devices work in a pair relationship in which
biological structures can perform the same operations as external
factors (see Clark and Chalmers, 1998) or in a complementary
relationship in which external devices can perform operations
that biological structures cannot, and vice-versa (see Sutton,
2010; Heersmink, 2015, 2016). The debate regarding the parity
or complementarity of the Internet and the brain has not yet
been resolved (Smart et al., 2017), and it is not our aim to
discuss that issue here. What is important in this context is that
Internet devices are so widespread in the social environment
that they are the principal external factor through which
people’s brains relate to and structure external representations;
these devices have thus become integrated in people’s cognitive
architectures (Halpin et al., 2010). Consider the examples of
how the use of GPS has modified people’s spatial navigation,
including its important impact on the neural mechanisms of
spatial cognition (Maguire et al., 2000), or considering how
Facebook use shapes the representation of the self, including
an important impact on the self-concept. This effect is not
merely about the interaction between a cognitive agent and
environmental devices or about the scaffolding function that
external factors have within the mind. The Internet is more
than just a scaffold that guides and integrates the mind as
it performs functions that the mind cannot accomplish alone
(Sterelny, 2010). Rather, people created the Internet to meet
people’s needs, and the Internet’s functions, such as that of e-
memory, have changed the ways in which people remember
and behave in the world (i.e., a person can recover remote
information without having to store every piece of information
from day to day). The Internet has changed people’s brain
structures, which have in turn evolved in such a way as to change
how the Internet meets new needs (Clowes, 2013). This view
requires consideration of the Internet as an extended function
of the mind, including its actual effects on the development
of the brain’s circuits. In a similar vein, the advent of cooked
food changed not only people’s tastes but also their digestive
functions and the structures of their jaws and teeth; it thus
had repercussions on environmental adaptation and species
conservation (Wrangham, 2009; Sterelny, 2010). The last thesis
regarding the Internet’s crucial role is that of distributed
cognition. This thesis relates to the cognitive processes (e.g.,
focusing, reasoning, remembering, and problem-solving) that a
collection of individuals share. Again, the Internet has allowed
people to take advantage of a huge network of geographically
distributed individuals who process cognitive operations at the
same time and on the same issue. This opportunity boosts
collaboration, information exchange, and the coordination of
collective efforts and collective decision-making (Chi et al., 2008;
Chi, 2009; Smart et al., 2017). These theories of cognition are
today a matter of debate. Some authors have preferred one
vision over others; others have considered the theories to not be
mutually exclusive and to instead by various integrated aspects of
cognition. In the article, we want to underline that, irrespective
of the vision that one embraces, the Internet represents a
fundamental part of cognitive processing. It not only boosts
cerebral operations but also shapes, modulates, and changes
neurobiological structures, functioning, and development; the
Internet is also, in turn, shaped and developed in a process that
resembles a spiral of mutual influence toward ever-higher steps
of development.
In this sense, a view of the Internet as a mere tool to be utilized
functionally or dysfunctionally, as in the model of Internet
addiction, is reductive in this era. Thus, considering the Internet
as a digital environment that encloses and characterizes cognitive
processes is more useful for understanding the phenomenon that
we are studying.
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THE INTERNET AS MORE THAN A TOOL
Consider the people of the nineteenth century, who began to deal
with great technological changes (due to the Second Industrial
Revolution). The invention of the train, for example, represented
a substantial change in the connection between long distances
and/or in the amount of people or material carried. People also
had to learn to use trains by acquiring new behaviors such as
buying tickets and waiting for the departure time; these behaviors
could be functional or dysfunctional (examples of the latter
include buying an expensive ticket or getting on the wrong
train). Although the train was intended as an instrument for
traveling to a destination, its growth into a global network and
its various functions (industrial, civil, and military) fostered the
sociocultural revolution of the 1800s. The train changed the way
people thought about industry; thus, in the nineteenth century,
the bourgeoisie affirmed its power, and science and literature
became more liberal. In other words, what began as a mere
instrument evolved into an environmental change that people
had to adapt to.
The example of the train concretely describes the difference
between a tool and a sociocultural environment. The dynamics
of the person–tool interaction have been thoroughly studied
and represent the basis for the strong Vygotskian psychological
tradition (Luria and Vygotsky, 1992). According to this tradition,
children organize their behavior by learning to use tools or
through external stimuli (Vygotsky, 1997). For example, a child
might pay attention to a tool and then name the tool; the
name of the tool thus becomes a word in the child’s internal
speech, thus inducing a new step in the child’s reasoning and
language functions (Bodrova et al., 2011). This explains how
the development of higher brain functions is mediated by the
utilization of tools, a view that fits well with the thesis of
embodied cognition, according to which external tools shape
the course of cognitive processing. It also fits with the thesis of
scaffolding cognition, according to which external tools drive
cognitive functioning. Within the latter conceptualization, the
Internet can be seen as a tool through which people interact
and whose use shapes the course of their cognitive processing.
However, this view is reductive because it does not take into
account the extra-brain operations that the Internet can provide
but that the brain cannot. For instance, in the scaffolding
view, people can interact with a social platform that reminds
them of a salient episode that occurred in their past, thus
shaping their emotional reactions and/or thoughts. However,
in this view, social-platform interaction does not allow for the
improvement of memory systems to provide a better ability
to remember salient episodes from the past. Rather, the social
platform is seen as a context inside which a limited memory
system can take advantage of externally stored information,
thus optimizing its work and allowing cognitive resources to
be delivered to other processes. In other words, although the
Internet—at least in its embryonic form, when recreation was
the main online activity—was once considered a tool that shaped
and mediated cognition and behavior, today, it is considered an
environment that characterizes the people of today. To return
to the example of the train, at the beginning, it was considered
to be a tool for enhancing travel, but after a few decades, it
began to shape the environment that characterized people in the
industrial era. Interestingly, Floridi (2014) explained how tools,
in addition to being utilized to boost behaviors, have also changed
the sociocultural fabrics of various eras, thereby marking the
evolution of humanity. The use of bronze (starting in 3000 BC)
changed the prehistoric world into the Bronze Age. Similarly,
today, people are part of an information society (also known as
the infosphere) and can access whatever information they lack
(e.g., facts about laws, politics, or science), meaning that there
are no boundaries between their online and offline lives—a state
known as “onlife” (Floridi, 2014).
As the reader may have noted, the arguments in favor of
considering the Internet as an environment have multiplied and
advanced. It is important to underline this vision here because
the classical model and the resulting research into IAD are based
on an obsolete conceptualization of the Internet as a tool.
REAPPRAISING INTERNET-ADDICTION
DISORDER
Over the last three decades, the literature on this phenomenon
has been abundant, but scholars have not reached an agreement
on which criteria must be focused on when determining the
dividing line between pathological or nonpathological Internet
use (Musetti et al., 2016). The main models of Internet-related
pathologies retrace those of other addictions (Young, 1998). If
the theorists of IAD do not consider the Internet to constitute
the current information society, they risk pathologizing a normal
behavior, similarly to what happened for new addictions (as
with new terms such as “shopaholic” or “workaholic”; see, e.g.,
Billieux et al., 2015). Without the environmental framework
of the Internet, the theorization of pathological Internet use is
limited to a reductive list of potentially problematic behaviors
(Schimmenti, 2017), such as using the Internet for pornography
or gambling. It is noteworthy that theDSM-5 does not resolve this
impasse, as it does not mention IAD; the only related disorder,
online gaming disorder, is inserted in a section regarding
diagnoses that require further study (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The seven symptoms of IAD in the classical
model are withdrawal; tolerance; concern over Internet use;
heavier or more frequent Internet use than intended; centralized
activities to obtain more from the Internet; loss of interest
in other social, occupational, and recreational activities; and
disregard for the physical or psychological consequences of
Internet use (Young, 1998). These criteria must be present for
at least 1 year. Clearly, these criteria are not applicable to
the vision of the Internet as an environment. If the Internet
constitutes the social fabric, it becomes impossible to withdraw
from it, making it impossible to be concerned over Internet
use; it likewise becomes impossible to focus on obtaining
the Internet. In particular, the criterion of “heavier or more
frequent use of the Internet than intended” lacks a comparative
parameter in the environmental view of the Internet. How
much Internet use is normal if the Internet is ingrained in
every part of people’s lives and also extends their cognition?
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 558136
Musetti and Corsano The Internet as a Social Environment
In the environmental view, considering the amount of time
spent online to be a pathological criterion would mean seeing
the entire information society as pathological. Moreover, and
paradoxically, a rehabilitation treatment based on this criterion
would be centered on reduced Internet access, thus limiting
the use of extended and collective cognition (Smart et al.,
2017), which could have important repercussions with regard to
social adaptation that, in turn, would favor an increase in other
pathological criteria, such as withdrawal from social occupation
or recreation.
THE INTERNET AS A SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT
Our position is that the classical IAD model should be
reformulated to match the vision of the Internet as a social
environment. First, researchers must determine whether it is
actually possible to be addicted to the Internet. In other words,
can people become addicted to their social fabrics? Perhaps it
is possible for a person to manifest difficulties or abnormalities
when adapting to a social environment. In a similar vein, new
models should ignore utilization-related criteria and instead
focus on the symptoms that indicate social maladaptation,
which may resemble manifestations of known symptoms such
as dissociation, depression, anxiety, and personality disorder
(Musetti et al., 2018). If this new focus were applied, a question
would need be raised about what preexisting pathological
conditions would predispose a person to have difficulty
adapting to an environment (Caplan, 2002). Considering the
Internet as the current socio-cognitive environment, a person’s
preexisting intra-brain features could favor the success or
failure of the adaptation process. In an interesting model,
scholars have suggested that maladaptive cognitions precede the
symptomatology of IAD (Davis, 2001; Taymur et al., 2016),
thus underlining the comorbidity of IAD with heterogeneous
psychopathological diagnoses (Orsal et al., 2013). A child
presenting with an attention disorder will have some difficulty
adapting to a school environment and to a social network of
peers, and this difficulty will often impair the development of
the child’s intellectual and other cognitive functions. Similarly,
a person who is cognitively poorly equipped could fail to take
advantage of the Internet’s contextual affordances (Ryding and
Kaye, 2017). This could result in the unsuccessful extension
and/or distribution of cognition processes, with repercussions
for the person’s cognitive development and risks of pathological
adaptation to the digitized environment. A similar view could
be used in studies on the appropriate treatments for cognitively
predisposing features and to help explain the adaptation
processes.
CONCLUSION
We are in favor of treating the Internet as a social environment
in which a cognitive agent exists. Our proposal is that Internet
use should not be seen as a mere instrumental action to achieve
a goal (and which could be functional or dysfunctional); rather,
we propose treating Internet use as an action situated in the
digital context, as part of a system with a proper structure
and rules. Considering the concept of the Internet as a social
environment, the classical IAD model should be reformulated,
as its implications are obsolete and misleading when applied to
studies on the pathological population or on potential treatments.
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We present a deflationary account of smartphone addiction by situating this purportedly
antisocial phenomenon within the fundamentally social dispositions of our species. While
we agree with contemporary critics that the hyper-connectedness and unpredictable
rewards of mobile technology can modulate negative affect, we propose to place the
locus of addiction on an evolutionarily older mechanism: the human need to monitor
and be monitored by others. Drawing from key findings in evolutionary anthropology
and the cognitive science of religion, we articulate a hypernatural monitoring model of
smartphone addiction grounded in a general social rehearsal theory of human cognition.
Building on recent predictive-processing views of perception and addiction in cognitive
neuroscience, we describe the role of social reward anticipation and prediction errors in
mediating dysfunctional smartphone use. We conclude with insights from contemplative
philosophies and harm-reduction models on finding the right rituals for honoring social
connections and setting intentional protocols for the consumption of social information.
Keywords: smartphone addiction, social neuroscience, evolutionary anthropology, predictive-processing,
cultural affordances, social rehearsal, hungry ghosts
INTRODUCTION
As this paper was undergoing final review, a new wave of editorials about the noxious effects
of smartphone use was sweeping the news. Major Apple shareholders, backed by petitions from
customers, were now demanding that the tech giant address the growing problem of smartphone
addiction and its impact on children’s development (Kawa, 2018). As cognitive scientists who have
studied the impact of the internet on human behavior (Veissière, 2016a,b), our aim is to present a
nuanced view of the relationship between mobile information technology and human well-being.
While we agree that excessive smartphone use can be detrimental to mental health, we aim to
recast current understandings of the mechanisms involved in these addictive patterns in a broader
evolutionary focus.
In this paper, we offer the provocative claim that current moral panics over smartphone
addiction overlook a factor of fundamental importance: there is nothing inherently addictive
about mobile technology. We suggest, rather, that it is the social expectations and rewards
of connecting with other people and seeking to learn from others that induce and sustain
addictive relationships with smartphones. Much has been said about Internet addiction
and the new medias and technologies that connect us and make us lonely at the same
time, leading to adverse mental health consequences (Twenge, 2017).The deeply prosocial
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nature of these mechanisms, however, is often understated.
Compulsive smartphone use, we claim, is not so much antisocial
as fundamentally social. Specifically, we argue that mobile
technology addiction is driven by the human urge to connect with
people, and the related necessity to be seen, heard, thought about,
guided, and monitored by others, that reaches deep in our social
brains and far in our evolutionary past.
Smartphones, we claim, provide a potentially unhealthy
platform for another healthy impulse. As we will see, they can also
enable us to remember and celebrate the role of other people in
making us who we are, and help us treasure the bonds that make
us a uniquely social species.
In fleshing out the social roots of smartphone addiction –
and by extension, of human behavior and well-being – we do
not intend to produce a general meta-theory that dismisses
other, non-social forms of excessive smartphone use. The hyper-
sociality of smart-device addiction, rather, may likely occur on a
continuum from the directly social to the indirectly social.
Playing video-games, outsourcing difficult tasks like
memorizing schedules or spatial orientation, and having instant
access to news and information are among of battery of everyday
smartphone functions that are known to be highly addictive
(Alter, 2017). At a glance, these domains are not readily apparent
as social. From an evolutionary perspective, however, the human
capacity to function optimally in any environment (and indeed
human intelligence itself) is predicated on having access to a
large, cumulative repertoire of contextually relevant cultural
information devised by others, and that no single individual
could invent on her own, or recreate alone in her own lifetime
(Henrich, 2016; Mercier and Sperber, 2017). Seeking news and
information, to put it simply, are ways to learn from others,
and to stay updated on culturally relevant events and people.
Video-gaming is similarly underpinned by social dimensions
that may not be readily visible to users and critics alike. While
many video-games involve explicit social rewards from playing
online with other users (Snodgrass et al., 2016) other uniquely
addictive smartphone games like Candy crush do not. The
unpredictable rewards derived from so-called “ludic loops” of
increased difficulty (Alter, 2017), as we expand in the Section
“Predictive-Processing and Smartphones,” typically activate
neurobiological systems that increase reward-seeking behavior
and addictions in other domains (West et al., 2015). In the next
section, we present findings supporting the hypothesis that most
smartphone notifications, from email and texting to social media,
modulate addictive behavior through the anticipation of social
rewards. The rewards derived from playing games, however,
are social in more indirect ways. The human drive for gaming
and competition, indeed, is also rooted in social evolutionary
mechanisms, in which intra- and inter-group competition
have helped drive the iterative spread of skill, knowledge, and
technology from generation to generation (Bell et al., 2009;
Richerson et al., 2016). In seeking to excel at a difficult game, we
are rehearsing excellence in particular domains of skill, but also in
the domain of social competition itself. Smartphones, as we will
argue, provide a hyper-efficient extension of deep evolutionary
urges for connection with others, learning from others, but also
comparing ourselves to and competing with others.
The Sociality of Smartphone Use
When it comes to smartphone use, current scientific literature
and intuitive wisdom are overwhelmingly pessimistic, warning
us of the dangers these new technologies enable. According to
current research, smartphone use is associated with depression
(Steers et al., 2014; Andreassen et al., 2016), materialism (Lee
et al., 2014; Twenge, 2017), and social anxiety (Billieux et al., 2015;
Emanuel et al., 2015; Hussain et al., 2017), spawning a generation
of anti-social, chronically anxious, self-obsessed ‘zombies’ (Lu
and Lo, 2017). While these findings raise important concerns
about the ‘dark side’ of smartphone use, they tend to focus on
new technologies as the sole locus of addiction and pathology. We
propose to bring this problem into a broader evolutionary focus,
and will go on to argue that the current ‘smartphone obsession’
is neither grounded in, nor indicative of a paradigmatic shift in
the psychosocial context in which human experience is invariably
framed. Popular accounts, we argue, miss the mark on a crucially
important factor: it is not so much smartphones themselves
that are addictive, but rather the sociality that they afford. We
insist that this drive for sociality is a fundamental feature of
human evolution that predates smartphones by hundreds of
thousands – by some accounts several millions – of years (Hrdy,
2007). Simply put, smartphone addiction is hyper-social, not
anti-social.
There is ample evidence to support the claim that smartphone
use is inherently prosocial, and by extension, that this prosociality
is a core locus of smartphone addiction. First, the majority
of smartphone use is spent on social activities such as social
networking, text messaging, and phone calls (Li and Chung, 2006;
Lopez-Fernandez et al., 2014). Even less interactive smartphone
use, like information seeking or surfing the web, has now become
implicitly social: ‘likes’, views, and comments are social indices
of prestige and collective attention. Second, individuals who
use their devices for primarily social purposes are quicker to
develop habitual smartphone use (Van Deursen et al., 2015).
These findings suggest that it is not just the smartphone itself that
is addictive but rather the—direct or indirect—social interaction
it enables.
Gendered dimensions of smartphone addiction provide
further clues into its inherent sociality. Current findings in
evolutionary psychology and social neuroscience indicate that
women are on average more proficient at social cognition and
tend to display more prosocial behavior than men (Eckel and
Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Meier, 2007;
Laasch and Conaway, 2009; Rand et al., 2016; Soutschek et al.,
2017; see Espinosa and Kovárˇík, 2015 for alternate explanations).
This gender discrepancy is maintained in smartphone use, with
numerous studies showing that women use their phones for
social purposes significantly more than men do (Tufekci, 2008;
Van Deursen et al., 2015). According to our hypothesis, the
prosocial nature of female smartphone use would render females
more susceptible to addiction. Recent estimates confirm this
view: females are more likely to develop addictive smartphone
behaviors, experience more anxiety if they cannot use their
smartphones, and feel less in control over checking their
phones (Thompson and Lougheed, 2012; Van Deursen et al.,
2015).
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Imagined Other Minds Guide Our
Expectations
Despite minor gendered differences in social cognition, it is
not controversial that humans as a whole are a prosocial
species. Beyond amply documented findings in developmental
psychology attesting to the intrinsic co-evolutionary links
between cognition and sociality (Moll and Tomasello, 2007;
Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2012), recent research on
mind-wandering has shown that a large part of our spontaneous
mental lives is devoted to rehearsing social scenarios. A recent
large-scale investigation using experience-sampling, for example,
demonstrated that nearly half of waking time is spent in mind-
wandering episodes unrelated to the task at hand (Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010). Although science on daydreaming often
describes the consequences of a wandering mind (e.g., Mrazek
et al., 2013), it is likely premature to believe that a cognitive
function that occupies such a large percentage of mental
life does not confer some adaptive benefit. To explain the
ubiquity of mind-wandering, Poerio and Smallwood (2016)
have proposed that the phenomenon is evolutionarily adaptive,
serving as a platform for offline social cognition. Supporting
this view, research shows that all but a small fraction of
daydreaming involves social scenarios (Mar et al., 2012; Song and
Wang, 2012). Moreover, mind-wandering and social cognition
rely on shared neural activation, whereby the neural activity
that occurs during daydreaming significantly overlaps with
that of core social processes like mentalizing and perspective
taking – the very processes that enable an individual to socially
flourish (Poerio and Smallwood, 2016). Recent models on the
evolution of depression help confirm this social hypothesis
for the mechanisms of ordinary cognition. In a series of
influential papers, Paul Andrews and colleagues have argued that
‘depression’ (a disorder characterized by cognitive rumination)
confers specific social advantages to help keep social problems
in mental focus. Again, it is of note that women (who are
demonstrably more proficient than men at social cognition)
experience depression at much higher rates than men. Andrews
and colleagues see this as further evidence that a significant
part of mental life is dedicated to rehearsing social scenarios
(Andrews and Thomson, 2009; Andrews et al., 2012, 2015). All
in all, a growing consensus between developmental psychology,
cognitive neuroscience, and phenomenology strongly suggests
that humans are almost always thinking about and through other
people (Frith, 2002; Tomasello, 2009; Mar et al., 2012; Ramstead
et al., 2016). The time is ripe, then, to elaborate a generalized
social rehearsal theory of cognition. In the following sections, we
expand on this theory and apply it to smartphone use.
Social Media and Internet Notifications
as Hyper-Natural Monitoring
In a series of recent papers, Ramstead et al. (2016; see
also Ramstead et al., 2017; Veissière, 2017) have described
symbolically enriched human worlds as organized landscapes of
“cultural affordances” grounded in mutual, recursively nested
expectations about shared standards of behavior. ‘Culture’, on
this view can be conceptualized as patterned allocations of
attention; that is, the practice of selectively paying attention,
ascribing meaning, and guiding behavior to certain features of
the world according to what we expect others to also expect
and pay attention to. While what is made salient through
collectively shaped attentional preferences acquires different
values and affords different experiences from group to group,
the capacity for shared attention extrapolated to large groups of
generalized ‘like me’ others is a species-wide disposition – the
very disposition, mediated by joint-intentionality, that gives rise
to cultural forms of life among Homo Sapiens (Ramstead et al.,
2016; Veissière, 2017).
On this view, over the course of normal cognitive and
social development, humans learn to see the world through
the perspective of other people and intuitively imagine context-
relevant agents (usually imbued with prestige) to guide them
in their actions (Veissière, 2017). From context to context and
moment to moment, we outsource a large part of our thinking,
feelings, and decision-making to sometimes explicit, most often
implicit scenarios of the “what would so-and-so think, feel, or
expect me to do” variety.
This reassuring feeling of being watched and guided by
imaginary others has been hypothesized to play an important
role in the evolution of cooperation, morality, organized
religion, and large-scale social life (Whitehouse, 2004; Boyer,
2008; Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Atran and Henrich, 2010;
Norenzayan et al., 2013). According to this view, often called the
super-natural monitoring hypothesis, we fashioned our Gods and
Spirits to better flesh out the imaginary agents that guide our
ordinary cognition, consciousness, action, and moral attitudes.
Instant text messaging, email, and social media provide a
platform for our hungry need to be connected, but also for
our need to watch and monitor others, and better still, for our
need to be seen, heard from, thought about, monitored, judged,
and appraised by others. We might call this the hyper-natural
monitoring hypothesis.
The prevailing – and hyperbolic – view on smartphone use is
that it is a sly weapon, responsible for pandemic-like waves of
mass loneliness, anxiety, insecurity, materialism, and narcissism
among today’s youth – particularly the so-called ‘digital natives’
born after 1994 (Roberts et al., 2015; Weiser, 2015; Pearson
and Hussain, 2015; Twenge, 2017). As Jean Twenge has pointed
out in her recent book on digital natives (Twenge, 2017), the
advent of electronically mediated childhoods in the West was
also concurrent with a general shift in parenting culture, and
the rise of so-called ‘helicopter parenting’1 in particular. Drawing
on extensive survey research, she points out that children and
youth born after 1994 spent considerably less unsupervised time
socializing with their peers than their forebears, and significantly
more time on electronic devices. While precise causality behind
1“Helicopter parenting” is used as a derogatory term to describe obsessive parental
supervision in most dimensions of children’s lives. Although the phrase first
appeared in the l9600s (Ginott, 1965/2009), it is often said to characterize the
post-1980s childrearing culture of “hovering around” one’s child. “Lawnmower
parenting” (where one paves the way for children in all aspects of their lives),
is sometimes used to describe more extreme forms of helicopter parenting. In
November 2017, the Economist reported that parents in the United States and
nine European countries (except for France), now spent 50% more time with their
children than in 1965 (The Economist, 2017).
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these two correlated factors cannot be ascertained, we can only
note that youth who otherwise do not interact with their peers
“in real life” (irl in internet lingo) seek to do so with the means
available to their generation. Online-mediated life, more to the
point, is always, already real life, and as such, it is inherently
social.
What current moral panics about digital media often fail to
consider, thus, is that the desire to see and be seen, and judge and be
judged is precisely about other people. There is nothing abnormal,
as such, about seeking self-worth through other people’s point of
view. We propose, thus, to think of this urge as fundamentally
normal, and anchored in core mechanisms of social cognition
that are distinct to our species. On our social rehearsal and
monitoring view, smartphones simply equip us with a novel
medium to channel innate human sociality. Their proclivity to
induce addiction, in turn, simply points to how much others
matter to us and how we want to matter to them.
PREDICTIVE-PROCESSING AND
SMARTPHONES
If the primary motivation of smartphone use is prosocial, why
can this technology lead to such negative outcomes? We turn to
the science of addiction to describe how mobile technology in
particular has sent us into a vortex of anxiety-inducing, hyper-
excited, hyper-monitoring.
A Brief Venture into the Neuroscience of
Addiction
The exact nature and neurochemical correlates of smartphone
addiction are currently unknown (Elhai et al., 2017). Key insights
from the neuroscience of learning and addiction, however, can
offer important insights into our attachment to the strange
flickering and buzzing bricks that seem to regulate our lives.
As we have seen, smartphone use is at once constitutive of and
constituted by a complex landscape of sociality. This landscape,
however, is also modulated by notifications from dozens of
applications that deliver beeps and buzzes, mostly to alert us that
another human has interacted with us. We should now consider
where and how ‘addiction’ fits in this picture. Social interaction
(digital or not) activates the dopaminergic reward circuits in the
basal ganglia (See Krach et al., 2010 for a review). It is important
to note that these same circuits are implicated in addictive
drug use (Belin et al., 2009), compulsive video-gaming, and
reward-seeking in general (West et al., 2015). These are circuits
that are also responsible for associative learning: the process
by which an individual learns to associate two stimuli (Hebb,
1976; Seger, 2006; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). For associative
learning to occur, an initial exposure to a new stimulus must
occur alongside a reflex-eliciting stimulus. With a smartphone,
nearly all notifications that the user encounters elicit a social
value and thus activate the dopaminergic reward circuit, leading
the user to anticipate and seek these rewarding notifications.
With each occurrence this link grows stronger, and the user will
anticipate and seek these rewarding notifications, paving the road
for habitual behavior.
The dopaminergic system regulates two functions that govern
addiction: the anticipation of reward and outcome evaluation
(Linnet, 2014). An important finding about dopamine and
addiction, however, is that dopaminergic surges typically occur
before the reward, or more precisely when a cue (e.g., a beep
indicating that one can press a lever) signals the reliable
delivery of a reward (e.g., from pulling a lever). Because
arousal decreases with frequent and predictable exposure, reward
anticipation is a much more powerful mediator of strong
addictions than outcome evaluations of the stimulus itself
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; van Holst et al., 2012). According to this
finding, addictions become strongest when we cannot figure out
the pattern of when to reliably expect them (van Holst et al.,
2012). Behavioral scientists call these addiction-inducing patterns
intermittent reinforcement or variable ratio schedules (Zuriff,
1970). Neuroscientists have identified that a cue triggering a
behavior that yields a reward 50% of the time is by far the most
anxiety-inducing of delivery schedules. A reward delivered 75%
of the time, for example can be reliably expected to deliver most
of the time. A cue signaling a reward that delivers 25% of the
time can similarly be expected not to deliver most of the time.
Such high-predictability schedules (when the brain can reliably
predict what is going to happen) typically trigger low arousal. At
a 50% delivery rate, a reward schedule is still predictable enough
to be enticing, but unpredictable enough to be anxiety-inducing
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).
The point to take home here is that arousal is more highly
correlated with reward anticipation than with the reward itself.
When rewards become most unpredictable, in turn, arousal
typically becomes negative, giving rise to anxiety (Figure 1).
Indeed, the beeps and buzzes of smartphone notifications
provide just such an intermittent, variable, unpredictable, but
uniquely desirable schedule of rarely met anticipation rewards,
thus providing chaotic patterns of reward anticipation that
trigger very strong modes of arousal. Because of the deeply social
nature of the rewards our phones make us crave, we often become
entrenched in vicious cycle of addiction (Figure 1).
Cravings as Prediction Errors
According to predictive-processing and free-energy theories of
cognition, we do not immediately perceive the world as it is.
Rather than directly respond to environmental stimulus, we
first process information through our expectations. Immediate
perception, in other words, first occurs through behavioral self-
predictions modulated by prior experience (Friston and Kiebel,
2009; Ramstead et al., 2016). On this view, our brains generate
statistical models of the world based on prior learning to
provide us with predictions of what will arise in experience
and how to act accordingly. In doing so our brains predict
upcoming sensory states and compare them with actual sensory
states, minimizing the differences between these distributions
through constant updates of priors and actions (i.e., learning)
(Ramstead et al., 2016, 2017). As our perceptual system constantly
attempts to reduce uncertainty by computing abysmal amounts
of disordered information to make it predictable, discrepancies
between prediction and perception – prediction errors in the
lingo – become commonplace. Cravings, on this view, could
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FIGURE 1 | Dopaminergic Activity in Response to Uncertain Stimuli (adapted from Fiorillo et al., 2003, Figure 3C). Average Sustained activation of dopamine
neurons in a primate as a function of reward probability, whereby the greatest dopaminergic activity occurs when the reward is present half of the time.
FIGURE 2 | Cue-activated reward anticipation and prediction errors and subsequent dopaminergic activity (adapted from Keiflin and Janak, 2015). (A) Before the
cue is conditioned, the unexpected reward results in phasic activation of dopamine neurons and a positive reward prediction error. (B) Once a reward is conditioned,
the cue (and not the reward) results in a positive reward anticipation and increased dopamine activity. (C) When the cue occurs but is met without the expected
award, the result is a negative prediction error and a reduction of dopamine activity below baseline.
be conceptualized as prediction errors (Tobler et al., 2006)
(Figures 2, 3).
As we mentioned above, associative learning and free-
energy models can explain the pervasive expectation that
the anticipation of smartphone notifications predicts an
upcoming social reward. In turn, the intermittent schedule of
smartphone notifications promotes stronger anticipations and
more compulsive expectations, subsequently inducing prediction
errors and affective disappointment.
Notifications are cues for checking behavior that eventually
becomes habitual, even without the initial alert (Oulasvirta et al.,
2012; Elhai et al., 2017). Recent studies reveal the magnitude
of this habitual checking behavior, with the average individual
spending over 3 h a day on their smartphone (Alter, 2017),
tapping, typing, or swiping an average of 2617 times every
day (dscout, 2016). The majority of users go on to experience
prediction errors in the form of hallucinations that their phone
is vibrating, a phenomenon entitled phantom phone (Sauer et al.,
2015). These prediction errors reinforce habitual phone checking
behaviors, which are a common gateway to smartphone addiction
(Oulasvirta et al., 2012). Prediction errors can also occur in more
subtle, but equally frequent and distressing way when precise
patterned expectations are not met: a beep that we hope may be a
message from a loved one or a Instagram ‘like’, for example, may
turn out to be an incoming spam email or a message from one’s
boss about an overdue task.
THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL
MONITORING?
Key models of ordinary cognition, like predictive processing,
free-energy, associative learning, and social rehearsal, all offer
clues to elucidate the newfangled phenomenon of smartphone
addiction. We have seen that smartphone addiction harnesses
basic human proclivities for social monitoring and associative
learning. While we largely intend this paper to add a hopeful note
about potentially healthy social causes of smartphone addiction
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FIGURE 3 | (A–D) Presents an extrapolation of the data presented in Figure 2 to the present issue of smartphone addiction, whereby the dopamine activity
increases at the anticipation of reward, and is reduced below baseline in cases where the expected reward is not met.
amidst current panics, we cannot dismiss the growing consensus
described above on such negative outcomes as depression,
anxiety, and loneliness.
Smartphone use and depression are strongly correlated,
and one causal theory suggests that smartphones, which are
frequently used to access social networks, provide a platform
for which to frequently (often negatively) compare oneself to
others (Steers et al., 2014). We have argued, however, that social
monitoring is a fundamentally normal – indeed necessary – part
of ordinary human cognition. Classical evolutionary accounts
of this propensity have emphasized the human fondness for
gossip (Dunbar, 2004) and social comparison (Festinger, 1954)
as conferring adaptive advantages to assess threats, track trends
and shifts in others’ social status, and locate credible sources
of cultural information and behavioral guides (Henrich, 2016).
We add that comparing ourselves to others and against cultural
norms also enables us to derive meaning, motivation, purpose,
and a sense of identity. With socially connected smartphones,
this evolutionary process simply runs on overdrive. We can now
constantly and relentlessly engage in hyper-speed comparisons
with social media content that is biased toward positivity. As
media researchers have suggested, this continual stream of
positive information about others allows users to repeatedly
perform upward social comparisons and negative self-evaluations
against a so-called “highlight reel” (Steers et al., 2014). Despite the
obvious antigenic nature of cyber-mediated social comparisons,
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these accounts fail to acknowledge that the desire to socially
connect is an even stronger motivator of smartphone use than
the desire to do better than others.
To further address the non-benign concerns of smartphone
overuse, the following section will once again employ theories
of ordinary cognition to propose actions individuals can take to
build happy, healthy relationships with mobile technology.
FEEDING OUR HUNGRY GHOSTS
If smartphone addiction rests on the fundamentally human
proclivity toward prosociality, we can also learn to harness our
social nature to pacify our cravings – or as Buddhic philosophies
would put it, we can learn to sate our hungry ghosts.
In classical Buddhism, all creatures are said to undergo six life
cycles, or go through six realms of existence (Levitt, 2003; Maté,
2008). They begin in Hell, where their life is described as constant
torture, before moving on to the realm of Hungry Ghosts, where
they are plagued by insatiable thirst, hunger, and cravings. Next
comes the realm of Animals: a world of servitude and stupidity.
This realm is followed by Asura, a world of anger, jealousy, and
never-ending conflict. The Human realm comes next: a world of
contradictions and indecisiveness; sweet and sour, hot and cold,
happy and sad, good and evil. The human realm is a world of
almost-thereness – wisdom and enlightenment are within reach,
but never quite attained. Whether the next world of Deva-gati,
or Heavenly Beings, offers final relief is open for debate (Levitt,
2003). It is world of intense pleasures, with intense miseries
to match. Freedom from suffering, in the end, seems nowhere
to be found. On a contemporary psychological reading, the Six
Realms metaphor can also describe the quality and intentionality
(aboutness) of the various states of consciousness and affect one
will routinely encounter throughout the course of a day.
The Hungry Ghosts in this story can be understood as the
state that regulates our cravings. This idea likely predates Buddhic
philosophies, and is found in earlier Indian religions under
the Sanskrit name Preta (Levitt, 2003). Pretas are supernatural
creatures plagued by insatiable hunger and thirst. They have
enormous stomachs, but very thin necks that can only support
eating tiny things. In many Buddhist and Zen rituals, such as
the Oryoki approach to eating and living, a single grain of rice
is offered to Hungry Ghosts to acknowledge their existence and
appease them a little (Levitt, 2003). The key here is to feed our
Hungry Ghosts, and to find just the right amount. As we discuss
further in our conclusion, this is consistent with harm-reduction
approaches to addiction treatment that advocate responsible use
over abstinence (Marlatt, 1996; Marlatt et al., 2011).
Recognizing smartphone cravings as Hungry Ghosts presents
the opportunity to turn phone addiction into a intentional, just-
enough ritual.
Set Intentional Protocols
Many smartphone users feel trapped by their phones (Harmon
and Mazmanian, 2013). The first step toward freedom from
phone Hungry Ghosts, as we have seen, is to regain control
of the pattern and make it predictable again. Switching off
all sounds and notifications can help to ‘un-ring’ Pavlov’s
proverbial bell and cull habitual checking behaviors. As we
described above, smartphone addiction is mediated by the
grasp of intermittent reinforcement schedules of social rewards.
With this in mind, setting regular intervals to check one’s
phone can reduce the strong cravings that arise from chaotic
patterns of reward anticipation. When it comes to instant phone-
mediated communication, we can also make our intentions and
expectations transparent, and agree on protocols with others.
Clear workplace communication policies, for example, those that
prohibit evening and weekend emails, or setting clear expectation
for time-windows in replying have been shown to be effective in
reducing stress and increasing productivity (Mark et al., 2012).
Similar ‘policies’ and clear expectations for when to text or not to
text – what we call ‘intentional protocols’ – can be devised among
friends, families and lovers.
CONCLUSION
Like all natural proclivities, social monitoring and rehearsal can
turn into Hungry Ghosts. The parallel with natural hunger and
eating bear relevance to our argument about mobile technology.
Blaming the rice, utensils, or kitchenware for one’s insatiable
gluttony does not so much deflate the problem as miss the
mark entirely. The root of addictions, as we have seen, is not
in substances or rewards themselves, and much less in the
technologies that deliver such rewards, but in the anticipation
of rewards and in delivery schedules and rituals. The hard truth
about cravings is that they are ultimately self-referential: cravings
are about cravings first and foremost.
Smartphones and mobile technologies are not the root cause
of modern distress. In post-industrial environments where foods
are abundant and readily available, our cravings for fat and sugar
sculpted by distant evolutionary pressures can easily go into
insatiable overdrive and lead to obesity, diabetes, and rampant
heart disease (Henrich, 2016; Harari, 2017). As we argued in
this paper, the prosocial needs and rewards of a physically
weak species that relied on collective parenting (Hrdy, 2009)
and distributed knowledge (Tomasello, 2014; Henrich, 2016) to
survive and carve a moral niche in a harsh world can similarly be
hijacked to produce a manic theater of hyper-social monitoring.
Smartphones may be equated to hyper-efficient kitchenware.
Both technologies help optimize the processing and delivery of
specific kinds of basic needs: food on the one hand, and social
information on the other. The key to eating well and being
good social beings lies in finding the quality and intensity of
consumption rituals. As in the oriyoki ‘just the right amount’
hungry ghost feeding ritual, the recipe lies in setting appropriate
intentions, quality of awareness, and pacing for the time, place,
and amount of information, connection, and comparison one will
consume. Turning off notifications, as we have seen, has been
shown to help users regain control of when and why to check their
devices intentionally (Alter, 2017). When used to judicious social
ends, smartphone and social media use can yield many positive
outcomes, from increased subjective well-being (Kim and Lee,
2011) to better romantic relationships (Steers et al., 2014).
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To conclude, we recognize that there is a controversy
in addiction research between abstinence-based and harm-
reduction approaches (Marlatt, 1996; Marlatt et al., 2011). The
latter approach, which we advocate in this article, supports safe
and responsible use, and consideration of the complexities of
the social context in which people are drawn to substance use.
While recent studies have shown that temporarily giving up
certain social media activities could increase subjective well-
being (see Alter, 2017, for a review), the professional and
social consequences of giving up smartphone use altogether are
currently not known, and are likely to be costly in a age that
requires instant connection in so many domains of social life.
Individuals, rather, can mobilize their intrinsic drive toward
sociality to mitigate the negative and increase the positive effects
of smartphone use. Pursuing healthy social connection is the
antidote. Rather than use smartphones to compare our lives to
the distorted slice of reality others present, we can use them as
communication tools to foster genuine emotional relationships.
When competitive comparison seems inevitable, we can subvert
into a motivator or reminder of our own unique skills – or better
yet, we can cultivate genuine joy for the achievements of others
(Chandra, 2017).
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In the last 20 years, the debate on the role of emotions in the field of industrial design has grown
exponentially. Emotional Design emerged as the effort to promote positive emotions (Norman,
2007) or pleasure in users (Jordan, 2002; Green and Jordan, 2003) by means of design properties of
products and services. According to Van Gorp and Adams (2012), design based on emotions can
affect overall user experience deeply, since emotions influence decision making, affect attention,
memory, and generate meaning. It is possible to identify twomain approaches to applied emotional
design. The first is based on the modification of object’s aesthetic appearance or interface, the latter
focuses on promoting fluent and engaging interactions.
Both these approaches pertain to technology design, which includes especially common-use
technological products. Regarding the first approach, several studies showed the importance of
emotional aspects as drivers of market success, enjoinment, and active usage of technologies.
For instance, Desmet et al. (2007) demonstrated that users attributed a “wow effect” (i.e., the
combination of fascination, pleasant surprise, and desire) to those cellphones having some pleasant
features in their exteriors. Studies inmultimedia learning (Um et al., 2012; Plass et al., 2013) showed
that embedding emotional stimuli (e.g., face-like shapes, vibrant colors) into interfaces elicited
positive emotions in learners and improved learning outcomes.
The second perspective considers fluid interactions as a fundamental factor for an overall
positive experience of use (Hancock et al., 2005; Hassenzahl and Tractinsky, 2006). This approach
includes design based on the concept of psychological flow, namely an optimal experience of
total absorption in a task when agent’s skills and environmental challenges are both at a high
level and balanced (Csikzentmihalyi, 1988; Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Research demonstrated that
flow experience is quite common in technology usage (Pilke, 2004; Triberti et al., 2016), such as
in video games (Cowley et al., 2008; Jin, 2012; Argenton et al., 2014) and personal computer-
mediated activities (Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 2003; Skadberg and Kimmel, 2004). For this
reason, flow-inspired design models have been created and applied to the design of interactive
digital technologies such as educational games and augmented reality (Alexiou et al., 2012; Neal,
2012). Other approaches for promoting emotions by engagement are gamification or the inclusion
of game mechanics in interfaces (such as, prizes, achievements. . . ) and interactive storytelling,
which frames interaction within emotional scenarios with compelling characters, events, and
motives (Morford et al., 2014).
The objective of the present contribution is to extend the discourse on emotional design,
highlighting that technology designers can rely on other components beyond the above-mentioned
aesthetic and engagement ones, in order to create innovative and effective devices. Indeed, emotions
have further aspects that could be exploited by emotional designers. For instance, emotions
are also cognitive processes—based on appraisal component—with a notable influence on the
overall quality of interaction. According to this perspective, new technologies can be considered
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and treated as opportunities to manipulate, enhance and trigger
different discrete, and even complex emotional states. Finally,
emotions can “participate” to interactions (instead of being a
mere byproduct of it), by providing inputs to digital technologies
to modify or influence final outputs.
This contribution explores opportunities provided by
conceiving emotions as cognitive processes and active agents of
interactions, in the field of emotional design.
Since Affective computing studies (Picard, 2003; Tao and
Tan, 2005), designer have developed computers able to sense,
recognize, and express emotions. New technologies combined
with ubiquitous and wearable sensing become able to adapt
to users’ actual emotional states. For example, video games
content changes (e.g., becoming more or less challenging)
according to gamers’ emotional state (e.g., bored or frustrated;
Gilleade et al., 2005). Also mobile apps have been integrated
with biofeedback sensors to promote positive emotions and
relaxation (Serino et al., 2014). For instance, users can learn to
monitor and control their emotional states by looking at virtual
environments features (e.g., a burning fire) changing according to
their psychophysiological activation. Affective Design (Reynolds
and Picard, 2001) has shown that “emotional design” could
be conceived not only as the inclusion of pleasant and/or
engaging aspects in interfaces to augment pleasure, but also as
the recognition and measurement of emotions to provide inputs
to the technology and modify its functioning.
However, we argue that this approach, which is mainly
based on general affect and moods, can be extended to
discrete emotions, each characterized by a specific pattern of
appraisal (i.e., emotion’s cognitive profile). Studies on appraisal
showed that an emotional episode emerges when one evaluates
his/her own relationship with the surroundings (Roseman,
1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1993; Aue and Scherer, 2008; So
et al., 2015). This automatic and subjective evaluation is based
on specific properties of the stimulus such as relevance and
congruence to personal goals or agency (oneself, others, or
impersonal causes of the event), coping potential and control
(Moors et al., 2013). The results of such evaluations bring
about specific discrete emotions. Discrete emotional events
are separable, distinguishable, and identifiable emotional state
inducing changes into psychophysiology, behavior, motivation,
judgment, and experience (Lench et al., 2011). Specifically,
a discrete emotional event such as surprise, disgust, fear,
would emerge after this first evaluation of the stimulus. After
the appraisal component has been activated, a motivation to
approach or avoid the stimulus follows (Moors et al., 2013).
Furthermore, also changes in physiological parameters are
involved, ranging from perspiration to muscle contraction.
Finally, emotions are subjectively felt, since they can be described
by the subject or can be quantified through numerical scales
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2016), usually based on arousal (high/low
intensity) and valence (positive/negative) aspects of the emotion
at least (Mattek et al., 2017).
In our opinion, the scientific knowledge of discrete emotions
based on their cognitive components—appraisal—can be easily
translated into initial guidelines to develop a cognitive science-
informed emotional design.
For instance, a field in which a partial discrete emotional
approach was combined with affective is automotive technologies
design (Ho and Spence, 2013). Nasoz et al. (2010) successfully
tested a multi-modal intelligent car interface based on
psychophysiological signals, able to classify driver’s discrete
emotional state as fear, boredom or anger that can be used to
tune multisensory features of the car environment accordingly
to help prevent accidents. In this case, technologies provide
unprecedented opportunities to record even discrete users’
emotional states (monitoring emotions), in order to tailor final
outcomes. Future research in emotional design may explore
how the continuous measurement of specific emotions can be
exploited to influence ongoing interaction with common-use
technology, for example modifying real-time easiness of use
of devices or selecting digital content depending on the users’
ongoing emotional responses.
A lot have been done, but we argue that still more can
be done relying on an appraisal-based discrete emotion design
approach. Indeed, appraisal theories of emotion have a lot to
offer emotional design (Desmet, 2003; Bordegoni et al., 2014;
Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 2014). Drawing on the scientific
literature on discrete emotions as cognitive process, it is possible
to expand the kinds of emotions that designers can reproduce
and promote. Insofar emotions are considered as discrete events
emerging from a specific pattern of appraisal themes (Smith and
Lazarus, 1993), the more these themes are detailed, the higher
the number of emotions and emotional nuances a designer can
detect and control. For instance, sadness’ core appraisal concerns
an irrevocable loss (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991). If
we detail this core appraisal, we can distinguish different kinds of
sadness, such as melancholy, disappointment.
Such approach not only allows distinguishing different
emotional nuances but it can also provide suggestions about
reaching and promoting specific complex emotional states
which include several single discrete emotional sub-components.
Indeed, intervening on aesthetic appeal of interfaces allows
designers to promote a general positive feeling in users, that is
what has been done by most current approaches. However, the
scientific literature can provide indications to elicit even specific
complex emotions simply basing on their pattern of appraisal.
For instance, one is the emotion of awe or the deep feeling of
wonder, astonishment and fear people experience when facing
stimuli perceived as incredible and incommensurable (Keltner
and Haidt, 2003) (e.g., looking at vast panoramas; witnessing
childbirth; etc.). Emotional appraisal leading to the experience
of awe includes two distinctive elements, namely the feeling of
vastness (perceptual or conceptual) and need for accommodation
(i.e., the need for updating one’s mental schemas to adapt them to
the extraordinary). Recent research demonstrated that immersive
technologies (e.g., Virtual Reality and 360◦ immersive videos)
can be used to induce profound awe experiences in controlled
environments, such as the lab (Gallagher et al., 2014; Chirico
et al., 2016, 2017; Gaggioli et al., 2016). For instance, Chirico
et al. (2017) were able to grasp subtle differences in the emergence
of awe considering both self-reported and psychophysiological
measures of this emotion. Awe resulted in a “freezing” response
in front of something perceived vast and whose intensity can
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FIGURE 1 | A resume of the development guidelines for a “scientific” Emotional Design, based on the human centered design phases according to ISO 9241
(hatching stands for possible iteration). While the second guideline in the table regards appraisal-based generation of emotion, the first and the third constitute
examples of emotions participating in design.
be enhanced by placing a user inside a 360◦ immersive virtual
environment even with a low degree of interactivity. Appraisal
dimensions of this emotion were analyzed in relation with the
psychophysiological ones, thus providing a clearer picture of the
emotional process.
In the emotional design, another important aspect concerns
that emotions are closely intertwined over a continuous stream
within subjects’ experience. The sub-components of emotional
episodes influence each other and subsequent emotional
responses. For example, sad people are more likely to attribute
agency of subsequent stimuli to others and the external world,
because sadness is an emotion experienced toward events one
cannot control (Han et al., 2007). Angry people are more likely
to transfer anger to the next event to be evaluated in the
surroundings (Beaudry et al., 2010; Darban and Polites, 2016).
In other words, emotions do not appear “out of nowhere”
as the simple byproduct of a given stimulus and its appraisal.
Instead, they are influenced by previous emotional states,
or pre-existing individual traits, dispositions, and contextual
factors (Verduyn and Brans, 2012; Kim et al., 2016). Therefore,
a technology designer working with emotions should be
able to identify and measure emotional profiles or pre-
existing individual/contextual characteristics that can influence
the effectiveness of emotion-based technological services. For
example, smartphones can be designed to elicit reactions such as
surprise (Desmet et al., 2007). Nevertheless, such emotional state
is not lasting in time, rather it tends to disappear shortly after
the first encounters with the stimulus, since surprise arises from
unexpected and novel events (Horstmann, 2006). Emotional
designer should be able to create technologies updating according
to users’ personal information, in order to renovate the emotion
of surprise continuously. In other words, they should design
technological products able to actively adapt their outcomes to
users’ everyday life in line with individuals’ peculiarities. This
would allow designers promoting lasting emotional benefits such
as loyalty, satisfaction, and possibly happiness and well-being.
Although such ability largely depends on the designer’s ability,
it is possible to empower one’s capacity to analyze emotional
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profiles of users by employing User Centered Design research
techniques (Abras et al., 2004; Garrett, 2010; Lowdermilk, 2013;
Triberti and Liberati, 2014; Triberti and Barello, 2016), especially
those involving the observation of users in the context of use
(Viitanen, 2011) and those resuming typical users’ needs and
emotional benefits (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Miaskiewicz
and Kozar, 2011). Collecting data on users’ habits, intentions and
context could help the designer to tailor technologies on their
pre-existing emotional stream, within a user-centered design
framework.
Finally, the advancement of common-use technology,
combined with the knowledge available in cognitive science
literature, could provide designers with extraordinary
possibilities to fully exploit emotions’ potential for user
experience (see Figure 1 for resume). In our opinion, this
new approach could be based on: (1) the assessment of
discrete emotions in an ongoing interaction to provide on-
line modifications of interfaces (affective computing/affective
design); (2) relying on scientific literature on emotions as discrete
cognitive processes, to promote even complex emotions, and (3)
analyzing users’ “emotional profiles” to tailor technologies on
their pre-existing emotional traits, within a user-centered design
framework.
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Acquired brain injury patients often report navigation impairments. A cognitive
rehabilitation therapy has been designed in the form of a serious game. The aim of
the serious game is to aid patients in the development of compensatory navigation
strategies by providing exercises in 3D virtual environments on their home computers.
The objective of this study was to assess the usability of three critical gaming attributes:
movement control in 3D virtual environments, instruction modality and feedback timing.
Thirty acquired brain injury patients performed three tasks in which objective measures
of usability were obtained. Mouse controlled movement was compared to keyboard
controlled movement in a navigation task. Text-based instructions were compared to
video-based instructions in a knowledge acquisition task. The effect of feedback timing
on performance and motivation was examined in a navigation training game. Subjective
usability ratings of all design options were assessed using questionnaires. Results
showed that mouse controlled interaction in 3D environments is more effective than
keyboard controlled interaction. Patients clearly preferred video-based instructions over
text-based instructions, even though video-based instructions were not more effective in
context of knowledge acquisition and comprehension. No effect of feedback timing was
found on performance and motivation in games designed to train navigation abilities.
Overall appreciation of the serious game was positive. The results provide valuable
insights in the design choices that facilitate the transfer of skills from serious games
to real-life situations.
Keywords: spatial navigation, acquired brain injury, usability, serious game, rehabilitation, cognitive training
INTRODUCTION
Serious games are games that are designed for a primary purpose other than entertainment
(Michael and Chen, 2005). The key concept of serious gaming is the implementation of game
attributes and game mechanisms to engage users toward achieving real-life goals. While many
of these game attributes and mechanics are adapted from the entertainment video games,
their underlying concepts correspond well to ideas originating in fields such as behaviorism,
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constructivism, and neuroscience (Yusoff et al., 2009). As such,
effective implementation of goals, feedback, rules, challenges and
fantasy elements enhances the motivation and engagement of
users toward achieving learning outcomes (Garris et al., 2002;
Yusoff et al., 2009; Charsky, 2010).
Over the past decade, serious gaming has proliferated
into different areas such as healthcare, military, corporate,
education and government (Susi et al., 2007). A notable
application of serious gaming is its introduction into the field
of neuropsychological rehabilitation. Acquired brain injuries
(e.g., stroke, traumatic brain injury and brain tumors) are
highly prevalent in modern society (Ma et al., 2014; Peeters
et al., 2015). Cognitive and behavioral deficits resulting from
acquired brain injury have a profound effect on many daily
life activities of these patients (Fann et al., 1995). The aim of
neuropsychological rehabilitation is to aid brain injured patients
in overcoming impairments and disabilities and to facilitate
a return to usual self-care and daily activities (Dobkin and
Dorsch, 2013). Rehabilitation programs often span over several
months and require patients to engage in repeated exercises or
mental rehearsals. Furthermore, patients are often required to
continue with home-based therapies after they are discharged
from hospital care (Trialists, 2004). The combination of home-
training, repetition of exercises, and high treatment costs provide
interesting opportunities for innovative approaches such as
serious gaming in rehabilitation.
A distinction can be made between physical and cognitive
rehabilitation. Physical rehabilitation focusses on motor abilities
and sensorimotor functioning. Serious games have been
developed to aid in the rehabilitation of balance impairments
(Betker et al., 2006), motor functions of the hand (Afyouni
et al., 2017) and the upper limbs (Broeren et al., 2008; Yoo
et al., 2014), for instance. Motor rehabilitation games take a
restitution-based rehabilitation approach, in which the aim
is to restore impaired functions through intense and repeated
stimulation of that function (Wolf et al., 2002). Consequently, the
application of serious games in physical rehabilitation benefits
from the motivational and engaging components of video
games. Furthermore, adaptive difficulty systems implemented
through game mechanics, allow for the presentation of adequate
challenges, further tailoring to the need of patients in the
program.
Serious gaming in cognitive rehabilitation is less common. As
of now, several serious games in cognitive rehabilitation have
been developed with the intention of directly training cognitive
functions by incorporating mental exercises in games (‘brain
training’). Brain training games such as “Lumosity” aim to
strengthen attention, working memory and executive functions
(Sternberg et al., 2013). The approach taken in these programs
is similar to the restitution-based rehabilitation approach taken
in serious games for motor rehabilitation, as patients repeatedly
perform short task with increasing difficulty. Most brain training
games have been developed for healthy elderly and persons with
mild cognitive impairments. Randomized controlled trial studies
have been performed to assess the effectiveness of brain training
games in patients with cognitive impairments as a result of brain
injuries. Evidence for the effectiveness of these brain training
games in this population is inconclusive, as the effects of the
training generally do not generalize beyond the training itself
(Zickefoose et al., 2013; van de Ven et al., 2017).
Contrary to restitution-based rehabilitation, compensation-
based rehabilitation has not been thoroughly explored with
serious games. Compensation training is based on the concept
that cognitive deficits can be overcome by substituting different
latent skills or by acquiring new skills (Dixon and Bäckman,
1999). Compensatory training is one of the most important
techniques in neurologic rehabilitation of acquired brain
injury (Cicerone et al., 2000, 2005, 2011). Accordingly, the
Cognitive Rehabilitation Task Force of the American Congress
of Rehabilitation Medicine Brain Injury Interdisciplinary Special
Interest Group has recommended compensation training as
standard practice for memory impairments after traumatic brain
injury and stroke (Cicerone et al., 2011).
Serious games designed to train compensation strategies
will have additional design considerations compared to games
designed to stimulate engagement. Aside from the affective
components, emphasis is placed on the cognitive and educational
components of the applications. Compensation strategies trained
in serious games need to be transferred to daily activities.
This requires patients to have a general understanding of the
cognitive function that will be compensated and their own
impairments regarding this function. Novel strategies will need
to be introduced and trained. Finally, patients need to learn how
and when a novel strategy can be applied in real-life situations
(Geusgens et al., 2007).
In the current project, we have developed a serious game
for the rehabilitation of spatial navigation impairments after
acquired brain injury. Navigation impairments are common
among stroke patients and have profound effects on the quality
of life, as patients experience reduced mobility, autonomy
and spatial anxiety (van der Ham et al., 2013). Even though
navigational impairments in stroke patients are prevalent,
no standardized rehabilitation training is currently available.
A recent article advocates a compensatory approach to the
rehabilitation of navigation impaired patients (Claessen et al.,
2016). Instead of focusing on the rehabilitation of impaired
cognitive function (such as memory or attention), The authors
propose that the rehabilitation training should focus on training
patients to use an alternative navigation strategy. Claessen
et al. (2016) identified patients’ impaired components of the
navigational ability through an extensive diagnosis procedure in
a simulated virtual environment. Based on a profile resulting
from this diagnosis, patients were trained to adopt a more
advantageous navigation strategy in a series of virtual reality
therapy sessions provided by a neuropsychologist. The results
of the navigation compensation training were promising, as
patients reported that they successfully adopted novel navigation
strategies in real-life situations and improved on the trained
navigation abilities.
As an extension to this therapy, we have developed a serious
game that trains compensatory strategy use by providing multiple
navigation exercises in combination with psycho-education. The
goal of this serious game is to change patients’ navigation
strategy in order to improve their navigation ability in daily life.
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The key concepts of the virtual reality therapy are adapted into
a serious game that can be used at home, without supervision of
a therapist. In order to ensure the usability of the application by
the target patient population, an extensive user interaction test
was conducted. In this usability study, three core principles of
the application were examined: interaction in 3D environments,
instruction modality and feedback timing.
The game’s training components take place in open, 3D
environments, which patients view and interact with from a
first-person perspective. In order to promote presence and
stimulate the transfer of skills trained in the game, unrestricted,
realistic movement in 3D environments is required. Effective
movement within the 3D environments requires intuitive and
accessible human–computer interaction. The manner in which
users use buttons and sensors of input devices to control
software events is referred to as a control scheme. Effective
control schemes are believed to have a positive effect on game
performance and the affective components of a game such as
enjoyment, frustration and feelings of competence (Limperos
et al., 2011; McEwan et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2015; Shin
and Chung, 2017). Furthermore, input modality can affect
working memory, presence and experienced realism during
gameplay (Kent et al., 2012; Shafer et al., 2014; Shin and
Chung, 2017). In terms of compensatory strategy training,
suboptimal movement control might frustrate patients, reduce
engagement, and shift attention away from the educative goals
of the exercises. The first aim of current experiment was to
assess the subjective experience and objective performance of
movement in 3D environments using two simple movement
control schemes.
The navigation training application consists of different
training games. In each of the games a specific spatial skill
is trained. In order for patients to integrate these skills into
a compensatory strategy, patients require knowledge about
the concepts that underlie the training. The concepts used in
spatial cognition (e.g., egocentric navigation, mental mapping,
landmark knowledge, etc.) can be particularly hard to grasp for
the average user. Therefore, it was important that instructions
and background information about the training concepts were
presented in a format that was easy to understand for patients.
As the games were presented on a multimedia computer, we had
the option of presenting information using text-based or video-
based instructions. Video-based instructions have the advantage
of conveying graphical information supporting a narrative verbal
instruction, which can be particularly useful for illustrating
concepts in spatial cognition. However, the stream of information
from video’s might exceed the processing capacity of viewers
and have a adverse effect on comprehension and knowledge
organization (Mayer and Moreno, 2003; Chiu et al., 2016). This
might be of importance as working memory is particularly
vulnerable for impairment after acquired brain injury (McDowell
et al., 1997; Christodoulou et al., 2001). Consequently, we
expected that the self-pacing nature of text-based information
would allow for a more optimal transfer of knowledge in acquired
brain injury patients. The second aim of the study was to
determine whether text-based instructions are more effective
than video-based instructions by assessing objective performance
and subjective preferences in an instruction comprehension
task.
Feedback presentation is an important component of effective
serious game design (Garris et al., 2002; Yusoff et al., 2009;
Charsky, 2010). The type, amount and timing of feedback
has been shown to be of influence on learning efficacy and
motivation in computer-based learning (Erhel and Jamet, 2013).
The effect of feedback timing is often studied in the context
of knowledge and skill assessments, where feedback is given
directly after an answer is given or after a delayed period
of time. Advantages and disadvantages of feedback timing on
learning efficiency have been identified. Direct feedback allows
learners to instantly correct erroneous responses, contributing
to knowledge acquisition (Kulik and Kulik, 1988). However,
processing direct feedback competes with cognitive resources
required for learning process and can disrupt the learning
process (Schooler and Anderson, 2008). Inversely, delayed
feedback has been shown to facilitate knowledge retention over
longer periods of time, but performance during knowledge
acquisition is reduced (Shute, 2008). Feedback timing effects
have predominantly been studied in educational scenario’s
such as classroom settings, quizzes and programming courses.
In these scenarios responses can be directly evaluated and
responses are often clearly correct or false. Less is known
about the effects of feedback timing in games where skills
are taught through interaction with a virtual game world.
Responses are seldom binary in games, but rather expressed
in a variable such as a score. Therefore, scoreboards are often
implemented to allow users to monitor their performance during
the gameplay. The timing and prevalence of this scoreboard can
be controlled.
The current study focused on two methods of feedback
timing: cumulative feedback and delayed feedback. Cumulative
feedback refers to the explicit presentation of a patient’s overall
performance during gameplay. Cumulative feedback is shown
directly after completing each challenge on an interval basis.
Delayed feedback refers to explicit presentation of a patient’s
overall performance after gameplay. The third aim of the study
was to determine whether feedback timing affects objective
performance and motivation (engagement and self-efficacy)
during a navigation strategy training game. Cumulative feedback
has been shown to positively affect performance in a working
memory task compared to a no feedback condition (Adam and
Vogel, 2016). Furthermore, cumulative feedback is similar to
direct feedback described in more traditional feedback timing
studies in the sense that patients can adjust their behavior
during tasks. We hypothesized that cumulative feedback leads
to increased performance during gameplay compared to delayed
feedback.
The serious game will serve as a home-based rehabilitation
treatment which patients will use over an extended period of
time without supervision. In this usability study, three core
principles of the application were examined: interaction in
3D environments, instruction modality, and feedback timing.
As the game required patients to interact with 3D virtual
environments, we have determined what type of movement
control was most intuitive: mouse controlled movement or
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keyboard controlled movement. In order for the training to
be effective, an understanding of complex spatial concepts was
required. We therefore determined what instruction modality
was most effective for the acquisition of knowledge in acquired
brain injury patients: video-based instructions or text-based
instructions. Furthermore, we have determined how performance
and perceived competence were affected by cumulative and
delayed feedback. Finally, as the serious game was designed to
be effective for all patients with brain injuries, regardless of
the nature of the brain injury, we assessed whether differences
between brain injury types exist in the appreciation of the
application.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Patients
A total of 30 acquired brain injury patients participated in the
study (Table 1). All patients were included by occupational
therapists at the Department of Rehabilitation of the University
Medical Center Utrecht. Inclusion criteria were: (a) clinically
diagnosed with acquired brain injury (e.g., cerebrovascular
accident, traumatic brain injury, hypoxic-anoxic brain injury),
(b) in the non-acute phase of brain injury, (c) between 18 and
80 years of age, (d) capable of operating a computer system
using their left or right hand, (e) sufficient communication,
comprehension and taxability (judged by an occupational
therapist), (f) no visual impairments interfering with the tasks
(e.g., blindness, neglect). All participants gave written informed
consent before participating in the study. Patients did not receive
monetary compensation for study participation.
This study was exempted from ethical approval by the Medical
Ethics Committee of the University Medical Center Utrecht in
accordance with the Dutch WMO law. This study was performed
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the ICH
guidelines for good clinical practice.
TABLE 1 | Characteristics of patients in study (n = 30).
Variable
Gender, male N 15 .50%/
Age in years, mean (range) 47:2 .23  68/
Education, mean (SD) 5:4 .1:07)
Brain Injury Type
- Cerebrovascular accident 16 .53:3%/
- Traumatic brain injury 9 .30%/
- Brain tumor 4 .13%/
- Brain hypoxia 1 .3:33%/
Brain injury location
- Left 9 .30%/
- Right 11 .36:67%/
- Bilateral 3 .10%/
- Unspecified/Unknown 7 .23:33%/
Months after brain injury, mean (SD) 26:43 .52:71/
Education scores used the Verhage scale. This is a Dutch education classification
system including 7 categories (Verhage, 1964): 1, lowest; 7, highest.
Tasks and Material
Three tasks were employed to assess different aspects of the
software’s usability: movement control, instruction modality and
feedback timing. Each task was comprised of an objective
component, performance on the task, and a subjective
component, a questionnaire with questions regarding a patient’s
user experience (Tables 2, 3). Furthermore, a questionnaire
was used to assess the menu-interaction experience (Table 4).
Additional questionnaires were presented at the start and end of
the experimental session to measure computer experience and
general appreciation, respectively (Table 5 and Supplementary
Table 1).
Movement Control
The movement control task was designed to assess usability
differences between mouse controlled and keyboard controlled
movement in 3D environments. A virtual environment was
created resembling a sandy desert (Figure 1). A bordered plateau
was placed in the middle of this environment. The plateau
consisted of three distinct components: A broad meandering
road, a large circular environment and a building consisting
of narrow corridors and 8 90-degree turns (Figure 2). Three
colored cubes (red, green, blue) were placed in the circular
environment. The starting-location was placed at the beginning
of the meandering road and the end-location was placed at the
end of the corridor inside the building. Following the one-way
road lead to the end-location as no junction points or crossroads
were present. A geometrically mirrored version of environment
was created to facilitate comparable environments for the two
movement conditions.
Keyboard controlled movement was performed by pressing
the four arrow keys on the keyboard. “Up” corresponded
to forward movement, “down” corresponded to backward
movement and the “left” and “right” buttons corresponded to left
and right rotation. Mouse controlled movement was performed
by using the left and right mouse button and by utilizing
the optical sensor. Left mouse button corresponded to forward
movement, right mouse button corresponded to backward
movement, moving the mouse left or right corresponded with
rotation in the respective direction. Similar to the keyboard input
condition, participants were unable to look up or down using the
mouse. Movement speed was set to 5 in both conditions. This
corresponded to a walking velocity of approximately 5 km/hour.
Patients were placed at the start of the meandering road and
were asked to travel to the end-location which was placed at the
end of the corridors in the building. Before entering the building,
all colored cubes had to be picked up. Cubes were picked up
by bumping into them. Patients were instructed to travel to the
end-location as fast as possible, without touching the walls. Time
required to finish the task (seconds) and number of collisions
with the walls were recorded. Patients performed a single trial in
each condition. A usability questionnaire was filled in following
each movement tasks. This questionnaire measured the following
concepts: ease of use, experienced improvement, similarity with
other software, enjoyment and presence on a 5 point Likert scale
(Table 2). After both the mouse controlled and keyboard control
tasks were completed, patients were presented with an open
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TABLE 2 | Movement control questionnaire (n = 30).
Variable Question Mouse mean (SD) Keyboard mean (SD) p
Ease of use I thought walking around in the environment was easy 4.2 (1.35) 3.33 (1.49) <0.01
Improvement Over time I felt I improved at walking around in the environment 4.3 (1.09) 3.9 (1.37) 0.14
Other software The controls of this application were similar to other software I have used 3.33 (1.77) 2.86 (1.59) 0.11
Enjoyment I enjoyed walking in the environment 4.24 (1.06) 3.72 (1.22) <0.01
Presence I could imagine myself walking in the environment 3.7 (1.26) 3.3 (1.44) <0.05
Significant differences are printed in bold letters. Ratings on a Likert scale with 1 corresponding to “completely disagree” and 5 corresponding to “completely agree.”
Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means.
TABLE 3 | Feedback timing questionnaire (n = 21).
Type Question Cumulative mean (SD) Delayed mean (SD) p
Interest I thought the task was interesting 4.33 (0.80) 4.57 (0.93) 0.17
Enjoyment When I performed the task. I enjoyed myself. 4.38 (1.12) 4.57 (0.98) 0.26
Perceived difficulty I thought the task was easy 2.90 (1.34) 2.90 (1.41) 0.96
Effort I put a lot of effort into completing the task 3.86 (1.35) 3.48 (1.25) 0.32
Strive I did the best I could during this task 4.62 (0.59) 4.48 (0.87) 0.41
Competence I had the feeling I was good at the task 3.71 (1.27) 3.62 (1.36) 0.69
Accept results I am content with my performance 3.57 (1.33) 3.52 (1.44) 0.79
Competition I think my performance was above-average 2.67 (1.15) 3.10 (1.37) 0.11
Desire to improve I wish I was better at the task 3.81 (1.36) 3.62 (1.32) 0.47
Differences between responses in the delayed and cumulative feedback timing condition were compared per item using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Ratings on a
Likert scale with 1 corresponding to “completely disagree” and 5 corresponding to “completely agree.” Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means.
questionnaire consisting of four questions: (1) What method of
movement did you like best? (2) Why did you prefer this method
over the other? (3) Do you have suggestions on how we could
further improve the movement in the game? (4) What method of
movement control would like to see in the training?
TABLE 4 | Menu-interaction experience (n = 29).
Statement Response mean (SD)
The text was easy to read 4.41 (1.09)
The information was placed where I expected
it to be
4.14 (0.88)
The color and layout used in the application
was distracting
4.62 (0.78)
The terms used in the application were
comprehensible
3.93 (1.36)
I understood what was meant with the term
“levels”
4.38 (1.12)
I knew what the training was about by
reading the names of the games
3.89 (1.26)
It was easy to navigate between different
menus
4.03 (1.27)
It was easy to view the progression that was
made on different challenges
3.97 (1.35)
I thought logging in was difficult 4.48 (1.24)
Controlling the application was easy to learn 4.69 (0.81)
Learning what the terms meant was easy 4.14 (1.30)
Ratings on a Likert scale with 1 corresponding to “completely disagree” and 5
corresponding to “completely agree.” Standard deviations appear in parentheses
next to means. Data shown on a reversed scale, higher score indicate higher
ratings of usability.
Instruction Modality
As the serious game was designed for desktop computers,
instructions could be provided using narrated video (tutorial
video) as well as more traditional texts. The instruction modality
task was designed to assess differences in knowledge acquisition
between text-based instructions and video-based instructions.
The instructions of 2 existing navigation training games were
used (“sense of direction game” and the “map use game”). Text-
based and video-based instructions were constructed for both
games. In the video version, the text was read aloud by a narrator
and supported by a video montage of a person playing the
TABLE 5 | Overall appreciation questionnaire (n = 24).
Variable Statement Response
mean (SD)
Ease of use The software was use to use 3.63 (0.25)
Enjoyment I enjoyed the experience 4.17 (0.23)
Clear goals The goals were clearly defined 4.00 (0.24)
Rewarding The experience was rewarding 3.92 (0.22)
Control I had a feeling of total control 3.29 (0.26)
Attention My attention was completely
directed on the task at hand
4.79 (0.10)
Concentration I was concentrated 4.54 (0.19)
Willingness to play
again
I would like to play the game
again
4.13 (0.23)
Challenge The game was challenging 4.08 (0.21)
Ratings on a Likert scale with 1 corresponding to “completely disagree” and 5
corresponding to “completely agree.” Standard deviations appear in parentheses
next to means.
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FIGURE 1 | Design of the environment used in the movement control task.
The environment can be subdivided in a meandering part, a circular area and
a building featuring sharp turns. A mirrored version was created to
accommodate for the two conditions.
FIGURE 2 | Design of the corridor with sharp turns used in the movement
control task. The corridors inside the building are made up of 8, 90; turns.
The blue icon with arrows indicates the entrance of the building. The blue icon
with the square indicates the end location of the task.
FIGURE 3 | Design of the environment used in the feedback timing task. In
this version of the task, participants study a map to remember the location of
the goal (red dot) in relation to the landmarks (pillars). Patients were then
placed on the starting location (blue dot). The goal and start locations are not
visible during a round.
game. In the text version, text was printed on the screen and
patients could scroll through the text at their own pace. When
presented with the video version, patients were asked to watch
and memorize the video. When presented with the text only
version of the instructions, patients were instructed to read and
memorize the text. No time limit was set. The order in which
patients received the video-based or text-based instruction, as
well as the combination of instruction modality and version of
the game was counterbalanced across patients.
After observing the instructions, patients were shown 12
statements about the objectives of the game and the implications
of using the navigation strategy that was trained in the game
(Supplementary Tables 2, 3). Patients determined whether these
statements were true or false. Following the true or false
statements for both instruction modalities, participants answered
three open questions: (1) What instruction type did you find most
effective? (2) Why did you prefer this type of instructions? (3)
Do you have suggestions on how we could further improve the
instructions?
Feedback Timing
The feedback timing task was designed to assess the effect of
cumulative vs. delayed feedback on performance and motivation
during a play-through of a training game. A virtual environment
was created resembling a sandy desert. In this middle of the
environment, a bordered circular plateau was placed. Two
versions of the game were used. In the first version, 4 distinct
landmarks were placed in the north, south east and west of the
plateau. These landmarks resembled the Horse of Troy, a Greek
galley, a Greek temple and the Colossus. In the second version, 3
local landmarks were placed inside of the plateau. The landmarks
resembled different colored pillars (red, green, blue). A hidden
goal location was placed on the plateau (Figure 3).
At the start of a trial, a 2D map of the environment was
shown on which the hidden plateau and the landmarks were
highlighted. Patients were then placed in the 3D environment
and were tasked to walk toward the hidden plateau, by orienting
on the landmarks. The movement control was similar to the
keyboard controlled movement described in the movement task
above. A pedometer bar was shown at the top of the screen
to indicate the amount of distance a patient had traveled. The
amount of coins in possession corresponded to the size of
the pedometer bar. As such, patients were instructed to take
as few steps as necessary to reach the end-location. Between
0 and 2 coins could be earned in each round. The goal of
the game was to earn as many coins as possible over the
course of 3 rounds. In the cumulative feedback condition, a
large scoreboard was presented between rounds. This scoreboard
showed the percentage of coins collected over the whole trial
(so if patients collected 3 coins at the end of round 2, the
score would show 75%). The scoreboard allowed patients to
monitor their performance of the span of 3 rounds. In the delayed
feedback condition, no overall score feedback was given between
rounds.
At the end of the three rounds, an overall score was shown
in both conditions. The total amount of coins earned was used
the measure of performance. After completing a task, patients
filled in a questionnaire that measured motivational components
related to engagement: interest in task, enjoyment, effort invested
while playing, strive (I did the best I could during this task),
desire to improve, and components related to self-efficacy:
perceived difficulty, competence, result acceptance, comparative
score (Table 3). The items were rated on a scale from 1 to 5,
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1 corresponding to “completely disagree” to 5 corresponding to
“completely agree.”
Additional Measures
The menu interaction task was designed to assess the
comprehensibility of the menu structure and phrasing of
terms used in the game. Patients were required complete
seven tasks by navigating through the menu tabs. In each task,
specific information needed to be found or specific actions were
required. Patients were asked to conduct the following activities:
(1) log in, (2) start a specific game, (3) locate background
information about the application, (4) determine the current
level on a specific game, (5) start another game, (6) determine
the amount of coins (score) currently in possession, (7) quit
the application. Patients were instructed to think out loud while
navigating the menu screens. When patients navigated to a
wrong menu or when they indicated they were unable to find
the requested information, the experiment would show the
correct method of finding the information. Following the menu
interaction task, a usability questionnaire was filled in (Table 4).
The questionnaire was specifically designed to address layout,
comprehensibility and interaction with important items of the
menu interface.
The computer experience questionnaire consisted of nine
items and was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (Supplemental
Table 2). The items in this questionnaire were inspired by the
Computer Attitude Scale and the Computer User Self Efficacy
scale (Nickell and Pinto, 1986; Cassidy and Eachus, 2002). The
first four items of this question addressed a patient’s exposure
to computers. Items 5–8 concerned a patient’s self-reported
knowledge of operating software and hardware. The ninth item
addressed feelings of anxiety when using a computer.
The overall appreciation questionnaire consisted of nine items
and was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (Table 5). Six items in
this questionnaire were adapted from the Flow State Scale and
three items constructed in context of the usability test (Jackson
and Marsh, 1996). The items addressed the overall appreciation
of the application and the experience of flow during the tasks.
The items were rated on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 corresponding
to “completely disagree” to 5 corresponding to “completely
agree.”
The tasks were constructed in the Unity 3D game engine,
version 5.3.4.4.f1, and run as standalone applications. The
application was run on a HP EliteBook 8760w laptop with a
NVIDEA Quadro 3000M graphic processing unit. The laptop’s
screen size was 17.3-inch wide screen (15.5 8.98) inch. The
laptop’s keyboard and a standard desktop mouse model (Dell
Optical Mouse – MS116) were used as input devices. All
questionnaires were constructed in Qualtrics and presented using
an internet browser.
Procedure
The data was collected in a therapy room of the Department
of Rehabilitation of the University Medical Center Utrecht. All
patients read the study’s information letter in advance and gave
written informed consent prior to the session. All experimental
sessions were planned prior to or after a patient’s scheduled
appointment with a doctor or occupational therapist. In order
to comply to a patient’s schedule during the visit to the medical
center, each experimental session was brought to an end after
approximately 60 min of testing.
At the start of the experimental session, patients were
informed about the nature of the study. Patients were explicitly
informed about the study’s objective of tailoring the software to
patients’ capability and needs. As such, patients were encouraged
to ask questions about the software, discuss design choices and
propose suggestions for changes in the software’s design. To
stimulate communication with the patients, an informal and
relaxed atmosphere was pursued.
The experiment started with the computer experience
questionnaire. This was followed by the movement control task,
the instruction modality task, the menu navigation task and
finally the feedback task. Patients then filled in the overall
appreciation questionnaire.
Statistical Analyses
Analysis of Objective Performance
Objective performance in the movement control, instruction
modality and feedback timing tasks was analyzed using within-
subject tests. Data were tested for normality using Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests. Normally distributed data were analyzed using
a three-way mixed model ANOVAs with (condition) as within
subject factor and (brain injury type) and (brain injury location)
as between subject factors. Non-normal data were analyzed using
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, in which conditions were contrasted.
Separate Kruskal–Wallis H Tests were used to assess the effects
of brain injury type and brain injury location on performance in
non-normal datasets.
Analysis of Subjective Measures
Internal reliability analyses were performed on all questionnaires.
Non-parametric tests were used to analyze the effect of condition
on subjective measures. Additionally, the proportion of responses
for the preference (what condition did you prefer?) items in the
open questionnaires were analyzed using Chi-square tests of
independence. The effects of brain injury type and brain injury
location on subjective responses were assessed using Kruskal–
Wallis tests.
Exploratory Analysis
Exploratory analyses were performed to inspect the relation
between objective performance and subjective measures for the
movement control task and the feedback timing task. Pearson
correlations analyses were conducted to investigate the relation
between objective performance and items of the subjective
measure questionnaires.
Attrition
Six patients were unable to complete all tasks of the experiment
within 60 min. Additionally, 2 patients were unable to complete
the instruction modality task due to reading impairments. One
patient was unable to complete the feedback timing task due
to severe navigation impairments. Technical difficulties lead to
missing data of 1 patient in the movement control task and 2
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patients in the feedback timing task. As such, the sample size for
the objective performance analysis for the movement task was 29
(30 for the subjective measures), the sample size of the instruction
task was 27(29 for the preference response) and the sample size of
the feedback timing task was 21.
RESULTS
Movement Control
In order to compare objective movement performance in the
mouse and keyboard controlled conditions, time required to
finishing the task (time) and the number of collisions with
the walls (wall bumps) were analyzed as main measures.
A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test indicated that the data for time
(mouse), D(29) = 0.21, p < 0.01 and wall bumps (keyboard),
D(29) = 0.17, p < 0.05, were both significantly non-normal.
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that time in the mouse
control condition (M = 85.29, SD = 44.19) was significantly
shorter than time in the keyboard control condition (M = 132.42,
SD = 58.63), z =  4.68, p < 0.01, r =  0.61 (Figure 4).
No significant effects of condition were found on the number
of wall bumps z =  0.92, p = 0.36, r =  0.12. Additional
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed to compare the
effects of movement control type within in the three sections
of the environment. Mouse controlled movement was faster
than keyboard-controlled movement in the meandering area
(p< 0.01) the circular area (p< 0.01) and the area with the sharp
turns (p < 0.01) (Figure 4).
A Kruskal–Wallis H Test revealed that there was no effect of
brain injury type on performance in the keyboard [χ2(3) = 3.71,
p = 0.29] and mouse controlled [χ2(3) = 5.49, p = 0.14] movement
tasks. Similarly, no effect of brain injury location was found on
performance in the keyboard [χ2(3) = 1.99, p = 0.57] and mouse
controlled [χ2(3) = 2.94, p = 0.40] movement task.
After completing the movement task, patients filled in a
subjective preference questionnaire. A reliability analysis was
performed and revealed an internal reliability of α = 0.85 for
the keyboard condition and α = 0.69 for the mouse condition.
Each of the 5 items of the questionnaire were compared for
the mouse control and keyboard control condition using a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. A significant effect of condition
was found for ease of use, as the mouse controls (M = 4.2,
SD = 1.35) were rated as easier to use than keyboard controls
(M = 3.33, SD = 1.49), z =  2.67 p < 0.01, r =  0.34. Mouse
control (M = 4.24, SD = 1.06) was also rated as significantly
more enjoyable than keyboard control (M = 3.72, SD = 1.22 ),
z =  2.67, p < 0.01, r =  0.34. Furthermore, a higher level of
presence was experienced during mouse controlled movement
(M = 3.7, SD = 1.26) compared to the keyboard control (M = 3.3,
SD = 1.44), z = 2.36, p < 0.05, r = 0.30 (Table 2).
Analysis of the open questionnaire revealed that 90.0% of the
patients reported a preference for mouse controls, 10% of the
patients reported a preference of keyboard control and 0% of
the patients did not have a clear preference. A Chi-square test
of independence revealed a significant difference in proportions,
χ2(1) = 19.20, p < 0.01.
FIGURE 4 | Performance on the movement task for keyboard and mouse
controlled movement (n = 29). The average time spend (seconds) in each area
is indicated by the different colored stacks in the graph. The error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.
Using Spearman correlation analyses, the relation between
objective performance (time) in the movement tasks and the
ratings on the 5 items of the questionnaire was explored.
A correlation between objective performance and enjoyment was
found for both the mouse control, r = 0.43, p < 0.05, and
keyboard control r = 0.39, p < 0.05, conditions. Additionally,
a correlation between objective performance and presence was
found for both the mouse control, r = 0.41, p < 0.05, and
keyboard control r = 0.40, p < 0.05, condition.
Instruction Modality
In order to determine the effect of instruction modality on
learning, patients answered 12 true of false questions about the
content of the instructions. Percentage correct was compared
for the video-based and text-based condition. A Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test indicated that the video-based instruction data was
significantly non-normal D(27) = 0.19, p < 0.05. A Wilcoxon
signed rank test was used to compare percentage correct for
the video-based and text-based condition. No significant effect
of instruction modality was found, z =  0.82, p = 0.41,
r =  1.12. Percentage correct did not differ between the video-
based (M = 70.20, SD = 15.64 ) and text-based (M = 66.13,
SD = 17.25) condition.
A Kruskal–Wallis H Test revealed that there was no effect
of brain injury type on percentage correct in the video-based
[χ2(2) = 1.78, p = 0.41] and text-based [χ2(2) = 1.01, p = 0.60]
conditions. Furthermore, no effect of brain injury location was
found on the percentage correct in the video-based [χ2(3) = 0.9,
p = 0.83] and text-based [χ2(3) = 1.09, p = 0.78] conditions.
The proportion of self-reported instruction preference was
investigated using a chi-square test of independence. 65.51%
of participants indicated a preference for the video-based
instructions compared while 20.69% of the patients preferred the
text-based instructions. 13.79% of the participants did not have a
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clear preference. The chi-square test revealed that this difference
in proportions was significant, χ2(2) = 13.72, p < 0.01.
Feedback Timing
The effect of feedback timing on objective performance was
investigated by comparing the total amount of coins between
the cumulative and delayed feedback condition. The total score
was calculated by summing the amount of coins over three
rounds for the cumulative feedback (M = 3.48, SD = 1.63) and
delayed feedback (M = 3.95, SD = 1.75) tasks (Supplementary
Table 4). A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test indicated that the total
score (cumulative), D(21) = 0.15, p = 0.2 and total (delayed),
D(21) = 0.17, p = 0.14 were normally distributed.
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed to
compare the effect of feedback timing on total score in the delayed
and cumulative feedback condition with brain injury type and
brain injury location as between subject factors. No significant
main effect of condition was found F(1,12) = 0.13, p = 0.27,
η2p = 0.10. No significant interaction effect was found for brain
injury type and condition (p = 0.41) and brain injury location
(p = 0.73).
After completing the feedback timing task, patients filled
in the motivation questionnaire. Each of the 9 items of the
questionnaire were compared between the cumulative and
delayed feedback conditions using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
No significant effect of condition was found in any of the items
(Table 3).
In an explorative analysis, the relation between objective
scores on the feedback tasks and ratings on the questionnaire
were analyzed using Spearman correlations. In delayed feedback
condition, a significant relation was found between objective
score and ratings in perceived difficulty, r = 0.59, p < 0.01,
competence, r = 0.55, p< 0.01, result acceptance, r = 0.74, p< 0.01
and competition, r = 0.73, p < 0.01. The subjective raring on the
items correlated in a positive linear fashion with the objective
score.
Similar relations were found between objective score and self-
reported ratings on the cumulative feedback condition. Objective
score significantly related to perceived difficulty, r = 0.61, p< 0.01,
competence, r = 0.64, p< 0.01, result acceptance, r = 0.72, p< 0.01
and competition, r = 0.57, p < 0.01. The subjective raring on the
items correlated in a positive linear fashion with the objective
score. Additionally, a strong negative relation was found between
desire to improve, r = 0.65, p< 0.01, and objective performance.
The rating on the desire to improve item correlated negatively
with objective score in linear fashion.
Additional Measures
After performing the menu interaction tasks, patients rated
the usability of the menu navigation (Table 4). The 11 item
questionnaire showed a high internal reliability of α = 0.81. An
overall score of the menu-navigation was computed by averaging
the ratings of each item. A Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted
to compare appreciation ratings between brain injury type and
between brain injury location. No effect of brain injury type or
location was found on the ratings on the overall menu interaction
questionnaire.
The overall appreciation questionnaire was filled in at the
end of the session to obtain ratings of overall appreciation
and the experience of flow (Table 5). The 9 items of this
questionnaire yielded a reliability rating of α = 0.76. An overall
rating of appreciation questionnaire was computed by averaging
the ratings of each item. A Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted
to compare usability rating between brain injury types and brain
injury locations. No effect of brain injury type or location was
found on the ratings on the overall appreciation of the game.
DISCUSSION
The usability of a serious game designed to train compensatory
navigation strategies in acquired brain injury patients was
investigated. The usability of three core principles of the
application was examined using objective and subjective
measures: movement control, instruction modality and feedback
timing.
Intuitive control schemes in games contribute to motivation,
engagement and reduction of cognitive load (Limperos et al.,
2011; McEwan et al., 2012). The importance of responsive
controls in serious games has been identified by several
guidelines and frameworks concerned with usability (Pinelle
et al., 2008). In order to optimize interactivity with the virtual
environments used in the game, two control types were assessed:
mouse and keyboard. The acquired brain injury patients clearly
preferred mouse controlled movement over keyboard controlled
movement. Mouse controlled movement was rated easier to
use, more enjoyable and a stronger feeling of presence in the
environment was experienced. While there is no consensus about
the positive effects of presence in training programs, several
studies have suggested that high levels of presence might aid in
the transfer of skills acquired during the training (Youngblut
and Huie, 2003; Alexander et al., 2005; Stevens and Kincaid,
2015). The advantages of mouse controlled movement over
keyboard controlled movements were reflected in the objective
performance measurements. Time required to finish the tasks was
lower is using the mouse, while the number of wall collisions
between control type did not differ. This indicates that patients
did not lower accuracy in favor of speed when using mouse
controlled input. Additionally, mouse controlled movement was
faster in all three areas of the environment, revealing that the
advantages of mouse movement were not specific to a single
maneuver, such as taking sharp turns. An exploratory analysis
revealed a positive relation between objective performance and
ratings of enjoyment and presence in the environment in both
movement control conditions. This finding further supports the
notion that effective interaction results in a more enjoyable
and natural gameplay experience. In sum, the implementation
of simple, mouse controlled movement in 3D environments is
recommended over keyboard-controlled movement based on
objective and subjective evidence in this study.
Unrestricted movement in virtual environments allows
patients to develop and experiment with novel navigation
strategies. However, patients can only progress through the game
when specific strategies are successfully adapted. It is therefore
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important that the underlying concepts of the compensatory
strategies are clearly communicated. Computers are multimedia
systems that allow for different instruction modalities. In the
current experiment, we examined the effects of video-based
and text-based instruction on knowledge acquisition. No clear
learning advantages of video-based instructions over text-based
instruction were found. Similar results are found in studies
that assess knowledge acquisition of complex topics (the news)
through printed text and video (Furnham and Gunter, 1985;
Walma van der Molen and Van Der Voort, 2000). While the
results do not indicate an advantage for either modality, a
clear preference for the video-based instructions was found
in the questionnaire responses. During conversations with the
patients about their preferred instruction modality, patients
mentioned the advantage of visual information in explaining
spatial concepts. This discrepancy between performance and
preference can be explained in terms of cognitive capacity.
Patients recognized that more information was presented to them
in the video condition compared to the text condition. However,
this additional information was not effectively maintained. We
suspect that the continuous stream of information in the
instruction video might have disrupted the information encoding
process. Capacity constrains were not limited to the video-based
instructions. Two patients were unable to complete the text-
based instruction task due to their impairments. While these
patients were able to read short texts, they were incapable of
maintaining their attention when reading extensive bodies of text.
The overload of cognitive capacity can be managed by providing
patients with additional control over the pacing of the video
(Mayer and Moreno, 2003). The aim for the instructions in the
current game is to provide short and effective information before
starting a gaming module. In this context, requiring patients to
systematically analyze a video might not be an optimal solution.
Subsequently, the addition of visual static images to text-based
instructions might be more effective than both video-based
and solely text-based instruction. This suggestion is supported
by studies with healthy subjects (Mayer et al., 2005). More
research is required to determine if this combination will indeed
enhance knowledge acquisition in acquired brain injury patients.
Overall, in this study we have established that patients prefer
video-based instructions over text-based instructions. Video-
based instructions are not more effective in context of knowledge
acquisition and comprehension.
Feedback presentation is an important component in
education and serious gaming (Garris et al., 2002; Yusoff et al.,
2009; Charsky, 2010). Contrary to our expectation, we did not
find a beneficial effect of cumulative feedback on objective
performance. Updating patients on their overall score between
rounds did not enhance performance in the task. Furthermore,
the motivational components of the game were not affected
by the timing of feedback as cumulative feedback did not
affect engagement and self-efficacy. An earlier study showed
beneficial effects of cumulative feedback on performance in
a working memory tasks when compared to a no-feedback
condition (Adam and Vogel, 2016). There might be several
reasons why this effect was not observed in the current study.
First, the current task included only 3 trials per condition,
whereas Adam and Vogel (2016) employed 150 short trials. It
is possible that the beneficial effects of cumulative feedback
only arise after participants are familiar with the task and start
performing at a stable level. In the current task, it is possible that
participants were still experimenting with strategies to complete
the task. Second, the current task was considerably more complex
than the working memory task employed by Adam and Vogel
(2016). This might have lead to a greater variation in performance
in both feedback timing conditions. Another explanation for
this finding is that patients were not heavily invested in
their performance within the game, as patients were explicitly
informed that the goal of the study was to test the usability
of the application. However, further analysis revealed positive
linear relations between objective score and result acceptance
(“I am happy with my performance”), indicating that patients
were indeed concerned with their score. The exploratory analysis
also revealed a negative linear relation between willingness to
improve (“I wish I was better at the task”) and the objective score
in the cumulative feedback condition. This finding hints at a
subtle effect of cumulative feedback on motivation. It is, however,
unclear whether this effect is beneficial or disadvantageous, as
this statement can be interpreted as a lack in confidence induced
by the feedback or an increase in motivation to perform better.
Overall, the current experiment did not provide evidence for
the advantageous learning or motivational effects of cumulative
feedback over delayed feedback.
Interaction with the menu screens and the overall appreciation
of the game were evaluated positively. Importantly, neither the
type of brain injury nor the location of the brain injury affected
ratings on the appreciation and menu interaction questionnaires.
Similarly, no effect of brain injury location and type were found
on any of the objective tasks. The results suggest that the overall
design and interaction with the serious game was suitable for all
types of brain injury patients in the sample.
Summarizing, in this study we have established what design
choices should be made in order to enhance the usability of a
serious game designed to train navigation strategies. From this
first study, we can conclude that mouse controlled movement
in 3D environments is more accessible than keyboard controlled
movement. Video-based instructions are strongly preferred over
text-based instructions, but not more effective in transferring
knowledge. Feedback timing did not affect performance and
motivation in the current training games. Based on the scores and
usability questionnaires, the results suggest that usability of the
serious game is adequate for the target patient population after
the implementation of the appropriate features as determined in
this study.
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Young children are prolific question-askers. The growing ubiquity of voice interfaces
(e.g., Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa), as well as the availability of voice input in search
fields, now make it possible for children to ask questions via Internet search when
they are able to speak clearly, but before they have learned to read and write, typically
between 3 and 6 years of age. The prevalence of voice search makes it important to
understand children’s changing conceptions of digital devices as a source of information
and the role of technology-mediated question-asking in development. While limited
research has focused on young children’s use of voice interfaces, reviewing two related
bodies of literature sheds light on how this use might unfold. This paper brings together
studies of how children look for information, and of how they perceive and understand
the informational and social roles of technology, drawing on human-computer interaction
research. We conclude by highlighting lines of questioning for future work on younger
children’s interaction through voice search.
Keywords: children, question-asking, voice interfaces, internet search, information-seeking
VOICE SEARCH AND CHILDREN’S QUESTIONS
Young children are curious and prolific question-askers. They are known to ask factual and causal
questions about the world around them when they perceive a gap in their understanding (Tizard
and Hughes, 1984; Callanan and Oakes, 1992; Chouinard et al., 2007). Voice interfaces powered
by natural language processing, such as Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, and the Google Assistant, as
well as the availability of microphone input features on the search fields of Google, YouTube, and
other services make it possible for children to press a button, or use a “wake word,” and simply ask a
question or perform an Internet search. The present paper refers to this interaction as voice search.
Voice search is now a common part of many interfaces on traditional computers, connected
home speakers, and mobile devices. Smartphones and tablet computers in particular have become
ubiquitous in the lives of American children. According to a report from Common Sense Media
(Rideout, 2017), almost all (98%) American children now live in a home with a tablet or
smartphone, and this trend includes low-income families adopting technology at similar rates
(Kabali et al., 2015). Unlike keyboards and mice, touch screens are immediately intuitive and
operated with gestures such as pointing and swiping, which develop in the first year of life. Indeed,
children aged 12 to 17 months are able to navigate simple tablet-based applications with moderate
ability (Hourcade et al., 2015).
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While text-based Internet search results might not be
accessible to pre- and emerging readers, the explosive growth
of online video content supports young children’s ability to
independently find and consume online information. Robert
Kyncl, YouTube’s Chief Business Officer, predicted at the 2012
Consumer Electronics Show that by 2020, 90% of Internet traffic
would be used by video, a prediction later anticipated by Cisco to
2019 (Tribbey, 2016). Google search results come with a video tab,
from which children can choose a video based on a representative
picture, press the play button and watch a video related to
their query. Thus, this dramatic shift in young children’s ability
to search online is due to both the prevalence of voice-based,
natural language search features and the increasing volume of
video-based search results.
This shift in children’s ability to find information through
connected devices makes it important to understand their
changing conceptions of digital devices as sources of information
and how they might fare as they attempt to use them to
find answers to their questions. However, research has yet to
understand the behaviors of young children using voice search.
By young children, here, we refer to children who are able to
speak fully formed sentences but have yet to learn how to read
and write with enough fluency to perform internet searches by
typing, typically between the ages of 3 and 6 years.
To help bridge this gap and identify promising lines of future
work, this review examines the existing literature on children’s
search behavior as well as studies of children’s perceptions of
technology. These existing studies largely focus on children ages 7
and older, because until recently, searching had required reading,
writing and typing skills, making it out of reach for younger
children. However, the findings of these studies can help shed
some light on what might happen when younger children attempt
to ask questions of technology independently.
We start by reviewing studies that focus on how children
as young as age 7 have searched the Internet at various
points during its history, including child-specific web directories
like Yahooligans (Bilal, 2000, 2001, 2002), keyword searches
(Druin et al., 2009, 2010) and the more recent use of natural
language (Kammerer and Bohnacker, 2012). To complement
this literature, we review studies of how children understand
technology, including their ideas about computers in general
(e.g., Van Duuren et al., 1998; Rücker and Pinkwart, 2016 for
a comprehensive review), how they understand robots (Kahn
et al., 2012, 2013) and media technology (Reeves and Nass, 1996;
Chiasson and Gutwin, 2005). We include these studies because
children’s perceptions of technology impact their expectations of
whether such technology might serve as sources of information.
We end by putting what we know in the context of child
development and suggesting new areas for future research
and design involving developmentally appropriate interactions
through voice search.
CHILDREN AND INTERNET SEARCH
Studies of how children aged 7 and older search for information
in digital interfaces began with the CD-ROM encyclopedias and
digital libraries of the 1980s and 1990s, where the realm of
information available was limited (e.g., Marchionini, 1989). Even
then, elementary-aged children showed a tendency to use natural
language in search fields (Marchionini, 1989). In a system that
was designed to find keywords, this strategy failed, generating no
results (Solomon, 1993).
In a series of studies of seventh graders using the web directory
Yahooligans, a child-focused resource managed by Yahoo, Inc.,
from 1996 to 2006, Bilal (2000, 2001, 2002) found that children
consistently preferred to browse the directory than to use the
search functionality. Only 50% of the students succeeded at
finding answers to specific, fact-based queries given by a science
teacher, while 69% partially succeeded at researching a topic more
generally using their own queries and 73% succeeded at finding
answers to an undirected, self-generated query. Bilal (2002) also
reported that 13% of children in the third study, who were using
their own queries, used natural language instead of keywords,
something seen as a liability at the time, leading to the conclusion
that students should receive better web search training.
In a more recent study about how children ages 7, 9, and
11 used keyword interfaces to search the Internet (Druin et al.,
2009), the researchers found that children had trouble typing,
spelling and deciding which words to use as search terms.
Specifically, children tended to look at the keyboard while typing,
making it difficult to catch typos until the entire word or phrase
had been entered and to see the predictive terms offered by the
search engine. Parents in their study suggested voice-input as a
solution to children’s typing and spelling problems. The study
also found other difficulties that might not be eliminated by voice
input: for example, children had difficulty choosing which words
to use and breaking down a complex query into multiple steps
when needed (query reformulation). When asked to find what
day of the week the vice-president’s birthday would fall on the
following year, none of the children were able to find the answer;
the youngest children, age 7, did not even try.
In a larger study including 83 children, again aged 7, 9, and
11, and their parents (Druin et al., 2010), these findings were
confirmed and expanded: the researchers identified seven distinct
search “roles,” or search behavior patterns, displayed by the
children, in isolation or combined with one or more other roles.
Each of these roles is associated with specific behaviors, triggers
(motivation for using search), obstacles (such as typing, spelling
and reading difficulties, lack of motivation and self-imposed
limiting rules) and influencer, or parent, roles (demonstrator,
fixer, mentor). The most common role was that of a developing
searcher, displayed by 58 of the children. Developing searchers
were found to be willing to search but possess a limited command
of search tools and, again, a tendency to use natural language. The
developing role was most often displayed at the same time as that
of domain-specific searcher, in which children are comfortable
with a few “tried-and-true” resources, usually related to personal
interests, and tend to return to those websites repeatedly, even
when searching for unrelated information. For example, children
attempted to find information about dolphins and about the
vice-president of the United States at a games website and
on spongebob.com. Other roles identified were power searcher,
distracted, non-motivated, visual, and rule-based searcher.
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While Druin et al. found that children’s use of natural
language in search engines was problematic, Kammerer and
Bohnacker (2012) compared natural language to keyword
searches performed by 21 children aged 8 to 10 using Google
in German and found that natural language users were more
successful than those using keywords. They gave children a two-
part task in which the first part was a simple yes/no question (do
all kangaroos have pouches?) and the second required a more
complex strategy and answer (how do baby kangaroos stay in
pouches?). Tasks were given orally and children could choose
what to enter in the search field. Of the 13 natural language users,
8 were able to answer both parts of the task correctly, 4 were
able to answer only the first and one was unable to answer either.
The 8 keyword users fared far worse, with only 3 being able to
answer both queries correctly, 3 answering only the first and 2
being unable to answer either.
As we consider younger children using voice interfaces to
search, some of the mechanical obstacles identified by prior work
(e.g., typing and spelling difficulties) may lose importance while
the discrepancy between the intended users of the interface, by
and large adults, and younger children, who now have access to
search, increases. For example, Druin’s domain-specific searchers
might become app-specific in this generation. Young children
who become comfortable searching inside an application such
as YouTube Kids could attempt to use it for queries that would
be better served by a different tool. Younger users also have
a less developed vocabulary and may be less precise in how
they formulate queries. Additionally, while videos and spoken
responses may dispense with reading requirements, such audio
and video content was likely not produced with young children
in mind, creating the potential for comprehension difficulties.
These obstacles, however, only matter if younger children indeed
perceive these technologies as sources of information and attempt
to ask questions of them.
CHILDREN’S PERCEPTIONS OF DIGITAL
DEVICES
To predict whether young children might see the devices
they use as potential sources of answers to their questions
and not just game and video players, we consider how they
conceptualize computing devices. Existing work (Van Duuren
et al., 1998; Papastergiou, 2005; Yan, 2005; Diethelm et al., 2012;
see Rücker and Pinkwart, 2016 for a review) about older children’s
understanding of computers and the Internet has found that they
perceive computers as capable of containing infinite amounts of
information (e.g., Van Duuren et al., 1998); however, results of a
few recent studies (McKenney and Voogt, 2010; Eisen and Lillard,
2016, 2017) with younger children have been mixed.
Rücker and Pinkwart (2016) present a systematic,
interdisciplinary review of studies of children’s conceptions
of computers. They identify five main ideas children have
expressed in studies over the years, between 1968 and 2012: (1)
intelligent machines; (2) omniscient databases; (3) mechanical
devices; (4) wire networks and (5) programmable machines. As
we consider the notion of computer-like devices as information
sources to young children, the most relevant concepts are those
of an intelligent machine and an omniscient database. Studies
included in the review found that children aged 8 and 11 (but not
5-year-olds) believed computers had the results of all possible
mathematical calculations already stored in their memory (Van
Duuren et al., 1998) and that 12-to-16 year-olds believed that the
entire Internet was stored in one single computer, either the user’s
own or another accessible through the network (Papastergiou,
2005; Diethelm et al., 2012).
Studies with younger children, however, present a more
mixed picture. A study of Dutch children’s perceptions of their
own computer use including 4- to 7-year-olds, most of whom
had daily access to computers both in and out of school,
found that the overwhelming majority of young children used
computers to play games and that using the computer for a
creative or communicative activity or to search the Internet
was far less common (McKenney and Voogt, 2010). Eisen and
Lillard (2016, 2017) performed two studies to understand which
functions preschool children attribute to touch screen devices
when compared to other media such as television and books. In
the first study, they found that children tend to attribute fewer
functions to most objects than adults. When asked to identify the
best object for learning about dogs, hearing Spanish or looking
at a map, touch screen devices were not their top choice. The
computer was the preferred method for seeing a map. In the
second study, children were asked to choose between a tablet
computer and a book for several learning tasks (e.g., cooking, the
weather, Virginia, yesterday’s football game). While the younger
children in the sample showed no clear preference, 6-year-olds
preferred the tablet computer for most tasks. However, children
did not take into account whether the information sought was
timely (i.e., the weather, yesterday’s football game), with even
6-year-olds preferring books to learn about the game.
While voice input is available, for example via the Google
mobile application, as well as YouTube and YouTube Kids, these
interfaces don’t respond verbally, but show the user’s query as text
input in the search field and then display search results after the
query is submitted. Conversational agents (like Siri or Alexa), on
the other hand, are programmed to respond as a person would.
Research on how children understand and interact with robots
and with other media provides insights into how machines that
attempt to act like humans are perceived by children.
Kahn et al. (2013) argue that social robots are establishing
a new ontological category, distinct from humans, animals or
simple artifacts. As children interact with a social robot, they
tend to believe that it has rights and feelings (Kahn et al., 2012).
At the same time, they are aware of the robot’s machine status.
Through a number of experiments, Reeves and Nass (1996)
found that people tend to respond to computers and other media
as they would to humans. They refer to this phenomenon as
the media equation. The set of interactions that are specific
to computers, whose responses, unlike those of television, are
contingent on user input, are studied under an area of research
called CASA (Computers as Social Actors). But is the tendency
the same in children? Some critics of these theories argue
that only inexperienced users would respond to machines as
if they were people. Children, then, could easily be expected
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to act this way. Chiasson and Gutwin (2005) predicted that
children would be even more affected by the media equation
than adults, since they are more likely to anthropomorphize
objects and accept fictional characters as real. They also predicted
that providing social cues in interfaces that made interactions
closer to those with people would help children stay engaged
in educational activities. To test this, they replicated two classic
Nass and Reeves CASA experiments comparing groups of adults
to children aged 10 to 12. In both experiments, they measured
the impact of social language – praise in one case and treating
the participant as part of the computer’s team in another –
on users’ assessments of their own experiences playing simple
games. Surprisingly, they found that, while social language had
a positive impact on adults, it had no impact on the children.
They proposed two explanations for this: one is that children
are so affected by the media equation that this overwhelms any
difference between experimental conditions (i.e., they would have
had a positive experience regardless of the social language in the
game). The other explanation is that people who have grown up
with computers, as was the case of the child participants, are
less susceptible to the media equation than those who learned
to use computers later in life, as was the case of the adult
participants.
VOICE SEARCH IN THE CONTEXT OF
DEVELOPMENT: DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
While voice input removes mechanical obstacles to Internet
searching, such as typing and spelling, there are other
developmental factors to take into account as we consider
younger children using voice search. First, children who are able
to make themselves understood by language processing software
are still developing theory of mind skills, broadly defined as the
set of skills that allows us to understand the mental states of
others. From our own prior work (Lovato and Piper, 2015), we
know that one of the obstacles young children face when using
voice search is not fully understanding what the system can and
cannot answer (i.e., what the system knows) and how much
context to provide. For example, systems cannot usually answer
questions about the location of specific people or objects – at
least not yet – and cannot answer questions about undescribed
objects or referents it cannot see (e.g., “where was this made?”).
Understanding what someone knows is an aspect of theory of
mind that is still in development in young children (Wellman and
Liu, 2004).
Preschoolers’ trust in technology sources has been found to
be largely based on previous experience, as it is with people
(Danovitch and Alzahabi, 2013). This behavior evolves with
age, with 4- and 5-year-olds being more likely to use past
experience as a reference than 3-year-olds (Mills et al., 2011).
The imperfect ability of voice agents to understand children’s
speech, combined with the agents’ inability to ask for more
information or context, could have an impact on how much
children learn to rely on conversational agents as sources: if Siri or
Alexa misunderstands a child and responds with an answer that
doesn’t make sense, the child might lose trust in it as a source of
answers.
While the existing literature on older children’s Internet
search and perceptions of technology as information sources
seems to support the potential for younger children to use voice
search, it also points to two central lines of inquiry regarding
what happens when younger children ask questions of voice
interfaces or conversational agents. The first relates to the distinct
obstacles young children might face when using this technology
and how voice interfaces can better support children in their
developmental needs. The second, equally important question,
relates to how the particular use of language required by search
engines and conversational agents might shape how children
learn to use language to obtain information.
As mentioned, young children ask questions when they
perceive an inconsistency, or a gap, in their understanding
of the world (Tizard and Hughes, 1984; Callanan and Oakes,
1992; Chouinard et al., 2007). Chouinard et al. (2007) found
that children’s levels of persistence in question-asking are high
when they receive responses that do not contain the information
requested and low when they do receive such information,
suggesting that children really are looking for information (as
opposed to simply adult attention). In understanding young
children’s goals when asking information-seeking questions (i.e.,
filling gaps in understanding), it is important to consider what
an optimal answer would be: would a piece of information stated
in a way the child can understand suffice? Or is a conversation
indispensable?
It is possible that when children ask questions, at least some
of the time, a simple factual answer is not the best answer. When
children direct factual questions at adults, these serve as “more
knowledgeable others,” who help children advance their state of
development (Vygotsky, 1978). Parents and teachers might ask a
child why she is asking a question, or what she thinks the answer
is, scaffolding the child as she figures out the answer, partly on her
own. Through dialog, children not only develop understanding,
but also language and reasoning. Can conversational agents serve
as more knowledgeable others? Future research should consider
how child-friendly conversational agents should respond to
children’s queries for optimal child development outcomes.
There is no question that voice search and conversational
agents will continue to develop. It is not impossible for this
technology to be made more child-friendly by, for example,
learning to distinguish between child and adult voices and
responding to children in ways that are more supportive.
A system could explain what it cannot answer or request
additional information in order to respond to a query. Such
developments could encourage young children to use these
systems more frequently, in turn increasing our need to
understand how such use could impact language development
and cognitive development more broadly.
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Intelligent tutor systems (ITSs) in mobile devices take us through learning tasks and
make learning ubiquitous, autonomous, and at low cost (Nye, 2015). In this paper, we
describe guided embodiment as an ITS essential feature for second language learning
(L2) and aphasia rehabilitation (ARe) that enhances efficiency in the learning process. In
embodiment, cognitive processes, here specifically language (re)learning are grounded
in actions and gestures (Pecher and Zwaan, 2005; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Dijkstra
and Post, 2015). In order to guide users through embodiment, ITSs must track action
and gesture, and give corrective feed-back to achieve the users’ goals. Therefore, sensor
systems are essential to guided embodiment. In the next sections, we describe sensor
systems that can be implemented in ITS for guided embodiment.
Keywords: tutor systems, language instruction, aphasia therapy, intelligent tutor system, gesture production,
gesture recognition, learning
Today in L2 learning, ITSs transpose classroom activities as reading, listening, andmaking exercises
in electronic environments (Holland et al., 2013). Similarly in ARe, a virtual therapist in a tablet
helps patients in the treatment of verbal anomia by presenting pictures (Lavoie et al., 2016). Virtual
therapists do basically what a human therapist would do, i.e., they ask patients to name the pictures
presented (Brandenburg et al., 2013; Kurland et al., 2014; Szabo and Dittelman, 2014).
Both domains, L2 and ARe, still treat language a purely mentalistic process, a manipulation
of symbols in our minds (Fodor, 1976, 1983). Consequently, symbols such as written words or
pictures representing the word’s semantics are the base of main stream language educational
and rehabilitation methods. Despite this, in the last three decades, a growing number of studies
have converged to suggest that language as a cognitive capacity is grounded in our bodily
experiences in the environment, in perception and action (Lakoff, 2012; Dijkstra and Post,
2015; Borghi and Zarcone, 2016). Words are not symbols any more. Instead, they have been
described as “experience related brain networks” (Pulvermüller, 2002). Interestingly, not only
concrete but also abstract vocabulary is rooted in the body. In a comprehensive review of
neuroscientific studies, Meteyard and colleagues show that simple recognition of abstract words
elicits activity in sensorimotor brain regions (Meteyard et al., 2012). This is explained by the
fact that abstract concepts are also internalized by real experiences that in their turn are related
to the body. Take for example the word love: it is embodied because acquired from concrete
and experienced concepts, i.e., perceiving the partner physically, doing things with the partner,
and so on. All these experiences converge to a metaphorical extension which is labeled as love.
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In fact, first language acquisition is tightly connected to
sensorimotor experiences (Inkster et al., 2016; Thill and Twomey,
2016). In infancy, the body is the main vehicle that collects
experiences related to language units as nouns and verbs
(Tomasello et al., 2017). Furthermore, very early in development,
gestures make their appearance. They are precursors of spoken
language (Mattos and Hinzen, 2015) and tightly bound to it.
Language and gestures represent the two sides of the human
communicative system (Kelly et al., 2010).
In adult age, the body can be used as a tool to enhance
memory for verbal information (Zimmer, 2001). This is achieved
by performing gestures to words or phrases that are to be
memorized. The effect of gestures on memory for verbal
information has been named “enactment effect” (EE) Engelkamp
and Zimmer (1985) and “self-performed task effect” (Cohen,
1981). The EE is robust and has been extensively investigated
with different materials, tests, and populations (Von Essen and
Nilsson, 2003). In memory research, the EE effect has been
reconducted to a motor trace that the gesture leaves in words’
representations (Engelkamp, 1998).
Also, in second language learning, self-performed gestures
accompanying words enhance memory performance compared
to just reading the words and/or listening to them (Macedonia,
2014), in the short and in the long term (Macedonia and
Klimesch, 2014). In a study with functional Magnet Resonance
Imaging (fMRI), Macedonia and Mueller (2016) have shown
that passive recognition of second language words trained
with gestures activates extended sensorimotor networks. These
networks involve motor cortices and subcortical structures as
the basal ganglia, and the cerebellum. They all participate to
a large motor network. It is thus conceivable that retention
is superior because words learned with gestures might engage
procedural memory in addition to declarative memory (Nilsson
and Bäckman, 1989). Interestingly, recent studies on patients
with impaired procedural memory have demonstrated that the
patients could not take advantage of learning through gestures
(Klooster et al., 2014).
In aphasia, gestures produced by patients trying to
communicate can easily be observed. These gestures fulfill
compensatory functions (Göksun et al., 2015; Rose et al.,
2016) if the patients’ language is impoverished or omitted
(Pritchard et al., 2015). However, because of the high variance
in lesion patterns, age of the patients, patho-linguistic profile,
intensity of intervention, etc., studies employing gestures and
studies employing other therapeutic instruments are difficult
to compare. Hence, effects of gestures on rehabilitation can be
diverging (Kroenke et al., 2013). Main stream aphasia therapy
is still constrained to the verbal modality and bans gestures as
tool that might help to restore language networks (Pulvermüller,
2002). Nevertheless, a growing number of studies show that
action and gesture can help support the missing side of the
communicative coin (Rose, 2013). Whereas simple observation
of action has a positive impact on word recovery (Bonifazi
et al., 2013), observation followed by execution of action leads
to better recovery results (Marangolo and Caltagirone, 2014).
These studies pave the way for a novel understanding of aphasia
therapy in which the body helps the mind to regain language
functions, as long as brain structures serving procedural memory
are not compromised (Klooster et al., 2014).
This is to say that humans need the body to acquire first
language, to support memory for verbal information, to learn a
second language, and to reacquire language functions disrupted
by brain lesions. At this point, a core issue is to stress that
embodiment of language needs active experience. In enactment
research, it has long been known that it is not enough to observe
gestures and actions, one must perform them (Cohen, 1981;
Engelkamp et al., 1994).When interacting with an ITS, the user is
first presented with the language to be trained and the gestures to
be performed. Thereafter, the user must perform the actions and
the gestures. Monitoring can make action performance accurate
in execution. Thus, one component of the ITS must detect
motion and gesture, compare it with a template and give feed-
back on execution accuracy. Execution monitoring needs sensor
systems.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR GESTURE
PERFORMANCE MONITORING
Guided embodiment requires an interaction between ITS and
user: A gesture representing a concept is performed by an ITS
avatar. The user observes the gesture and imitates it. The user’s
gesture must be sensed during performance. Performance is
evaluated by the system on the base of a template. Visual, auditory
and or tactile feedback is given by the ITS (please see Figure 1).
Audio-Visual Gesture Presentation (AVGP)
First, a written word is presented to the user on a display
simultaneously with a video in which an actor performs a
representational gesture. The gesture can be presented by a
human through a video or by an avatar, or an agent (Bergmann,
FIGURE 1 | Embodiment interaction model.
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2015). Synchronously, an audio file of the word is played via
loudspeaker.
Motion Capturing
Motion is the change of body position in time. Motion
capturing occurs as a two-phases process. First, a single motion
is sensed generating data (motion sensing) (Moeslund et al.,
2006). Secondly, the data are sampled (motion sampling) and
sequenced in time into a movement path, a so-called motion
trajectory model. Depending on the location of the sensors
used to detect the motion, Motion capturing can be subdivided
into two categories: infrastructure based or through wearables.
Infrastructure-based systems rely on hardware that is rigidly
mounted inside a room as high-speed infrared cameras in a gait
analysis laboratory, or sensors in a blue screen environment.
Infrastructure based systems use sensors with high power
consumption.
Systems based on microwave, ultrasonic or radar sensors
operate by emitting electromagnetic or sonic waves and sensing
the echo received. Depending on the purpose of motion
capturing, sensor technologies can vary. For example, ultrasonic
motion detection is quite common in prenatal diagnostics
(Birnholz et al., 1978). For remote vital sign detection radar-based
motion detection is frequently used (Lubecke et al., 2002).
Vision-based systems (VBS), including single camera,
multiple cameras, and depth camera systems, play the most
important role in human motion capture. Sensors detect light
which can be visible or invisible to the human eye which is
emitted or reflected by the body or an object (Moeslund et al.,
2006).
Single camera-based motion detection systems are present
in notebooks, tablets, and mobiles. Although these systems often
have a high-quality resolution, they operate with a single camera.
A single camera cannot capture the motion of body parts that
are occluded by other body parts. This results in an inaccurate or
incomplete analysis of the motion.
Multiple camera systems with two or more cameras allow
3D capturing. Algorithms combining 2D images from the
cameras calculate a 3D-resolution (Aggarwal and Cai, 1997; Cai
and Aggarwal, 1999). In the 3D-resolution, the synchronized
recordings are combined. The combination includes the
positions of the cameras relative to each other and their angles of
view. Multiple camera systems are used in rigid mounted setups,
in laboratories or dedicated rooms for example in rehabilitation
(gait analysis), and sports (motion analysis).
Depth cameras sense 3D-information by means of infrared
light. They calculate the distance between the camera and a body
in two ways. They project an invisible grid onto the scenery and
sense the grid’s deformations. Alternatively, they measure the
distance to the scenery and they calculate the transfer time of the
infrared light from the camera to the object. This second kind
of depth camera is also called “Time-of-flight”-camera (ToF)
(Barnachon et al., 2014; Cunha et al., 2016; Garn et al., 2016).
Depth camera systems with a single device do not overcome
the problem of occluded parts (Han et al., 2013). However, they
have an advantage: they provide information about the distance
of each object or body within the camera’s view relative to the
camera’s position. These systems do not rely on heuristics about
proportions of the object in order to determine its distance. This
information increases accuracy in calculating the position of a
human body or object.
Wearables are sensors worn on the body. They are light-
weighted and have low power consumption. They are often used
in sports (Roetenberg et al., 2013). Among wearables, we find
inertial measurement units (IMUs) and sensing textiles.
Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) are small electronic
devices that measure acceleration, angular changes and changes
in themagnetic field surrounding the body or object (Roetenberg,
2006; Shkel, 2011). If the starting position is known, an
approximate position at time t is can be calculated by
implementing the changes in forces, angles and magnetic field
from the starting position up to t. IMUs differ from camera-
based systems: while the latter measure the absolute position of
the body at every time point t, IMUs acquire a starting position
and the movement’s sequence.
IMUs are integrated into wearable objects and respond
on minimal deviations of the sensors by showing a drift.
This drift can sum up to false positions over time. Fusion
algorithms combining filtering and validation of sensor are used
to compensate, respectively minimize drifts values (Luinge and
Veltink, 2005; Sabatini, 2011; Roetenberg et al., 2013).
Sensing textiles represent a novel way of capturing motion.
They consist of fabrics containing enwoven pressure sensitive
fibers. These fibers change their electric resistance depending on
the pressure changes that they sense (Mazzoldi et al., 2002; Parzer
et al., 2016). Clothes tailored with these fabrics enable to calculate
movements of the body in a fine-grained way (Parzer et al., 2016).
The choice of the adequate type of motion sensing technology
depends on the application domain. In our case, sensing of
human body movements for an ITS can be accomplished with
four sensor technologies: camera, depth-camera, IMUs, and
sensing textiles.
Vision-based systems (VBS) take pictures over time and
analyze them in order to detect body parts. Thereafter, VBS
transform the detected body parts into digital representations,
into human body models. Common models are skeletal, joint-
based (Badler and Smoliar, 1979; Han et al., 2017), and mesh-
based (de Aguiar et al., 2007). For an overview and classification
of the major techniques used for sampling 3D data, please see
Aggarwal and Xia (2014).
Additionally, VBS can increase the accuracy of the human
body model by markers as light-emitting diodes, passive
reflectors or patterns. These markers are fixed on pre-defined
body parts and map them to the according representation
within the model. Marker-less systems use heuristics about
shapes, dimensions, and relations between body parts
estimating and calculating the model according to these
constraints.
Body data are sampled and thereafter transferred into a digital
form in constant periods of time. This is done in order to obtain
the motion trajectory model needed. It represents the body parts
and their changes in posture over the time of recording (Poppe,
2010). Hence, motion sampling results in a motion trajectory
model.
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TABLE 1 | Evaluation of sensor technologies.
Single
camera
Multiple
cameras
Depth
camera
Sensing
textiles
IMUs
Accuracy 0 ++ + ++ 0
Setup ++ + + ++ +
Mobility + + + ++ ++
Size + + 0 ++ +
0, moderately fulfilling the users’ requirements; +, fulfilling the requirements; ++, fulfilling
the requirements very well.
Gesture (and Audio) Analysis
In the literature, different approaches for matching motion
trajectory models are discussed. Kollorz et al. (2008) ground their
model on projections of image depth. Mitra and Acharya (2007)
describe the use of hidden Markov models (Rabiner and Juang,
1986), finite-state machines (Marvin, 1967) and, neural networks
(Lippmann, 1987). Other authors use a support-vector machine-
based approach (Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000; Schuldt
et al., 2004; Miranda et al., 2014). A template-based method
for matching motion has been developed by Müller and Röder
(2006). Stiefmeier et al. (2007) convert the motion trajectory
model into strings of symbols. This is done in order to apply
string matching algorithms that are faster in running analyses.
Detailed reviews on vision-based human motion recognition
methods are provided by Poppe (2010) and Weinland et al.
(2011).
Embodiment-based ITS employed in language learning and
rehabilitation need real-time processing of sensed gestures
because of the immediate feedback on gesture accuracy that users
need (Ganapathi et al., 2010).
Accuracy in sound reproduction is an important issue in both,
second language learning and aphasia rehabilitation. Language
output by the user is recorded and analyzed by different methods
(Rabiner and Juang, 1993). Recent approaches employ complex
models as neural networks for speech recognition (Hinton et al.,
2012; Graves et al., 2013).
After a match between the sensed gesture or the voice and
the template within the representing motion trajectory model has
occurred, feedback can follow. It can be visual via the display,
acoustical with sound through a speaker (built-in or external),
and tactorial by means of a vibration given by the device.
Feedback can be simple (i.e., a sound or synthesized speech).
Evaluation of Sensor Technologies
In order to give an overview of the sensor technologies
presented in the preceding sections, we created Table 1. It
describes the degree of following characteristics: accuracy in
motion sensing, ease of set up for an expert, mobility and
size. Note that the description is done for the use of a
professional (lab technician) and for an institution (language
school or hospital). We do not consider ITS software, software
processes, and design patterns, or aspects of user-interface
design. For further reading, please see (Oppermann, 2002;
Dillon, 2003; Carroll, 2006; Smith-Atakan, 2006; Preece et al.,
2015).
In this paper, we describe two application domains for
ITS following principles of guided embodiment: language
(re-)learning and aphasia rehabilitation. So far, we have focused
on the possible use of the ITS in an institution (school vs.
hospital). However, considering that language learning and
rehabilitation need massed practice (Pulvermüller et al., 2001;
Kurland et al., 2014), ITS should accompany users during the
learning task in their homes. Sensing textiles can represent an
emerging field in guided embodiment for language learning
and aphasia rehabilitation. A learning t-shirt could combine a
few advantages: high accuracy in sensing motion, ease of use
and possible vibration feedback. However, to our knowledge
no such system is present to date on the market, even as a
prototype.
To present, only single camera systems present in tablets
and mobile phones are affordable and easy to use. Also,
nearly everyone has an own device. Because of their size,
single camera systems can be carried where users need them.
Despite the fact that presently single cameras are not very
accurate in motion capturing as described in the preceding
section, they might become the instruments used in a near
future.
Altogether, this brief overview highlights the fact that
guided embodiment of language could be the way to enhance
performance in learning and rehabilitation. However, more
research in the field is needed.
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